



**PREPORUKE ZA  
SIGURNOSNU POLITIKU  
EU TEMELJEM ISKUSTVA  
IZGRADNJE MIRA  
DRŽAVA NASTALIH  
DEZINTEGRACIJOM  
JUGOSLAVIJE**

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
EU SECURITY POLICY  
BASED ON PEACE BUILDING  
EXPERIENCE FROM  
COUNTRIES FORMED BY  
THE DISINTEGRATION  
OF YUGOSLAVIA

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# UVOD

LANA VEGO  
GORDAN BOSANAC

CENTAR ZA MIROVNE  
STUDIJE

Pred vama je publikacija koja je nastala kao pokušaj prikupljanja i artikuliranja bazi nog (ili popularno zvanog *grass root*) iskustva izgradnje mira na području bivše Jugoslavije te formuliranja i oblikovanja tih iskustava u preporuke za sigurnosnu politiku na razini Europske unije.

Centar za mirovne studije polazi od stava da se države nastale raspadom Jugoslavije, jednom kada postanu punopravne članice Europske unije, ujedno biti i jedine države članice s nedavnom ratnom prošlošću i direktnim iskustvom u izgradnji mira. Na taj način, otvara se mogućnost "iskorištavanja" ratne prošlosti i korištenje iste kroz naučne lekcije, kroz dobra ili loša iskustva, kroz pokušaje i pogreške, za učenje na vlastitoj koži o izgradnji mira te formuliranje iskustva za doprinose sigurnosnoj politici. Jednako tako, na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije dominira proces priključivanja država nastalih raspadom Jugoslavije u Europsku uniju i taj proces se najčešće doživljava kao jednosmjernan – države kandidatkinje reformiraju svoja zakonodavstva, ali i političke prakse sukladno uvjetima Europske unije što je važan proces koji doprinosi demokratizaciji i stabilizaciji regije. Istovremeno, države kandidatkinje moraju biti svjesne svojih potencijala kojima se u konačnici obogatiti i pridonijeti Europskoj uniji. U tom smislu, negativno iskustvo rata paradoksalno postaje potencijal kojim naša iskustva direktne izgradnje mira možemo prekriti u sigurnosnu politiku EU kako bi zajedno radili na prevencijama sukoba. Ova publikacija jedan je mali pokušaj da se proces priključivanja uini dvosmjernim.

Na pojam mira gledamo puno šire od odsudstva oružanog sukoba između dvije zarađene strane te spuštanje oružja u sukobu ne znači nastupanje mira, a pogotovo ne održivog mira. Tako i pojam izgradnje mira ima vrlo široko značenje, zbog kojeg često nailazi na različite i kontradiktorne interpretacije. Izgradnja mira mogu biti procesi koji se odvijaju nakon završetka nasilnog sukoba, a odnose se na širok raspon aktivnosti kao što su: izgradnja kapaciteta, pomirenja i socijalna transformacija. Ovako shvaćena izgradnja mira je faza koja nastupa nakon završetka oružanog sukoba. Nešto širi koncept izgradnje mira obuhvaća inženjeringa koja dovodi do završetka sukoba, tj. do uspostave mira, a zatim i do nastojanja za održavanjem mira. Tako se i rana upozorenja, prevencija nasilja, zagovaranja aktivnosti, civilno i vojno održa-

# INTRODUCTION

LANA VEGO  
GORDAN BOSANAC

CENTRE FOR PEACE  
STUDIES

The publication before you is a result of an attempt to collect and articulate basic (or so called *grass root*) experiences in peace building on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and to formulate and shape those experiences into recommendations for EU security policy.

Our primary standpoint is that, once the countries formed after the disintegration of Yugoslavia have become full members of the European Union, they will be the only member states with recent war past and with direct experience in peace building. This opens the possibility to "exploit" and use their war past through lessons learned, good or bad experiences, attempts and mistakes, in order to learn from our own experiences in peace building and to formulate this experience into contribution to security policy. Now, the countries formed after the disintegration of Yugoslavia are going through the process of accession to the European Union. This process is seen as moving mostly in one direction – candidate countries need to reform their legislation and political practices to fit the requirements of the European Union, which is a very important process that contributes to democratization and stabilization of the region. At the same time, candidate countries need to be aware of their potential to enrich the European Union by making their own contribution. In this sense, paradoxically, the negative experience of war becomes an opportunity to embed our direct peace building experiences into EU security policy, and thus work together toward conflict prevention. This publication represents a small attempt to make this one-way process a two-way one.

In our opinion, the notion of peace encompasses much more than the absence of armed conflict between two sides at war with each other, and the mere lowering of weapons in a conflict does not imply the beginning of peace, especially not sustainable peace. The notion of peace has a broad meaning which often causes wrong and contradictory interpretations. Peace building implies those processes which take place after the end of a violent conflict and include a wide array of activities, such as capacity building, establishing truce, and social transformation. This kind of peace building represents a phase that follows the end of an armed conflict. A somewhat broader peace building concept encompasses all the activities that lead to the end of a

vanje mira, vojna intervencija i humanitarna pomoć svrstavaju pod aktivnosti izgradnje mira.

Uz namjerno naglašavanje širine pojma izgradnje mira važno je spomenuti i promjene u samom karakteru sukoba. Danas su rijetki sukobi između država - država protiv države - veći je broj onih sukoba koji buknu unutar granica određene države, a koji imaju toliko razorno djelovanje da tek kada sukob završi, u smislu zaustavljanja fizičkog nasilja, započinje "pravi posao" usmjeren na dugotrajno, uporno i sistematizirano djelovanje u izgradnji potpuno (fizički) razrušenih zajednica i izgradnji uništenih međuljudskih odnosa. U tom kontekstu izgradnja mira je relativno novi pojam s kojim smo se nedavno, nažalost, počeli baviti i to ne ponukani pukom znanstvenom znatiželjom, već direktnim iskustvom rata. Također, zadnjih nekoliko godina oružani sukobi dobili su novu dimenziju razumijevanja terorizma kao pojave na koju reagiraju vojne strukture pojedine države. Dok bi se terorizmom primarno trebale baviti policijsko-obavještajne snage, trend je da se na terorističke napade odgovara vojnom infrastrukturom. Na taj način se izgubila granica podjele poslova i ovlasti između vojske, policije i obavještajne zajednice. Takav kontekst nameće nove oblike eskalacije nasilja i povreda ljudskih prava, no u biti je to nevažno za samu izgradnju mira, koja i u novonastalim okolnostima ima jednake stare ciljeve: rad na smanjenju društvene nepravde, rad na transformaciji i rješavanju sukoba. Zbog toga, izgradnja mira jednako je važna danas za sve nas kao što je bila važna i početkom rata na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Iako sukob u Jugoslaviji nije imao karakteristike današnjih novonastalih sukoba, zasigurno i dalje može poslužiti kao mjesto iz kojega se mogu naučiti važne lekcije o smanjenju nasilja.

Ova publikacija u središte stavlja *grass root* iskustva izgradnje mira i na temelju njih artikuliра preporuke za sigurnosne politike. Pod *grass root* iskustvima podrazumijevamo sva ona nastojanja na području bivše Jugoslavije koja kreću od pojedinca ili organizirane grupe pojedinaca u ratnoj ili postratnoj zajednici kojoj su potrebni osnaživanje i rekonstrukcija porušenih društvenih odnosa. Podrazumijevamo aktivnosti koje nisu rezultat političke odluke, one nisu dio šire strategije izgradnje mira koje su države na ovim prostorima pokušale implementirati, a nisu ni dio nastojanja međunarodne zajednice u sprečavanju sukoba. One su proizašle od pojedinaca koji najčešće nisu profesionalci/ke s iskustvom, od ljudi koji su se zatekli u krvavom sukobu koji je ostavio krajnje razorne posljedice, od ljudi koji su imali nezatamljivu potrebu djelovanja i koji su imali hrabrost i ideju za akcijom, koju možda tada sami nisu ovako definirali. **Ti ljudi i njihova iskustva čine neiskorišteni i nedovoljno priznat kapacitet za lokalne, ali i regionalne i europske sigurnosne politike. Vjerujemo da ta iskustva u sebi kriju ogroman potencijal da budu pretočena u globalne sigurnosne politike, i to je jedan od razloga za ovu publikaciju.** Iskustva ljudi u razrušenim sredinama po Bosni i Hercegovini, Srbiji, Kosovu, Crnoj Gori i Hrvatskoj mogli bi sa injavati temelj na kojem gradimo svaku politiku koja se odnosi na razvoj sigurnosti, ekonomske održivosti i bilo kojeg aspekta u okviru ljudske sigurnosti.

conflict, i.e. the restoration of peace, and than all the efforts to maintain that peace. Thus early warnings, prevention of violence, advocacy, civic and military preservation of peace, military intervention and humanitarian aid are all considered to be peace building activities.

Besides stressing the broad meaning of the notion of peace building, it is also important to mention the changes in the very nature of conflict. Conflicts between two states – state against state - are very rare today, there is a far greater number of those conflicts that appear within the boundaries of a particular state and which have extremely destructive effect. Only after the end of the conflict in the sense of physical violence does the 'real work' begin: persistent and systematic efforts towards rebuilding completely (physically) destroyed communities and human relationships. In this context, peace building becomes a relatively new notion in which we have lately become actively engaged, not out of pure scientific curiosity, but, unfortunately, by direct experience of war. In the last several years, armed conflicts added a new dimension to the perception of terrorism as an occurrence to which military structures of a state react. While terrorism should primarily belong to the province of police intelligence, the use of military infrastructure has become a popular response to terrorist attacks. This has led to the loss of clear line dividing the responsibilities and jurisdictions of military, police and intelligence. This context imposes new forms of escalations of violence and of violating human rights, but that is in fact irrelevant for peace building itself, which, in the newly formed circumstances, still possesses the same old goals: working towards decreasing social injustice and towards transforming and solving conflicts. For this reason, peace building today is equally important to us as it was on the territory of the former Yugoslavia when the war began. Although the conflict in Yugoslavia was different from present day conflicts, still it may serve as an important source of valuable lessons in decreasing violence.

This publication places grass root experiences in peace building in the centre and uses those experiences to articulate recommendations for security policies. When we talk about grass root experiences, we talk about all the activities on the territory of the former Yugoslavia coming from an individual or an organized group of individuals in a war or post-war community that requires strengthening and reconstruction of its broken social relations. By that, we imply those activities that are not the result of a political decision or part of a broader peace building strategy composed by states from this region, nor do they belong to the attempts of international community to stop conflicts. The sources of these activities are individuals who are rarely experienced professionals; people caught in a bloody and extremely destructive conflict who felt a strong need to act and had courage and ideas enough to do it. **These people and their experiences represent unrecognized and neglected capacity for local, regional and European security policies. We believe that those experiences hide a great potential to become part of global security policies, which is, in a way, a reason for putting together**

Publikacija ispunjava dvije svrhe. Kao prvo služi kao dokument, kao zapis prošlosti o aktivnostima različitih aktera u izgradnji mira. Da bi bilo moguće inkorporirati iskustva u sigurnosnu politiku, potrebno je prikupiti, dokumentirati i artikulirati izgradnju mira na ovim prostorima. Kroz istraživanje za ovu publikaciju, kao i kroz diskusije na okruglim stolovima u okviru ovog projekta, esto je primjevano određenih nedostatak nastojanja baš u prikupljanju i artikulaciji aktivnosti. Zbog ograničenog prostora te protoka i nedostatka vremena nemoguće je obuhvatiti sva vrijedna i utjecajna iskustva te smo itekako svjesni nesavršenosti publikacije u tom kontekstu. S druge strane, posebnost i vrijednost ove publikacije je baš u artikuliranju pobrojanih iskustava u preporuke za sigurnosnu politiku, u promišljanjima samih aktivistkinja o kontekstu Europske unije i formiranju Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike u odnosu na Balkan, u načinima integracije mirovnog iskustva u politiku, u živim debatama koje su se razvile na sva tri okrugla stola, u kritičkom razmišljanju i samom mirovnom djelovanju.

## O PROJEKTU I NASTANKU PUBLIKACIJE

U prvom dijelu publikacije donosimo autorske tekstove prikupljene kroz javni poziv za dostavu radova na temu "Kako EU može učiniti iz ratnog i postratnog iskustva izgradnje mira na Balkanu". U drugom dijelu publikacije nalaze se dijelovi rasprave sa tri održana okrugla stola tijekom kojih smo pokušali okupiti relevantne aktere u izgradnji mira na Balkanu kao i kreatore sigurnosne politike iz regije:

/ Prvi okrugli stol bio je na temu "Iskustva ratne prošlosti i naučene lekcije: mirna reintegracija" oko koje su se okupili pojedinci koji su bili direktni sudionici procesa mirne reintegracije istočne Slavonije i Podunavlja kojom je Republika Hrvatska ostvarila civilnu vlast nad cjelokupnim državnim teritorijem bez ijednog ispaljenog metka, bez ljudskih žrtava i bez povreda humanitarnog prava. Smatramo da je taj događaj zanemaren i nedovoljno vidljiv u javnosti te nikada iskorišten u evaluacijama naučenih lekcija.

/ Na drugom okruglom stolu "Grass root iskustva izgradnje mira" bilo je riječi o različitim iskustvima i formama izgradnje mira, od rada u podijeljenim zajednicama, do direktnog rada s lokalnim stanovništvom, osnaživanjem žena, umjetničkiim formama koje se bave osjetljivim temama, mirovnog obrazovanja, rada s izbjeglicama i sl.

/ Kroz treći okrugli stol "Sigurnosna politika izgradnje mira u državama bivše Jugoslavije" pokušali smo artikulirati širi sigurnosni koncept izgradnje mira, ljudsku sigurnost te kroz sagledavanja uzroka sukoba artikulirati modele ranih upozorenja.

U trećem i zadnjem dijelu publikacije nabrojane su preporuke koje su sistematizirane iz radova i iz diskusija s okruglih stolova. Neke od preporuka već su poznate i integrirane u sigurnosnu politiku, ali držimo kako ih je bitno još jednom naglasiti jer dolaze iz pozicije onih koji su se vlastitim radom u oružanom sukobu uvjerali kako pojedini mehanizmi izgradnje mira dobro ili loše funkcioniraju. Ostale preporuke, koliko god se čine specifičnije, mogu biti veliki potencijal i inspiracija za kreatore sigurnosne politike, kako u Europskoj uniji tako i u ostalim dijelovima svijeta.

**this publication.** Experiences of people in devastated places throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Croatia could be the foundation upon which we would build any policy referring to the development of security, economic sustainability or any other aspect of human security.

This publication has two purposes. First – it serves as a document, the record of past peace building activities. In order to successfully incorporate those experiences into security policy, it is necessary to gather, document and articulate peace building activities in this region. Research and various round table discussions that were part of this project often revealed a certain lack of effort to gather and articulate those activities. Due to restrictions of space and time, it is impossible to cover all the valuable and important experiences, and we are highly aware of the inadequacy of this type of publication in that context. On the other hand, the unique value of this publication lies exactly in forming the enumerated experiences into recommendations for security policy, in activists' discussions of the context of the European Union and of creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy in relation to the Balkans, in the ways of integrating peace building experiences into policies, in live debates developing at round tables, in critical thinking and in peace activism itself.

## ABOUT THE PROJECT AND MAKING OF THE PUBLICATION

In the first part of the publication we edited papers received from a public call for papers on the topic: "How can EU learn from peace building experiences in the Balkans during and after the war." The second part of the publication contains excerpts from three round table discussions through which we tried to gather relevant peace building activists and creators of the security policy in the region:

/ The topic at the first round table was: "Wartime experiences and lessons learned: peaceful reintegration". This table gathered individuals who had directly participated in the process of peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonija and Podunavlje through which the Republic of Croatia established civil authority over its entire territory without firing a single bullet, without human casualties and without violating human rights. We see this event as neglected, insufficiently known to the public and never used in the evaluation of lessons learned.

/ At the second round table "Grass root experience in peace building process" discussion revolved around various experiences and forms of peace building: working in divided communities, working directly with the locals, empowering women, art forms dealing with sensitive issues, peace education, working with refugees, etc.

/ At the third round table "Peace building security policy in ex-Yugoslavia countries" we tried to articulate a broader security concept of peace building, human safety and, by analyzing the causes of conflicts, the patterns of early warnings.

Na kraju želimo se zahvaliti svima koji su pridonijeli nastanku ove publikacije kroz okrugle stolove i pisanje tekstova. Vaša iskustva i stavovi važni su i vrijedni. Posebnu zahvalu dugujemo i našem partneru Zaklada Heinrich Böll - Europska unija. Nadamo se kako će ova publikacija naći svoj prostor ne samo u politici, već i u akademskim i aktivističkim krugovima te da će u konačnici doprinijeti miru.

In the third and last part we tried to systematize the recommendations articulated through the papers and the round table discussions. Some of the recommendations are already known and integrated in the security policy, but we think it is important to stress them again because they come from those who have come to know those peace building mechanisms directly, in an armed conflict and by working with them, and thus possess the immediate knowledge of their quality. Other recommendations, as specific as they seem, can represent a great potential and inspiration for the creators of security policy in the European Union and across the world.

In the end, we want to thank everybody who contributed to the making of this publication both through round tables and through papers. Your experiences and opinions are very important and valuable. We are especially indebted to our partners from Heinrich Böll Stiftung European Union. We hope this publication will find its place not only in political, but also in activist and academic circles, and thus make its own contribution to peace.



## 2

## RADOVI / PAPERS

# HRVATSKA KAO BALKANSKI TEMELJ STABILNOSTI I ZAJEDNI KA VANJSKA I SIGURNOSNA POLITIKA (CFSP)

AUTORICA:  
**MONIKA BEGOVIĆ**

MONIKA BEGOVIĆ MAGISTRIRALA JE ME UNARODNE ODNOSNE  
NA FAKULTETU POLITI KIH ZNANOSTI U ZAGREBU NA TEMU:  
*UTJECAJ AMERIČKE VANJSKE POLITIKE NA EUROPSKU SIGURNOST,*  
A TRENUTA NO JE U PRIPREMI DOKTORSKE DISERTACIJE NA  
DOKTORSKOM STUDIJU HRVATSKA I EUROPA PRI FAKULTETU POLITI KIH  
ZNANOSTI U ZAGREBU NA TEMU: *SIGURNOSNE BENEFICIJE ČLANSTVA*  
*HRVATSKE U NATO I EU.* ZAPOSLENA JE U DIPLOMATSKOM UREDU ZA  
VEZU ME UNARODNOG KAZNENOG SUDA ZA BIVŠU JUGOSLAVIJU U  
ZAGREBU.

## SAŽETAK

Medijski su napisali esto puni spekulacija oko toga što Hrvatska, ali i zemlje regije, dobivaju ulaskom u Europsku uniju, na ekonomskom, sigurnosnom te političkom nivou. Injenica što Europska unija dobiva u članjenjem zemalja bivše Jugoslavije, posebice iz njihova postratnog iskustva izgradnje mira i stabilne svakodnevice u svim aspektima javnog života, ne razmatra se dovoljno ozbiljno.

Zemlje Zapadnog Balkana, kako se prema izvedenici Europske unije nazivaju zemlje bivše Jugoslavije, isključivo Slovenije, a uključivo Albanije, u svojoj i bližoj i daljoj povijesti nose niz iskustava. Ratom obojani događaji 90-ih godina nisu bili pohvalna točka u brzom, pravovremenom i tako potrebitom djelovanju Europske unije. Europljani su, naime, 90-ih bili potpuno nespripremljeni u rješavanju pitanja međunarodnog mira i sigurnosti, što je urodilo posljedicom izbijanja ratova. Europske su se zemlje tek u tim trenucima počele okretati ka ozbiljnijoj izgradnji Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike (ZVSP), što i dalje nije bilo dovoljno da sukobe sprijechi odmah po izbijanju. Niti Ugovor o Europskoj uniji, koji je formirao Uniju podijelivši je na tri stupa, a od kojih je jedan tvorila ZVSP, kao simbol jedinstvene političke volje svih europskih zemalja, nije donio konkretnu i efikasnu politiku Europske unije prema zemljama Zapadnog Balkana.

Zbog svoje povijesti ta je regija specifična u procesu europeizacije u odnosu na države Srednje i Istočne Europe te bi Europska unija trebala prilagoditi

# CROATIA AS A PILLAR OF BALKAN STABILITY AND THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)

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## SUMMARY

Media articles are often full of speculations about what Croatia, as well as the countries of the region, will gain by entering the European Union, on economic, security and political level. However, what the European Union will gain by the accession of the countries of ex-Yugoslavia, especially by their post-war experience of peace-building and stable everyday life in all aspects of public life, is not considered seriously enough.

The Western Balkans countries, as are according to the European Union called the countries of ex-Yugoslavia, excluding Slovenia and including Albania, carry many experiences in their recent and older past. The war-stained events of the '90s were not a commendable point in quick, timely and much needed action of the European Union. Namely, in the '90s the Europeans were completely unprepared for dealing with the questions of international peace and security, which resulted in the outbreaks of wars. It is only at that time that the European countries started to turn to serious building of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was still not enough to prevent conflicts immediately after their outbreaks. Not even the Treaty on European Union, which created the Union based on three pillars, one of which was the CFSP, did bring a concrete and efficient policy of the European Union towards the Western Balkans countries.

usmjerenje posebice ZVSP-a prema potrebama još uvijek nedovoljno stabilnog područja, poglavito u novoj, Reformskim ugovorom nastaloj konstrukciji. U takvim joj je nastojanjima bitno ono što će te zemlje u članjenjem unijeti u Uniju, kako bi se aspekt suočavanja s prošlošću i daljnje prevencije sukoba razmotrili iz ozbiljnije perspektive. Europska unija u Hrvatskoj tako vidi glavni faktor stabilnosti u regiji, čime postavlja uporište u regiji kao usmjerenje ZVSP-u.

### UKRATKO O RAZVOJU CFSP-A

Jedinstveni europski akt iz 1985. godine, kojime se usvaja procedura političke suradnje europskih zemalja, daje Europskoj politici koja suradnji (*European Political Cooperation*) službeni okvir. Naime, Europska politička suradnja smatra se pretečom Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike – ZVSP-a (*Common Foreign and Security Policy* - CFSP), a unutar nje su se rješavali vanjskopolitički odnosi Europske zajednice, s ciljem usklađivanja vanjske politike zemalja članica Europske zajednice.

U to vrijeme hladnog rata međunarodni su odnosi bili obilježeni napetim odnosima između dviju supersila – SAD-a i SSSR-a te nisu dopuštali intenzivniji razvoj političke suradnje zemalja članice Europske unije. Krah bipolarnih odnosa pokazao je pak nespremnost Europe jer su nedostajali zajednički stavovi zemalja članica, ali i institucionalne podloge te instrumenti. To se posebno očitovalo tijekom promjena koje su se počinjale na europskom prostoru, a koje su bile globalno uzrokovane novim svjetskim poretkom, raspadom SSSR-a te nacionalnim previranjima na Zapadnom Balkanu, dok se istovremeno vodio i Zaljevski rat. Europljani su bili vrlo nespremni u rješavanju pitanja važnih za međunarodni mir i sigurnost, što su iskoristile Sjedinjene Američke Države preuzimajući ulogu tzv. svjetskog policajca, stremeći pritom ideji da se europska sigurnosna arhitektura temelji samo na NATO-u. Unatoč tome, europske zemlje počinjale su se okretati k osnutku zajedničke politike, ali i dalje podijeljene u različitim gledištima: Britanci i Francuzi su nastavili zastupati stajalište kako bi sigurnosna politika trebala ostati unutar nacionalnih politika, jer europski okvir još uvijek nije bio dovoljno jak za to, dok su, s druge strane, Nijemci i zemlje Beneluksa zastupali stajalište da bi se obrambena sfera trebala prebaciti u domenu Europske zajednice.

Uslijedio je obrat na konferenciji u Maastrichtu kada je napravljen kompromis među različitim stajalištima. Poznati Ugovor o Europskoj uniji (ratifikacija Ugovora - 1993.) formirao je Uniju baziranu na tri stupa (javne politike, ZVSP i sudstvo), od kojih je jedan tvorila ZVSP, kao simbol jedinstvene političke volje svih europskih zemalja. Ugovor je jamčio da će zajednička obrambena politika biti razvijena kao integralni dio zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cameron, Fraser, 1999, *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future*, Sheffield, Academic Press (p.37)

Due to its history, this region has a specific position in the process of Europeanization when compared to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the European Union should, especially in the new construction set up by the Reform Treaty, adjust its direction, especially of the CFSP, towards the needs of a still insufficiently stable area. In such efforts, what those countries will bring with their membership is important for the Union, so as to examine the aspects of dealing with the past and further prevention of conflicts from a more serious perspective. The European Union thus sees Croatia as the main pillar of stability in the region, thereby setting a stronghold in the region as the direction of the CFSP.

### BRIEFLY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CFSP

The Single European Act from 1985, which adopted the political cooperation procedure of the European countries, provided official framework for the European Political Cooperation. Namely, the European Political Cooperation is considered as a forerunner of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and it dealt with foreign relations of the European Community, with the aim of creating a common approach to foreign policy of the European Community Member States.

During that time of Cold War, the international relations were marked by tense relations between two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, and they did not allow for a more intensive development of political cooperation between the European Union Member States. However, the collapse of bipolar relations revealed the unpreparedness of Europe, because there was a lack of common positions of the Member States, as well as institutional background and instruments. This was especially made obvious during the changes that started to take place on the European territory, and which were globally caused by the new world order, the dissolution of the USSR and national turmoils in the Western Balkans, while at the same time the Gulf War emerged. The Europeans were very much unprepared for dealing with questions important for international peace and security, and the USA took advantage of that fact by becoming the so-called world's policeman, and having thereby aspiration to base the European security architecture only upon NATO. However, the European countries started to turn to the establishment of common policy, although still divided in principle positions: the British and the French still held the view that the security policy should remain within national policies, because the European framework was still not strong enough for it, while, on the other hand, the Germans and the Benelux countries held the view that the defence sphere should be transferred to the domain of the European Community.

A shift took place at the conference in Maastricht when a compromise between different views had been made. The famous Treaty on European Union (ratified in 1993) created the Union based on three pillars (public policies, CFSP and judiciary), one of which was the CFSP, as a symbol of undivided political will of all European countries. The treaty guaranteed the

Maastricht je bio prekretnica u nastojanjima Europljana da pojačaju svoje zajedništvo. Poznato je da je Maastrichtski ugovor stvorio Europsku uniju s trojkom strukturom koja se predložuje kao grčki hram na tri stupa: prvi stup – tri europske zajednice; drugi stup – Zajednička vanjska i sigurnosna politika (ZVSP); a treći – suradnja država u pravosuđu i unutarnjim poslovima (*Justice and Home Affairs*).<sup>2</sup>

U Maastrichtskom ugovoru utvrđeni su i ciljevi ZVSP-a, od kojih su, u ovome kontekstu, najbitniji: o čuvanje mira i jačanje međunarodne sigurnosti te čuvanje zajedničkih vrijednosti, temeljnih interesa i neovisnosti Unije. Prema Ugovoru, suradnja podrazumijeva da se zemlje članice međusobno informiraju i savjetuju o svakom pitanju koje je od općeg značaja u kontekstu vanjske politike i zajedničke sigurnosti. Maastrichtskim ugovorom o Europskoj uniji odlučeno je i da EU ima pravo zahtijevati od Zapadnoeuropske unije (*Western European Union* – WEU) implementaciju odluka i akcija CFSP-a, koji se tiču obrambene politike.<sup>3</sup> Članak J.4<sup>4</sup> Maastrichtskog ugovora nalagao je da CFSP uključuje sva pitanja vezana za sigurnost Unije, uključujući i eventualno uokviravanje zajedničke obrambene politike, koja bi vremenom mogla dovesti do zajedničke obrane. U skladu s time, Zapadnoeuropska unija (WEU) opisana je kao integralni dio razvitka Unije. Zajednički se stavovi usvajaju u ime Vijeća i prosudi da je to potrebno i da se tako povezuju nacionalne politike država članica i da se uvrštavaju njihov položaj u međunarodnim krugovima.

Usprkos ovakvom naglom zbližavanju stavova zemalja članica Europske unije, još uvijek se samo postepeno definira zajednička obrambena politika i obrana, osiguranje mira, jačanje demokracije, pravne države i ljudskih prava, dok na području bivše Jugoslavije bukte nemiri.

### UGOVOR IZ AMSTERDAMA (1997.)

Amsterdamskim ugovorom utvrđeno je nekoliko novih amandmana Ugovoru o Europskoj uniji, a EU je dobila nove institucijske i operativne instrumente. Najveća promjena koju je unio Ugovor iz Amsterdama je osnutak nove funkcije: visokog predstavnika za CFSP. Cilj osnutka ove pozicije jest namjera EU-a da ojačava svoju diplomatsku prepoznatljivost te da pomaže Vijeću u pitanjima koja spadaju pod zajedničku vanjsku i sigurnosnu politiku.

Novost Ugovora iz Amsterdama vezan uz ZVSP je osnivanje Odjela za planiranje i rano upozoravanje, čiji je zadatak da nadzire i analizira razvoj Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike, daje procjene i upozorava na takve događaje koji mogu utjecati na vanjsku i sigurnosnu politiku Unije. U tom je kontekstu Amsterdamski ugovor naznačio razliku između zajedničkih akcija (*joint actions* – podrazumijevaju koordinirano djelovanje država članica, kojima su svi resursi mobilizirani kako bi se ostvarili konkretni ciljevi koje je odredilo Vijeće na temelju općih smjernica Europskog vijeća) i zajedničkih

- 2 Ugovorom iz Amsterdama je definirano da se odnosi na suradnju policije i pravosudnih tijela u kaznenim pitanjima (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters)
- 3 [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/economic\\_and\\_monetary\\_affairs/institutional\\_and\\_economic\\_framework/treaties\\_maastricht\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htm)
- 4 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0001000001>

development of a common defence policy as an integral part of the common foreign and security policy<sup>1</sup>.

The Maastricht Treaty marked a turning point in the efforts of Europeans to strengthen their unity. It is well-known that the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union with a threefold structure, which is often portrayed as a Greek temple on three pillars: the first pillar is comprised of the three European communities; the second pillar is made up of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the third pillar consists of the cooperation of States in Justice and Home Affairs<sup>2</sup> The Maastricht Treaty also defined the objectives of the CFSP, of which the most important, in this context, are: to preserve peace and strengthen international security and to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union. According to the Treaty, the cooperation means that the Member States should be mutually informed and consulted on every question of general importance in the context of foreign policy and common security. It was decided by the Maastricht agreement that the EU has the right to demand from the Western European Union (WEU) the implementation of decisions and actions of the CFSP which concern defence policy<sup>3</sup>. The Article J.4<sup>4</sup> of the Maastricht Treaty required that the CFSP include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the potential framing of common defence policy, which might in time lead to common defence. In accordance with that, the Western European Union was described as an integral part of the development of the Union. Common positions are to be adopted as soon as the Council judges it necessary and that connects national policies of Member States and strengthens their position in international circles.

Despite this fast rapprochement of views of the Union Member States, the common defence policy, the preservation of peace, the consolidation of democracy, rule of law and human rights were still being only gradually defined when on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia the unrests were breaking out.

### THE AMSTERDAM TREATY (1997)

The Amsterdam Treaty introduced several new amendments to the Treaty on European Union, and the EU gained new institutional and operational instruments. The biggest change that the Amsterdam Treaty put forward was the establishment of the new function: the High Representative for the CFSP. The goal of the establishment of this position was the intention of the EU to strengthen its diplomatic visibility, and also to help the Council deal with questions of common foreign and security policy.

The novelty in the Amsterdam Treaty related to the CFSP was the establishment of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, the task of which

- 1 Cameron, Fraser, 1999, *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future*, Sheffield, Academic Press (p.37)
- 2 In The Treaty of Amsterdam it was defined that this refers to the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
- 3 [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/economic\\_and\\_monetary\\_affairs/institutional\\_and\\_economic\\_framework/treaties\\_maastricht\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_framework/treaties_maastricht_en.htm)
- 4 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0001000001>

stajališta (*common positions* - od država članica se traži da slijede i brane pozicije, usvojene jednoglasno, na sastancima Vijeća ministara), a uveo je i novi instrument ZVSP-a: zajedničke strategije (*common strategies*), kojima je cilj da EU ipak zadrži politički utjecaj, posebice u kriznim područjima, a u kojima države imaju zajedničke interese. Ugovor se nastavno odnosi i na postepenu izgradnju zajedničke obrambene politike, što bi vremenom trebalo dovesti do zajedničke obrane, čime bi se smanjio i utjecaj NATO-a na europskom prostoru. Politički (i sigurnosni) odbor ima zadatak upravljanja krizama te prati meunarodne događaje i pomaže pri oblikovanju i nadzoru provedbe politika.

Ugovor iz Amsterdama inkorporirao je Petersburške odrednice Zapadnoeuropske unije<sup>5</sup> (humanitarna pitanja, održavanje mira, formiranje jedinica u slučaju krize uključujući i stvaranje mira) u Ugovor o Europskoj uniji, što je doprinijelo da se razvija Europska sigurnosna i obrambena politika - ESOP (*European Security and Defence Policy* - ESDP) kao dio ZVSP-a. Centralni cilj ESOP-a je omogućiti Uniji da reagira u slučaju međunarodnih konflikata i kriznog managementu<sup>6</sup>, čime bi se pojačao međunarodni utjecaj EU-a. Ugovor iz Amsterdama ipak još uvijek ističe kako zajednička sigurnosna obrana neće utjecati na specifičnosti obrambene politike zemalja članica EU-a i poštovati želje zemalja članica koje svoju obranu žele realizirati kroz sistem NATO pakta.<sup>7</sup>

Tako se od ratifikacije Ugovora u Amsterdamu, ali i od Kosovske krize, počeo razvijati Europski sigurnosni i obrambeni identitet (*European Security and Defence Identity* - ESDI) unutar NATO-a. Suočena s izazovima nakon kraja Hladnog rata te konfliktima koji su uslijedili ranih devedesetih godina, Europska unija je trebala pronaći način za suočavanje s novonastalim situacijama u zemljama njezinog susjedstva te je potreba za zajedničkom obranom postala nezaobilazna.<sup>8</sup>

Ugovor iz Amsterdama bio je svojevrsna prekretnica u daljnjem formiranju Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike, no nije potpuno zadovoljio očekivanja Europljana i nije predstavio dovoljno veliki korak prema politici ujedinjenja Unije. Sigurnost Unije je i dalje ovisila o NATO-u, odnosno SAD-u, a Europska unija i dalje nespretno traži svoju pravu međunarodnu ulogu na području nemirnog Zapadnog Balkana.

### UGOVOR IZ NICE (2001.)

Godina 2001. predstavlja prekretnicu na području međunarodnog mira i sigurnosti novim raspletom na međunarodnoj sceni i pojavom terorizma kao najveće prijetnje svjetskom miru. Dan obilježen terorističkim napadima na

- 5 Petersburški zadaci uvršteni su u Glavu V. Ugovora o EU i cilj im je jačati interventnu sposobnost EU putem humanitarne i spasilačke misije, održavanje mira, upravljanje krizama pa čak i misije uspostave mira
- 6 [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european\\_security\\_defence\\_policy\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_policy_en.htm)
- 7 Vukadinović, Radovan, Čehuli, Lidija, 2005.: Politika europskih integracija, Topical, Zagreb
- 8 Čehuli, Lidija, 2006.: Europska obrana, Politika kultura, Zagreb

is to monitor and analyse the development of common foreign and security policy and to provide assessments and warnings of such events which might have significant repercussions on foreign and security policy of the Union. In this sense the Amsterdam Treaty set a difference between *joint actions* (coordinated action by EU Member States whereby all resources are mobilised to attain the specific objectives set by the EU Council on the basis of the general policy orientations of the European Council) and *common positions* (Member States are bound to follow and defend positions adopted unanimously at the meetings of the Council of Ministers), and it also introduced a new instrument of the CFSP: *common strategies*, whose objective was to retain the political influence of the EU (especially in crisis areas), where the Member States have common interests. The Treaty also refers to the gradual building of common defence policy, which should in time lead to common defence, and which would as a result decrease the influence of NATO on the European territory. The Political (and Security) Committee deals with crisis management, monitors international events and helps to define and monitor the implementation of policies.

The Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Western European Union's Petersberg Tasks<sup>5</sup> (humanitarian questions, peacekeeping tasks, formation of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking) into the Treaty on European Union, which contributed to the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as the part of the CFSP. The main objective of the ESDP is to enable the Union to react in case of international conflicts and crisis management<sup>6</sup>, which would strengthen its international influence. However, the Amsterdam Treaty still stresses the fact that the common security defence will not influence the specific character of the defence policy of the EU Member States and that it will respect the wishes of the Member States who want to realize their defence through the system of the NATO pact<sup>7</sup>.

So, after the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, but also after the Kosovo crisis, the European Security and Defence Identity started to develop within NATO. Faced with challenges after the end of the Cold War, and conflicts which ensued in the early '90s, the European Union needed to find a way to deal with new circumstances in its neighbouring countries, and so the need for common defence became indispensable<sup>8</sup>.

The Amsterdam Treaty was a sort of a turning point in further formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but it did not completely satisfy expectations of the Europeans, and it did not represent a big enough step towards the political unification of the Union. The security of the Union still depended on the NATO, i.e. the USA, and the European Union was still

- 5 The Petersberg tasks have been incorporated into Title V of the Treaty on EU and their objective was to strengthen the intervention competence of the EU through humanitarian and rescue missions, peace keeping, crisis management and even peace-making missions.
- 6 [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european\\_security\\_defence\\_policy\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_policy_en.htm)
- 7 Vukadinović, Radovan, Čehuli, Lidija, 2005.: European Integrations Policy, Topical, Zagreb
- 8 Čehuli, Lidija, 2006.: European Defense, Politika kultura, Zagreb



Ameriku, 11. rujan 2001. godine, na neki je na in zbližio euroatlantske partnere, ali i ojačao NATO. Europski obrambeni sustav bio je relativno nespreman pred takvim iznenadjenjima te se ponovno priklonio NATO-u i SAD-u. Navalom mnogih promjena u međunarodnoj sigurnosnoj arhitekturi, ZVSP suojen je i s izazovima opstanka na međunarodnoj sceni. Jedan od izazova koji se javlja je i suprotstavljanje nacionalnih interesa europskim. Raznolikost europskih zemalja doprinosi i raznolikosti interesa koji bi se trebali na i pod krovom zajedničke strategije. Takvu situaciju nikako ne olakšava proširenje Unije, jer bi, kako se špekuliralo, ono moglo dovesti do pojave nestabilnosti i nedostatka sigurnosti unutar Unije.<sup>9</sup>

Ugovorom iz Nice WEU se inkorporira u ESOP, obrambena politika postaje politika EU-a, iako su još uvijek naglašene uske veze s NATO-om. Po prvi puta se unutar ZVSP-a spominje tzv. *enhanced cooperation* – pojednana suradnja između nekih zemalja članica. Ugovorom je omogućeno Političkom odboru da nakon odobrenja Europskog vijeća donosi odluke s ciljem bolje političke kontrole i strateškog odlučivanja o operacijama upravljanja krizama, čime dobiva istaknutiju ulogu u sklopu Europske sigurnosne i obrambene politike. Dogovoreno je i da visoki predstavnik za ZVSP objavljuje Europsku sigurnosnu strategiju, a to je prvi put da, po uzoru na Bijelu knjigu, i Europska unija ima sigurnosnu strategiju koja definira prijetnje europskom miru i sigurnosti te smišlja temelje eventualnom zajedničkom odgovoru na prijetnje. Primjerice, Strategija iz prosinca 2008. godine naglašava važnost transatlantske suradnje, ali u nastojanju da EU dobije ulogu aktivnog, sposobnog i globalnog igrača.<sup>10</sup> Čini se da Europska unija napokon preuzima svoju međunarodnu ulogu, iako se zemlje Zapadnog Balkana u trenutku potpisivanja Ugovora iz Nice suočavaju s drukčijim problemima od onih sigurnosnih.

### CFSP I UGOVOR IZ LISABONA (2009.)

Neusvajanje Europskog ustava - neuspjelog pokušaja političke unifikacije Europske unije, dovelo je do potpisivanja Lisabonskog ili tzv. Reformskog ugovora, koji je, nakon mnogo pregovaranja, stupio na snagu 1.12.2009. te je donio mnogo reformi. Jedna od najbitnijih reformi jest da Europsku uniju vidi kao jednu tvorevinu, bez dosadašnjega utemeljenja na stupovima, što vodi stvaranju veće koherentnosti u zajednici koja politički, u inkovitosti i prepoznatljivosti. Što se Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike tiče, donio je niz promjena. Prva se temelji na reformi funkcije visokog predstavnika za vanjske poslove i sigurnosnu politiku. Namjera reforme jest da se usuglase tri funkcije: funkcija predsjedavajućeg Vijeća ministara za vanjske odnose, zatim povjerenika Europske komisije za vanjske odnose i njezinog potpredsjednika te glavnog tajnika Vijeća EU-a. Visoki predstavnik vodi i sigurnosnu i vanjsku politiku Vijeća te predsjedavati Vijećem za vanjske odnose.<sup>11</sup> Također je predstavljati Uniju prema trećim državama i postiti da EU govori jednim glasom.

9 Cameron, Fraser, 1999: *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future*, Sheffield, Academic Press

10 [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf)

11 [http://europa.eu/lisbon\\_treaty/full\\_text/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm)

clumsily searching for its right international role on the territory of unrestful Western Balkans.

### THE TREATY OF NICE (2001)

The year 2001 represented a turning point in international peace and security with the events that took place on international scene and with the appearance of terrorism as the biggest threat to the world peace. A day marked by terrorist attacks on the USA, September 11th 2001, in a way brought the Euro-Atlantic partners together, but also strengthened the NATO. The European defence system was relatively unprepared for such surprises and so it once again recurred to the NATO. With the outbreak of many changes in international security architecture, the CFSP was faced with challenges of survival on the international scene. One of the challenges that came about was opposing the national interests to the European ones. The diversity of the European countries contributed to the diversity of interests which needed to be put together under one common strategy. The situation was not to be made any easier by the expansion of the Union which could, as it was speculated, lead to the emergence of instability and the lack of security within the Union<sup>9</sup>. The Treaty of Nice incorporated the WEU into ESDP, the defence policy became the policy of the EU, although close connections with NATO were still notable. *Enhanced cooperation* – intensified cooperation between some Member States – was mentioned for the first time within the CFSP. The Treaty enabled the Political and Security Committee to make decisions (after they had been authorized by the European Council) with the goal of ensuring a better political control and strategic decision-making on the operations of crisis management, which accorded the Committee a more prominent role within the European Security and Defence Policy. It was also agreed that the High Representative for the CFSP be in charge of releasing the European Security Strategy, and that was the first time that the European Union, after the example of the White House, had a security strategy, which defined threats to the European peace and security and created a basis for potential common response to the threats. For example, the Strategy from December 2008, stressed the importance of transatlantic cooperation, but all in effort to secure the role of active, competent and global player for the EU<sup>10</sup>. It seems that the European Union was finally taking on its international role, even though countries of the West Balkans were facing problems different from security issues at the time of the Treaty of Nice.

### CFSP AND LISBON TREATY (2009)

Voting against the European Constitution - failed attempt at politically unifying Europe, brought about the signing of the Lisbon Treaty also known as the Reform Treaty, which after much negotiation, became valid on 1 December 2009. This treaty brought about many reforms. One of the most important

9 Cameron, Fraser, 1999: *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future*, Sheffield, Academic Press

10 [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf)

Unutar Reformskog ugovora predviđeno je osnivanje *European External Action Service*-a – Službe vanjskih poslova. Ovu bi diplomatsku službu činili službenici Vijeća, Komisije i diplomatskih misija zemalja članica. Funkcija stalnoga Predsjednika unutar Europskog vijeća ima u cilju vanjsko predstavljanje Unije u pitanjima vezanim za ZVSP.

Lisabonski ugovor pretvara Europsku sigurnosnu i obrambenu politiku - ESDP (*European Security and Defence Policy*) u Zajedničku sigurnosnu i obrambenu politiku - CSDP (*Common Security and Defence Policy*), i dalje kao dio ZVSP-a i kao referencu na NATO, koji predstavlja temelj osnutka sigurnosne politike zemalja EU-a. Europska obrambena agencija (*European Defence Agency*), kreirana 2004., ostaje unutar CSDP-a, a zadatak joj je izgradnja operacijskih sposobnosti EU-a kao vojnog aktera na međunarodnoj sceni.

Ugovor unosi i novinu Stalne strukturalne suradnje (*Permanent Structured Cooperation*) koja dopušta zemljama članicama, lije vojne sposobnosti zadovoljavaju više kriterije i koje su se obvezale na intenzivniji međusobni angažman u ovome području s koncentracijom na najzahtjevnije misije<sup>12</sup>, da osnuju stalnu strukturalnu suradnju unutar okvira Unije. Praktički, ovakav pristup tendira stvaranju "hard core" najviše 6 europskih zemalja – Francuske, Velike Britanije, Španjolske, Njemačke, Poljske i Italije, što je još poznato i pod nazivom "Obrana G6" (*Defence G6*). U ovom načinu pristupa obrani pronašao se i negativan aspekt koji se ogleda u mogućnosti da se stvori dvo-brzinska Europa, u kojoj bi male zemlje, koje možda imaju volje, ali ne i ljudstva i dovoljno financijskih resursa da postignu zadane uvjete, bile isključene. Stoga ideja kreiranja ekskluzivnog kluba može biti kontradiktorna principima na kojima je EU utemeljena. Ono što mnogi stručnjaci preporučuju jest da se ovakva grupa uzima kao motor koji bi gurao ostale zemlje članice u smjeru poistovjetivanja vlastitih mogućnosti. No, vidljivo je kako su nacionalni interesi još uvijek bitan segment u ujedinjenoj Europi. Oni koji su se protivili Lisabonskom ugovoru smatrali su kako njegove odrednice podrivaju nacionalni suverenitet, dok oni koji podržavaju Ugovor drže kako na pravi način stremi stvaranju europske vanjske i sigurnosne politike kao puno učinkovitije, a u isto vrijeme čuva i nacionalne sigurnosne interese.

## ZVSP I ODRŽIVI MIR – POUKE IZ BALKANSKE PROŠLOSTI

Kao jedinstvena nadnacionalna integracija europskih demokratskih zemalja okupljenih s ciljem zajedničkog promicanja mira i prosperiteta, Europska unija po samoj svojoj prirodi teži ostvarivanju mira i sigurnosti. Svojom Zajedničkom vanjskom i sigurnosnom politikom potiče suradnju između država članica u provođenju njihovih politika koje vode određivanju zajedničkih stajališta te postupnoj provedbi zajedničkih mjera u područjima gdje države članice imaju zajedničke interese.

12 op.a. nisu definirani viši kriteriji, no definirani su uvjeti za ulazak u "Grupu G6", kao što je određeno izdavanjem BDP-a za obranu i sl.

is that the EU is seen as a single entity which leads to creating greater coherence in the common policy, efficiency and visibility. When it comes to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it brought about a series of changes. The first is based on the reform of the function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The purpose of the reform is to consolidate the three functions: of a representative presiding over the Council, the European Commissioner for External Relations and its vice president as well as the Secretary General. The High Representative will head the security and foreign policy of the Council and shall preside over the Council on Foreign Relations.<sup>1</sup> He will also represent the Union in relations to other countries and achieve that the EU speaks with one voice.

The Reform Treaty provides for the formation of the European External Action Service – a foreign relations service. This diplomatic service would be formed from officials of the Council, the Commission and diplomatic missions of member countries. The function of the permanent president within the European Council is representing the Union in matters and issues related to the CFSP.

The Lisbon Treaty changes the European Security and Defence Policy - ESDP into Common Security and Defence Policy - CSDP, still as a part of the CFSP and a reference to NATO, which is the foundation of the security policy of EU countries. Furthermore, the European Defence Agency, founded in 2004, remains within the CSDP and its task is to build operational capacities of the EU as a military figure on the international scene.

The contract brings the novelty of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, which allows member states whose military potentials fulfill stricter criteria and who have sworn to intensify mutual efforts in this area, concentrating on the most challenging missions<sup>12</sup> to establish a permanent structured cooperation within the framework of the Union. Practically, this approach tends to create a "hard core" of the six largest European countries - France, UK, Spain, Germany, Poland and Italy, also called Defence G6. In this manner of addressing the defence, a negative aspect is found, which is reflected in the possibility of creating a two tier Europe, in which case, the small countries would be excluded, which may have the desire, but neither the manpower nor the financial resources to achieve the set conditions. Thus, the idea of creating an exclusive club could be contradictory to the principles on which the EU was founded. What many experts propose is that such a group should be thought of as an engine, which would push other member states to realize the same potential. It is apparent that the national interests are an important segment of united Europe. Opponents of the Lisbon treaty argue that it undermines national sovereignty, while those who support the Reform Treaty state that this Treaty properly aims at creating a more efficient European foreign and security policy and at the same time preserving national security interests.

## CFSP AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE - LESSONS FROM THE BALKAN PAST

As a uniform supranational international integration of democratic European countries assembled in order to promote peace and prosperity, the

Jedan od ciljeva ZVSP-a jest o uvanje mira i ja anje me unarodne sigurnosti. Europska unija u tom podru ju ima dovoljno iskustva da uskladi teoriju i praksu koja bi vodila sustavnoj izgradnji održivog mira. Doga aji koji su potresali stari kontinent devedesetih godina prošloga stolje a dovoljna su lekcija službenim politikama te nose svoja dobra i loša iskustva. Najbitnije što je Europska unija izvukla iz tzv. balkanske prošlosti jest injenica da je uvijek bitna suradnja kako bi se sprije ilo daljnje ja anje tenzija. Suradnja izme u država podrazumijeva da se one me usobno informiraju i savjetuju o svakom pitanju koje je od op eg zna aja u kontekstu vanjske politike i zajedni ke sigurnosti. Ne tako davnih devedesetih, europske zemlje nisu bile spremne na potpunu suradnju, na donošenje jednoglasnih odluka te na unificirano djelovanje. Europska zajednica jednostavno se našla nespremnom nad izazovima novih promjena na starom kontinentu te je kriza u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije eskalirala u ratne sukobe. Unija se u to vrijeme velikih promjena u cjelokupnoj slici me unarodne sigurnosne arhitekture suo ila s mnogim svojim nedostacima, najviše iz razloga nedovoljne kohezije me u zemljama lanicama, što je dovelo do nereagiranja na krizu širokog spektra. Takav razvoj doga aja, nepogodan i za me unarodni ugled Europske zajednice koja se silom htjela nametnuti kao arbitar na ovim prostorima, doveo je do zaklju ka kako se treba uspostaviti doista u inkovita zajedni ka vanjska i sigurnosna politika koja bi vodila uspostavi održivog mira i sigurnosti.

Pouka preuzeta iz ratnih doga anja na europskom jugoisto nom prostoru formirala je zajedni ko slaganje zemalja lanica u pogledu usmjerenja Zajedni ke vanjske i sigurnosne politike, koje bi se fokusiralo na suradnju zemalja lanica, ali i na politiku usmjerenu šire od samog prostora Europske unije, polaze i od injenice važnosti me unarodnog mira i sigurnosti za mir te sigurnosti svih država Europske unije. Da je tijekom devedesetih bilo prave suradnje, zna i obostrane komunikacije, ratni bi doga aji, gotovo sigurno, bili izbjegnuti.

Kako ZVSP može danas unaprijediti suradnju zemalja? Evidentna je, naime, injenica da su mediji odigrali veliku i zna ajnu ulogu u eskaliraju im konfliktima na podru ju bivše Jugoslavije, gotovo na jednak na in kao što su danas preuzeli ulogu radikaliziraju eg instrumenta koji mlade ljude pretvara u teroriste. No, kako mediji mogu biti upotrijebljeni u takvoj misiji, mogu imati i veliki doprinos sprje avanju konflikata i izgradnji mira. Medijske i komunikacijske strategije ine esencijalni dio u konflikt menadžmentu tijekom krize. Kako bi bila uspješna u svojim odgovorima mogu im konfliktima, u svojem širenju demokracije i ljudskih prava te u svojim ambicijama da podržava socijalni razvoj, regionalnu suradnju, izgradnju mira i sprje avanje sukoba, Europska unija mora koristiti medije kao katalizatore promjena. U bivšoj Jugoslaviji nije bilo mogu e o svemu što se doga alo otvoreno raspraviti u medijima, posebno u predkonfliktnoj fazi. Tada se možda u raspravama o vladaju oj Komunisti koj partiji moglo govoriti o osnovama na kojima je izgra ena jugoslavenska država, karakterizirana multinacionalnim sastavom i na koji se na in, mirnim putem mogla riješiti postoje a situacija porasta tenzije u zemlji. Pouka o ciljevima i sredstvima koje me unarodni akteri, u ovom slu aju konkretno Europska unija, mogu u budu nosti upotrijebiti u ranoj predkonfliktnoj fazi su: sprje avanje konflikta, uvo enje demokratskih okvira, osnov-

European Union is by its very nature seeking to achieve peace and security. It's Common Foreign and Security Policy promotes cooperation between member states in implementing their policies and leading to the determination of common policies and progressive implementation of common measures in cases where member states have common interests.

One of the objectives of the CFSP is to help preserve peace and strengthen international security. In this area the European Union has enough experience to align the theory and practice that would lead to the systematic development of sustainable peace. The events that have shaken the old continent in the 1990's are lesson enough to official policy makers and carry both good and bad experiences. The most important thing that the European Union had learned from the so-called Balkan history and past was the fact that cooperation is important in order to prevent further tensions. Cooperation between countries implies that they mutually inform and advise each other on any matter of common importance concerning foreign policy and common security. Not so long ago, in the 1990's, European countries were not ready for full cooperation, the adoption of unanimous decisions and unified actions. The European Union was simply found unready for challenging new changes on the old continent so the crisis in former Yugoslavian countries was allowed to escalate into war. The Union, in a time of great change in the overall picture of international security, was faced with many of its shortcomings, mostly due to the lack of cooperation among member states, which led to the reluctance to react to the overall crisis. Such developments are negative for the international reputation of the European Union, which wanted to impose itself by force as an arbitrator in this area. This has led to the conclusion that it should establish a truly effective common foreign and security policy, which would lead to the establishment of sustainable peace and security.

The lesson taken from the war in the south-eastern European region has formed a joint agreement between member states concerning the direction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and has focused on the cooperation of member states, as well as policies aimed at a wider area than just the European Union, starting from the fact that international peace and security are important for the peace and security of all EU countries. If, in the 1990's, there had been real collaboration and mutual communication, war would have almost surely been avoided.

In what way can CFSP currently promote cooperation between countries? Obviously the media played an important role in the escalating conflict in former Yugoslavia, almost in the same way as they are today in being a radical instrument which turns the youth into terrorists. However, while the media can be used for such purposes, they can also contribute greatly to conflict prevention and peace building. Media and communication strategies are essential during a crisis. To be successful in its conflict prevention, spreading of democracy and human rights policies and in its ambition to support social development, regional cooperation and peace building, the European Union must use the media as catalysts for change. In the former Yugoslavia it was not possible to discuss everything in the media, especially in the pre-conflict stage, where discussions about the ruling Communist Party could have been spoken of only as having built the Yugoslavian state. These discussions, characterized by multinational structure, and how



nih sloboda i prava te temelja održivog mira pod meunarodnom palicom. Također je bitno spomenuti da mediji mogu pomoći i u lakšem preuzimanju demokratskih osnova zemljama u tranziciji. Naime, bivša Jugoslavija je samo jedan od primjera u kojem je došlo do konflikta ubrzo nakon što su dopušteni demokratski izbori, iz razloga što narod nije bio dovoljno educiran o postojećoj promjeni. Dakako da je uvođenje demokracije u zemljama u tranziciji prioritetni cilj, no iskustvo nas je poučilo kako bi u takvoj situaciji trebalo posložiti realne ciljeve, od kojih bi najvažniji bio sprječavanje eskalacije nasilnih konflikata. U takvom bi razvoju situacije mediji imali veliku ulogu, a sloboda i nepristranost i jesu samo jedan važan korak u demokratskom razvoju zemlje. Iako je u slučaju zemalja bivše Jugoslavije, pod meunarodnim pritiskom bilo dopušteno otvaranje novih medijskih kuća, meunarodna palica nije razmatrala mogućnost da ti mediji doista budu nepristrani i u odnosu na novo političko vodstvo, koje je u svim zemljama praktički podržavalo međusobne konflikte. Tako novi zakoni nisu bili uistinu implementirani u svakodnevni život, što je doprinijelo činjenici da mnogi mediji, a posebno državni, postanu samo alat nove propagande. Mnogi iskusni novinari nisu više imali mjesta za svoje nepristrano stvaralaštvo, a na njihova su mjesta dolazili patriotski usmjereni novinari i urednici. To je dovoljan dokaz kako bi meunarodni fokus u samom početku eskalacije konflikta trebao biti na praktičnoj zaštiti sigurnosti, prava i nezavisnosti medijskih kuća te bi se mediji upravo ondje trebali pokazati kao funkcionalni instrument Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike. Također bi bilo bitno izgraditi strateški i tehnički kapacitet da Europska Unija može brzo i djelotvorno nastupiti s medijima u konfliktima i krizama kako bi se mogli ponovno izgraditi odnosi među sukobljenim grupama.

Za razliku od UN-ovih mirovnih operacija, koje su bile limitirane na odvajanje zaraćenih strana i nadgledanje prestanka sukoba, Europska unija, poučena iskustvom, posebno onim na području Jugoistočne Europe, konkretnije Balkana, u svoju sigurnosnu politiku implementira krizni menadžment kroz naglašavanje sveobuhvatne transformacije postkonfliktnih društava do održivog mira. Europska sigurnosna strategija<sup>13</sup> potvrđuje takvo djelovanje kao reakciju na sve izazove, ne zaobilazeći slabe državne temelje, uvodeći i u krizna područja stručnjake iz područja razvoja i ljudskih prava, policijske stručnjake i sudsko i vojno osoblje. Operacije održavanja mira i uvođenja održivog mira inkorporiraju širok dijapazon reformi u civilnom, zakonodavnom i sudskom te sigurnosnom sektoru. Rezultat je to razmatranja bliže povijesti na europskom kontinentu koji je pridonio formiranju šireg mandata odgovaranjem na krize s različitim razvojnim projektima u zemljama koje izlaze iz konflikata, ne zanemarujući i kratkoročni rad na uspostavi sigurnosti i stabilnosti.

Poznate su misije ESOP-a (Europske sigurnosne i obrambene politike) širom europskog susjedstva tijekom kojih je Europska unija pokazala kako ima instrumente za uspostavu održivog razvoja, kao što su: politički alati poput političkog posredovanja, ekonomski alati poput humanitarne pomoći ili kon-

13 <http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2008/EUFocus-Peacekeeping-Nov08.pdf>

the current situation of increasing tension in the country can be resolved through peaceful means. The lesson on goals and means which the international community, in this case, the European Union, may use in an early pre-conflict stage are conflict prevention, the introduction of democratic frameworks, basic freedoms and rights as well as foundations for sustainable peace.

It is also important to mention that the media can help streamline the transition of democracy in transitioning countries. The former Yugoslavia is just one example where democratic elections were held and soon after conflict occurred. This was also due to the fact that people had not been sufficiently informed on current change. Of course, the introduction of democracy in transitioning countries is a priority, but experience has taught us that realistic goals should be set in order to prevent the escalation of violent conflicts. In such cases the media would play a major role and its freedom and impartiality are an important step in the democratic development of a country. Although in the case of the former Yugoslavia, under international pressure, opening of new media outlets was allowed. However, the international community did not take into account the fact that these may not be truly impartial in relation to the new political leadership, which in all countries supported mutual conflict. New laws were not fully implemented in daily life which contributed to many media outlets, especially the state-owned, becoming propaganda tools. Many experienced journalists had no place to report their impartial writing and they were replaced by journalists and editors more sympathetic to the ruling party. This is sufficient evidence as to how the international focus at the beginning of the escalation of a conflict, should be on practical security, rights and independence of the media. Here the media are shown as a functional instrument of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Certainly, it is also important to build a strategic and technical capacity so that the European Union could quickly and effectively cooperate with the media in areas of conflict and crisis to rebuild relations between the conflicted groups.

Unlike the UN peacekeeping operations, which were limited to the separation of warring factions and monitoring the resolution of conflict, the European Union, taught by experience in the Balkans, implemented crisis management in its security policy, through an emphasis on thorough restructuring of post-conflict societies towards sustainable peace. European Security Strategy<sup>14</sup> confirms introducing experts in the critical areas of development and human rights, law enforcement professionals, judicial and military personnel as a response, while not ignoring the weak foundations of the state. Peacekeeping operations and the introduction of sustainable peace, incorporate a wide range of civil, legislative, judicial and security reforms. This is the result of reassessing recent European history that has contributed to the creation of crisis response with a variety of development projects in countries recovering from conflict, without neglecting short term work on security and stability.

The ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) missions are well-known throughout Europe. Implementing ESDP, the EU unveiled its instruments for maintaining sustainable development: various political tools such as political mediation, economic tools such as humanitarian aid, substantial economic

14 <http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2008/EUFocus-Peacekeeping-Nov08.pdf>

kretno ekonomske pomoći te vladavine prava, policijske i vojne operacije. Operacija Europske unije u Bosni i Hercegovini pokazuje kako se EU nosi s izazovima sveobuhvatnosti i efektivnosti. Mogli bismo reći i kako postoje dva glavna razloga koja objašnjavaju europsku intervenciju u BiH. Prvi se odnosi na svojevrsnu odgovornost po savjesti s obzirom da EU nije uspjela spriječiti ni zaustaviti krvave konflikte te su europske institucije osjetile dužnost promovirati mir i stabilnost u toj zemlji kako bi je približile europskoj perspektivi. No, može se reći i kako je BiH zapravo plodno tlo, ili bismo čak mogli reći i, laboratorij za testiranje efikasnosti kriznog menadžmenta te sposobnosti ESOP-a.

U današnjem međunarodnom poretku terorizam je nova prijetnja međunarodnom miru i sigurnosti iako ne i potpuno novi fenomen. S obzirom na rastu otvorenost Europske unije, u kojoj se ljudi, ideje, tehnologija i resursi kreću u nesmetano i slobodno, europska akcija, koja je dio one globalne, jest borba protiv terorizma. Terorizam kao pojava je prijetnja svim državama i narodima, njihovoj sigurnosti, vrijednostima i demokratskim naslijeđima, kao i ljudskim pravima. To je novi izazov europskoj sigurnosnoj politici ali i Zajednici koja vanjskoj i sigurnosnoj politici na političkom nivou. Kakve je lekcije Europska unija izvuče iz daljnjeg perioda razvoja međunarodnih odnosa, pokazati će vrijeme.

## HRVATSKA I ZVSP

Tijekom prošloga desetljeća Hrvatska je završila transformaciju i profilirala se kao centar stabilnosti, sigurnosti i suradnje u Jugoistočnoj Europi. U svjetlu približavanja Europskoj uniji, Hrvatska je svjesna da sudjelovanje u Zajednici koja vanjskoj i sigurnosnoj politici znači i prihvaćanje i ispunjavanje obveza iz zajedničkih akcija i zajedničkih stajališta Vijea ministara EU-a, što je bilo određeno zajedničkim usvajanjem Deklaracije na vrhu EU-a i 5 država iz Procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja (PSP - Hrvatska, BiH, Srbija, Crna Gora, Makedonija i Albanija) održanog u lipnju 2003. u Solunu, kada je prihvaćen dokument "Solunski program za Zapadni Balkan: Kretanje prema Europskoj integraciji"<sup>14</sup> (Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving Towards European Integration). Ovim se programom uvelo niz novih instrumenata i oblika suradnje između EU-a i PSP-država, a suradnja u CFSP-u podrazumijeva pozivanje PSP-država na pridruživanje izjavama, zajedničkih stajalištima i drugim odlukama u okviru CFSP-a. Osim dogovorenih suradnja u raznim područjima, također je dogovorena i suradnja u CFSP-u te se razmotriti pozivanje PSP-država na koordinacijske sastanke organizirane za države pristupnice i države kandidatkinje u glavnim europskim gradovima i sjedištima međunarodnih organizacija te na sastanke Političkog i sigurnosnog odbora ukoliko su na dnevnom redu teme iz područja sigurnosti i upravljanja kriznim situacijama u regiji. Kroz politički dijalog koji se vodi u okviru Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, kao i u okviru pristupnih pregovora, Hrvatska se pridružuje izjavama i stajalištima Unije.

<sup>14</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement\\_process/accession\\_process/how\\_does\\_a\\_country\\_join\\_the\\_eu/sap/thessaloniki\\_agenda\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm)

aid, and aid in areas of law, policing and military operations. The EU's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina show how it copes and deals with challenges. We could say there are two main reasons that explain the European intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first of which refers to Europe's responsibility for prevention of the bloody conflict and that the European institutions felt a duty to promote peace and stability in that country and to bring it closer to a European perspective. However, it could be said that Bosnia and Herzegovina is in fact fertile ground or possibly a laboratory for testing the efficiency of crisis management capabilities of the ESDP. In the today's new order terrorism is a rising threat to international peace and security, although not an entirely new phenomenon. Given the increasing openness of the European Union, where people, ideas, technology and resources move smoothly and freely, European action is part of the global fight against terrorism. Terrorism as a phenomenon is a threat to all countries and peoples, to their safety, values, democratic heritage and human rights. This is a new challenge to the European security policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy at a political level. What lessons can be drawn from the EU's subsequent international relations, only time will tell.

## CROATIA AND THE CFSP

Over the last decade, Croatia has completed its transformation and profiled itself as a center of stability, security and cooperation for Southeastern Europe. In the light of accession to the European Union, Croatia is aware that the participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy means acceptance and fulfillment of the requirements of joint actions and common positions of the Council of Ministers, which was determined by adopting a common Declaration as well as five countries from the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP - Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania), held in June of 2003 in Thessaloniki, when the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving Towards European Integration<sup>12</sup> was adopted. This program introduced a number of new instruments and forms of cooperation between the EU and SAP countries. In addition to the agreed cooperation in various fields, a cooperation in the CFSP was agreed and the SAP states are invited to take part in joint statements, mutual positions and other decision making processes within CFSP. Also, SAP countries will be considered for attending coordination meetings organized for the accession and candidate countries in major European cities and the headquarters of international organizations and at meetings of the Political and Security Committee if the agenda involves the security and crisis management of the region.

How the European Union sees the progress of Croatia toward accession to the European Union is seen in the latest Croatia 2008 Progress Report<sup>13</sup>. Chapter 31 of the report relating to Foreign, security and defense policy states that Croatia continues to comply with mutual positions, declarations and statements of the EU. Croatia is also committed to develop the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) through training and strengthening its

<sup>12</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement\\_process/accession\\_process/how\\_does\\_a\\_country\\_join\\_the\\_eu/sap/thessaloniki\\_agenda\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_agenda_en.htm)

<sup>13</sup> [http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/lzvjesce/lzvjesce\\_o\\_napretku\\_RH\\_2008.pdf](http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/lzvjesce/lzvjesce_o_napretku_RH_2008.pdf)

Kako Europska unija vidi napredak Hrvatske u njezinom približavanju Europskoj uniji opisuje posljednje Izvješće o napretku Hrvatske za 2008. godinu,<sup>15</sup> a koncentriramo li se na Poglavlje 31., koje se odnosi na Vanjsku, sigurnosnu i obrambenu politiku, pojasnit ćemo nam se kako Hrvatska nastavlja usklađivanje sa zajedničkim stajalištima, deklaracijama i izjavama EU-a. Hrvatska je opredijeljena za razvoj Europske sigurnosne i obrambene politike (ESOP) i putem osposobljavanja i jačanja administrativne sposobnosti. U skladu s time, Hrvatska se obvezala na aktivno sudjelovanje u civilnim operacijama u okviru ESOP-a, kako bi se povećala sposobnost EU-a za poduzimanje mjera za kontrolu krize, posebno na Kosovu. U Izvješću stoji:

"Hrvatska u ovom poglavlju nastavlja ostvarivati napredak. Općenito je Hrvatska ostvarila visoku razinu usklađenosti u području Vanjske, sigurnosne i obrambene politike. Kako bi se u potpunosti pripremila za pristupanje, Hrvatska treba jačati primjenu i provedbu kontrole oružja, uključujući i transparentnost informiranja u vezi s oružjem te nastaviti poboljšavati sposobnosti za punu primjenu CFSP-ESOP-a."

Dakle, suradnja u području CFSP-a je djelomično uspostavljena Zajedničkom izjavom o političkom dijalogu, a dodatno ojačana Solunskom agendom, koja je omogućila pokretanje sustavne suradnje i mehanizma formalnog pridruživanja RH i ostalih PSP-država izjavama, *demarchevima* i zajedničkim stajalištima EU-a na području CFSP-a. Iz dopisa Europske komisije Vijeću i Europskom parlamentu «Strategija proširenja i glavni izazovi 2009-2010» stoji da Hrvatska nastavlja sa svojim napredovanjem ka zadovoljavanju političkih kriterija, a napredak je vidljiv čak i u području vladavine prava, dok se veći napor treba uložiti u reformu sudstva, borbu protiv korupcije, prava manjina i povratak izbjeglica.

Što se tiče odnosa sa zemljama u susjedstvu, kao zemlja stabilnosti u regiji, Hrvatska među prioritetima svoje vanjske politike vidi i snažne i razvijene odnose sa zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, a također je i sudionica regionalnih obrambenih mehanizama za suradnju, dok Hrvatske oružane snage sudjeluju i u UN-ovim misijama, a broj pripadnika Hrvatskih oružanih snaga koje sudjeluju u misijama u inozemstvu neprestano raste.

## ZAKLJUČAK

Uspostava, ali i neprestano ažuriranje odredaba i zadaća Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike bio je mukotrpan proces, posebice stoga što se događao u vrijeme koje nije bilo povoljno za zemlje Europske unije, nespremljene na nove razvoje događaja koji prijete međunarodnoj sigurnosti. Promjene na europskom kontinentu dovele su do većeg približavanja država članica EU-a u smjeru organizacije Zajedničke vanjske i sigurnosne politike. No, za razliku od NATO-a, koji ima jasnu koncepciju i strukturu, EU još uvijek traga za odrednicama svojeg međunarodnog djelovanja, koje je i nakon Lisabonskog ugovora nedovoljno strukturirano, zbog čega je još uvijek dvojbena odluka.

<sup>15</sup> [http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/Izvjesce/Izvjesce\\_o\\_napretku\\_RH\\_2008.pdf](http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/Izvjesce/Izvjesce_o_napretku_RH_2008.pdf)

administrative capacity. Consequently, Croatia is actively committed to participating in civil operations within the ESDP in order to increase the EU's ability for taking measures during crisis, especially in Kosovo. The Report says: "Croatia is, in this chapter, continues making progress. Generally, Croatia has achieved a high level of alignment in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. In order to prepare for accession fully, Croatia needs to strengthen implementation and enforcement of gun control, including the transparency of information in relations to this topic and further improvement for a thorough implementation of the CFSP-ESDP." Cooperation in the field of the CFSP was partially established by the Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue, and further strengthened by the Thessaloniki agenda, which has enabled the launch of a systematic cooperation and the mechanism for the formal accession of Croatia and other SAP members using statements, demarches and common EU objectives when concerning the CFSP. From the documents of the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, "The Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010" says that Croatia continues in its progress towards meeting the political criteria, a visible progress is seen even in law related matters, while greater efforts should be made in the judicial reform, fight against corruption, minority rights and refugee return.

As for relations with neighboring countries, Croatia, as a country of stability in the region, has among its foreign policy priorities also strong relations with the Western Balkans. It is also a participant in regional defence mechanisms for cooperation, since the Croatian armed forces are involved in the UN missions, and have an increasing deployment participating in missions abroad.

## CONCLUSION

The establishment, as well as the constant update of the provisions and duties of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was a difficult process, especially due to the fact that the then current events were not favorable for the countries of the European Union, unprepared as they were for new developments that are threats to the international security. Changes on the European continent prompted the member states to become more uniform concerning the organization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. But, unlike NATO that has a clear concept and structure, the EU is still searching for the boundaries of its international operation, which is, even after the Lisbon Treaty, insufficiently structured and where the decision making is still dubious. Common Foreign and Security Policy is now influenced by past Balkan experience and by which the foundations of policies should be made and incorporated in the CFSP in order to prevent conflicts: not only in the Union but also in neighboring countries. There are many areas for discussion but only a few are stated here. It is necessary to discuss, on both an academic and political level, how errors in recent history must not be repeated.

However, a more recent threat to international peace and security - terrorism, which we briefly covered in this paper, highlights still, a lack of coherence and cooperation between European countries. It suggests also the possibility given in the European Security and Defense Policy that relate to the

Zajedni ka vanjska i sigurnosna politika danas naslje uje iskustvo balkanske prošlosti na kojemu bi se trebale graditi osnove *policyja* koje bi se inkorporirale unutar CFSP-a s ciljem prevencije konflikata na podru ju same Unije, ali i zemalja u susjedstvu. Definitivno ima jako puno podru ja za raspravu, od kojih je ovdje iznešeno svega nekoliko. U tom cilju je potrebno što više raspravljati na akademskom i politi kom nivou kako se greške, u injene posebno u novijoj povijesti, ne bi ponavljale.

Me utim, novija prijetnja me unarodnom miru i sigurnosti – terorizam - kojega smo se nakratko dotakli u ovome radu, još uvijek pokazuje nedovoljnu koherentnost i povezanost unutar europskih zemalja, kao i mogu nost prenošenja zadataka kolektivne obrane na NATO u Europskoj sigurnosnoj i obrambenoj politici, što služi kao pokazatelj svjesnosti Europljana o vlastitim nedostacima u vidu sigurnosne i obrambene politike. Ipak, Europa doista postaje zna ajan akter u me unarodnim odnosima te shodno tomu nastoji riješiti sve prepreke prema u vrš enju zajedni ke vanjske i sigurnosne politike.

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transference of tasks of collective defense to NATO. These could be indicative of an awareness of Europe's shortcomings concerning its security and defense policy. Still, Europe is truly becoming an important figure in international relations and consequently seeks to resolve all obstacles towards the consolidation of the common foreign and security policy.

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# SIGURNOST ILI SOLIDARNOST – KOJIM PUTEM KRENUTI?

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VEDRAN HORVAT JE SOCIOLOG, NOVINAR I PUBLICIST TE VODITELJ  
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(Post)ratno iskustvo zemalja u regiji tzv. zapadnog Balkana nezaobilazno je mjesto u oblikovanju sadašnjih sigurnosnih politika u regiji. To dakako sa sobom donosi i prednosti i ograničenja. U prvom slučaju zbog bliske vremenske distance, ali i neminovne uključenosti u spomenute procese, nedavno iskustvo konflikta, grubog kršenja ljudskih prava i humanitarnih katastrofa osigurava neku vrst dodane vrijednosti zemljama zapadnog Balkana da dublje razumiju porijeklo nasilnih društvenih sukoba. U drugom pak slučaju, sam karakter sukoba u regiji, temeljen na etno-religijskoj identifikaciji potpomognutoj imperijalističkim ili pak kriminalnim motivima, nekompatibilan je većim dijelom u odnosu na nove sigurnosne prijetnje, nesigurnost opskrbe hranom i energijom, na promjene klime koje će utjecati na dostupnost resursa kao i na cijeli niz novih ili nanovo otkrivenih linija podjela koje donedavno nismo ni mogli zamisliti.

## OD "BUSINESS AS USUAL" DO "CONFLICT AS USUAL"

Tome uprkos, sigurnosne politike koje se u zemljama regije sada oblikuju i dalje imaju snažnu državocentričnu, ako ne i državotvornu komponentu, sada možda nešto bolje sakrivenu. Takvo razumijevanje, a posljedica i profilacija *policy-makers* u tom području nije nimalo slučajna, nacionalna se sigurnost poima kao državna sigurnost i primarno oslanja na vojno-obrambeni sustav i ostatak represivnog aparata (policija, tajne službe). Poimanje sigurnosti koje u središnjem mjestu i dalje ima državu kao garanciju sigurnosti pati od jednog redukcionizma koji ga čini manje kompatibilnim s trenutnim izazovima koji nas okružuju, naročito u slučaju 'slabih' ili nestabilnih država/društava kakve i dalje zatičemo u regiji.

Takav neporemećen i uhodan "*business as usual*," ustrojen na periferiji europske sigurnosne arhitekture vodi nas ravno u potencijalni "*conflict as usual*," u repetitivnu sukoba na osnovu netransformiranih i u državocentričnost usidrenih javnih politika u području sigurnosti. Najmanje su dvije točke koje mogu poslužiti kao objašnjenje ove situacije. Prvo, sigurnosni sektor u Hrvat-

# SECURITY OR SOLIDARITY: WHICH PATH TO TAKE?

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The (post)war experience in the so-called West Balkans region is something we cannot overlook while formulating current security policies in the region. This has its advantages and limitations. Because these processes took place rather recently and the whole region was pervasively involved in them, the recent experience of conflicts, severe human rights violation and humanitarian disasters enables the citizens of the West Balkans some sort of superior understanding of violent social conflicts. On the other hand, the nature of the conflicts in the region, which were based on ethno-religious identification encouraged by imperialist or criminal motives, is mostly unrelated to new security threats, the uncertainty of food and energy supplies, climate changes which will influence the availability of resources, or any new, hitherto unimaginable social divisions which may arise.

## FROM "BUSINESS AS USUAL" TO "CONFLICT AS USUAL"

In spite of this, the security policies that are being formulated in the countries of this region are still based on protecting the interests and identity of the state, even though this motivation is somewhat better concealed. This attitude and consequently the profiles of the policy-makers are not incidental: national security is conceptualized as the security of the state and thus relies heavily on the system of military defense and the accompanying repressive institutions (the police and secret services). The central concept of security which centers on the state as a guarantee of security is reductionist in nature which means that it is less equipped to handle contemporary challenges, especially in the case of "weaker" or less stable countries and societies which still exist in this region.

This sort of accepted and widespread *business as usual* attitude predominant on the periphery of the European security structure leads us directly into a potential state of *conflict as usual* – a repetition of conflicts caused by untransformed state-centered public security policies. We can determine at least two underlying causes of this condition. Firstly, the security sector



skoj tek je djelomično integriran, a veći dio je dijelom nakalemljen na kostur europskog ili transatlantskog sigurnosnog paketa. Kada se i radi o pitanju integracije, ona je primarno funkcionalna, svedena na korištenje lokalnih resursa: primarno ljudstva, prostora, zraka, mora ili komunikacijskog prostora od strane "saveznika snaga". Drugo, dominantne politike u regiji koje utječu u krajnjoj instanci na oblikovanje i prihvaćanje sigurnosnih paketa u svojoj pozadini nemaju širi društveni proces suočavanja sa prošlošću u koji bi im omogućio pomak u novo razumijevanje sigurnosti temeljeno na većaširenom konceptu "ljudske sigurnosti"<sup>1</sup>. Utoliko je bez radikalne promjene poimanja paradigme sigurnosti i njenog proširenja, neminovna repetitivna konfliktacija na bazi etničkih ili ideoloških podjela poznatih u zemlji pa i u regiji, od sredine 20. stoljeća.

Upravo zbog ovih posljednjih, koje postoje i u Hrvatskoj i u zemljama u regiji, a koje i dalje dominiraju regijom, nužan je snažan paradigmatički zaokret. No, politička podrška mogućoj transformaciji nailazi na puno otpora, ne samo u zemljama u regiji nego i u Europskoj uniji budući da takav *business as usual* odgovara privrednim i političkim elitama u EU, dijelom i iz razloga što je vezan uz industriju i partikularne interese određenih zemalja članica. Naravno, europska sigurnosna i obrambena politika (ESOP) ne slijedi 'državo-centrični' model jer to i ne može, no u svojim 'core' kompetencijama i nadležnostima ona i dalje otvara vrata militarizaciji, umjesto da unaprijeđuje svoj 'mekani pristup', velikim dijelom kompatibilan s razumijevanjem koncepta **ljudske ili pak građanske sigurnosti**.<sup>2</sup> Kako upravo zbivanjima na vlastitoj periferiji, u jugoistočnoj Europi tijekom devedesetih, može zahvaliti svoj 'ubrzani razvoj', ESOP bi, nakon 'upravljanja krizom' u svojoj daljnjoj kristalizaciji iz tog iskustva mogao izvući korisne zaključke u daljnjem formuliranju rješenja.

Međutim, ako bi se i uspješno tek privremeno izdignuti iznad neravnopravnog odnosa centra i periferije koji opterećuju moguće ovakve razmjene, uz ovakvo poimanje sigurnosne politike, razmjena iskustava na nivou 'policy maker' skoro pa da je i nemoguća, bar kad se radi o formalnom, institucionalnom nivou. Stoga je za razmjenu iskustava između EU i zemalja u regiji, ona koja bi imala rezultata, a ne bi podupirala daljnju militarizaciju Europske unije bitno, neophodno i jedino moguće da krene 'odozdo', iz civilnog društva, od zainteresirane javnosti i uključivanja ona koji svoje direktno iskustvo mogu komunicirati s ekspertnom zajednicom.

Ipak, prije nego krenemo u smjeru otkrivanja mogućnosti za razvoj alternativne sigurnosne politike koja bi se, oslanjajući se na ratno iskustvo zemalja

- 1 Koncept ljudske sigurnosti je paradigma razvijena sredinom 90-ih i prihvaćena u UN-u i koja u centralno mjesto sigurnosti dovodi pojedinca, a ne državu. Sigurnost razumijeva znatno šire, kroz interakciju ekonomske sigurnosti, sigurnosti opskrbe hranom, zdravstvene sigurnosti, ekološke i osobne sigurnosti, kao i sigurnosti zajednice te političke sigurnosti (u slučaju nestajanja, represije i nepoštivanja ljudskih prava).
- 2 "Green Security Strategy for Europe", prepared by Angelika Beer, The Greens, 2008. "Yet the approach taken by the ESS does not go far enough. A narrow, military, state-oriented concept of security will result in important problem areas being neglected, such as the violation of human rights (including fair social policy), the unfair distribution of resources, and also pollution and climate change".

is only partially integrated in Croatia: for the most part, it is simply a transposed version of the European or trans-Atlantic safety package. The integration itself is primarily functional, reduced to merely utilizing local resources, such as human resources, facilities, air, sea, or the communication space belonging to "allies". Second, the dominant policies in this region which ultimately influence the formation and implementation of security packages are not based on a wider social process of facing the past which would enable a step in the direction of a new understanding of security based on the already widely accepted concept of "human security"<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, without a radical change in the perception of the security paradigm and its potential for change, a repetition of ethnic or ideological conflicts which have been widespread in both the country and the wider region from the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century will be inevitable.

A strong shift in paradigm is required, especially in these latter conflicts, which exist both in Croatia and in other countries in the region and which continue to dominate the region. However, the political support to the possible transformation has been encountering a lot of resistance, not only in the countries of the region but in the European Union as well, because this sort of *business as usual* is beneficial to the economic and political elites of the EU, partly because it is tied to the industries and particular interests of certain member-states. Of course, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) does not follow the state-centric model because it is not able to, but its core competences and authorities still give a lot of leeway to militarization instead of advancing its "soft approach" which is mostly compatible with an understanding of security as **human or civil security**.<sup>2</sup> In light of the fact that these events on its periphery, in South-East Europe in the nineties, have had a great impact on its "rapid growth", the CSDP should use this experience to learn valuable lessons and formulate strategies applicable to the phases following the "crisis management" itself.

However, even if we could manage to temporarily rise above this disparate relationship between the center and the periphery which impedes these exchanges, the current concept of security policies makes the exchange of experiences on the policy-maker level almost impossible, especially on a formal, institutionalized level. Therefore, it is important and vital for an effective exchange of experiences between the EU and the countries of this region, which would not encourage the further militarization of the EU, that these processes start "bottom-up", based on civil society, informed media

- 1 The concept of "human security" is a paradigm developed and accepted by the UN in the mid-90s, which focuses the issues of security on the individual, not on the state. Security is conceptualized more widely, from the perspective of the interaction of economic safety, the availability of food, social security, ecological and personal security, as well as the safety of the community and political security (in the cases of people going missing, being repressed and having their human rights violated.)
- 2 "Green Security Strategy for Europe", prepared by Angelika Beer, The Greens, 2008. "Yet the approach taken by the ESS does not go far enough. A narrow, military, state-oriented concept of security will result in important problem areas being neglected, such as the violation of human rights (including fair social policy), the unfair distribution of resources, and also pollution and climate change".

u regiji lakše demilitarizirala, potrebno je pripaziti na zamku **'securitizacije'**. To je ustvari na in da se cijeli dio sustavnih problema koji su trenutno dio i element sustavne krize proglasi sigurnosnim problemom. Djelomi no to može biti zaista tako, no ve i sam koncept ljudske sigurnosti nekad je zlou-potrebljen na na in da legitimira cijeli niz akcija kojima nije središnje mjesto zaštita ovjeka, ve nekih partikularnih interesa, npr. zaštita pravaca doba-ve nafte, trgovinskih pravaca, ve ih investitorskih projekata ili nekih sli nih slu ajeva u kojima se ljudska sigurnost koristi kao fasada ili legitimitet za djelovanje koje uglavnom nema bitan utjecaj na ljudsku sigurnost i esto je povezano s ne lijim koristima, a ne s javnim interesom.<sup>3</sup>

Trenutna višestruka kriza jasno pokazuje kako je i cijela sigurnosna politika vezana uz krizu sustava i kako više nije mogu e oblikovati, niti kreirati neka rješenja izolirana u paketu sigurnosne politike. Utoliko, sigurnosne politike koje bi se, na neki na in, trebale ili mogle oblikovati u regiji, moraju ako ne davati, onda pokušati oblikovati odgovore na klimatsku krizu, na energetske krizu, na pitanje socijalne isklju ivosti, na pitanje sve kobnijih generacijskih podjela. Dakle, investiranje u povjerenje spram institucija, investiranje u po-vjerenje u pravnu državu, revitalizaciju uvjeta za solidarnost i projekti koji reinstaliraju povratak povjerenja u društvu ine strateške smjernice za po-stizanje daleko ve eg stupnja sigurnosti. Utoliko i investicija pojedine države u oblikovanje sigurnosti, ak i unutar državnih granica, mora doživjeti jednu radikalnu preobrazbu u razumijevanju sigurnosti.

## 5 P - ZA VIŠE SIGURNOSTI U REGIJI - PREVENCIJA, PARTICIPACIJA, PERIFERIZACIJA, PRIVATIZACIJA, PAUPERIZACIJA

Sigurnosni se problemi mogu po eti prepoznavati na novim linijama sukoba koje su generirane novim nizom nejednakosti. Stoga, u slu aju zemalja u regiji uskoro ne mora biti važno koja je politi ka stranka na vlasti, nego tko je vlasnik prehrambene industrije, o kome ovisi sigurnost opskrbe energijom i koliko je ljudi dužno bankama koje su uglavnom u stranom vlasništvu. Tako središnje mjesto sigurnosti postaje pitanje nejednakosti u dostupnosti resur-sa, nejednakosti u pristupu visokom obrazovanju, nejednakosti u zadovolja-vanju osnovnih potreba i uživanju temeljnih ljudskih prava. Pitanje sigurnosti tako postaje potpuno *cross-sektoralno* i bilo kakvo izolirano parcijalno rješe-nje u oblikovanju sigurnosne politike na koje smo navikli u zemljama u regiji, ne e mo i dati rezultata, niti e biti kompatibilno sa sigurnosnom politikom Europske unije koja se ve približila (iako i ona nedovoljno), ne samo pojmu 'ljudske sigurnosti' ve i njegovim derivacijama u 'policy- making procesu', i

3 Grubiša, Damir " Nacionalna sigurnost Hrvatske, državo-centrizam i koncepcija ljudske sigurnosti", u "Sigurnost – od koga, za koga?", Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2009. g. Zagreb. Tradicionalna koncepcija sigurnosti i na njoj zasnovane politike (politika nacionalne sigurnosti, politika unutarnje sigurnosti i druge specifi ne politike koje se ne mogu obu-hvatiti pojmom "javne politike", ve bi ispravnije bilo nazvati ih *polujavnim politikama*) bave se prvenstveno sigurnosnim potrebama države kao što su: državne granice, držav-ne institucije i poredak, dok je u fokusu *ljudske sigurnosti* briga za sigurnost pojedinaca i društvenih skupina te njihova zaštita. Razlika izme u te dvije koncepcije ogleda se u referentnom okviru, ciljevima, akterima i sredstvima.

and involved citizens who can communicate their immediate experiences to the expert community.

But before we delve deeper into possible alternative security policy options, which would, in light of the war experience in the countries of the region, be more open to demilitarization, we must be wary of the trap of "securi-tization". This is nothing else than an attempt to take a whole plethora of systemic problems which are a key element and cause of the crisis of the system, and label them "security problems". Partially, that may be true as well, but even the concept of human security itself is sometimes abused to legitimize a number of actions which do not aim to protect individuals but certain interests such as the protection of oil supply corridors, trade cor-ridors, large investment projects or similar cases in which human security is used as a façade or legitimate reason for action which in their essence have nothing to do with human security and are more often tied to personal gain rather than public interest<sup>3</sup>.

The ongoing multi-lateral crisis highlights the close ties between the entire security policy and the crisis of the system; thus, it is no longer possible to create or form any solutions entirely from within the security policy pack-age. Therefore, security policies which should and could, in some way, be formulated within the region, should also try to provide or suggest answers to the climate crisis, the energy crisis, the issue of social exclusion, and the is-sue of the increasingly vitriolic generational divisions. In short, this would be an investment in building trust towards institutions, towards the rule of law, a revitalization of the conditions for building solidarity and projects which instill a renewed trust within the society; all of these are strategic guidelines aimed at developing a higher level of security. Therefore the investment of any given country into security policies, even within state borders, has to undergo a radical transformation in the conceptualization of security.

## THE FIVE PS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY: PREVENTION, PARTICIPATION, PERIPHERIZATION, PRIVATIZATION, PAUPERIZATION

Security problems can thus begin to be linked to new lines of conflict gener-ated by a series of inequalities. In the case of the countries in this region, soon it may not be important which political party is in power, but who owns the food industry, who provides a reliable supply of energy, and the size of the citizens' debt towards banks which are owned by foreigners. The cen-

3 Grubiša, Damir " Nacionalna sigurnost Hrvatske, državo-centrizam i koncepcija ljudske sigurnosti", in "Sigurnost – od koga, za koga?", Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2009. Zagreb. The traditional concept of security and other policies based on it (the policy of national security, the internal security policy and other specific policies which do not fall in the scope of "public policy" but are more accurately described as "semi-public policies") focus primarily on the security needs of the state, while *human security* focuses on the safety on individuals and social groups and providing protection to them. The difference between these concepts is reflected in their referential frameworks, agents and meth-ods.

ne uvijek u smjeru koji se prvotno zamišljao.<sup>4</sup>

Za daljnji razvoj rasprave pa tako i moguće razmjene mišljenja o sigurnosnim politikama ukazat će na 4 P – četiri osobine koje su s različitim predznacima izuzetno bitne u daljnjem "policy makingu" sigurnosne politike u regiji: **prevencija, participacija, periferizacija i privatizacija.**

Pored već spomenutih razvijanja sustava "early warninga", kod latentno kriznih i nestabilnih područja, kakvim se područje jugoistočne Europe i dalje može smatrati, moguće niša za 'prevenciju' kao osnovnu komponentu je pitanje distribucije proračuna dotičnih zemalja što je u ovom slučaju i sigurnosno pitanje. Naime, većalažanja u proračun obrambenih i sigurnosnih službi nužno ne znače i većali stupanj sigurnosti za građane, a u nekim slučajevima znače i povoljno tlo za korupciju i pogodovanja aktera koji su preuzeli 'vlasništvo' nad sigurnosnim pitanjem kao javnim pitanjem. Utoliko mislim da je za zemlje u regiji izuzetno važno mijenjati odnose unutar samih proračuna i osnažiti sektore koji posredno mogu povećati sigurnost, prvenstveno kroz porast kompetencija, ekspertize i kapaciteta za suočavanje s novim oblicima prijetnji sigurnosti, kojima ćemo, unatoč perifernoj poziciji ili upravo zbog nje, biti uskoro izloženi. Prvenstveno to označava fundamentalnu promjenu, povećanje ulaganja u obrazovanje, u poljoprivredu, u zaštitu okoliša, kao i u energetsku sigurnost ili primjerice u bolju pripremljenost na izvanredne situacije (i npr. ekološke katastrofe)<sup>5</sup>. Takav bi poredak daleko više umanjio buduće sigurnosne rizike, koji su možda realniji od pitanja nekog novog etničkog sukoba na koje je uvijek i (pre)dobro pripremljen sadašnji koncept državne sigurnosti koji se razvija u nadležnim institucijama.

Upravo kroz ovu širu perspektivu ljudske sigurnosti moguće je navesti dva hipotetska slučaja: pitanje poljoprivrede i decentralizacije proizvodnje hrane ili pitanje decentralizacije proizvodnje električne energije, a ti slučajevi mogu poslužiti kao primjeri koji emancipiraju određenu zajednicu od centralnog sustava. Zatim, nakon što ona osigura veću sigurnost opskrbe hranom i kada osigura dotok energije u kućanstva putem upotrebe obnovljivih izvora energije, ona više ne ovisi o političkim odlukama sustava koji je okružuje i koji je izrazio nesiguran. Naime, Hrvatska danas uvozi više od 50% hrane, a osim vlastitog plina i nešto obnovljive energije iz hidroelektrana, uvozi značajnu količinu energenata. U ovom slučaju visoko centralizirani sustav koji se temelji na državno-centralnom poimanju sigurnosti propušta priliku, kroz decentralizaciju i pojedine infrastrukturne projekte, povećati sigurnost te ostaje daleko ranjiviji na vanjske okolnosti, koje u nadolazećim krizama

4 "Green Security Strategy for Europe", prepared by Angelika Beer, The Greens/EFA, 2008. " Firstly, the concept of 'human security' has been stretched so far as to even legitimize the deployment of armed forces to secure supplies of fossil fuels, for example. Secondly, as a result of this militarisation of 'human security' - justly criticised -, large sections of the peace movement have now rejected their own concept and concern themselves exclusively with civilian instruments. Thirdly, we are being diverted from the need to examine how to obtain more security with less military involvement via the controlled harmonisation of European armed forces.

5 Dovoljno je sjetiti se nepripremljenosti nadležnost sustava u RH u slučaju ljetnih požara (slučaj Kornati i mnogi drugi).

tral issue of security thus becomes the inequality of resource availability, the inequality in accessibility of education, the inequalities in satisfying basic needs and elementary human rights. The issue of security becomes an entirely cross-sector issue and any isolated partial solutions in forming security policies akin to those we have become accustomed to in this region will not provide any results, nor will it be compatible with the security policies of the European Union which have, albeit insufficiently, developed not only toward the concept of "human security" but also to its derivations in the policy-making process, and not always in the direction which were originally intended<sup>4</sup>.

In order to further develop the discussion and possible exchange of opinions on security policies, I will discuss the "4 Ps" – four concepts which have, each in its own way, been very influential in the security policy making in the region: **prevention, participation, peripherization and privatization.**

In addition to the aforementioned development of "early warning" systems in latently critical and unstable areas, with Southeast Europe still considered one such region, a possible niche for "prevention" as a key component of those systems lies in the distribution of the budgets of the countries involved, which is in itself a security issue. Greater investments in the budget of state defense and security services do not in and of themselves guarantee a greater degree of security for the citizens themselves, and can, in some cases, create fertile ground for corruption and power plays for agents who aim to transform the public issue of security into a private issue of property.

Therefore I believe that it is important for the countries of this region to shift the ratios within the budgets themselves in order to strengthen the sectors which can indirectly increase security, primarily through an increase in competences, expert skills and capacities in handling new forms of security threats which will, in spite of our peripheral position or in fact because of it, soon arise in the region. This primarily involves fundamental changes by increasing investments in education, agriculture, environmental protection, and energy, as well as preparing more thoroughly for emergency situations and environmental disasters<sup>5</sup>. This type of system would reduce potential security risks which are currently more likely than renewed ethnic conflicts, which the existing national security systems are more than well-equipped to handle.

From this wider perspective of human security it is possible to detail two

4 "Green Security Strategy for Europe", prepared by Angelika Beer, The Greens/EFA, 2008. " Firstly, the concept of 'human security' has been stretched so far as to even legitimize the deployment of armed forces to secure supplies of fossil fuels, for example. Secondly, as a result of this militarization of 'human security' - justly criticized -, large sections of the peace movement have now rejected their own concept and concern themselves exclusively with civilian instruments. Thirdly, we are being diverted from the need to examine how to obtain more security with less military involvement via the controlled harmonization of European armed forces.

5 We need only point out the Croatian government's ill-preparedness in the cases of summer fires (for example in the Kornati islands).



moгу uvelike utjecati na sigurnost u zemlji.

Druga je to ka intervencije **"participacija"**. Pod tim prvenstveno mislim na uklju ivanje interesa svih grupa sa specifi nim sigurnosnim potrebama, i onih dionika koji pored totalne populacije, mogu biti pod dodatnim sigurnosnim prijetnjama. Participacija je, stoga, neophodna dimenzija oblikovanja nove sigurnosne politike obzirom da je dosad vrlo esto bila reducirana na proizvod i rezultat rada ekspertne zajednice, dobro povezane s trenutnom elitom. Sama metodologija rada na takvim (ne)javnim politikama u podru ju sigurnosti bila je resistantna, da ne ka ujemo alergi na, na ve i stupanj demokracije u njegovom oblikovanju, proglašavaju i pritom i samu demokraciju sigurnosnom prijetnjom. U tom smislu, proces *policy makinga* u podru ju sigurnosti potrebno je fundamentalno mijenjati uvo enjem rada s pojedinim fokus grupama, ekspertnim timovima i pripremati infrastrukturu i cjelokupnu populaciju na one slu ajeve koji utje u na manji stupanj sigurnosti, a time i ni standard kvalitete ivanja. Ovdje zato vrijedi ponoviti da je "grass root" pristup upravo onaj koji tra redefiniranje politike odozdo, ona neophodna dimenzija za oblikovanje koncepcije sigurnosti u budu nosti, budu i da radi otklon od redukcionizma koji nastaje oblikovanjem sigurnosnih politika od strane elita.

Ono što se name e kao sporno u okviru mogu e razmjene iskustava između u postratnih zemalja jugoisto ne Europe i EU, u sferi *policy makinga* jest **"periferizacija"**. Tu prvenstveno treba istaknuti neravnopravan odnos dvije strane koje bi u interakciji, dijalogu i suradnji trebale zajedno raditi na novim sigurnosnim politikama. Od Bruxellesa se ovdje tra jedno pragmatično, bar privremeno obrtanje procesa između u centra i periferije i dopuštanje da se iskustva na periferiji ili u budu im lanicama Europske unije koriste i u centru politički kog odlu ivanja. Kako je ve istaknuto, u uvjetima "business as usual" takva se suradnja zaustavlja na granicama "wishful thinking-a". Unato tome što se ta politika upravo po ela razvijati i oblikovati kroz krizu na Balkanu, ona sada zanemaruje proces u enja i iskustva ste enog u tom procesu kao cjelokupnog kapitala te krize. Neophodna je jedna otvorena razmjena o sigurnosnim prijetnjama između u Bruxellesa i zemalja na Balkanu, kako za daljnju integraciju zemalja na Balkanu s EU, tako i za samu EU i njeno daljnje pozicioniranje u susjedstvu ili pojedinim lanicama koje se pokazuju manje stabilnima (Gr ka, Belgija, Portugal...). Rašireno je, i usudio bih se re i, velikim dijelom pogrešno mišljenje u nekim krugovima u Bruxellesu da daljnje proširenje podrazumijeva na neki na in "uvoz nesigurnosti" koja je bila potisnuta na periferiju, u zemlje Balkana. Drugi e re i da je upravo ta nestabilnost i nesigurnost koja postoji u regiji kao inherentna karakteristika, bila razlog zbog ega se taj prostor nije daleko prije integrirao i spojio sa stabilnom i mirnom Europom. Me utim, upravo dokidanje periferizacije, kao jednog od fundamentalnih odnosa u samom donošenju odluka u Bruxellesu, mogao bi biti prvi korak naprijed u oblikovanju sigurnosne politike koja bi bila u mogu nosti integrirati postratno iskustvo i primiti prve lanice koje ga u europsku obitelj donose. Utoliko hipotetski, možemo govoriti i o uvozu sigurnosti ako se ta iskustva pravilno razumiju i koriste. S druge strane preostaje nam više nego temeljno pitanje: jesu li neke zemlje Europske unije, među njima i one

hypothetical cases: the issue of agriculture and the decentralization of food production and the issue of the decentralization of the production of electric energy can serve as examples which enable the emancipation of individual communities from the central system. After that, when the community has secured a steady influx of food and energy resources through renewable sources of energy, it is no longer dependent on the political decision of the system that surrounds it and which has proven to be extremely unstable. Croatia imports more than 50% of its food, and in addition to its gas reserves and a certain amount of renewable hydro-electrical energy, it imports a substantial amount of fuel and power sources. In this case the highly centralized system based on a state-centric concept of security misses out on a chance to increase security through decentralization and infrastructural projects, and remains much more vulnerable to outside forces which could adversely affect the security of the country in the upcoming crises.

The second point of intervention is **"participation"**. By participation I primarily mean the process of taking into consideration all groups with specific security needs, and those members of society who may be endangered by security threats which do not affect the overall population. Participation is thus a necessary aspect of shaping new security policies, due to the fact that it has so far often been reduced to the product or result of the agency of experts which are well-connected to the current elite. The methodology of work in these (non-)public policies in the field of security has proven to be resistant, if not outright allergic, to attempts to introduce more democratic approaches to the policy-making process, by proclaiming the democratic process itself to be a security risk. In that sense, the policy-making process in the field of security needs to be fundamentally changed, by introducing work with focus groups and expert teams and by raising awareness, within the entire infrastructure and general population, of those security issues which hinder overall security and reduce the standard of living. It bears repeating here that the grass-roots approach which calls for a redefining of bottom-up politics is the focal point for shaping the security policies of the future, because it represents a step away from the reductionist approach stemming from the elite-centered security policy-making practices.

A point of contention within the framework of the exchange of experiences between the post-war countries of Southeast Europe and the EU is the process of **"peripherization"**. What needs to be primarily emphasized is the relationship of inequality between these two sides which should be working on formulating new security policies, through interaction, dialogue and cooperation. Brussels is expected to agree to a sort of pragmatic temporary reversal of relations between the centre and the periphery in order to allow experiences from the periphery or from prospective EU member states to be integrated into the central decision-making processes. As we have already mentioned, in the current "business as usual" decision-making conditions such cooperation is limited to the domain of wishful thinking. In spite of the fact that the Balkan crisis was the reason this policy was inaugurated in the first place, the experiences and learning processes it has provided us with, which are the only positive products of the crisis, are now being ignored

sada najjače, pogotovo u ekonomskom krizom, upravo ona okruženja iz kojih zemlje Balkana putem članstva mogu "uvesti sigurnost"? Međutim, EU nije potreban Balkan da bi uvezla sigurnosne prijetnje, sam model daljnjeg razvoja na principu rasta njihove nejednakosti, više je nego dovoljan da generira nove sigurnosne prijetnje.

Posljednje dvije komponente usko su povezane. Sve veće ekonomske razlike, ne samo između europskog sjevera i juga, nego i unutar granica samih država članica EU postaju sve veće sigurnosno pitanje. "**Pauperizacija**" koja se događa uzduž Europe i povremeno eruptira kao u grčkom slučaju, neizostavno je povezana s pitanjem "**privatizacije**" sigurnosti prema kojoj sve veća naklonost imaju privredne i političke elite u EU, ali i regiji. Ta polarizacija nerijetko vodi u slučajeve koji interese privatnog kapitala ili investitora proglašavaju legitimima i javnim, i posredno mobiliziraju javne službe sigurnosti ne bi li obranile njihovo postojanje.<sup>6</sup> Sama mogućnost da se sigurnost osigura putem javnih sredstava ugrađena je u srž europskog jedinstva, u primat privatnog vlasništva, što opet primarno pokazuje ekonomsku motivaciju cijelog projekta ujedinjenja. Međutim, ostaje više nego sporno kada se ona i u kojoj mjeri može suprotstaviti interesima građana, javnosti i demokratske legitimacije. To otvara pitanje kakvu Europu gradimo, kakvoj EU želimo pripadati?

### EUROPSKA SIGURNOST I SOLIDARNOST: KULE OD KARATA ILI WIN-WIN KOMBINACIJA?

Na kraju, ne smijemo zaboraviti da (post)ratno iskustvo, vidimo to i ovih dana iz slučajeva objave Registra branitelja, postoji kao mjesto identiteta za određeni dio građana, individualno i kolektivno. Međutim, neproizvodan i ambivalentan odnos spram tog post-ratnog iskustva dijeli nas od Europske unije više nego samo strateško iskustvo. I dalje prevladava primarno državo-centričan koncept sigurnosti, tek ukrašen prepoznavanjem (ali ne i primjenom) koncepcije ljudske sigurnosti, dakle model sigurnosnih politika u regiji koji generira i održava niz nejednakosti koje za nas predstavljaju sigurnosne prijetnje.

Vrijednosti u pozadini oblikovanja sigurnosnih politika možda su ono što se najčešće i najlakše zaboravlja. Budući da i u samoj Europskoj uniji postoji neka vrsta kakofonije u koncepciji sigurnosti, i budući da ni ona nema potpuno jedinstvenu i harmoniziranu sigurnosnu politiku među državama članicama, ostaje relevantnim pitanje solidarnosti kao ono koje, izgleda još uvijek na krhkim temeljima, osigurava harmonizaciju sigurnosnih politika i funkcija u kreiranju sigurnosti u Europskoj uniji.

Povjerenje i solidarnost među državama članicama Europske unije u najvećoj je krizi dosad. Ono je pak neophodno za sam koncept harmonizacije sigurnosnih politika među državama članicama. Postavlja se pitanje možemo li sigurnost u Europi graditi na izostanku solidarnosti kakva se očituje danas? Ili je EU nakon postkriznog mamurluka potrebna potpuno nova koncepcija si-

<sup>6</sup> Slučaj 'Varšavske' i HOTO grupe, veljača i svibanj 2010. godine.

by the EU. But a sort of open exchange between Brussels and the Balkans on the topic of security threats is necessary, not only for the process of further integration of the Balkan countries into the EU, but also for positioning of the EU itself, or to help current member-states which have proven to be less than stable (Greece, Belgium, Portugal). There is a widespread and in my opinion mostly erroneous school of thought among some circles in Brussels that further expansion entails a sort of "import of instability" which was heretofore contained within the periphery, i.e. the Balkans. Others will say that the instability and insecurity which characterize this region only exist due to the fact that this region hasn't yet been integrated with and accepted into the stable and peaceful European community. However, stopping peripheralization as one of the fundamental forces in the decision-making process in Brussels could be the first step towards forming a security policy which would be able to integrate the post-war experience and accept into the European family the first countries who were marked by that experience.

So, hypothetically, we could consider the import of security, if this experience is properly understood and applied. On the other hand, we are facing a fundamental question: are some of the states of the European Union, including the ones who are currently feeling the most devastating effects of the economic crisis, precisely the sort of environments which would benefit from "imported safety" should the Balkan countries join the Union? But the EU certainly does not wish to import additional security threats from the Balkans, and the developmental model itself, which is based on growing inequalities, is more than enough to generate new security threats on its own.

The final two components are tightly interwoven. The escalating economic differences not only between the European north and south but within state boundaries are becoming a growing security risk. The "**pauperization**" taking place all over Europe, and which occasionally erupts as it did in Greece, is tightly connected to the issue of the "**privatization**" of security which is increasingly becoming a trend within the political and economic elites both in the EU and in this region. This polarization frequently leads to cases in which private capital interests or investments are presented as matters of legitimate public concern, whereby public security services are indirectly mobilized to defend these private interests<sup>6</sup>.

The possibility of ensuring private security by utilizing state resources is embedded in the very core of European unity, in the primacy of private property, which once again demonstrates the primarily economic motivation of the entire unification project. However, it is still a matter of contention whether and to what extent we can allow these interests to overrule the interests of the citizens, the public and democratic legitimacy. The question, then, is: what sort of a Europe are we building, what kind of EU do we want to join?

<sup>6</sup> The case of Varšavska street and the HOTO group, Zagreb, February and May 2010.

gurnosti? Kako oblikovanje sigurnosnih politika u EU ne bi (p)ostalo “sizifov posao” nadajmo se da će “europski demos”, ako takav već postoji, prevladati ovu vrijednosnu krizu, ukinuti ovu lažnu dilemu te stvoriti novi, pobjednički odnos između solidarnosti i sigurnosti.

## EUROPEAN SECURITY AND SOLIDARITY: A HOUSE OF CARDS OR A WIN-WIN SITUATION?

Finally, we must never forget that the (post)war experience exists as a locus of identity for some citizens, both as an individual and a collective experience, as was made evident recently when the Veterans Register was made public. However, the ambivalent and unresolved attitudes towards this post-war experience are a greater roadblock to our EU accession ambitions than the post-war experience in itself. The primarily state-centered security concept is still prevalent, and while it has been cosmetically enriched by the acknowledgment (but not the application!) of the concept of human security, it is still a model of regional security policies which generates and enforces a series of inequalities which pose security threats to our society.

The values behind the process of shaping security policies are something that is usually quickly and easily forgotten. Seeing how the European Union itself abounds with cacophonous interpretations of the concept of security, and in light of the fact that the Union itself doesn't have a unified or harmonic security policy, the remaining relevant issue is the issue of solidarity as a – currently rather fragile – means of bringing harmony to security policies and functions in the process of creating security within the European Union.

The trust and solidarity between the member states of the European Union are undergoing the most serious crisis yet. But solidarity is central to the concept of harmonizing security policies between member states. The question arises: can European security be built on the lack of solidarity which is evident today? Or will the EU, after its post-crisis “hangover”, be faced with formulating a new concept of security? In order to prevent the formation of security policies in the EU from becoming a Sisyphian task, we must hope that the “European demos”, if there is such a thing, will overcome this crisis of values, end this false dilemma, and create a new, winning synergy between solidarity and security.

# RAT KAO PRILIKA

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GORDAN BOSANAC PROGRAMSKI JE VODITELJ CENTRA ZA MIROVNE  
STUDIJE TE DUGOGODIŠNJI MIROVNI I LJUDSKOPRAVAŠKI AKTIVIST.

Europska unija djelomično gradi svoj identitet na Drugom svjetskom ratu. Iako nema sumnje da je primarni interes ujedinjenja bio ekonomski, ideja prevencije sukoba, onako brutalnog i iracionalnog kao što je to bio Drugi svjetski rat, sve više se ugrađivala u vrijednosti Europske unije. Razvoj demokratskih institucija i poštivanje ljudskih prava do danas su se pokazali kao važni mehanizmi prevencije sukoba. Ipak, ti mehanizmi nisu uspjeli prevenirati sukob u neposrednom susjedstvu Europske unije u devedesetim godinama prošlog stoljeća. Je li i tada EU imala izgrađene sigurnosne mehanizme budući da se ispred njenog dvorišta ponavlja brutalnost i iracionalnost prakticiranja nasilja? Odgovor je jednostavan: nije. Upravo zbog toga, ratovi na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, a još više procesi izgradnje mira na tim prostorima od iznimne su vrijednosti za ideju ujedinjene Europe, ali ne samo one ekonomsko-političke, već i teritorijalne. EU je tek nedavno počinjala više promišljati o konceptima ljudske sigurnosti koji bi trebali nadopunjavati klasične sigurnosne politike. U ujedinjenoj Europi sve je manje mjesta nacionalnim sigurnostima pojedinih država članica zbog toga što gube svoj identitet u globalizacijskim procesima, a fokus nacije sve više prelazi na 21. vijek. Da je EU imala mehanizme takvog pogleda na sigurnost u 90-tim godinama, vrlo brzo bi uočila u kojoj mjeri je rat u bivšoj Jugoslaviji bio prijetnja i građanima/kama Unije. Balkanski laboratorij nasilja sada uistinu mora postati prostor "ekperimenta izgradnje mira, povjerenja i nenasilja", ali ne onog zakulisno-izvanjsko-diplomatsko-interesnog, nego prostor pokušaja i pogrešaka građanja društva nenasilja na području bivše Jugoslavije, koji dolazi od samih građana/ki. Zemlje bivše Jugoslavije imaju golemi potencijal da se kroz diskurs izgradnje mira nametnu i tavaj Europi, ali više je nego jasno da su se, po dosadašnjem iskustvu nacionalnih vlada, te kvazi politike izgradnje mira uvijek odvijale s "figom u džepu", tj. najčešće su bile nevjerodostojne. Ukoliko to ne mogu Vlade, možda može civilno društvo.

Izuzetno je važno pratiti koji su to društveni faktori generatori izgradnje mira u postjugoslavenskim zemljama, tko su "vizionari/ke" koji govore o događajima i prije nego li se oni dogode te kako na vrijeme prepoznati i podržati

# WAR AS OPPORTUNITY

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The identity of the European Union is partially built on the Second World War. Although the primary reason for its inception was unquestionably economical in nature, the prevention of conflict, especially as brutal and irrational as the Second World War had been, gradually became one of the core values of the European Union. Developing democratic institutions and upholding human rights have proven to be essential mechanisms of conflict prevention. However, those mechanisms were not sufficient for preventing the conflict in the immediate vicinity of the European Union in the 1990s. If brutal, mindless violence reoccurred in their 'neighbourhood', were European Union's safety mechanisms really fully organized and functional? The answer is simple: they were not. For this exact reason, the wars on the former Yugoslav territory and, even more so, peace building processes on these same territories, are of exceptional value to the united Europe project, not only in economical and political, but also in territorial sense. The EU has only recently started paying more attention to the concepts of human safety as supplements to standard safety policies. There is considerably less room within the European Union for national securities of individual member states, as they are gradually losing their identities through globalization processes. The focus is shifting from the nation towards the human being. Had this outlook been an innate component of its safety mechanisms in the 1990s, the EU would have realized very soon the foreboding effects of the ex-Yugoslav war on the citizens of the Union. The Balkan breeding ground for violence must now truly become "a testing ground for the building of peace, mutual trust, and non-violence," not of the behind the screens-external-diplomatic-opportunistic sort, but space for attempts at building a society of non-violence on the former Yugoslav territories made by the citizens themselves. The former Yugoslav countries hold an enormous potential to distinguish themselves by enforcing peace building discourse. However, the lesson taught by national governments experiences is that these quasi peace building politics generally lack credibility, or, to put it differently, they result in "no dice" situations. If the governments are unable to achieve it, perhaps the answer lies in civic

“vizionare/ke”. Organizacije civilnog društva zasigurno su često bile ispred vremena nacionalnih politika, ali nisu to bile samo one, već i brojne druge inicijative i pojedinci/ke čiji rad nije na vrijeme bio prepoznat i osnažen. Komunikacija s institucijama uvijek je bila obojena odnosima moći i u tom odnosu često, ne nužno zlonamjerno, promaknu poruke koje dolaze od onih koji nisu u poziciji moći.

Ukoliko sada, kao građani koji žive u različitim dijelovima europskog kontinenta, želimo bolje sigurnosne mehanizme, nego što smo ih izgradili na dosadašnjim sukobima, moramo graditi naš sigurnosni kapital upravo na ostacima rata na Balkanu. Iako zvuči paradoksalno, iskustvo rata bi moglo postati strateškom prednošću zemalja bivše Jugoslavije. No, postoji i opasnost da se taj kapital materijalizira u novim sukobima, politikama laži i manipulacijama, a ne u politikama ljudske sigurnosti i izgradnje mira.

### JE LI SE PREVIŠE TOGA PROMIJENILO U ZADNJIH DVADESET GODINA?

Sigurnosni kontekst početka rata na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije uvelike se promijenio u zadnjih 20 godina. Nema sumnje da se glavni uzroci nastanka konflikta moraju primarno tražiti upravo na području bivše Jugoslavije, među tadašnjim političkim vođama, ali i u činjenici da se “model Jugoslavije”, kao primjer iznimno popularne zemlje komunističkog/socijalističkog uređenja, u tadašnjim međunarodnim odnosima, nije pokazao kao uspješna podloga za transformaciju sukoba. Do danas su napravljene brojne analize uzroka raspada Jugoslavije kroz iznimne količine nasilja. Teško je, naravno i pomisliti da se ikada dobiti jasna zajednička slika koji su sve faktori utjecali na eskalaciju nasilja u zemlji koja je glasila kao svijetao primjer izmeću tadašnjih blokovskih podjela. Bilo kako bilo, rat tj. nasilje intenzivno su obilježili stvaranje novih zemalja, nastalih raspadom bivše Jugoslavije. Kao iz svakog nasilja, želja nam je naučiti lekcije i probati stvoriti društvene mehanizme koji bi bili dobri indikatori ranog upozorenja mogući nastojanja eskalacije nasilja. Pri tome odmah treba odmaknuti svaku iluziju da je moguće napraviti jednostavan model s indikatorima koji bi putem matematičke preciznosti mogli dati jasne signale upozorenja na mogućnost eskalacije nasilja među ljudima. Ipak, ono što je moguće, je barem uvidjeti greške koje su činjene u prošlosti, ne nužno kako se one ne bi ponovile, već zbog toga kako bi svi zajedno, što bolje razumjeli što se dogodilo tih godina na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Vjerojatno je niz pogrešaka koje su tada činjene danas puno vidljiviji, nego li je to itko mogao razaznati u tadašnjem društveno-političkom kontekstu. Tako npr. visoka stopa militarizacije bivše Jugoslavije (izdvajanja za BDP, utjecaj časnika na političke odluke i sl.) danas izgleda zastrašujuće, ali u to isto vrijeme izražena militarizacija bila je prisutna i u pojedinim demokratskim zemljama. Većina analitičara se slaže kako je Jugoslavija na kraju postala izjednačena samo sa svojom vojskom dok su se državne institucije polako rastapale. Naime, rastapanje vojske nije išlo podjednakim tempom kao što je išlo rastapanje države. Politizacija procesa raspada Jugoslavije kao da je na neki način, većina revolucionarnim uzletima stvaranja nacionalnih država, previdjela kako će se, osim instucija države, urušavati i institucije vojske. S druge strane, vojska

society initiatives.

It is of utmost importance to observe which social elements initiate peace building processes in the former Yugoslav countries; to recognize and support various “visionaries” who are able to predict events before they occur. Civic society organizations were frequently ahead of government politics, and so were numerous other group or individual initiatives whose work unfortunately was not recognized and encouraged on time. Communication with institutions is always filtered through power relations, and in this relationship, messages coming from those who do not hold the positions of power are often, intentionally or not, overlooked.

If we, the citizens of different parts of the European continent, seek better safety mechanisms than those we have built on past conflicts, we must build our safety capital on the very remnants of the Balkan war. As paradoxical as it may seem, the experience of war should today present a strategic advantage for the former Yugoslavian countries. The tragic backside of this potential is its capacity to develop into new conflicts and politics of lies and manipulation, instead of politics of human safety and peace building.

### WERE THERE TOO MANY CHANGES IN THE PAST TWENTY YEARS?

The safety context preceding the beginning of the war on the former Yugoslav territories changed significantly during the last twenty years. The reasons for the escalation of conflict certainly lie within former Yugoslav territories and their political leaders of the time, but also in the fact that the model of Yugoslavia, internationally recognized as a successful communist socialist state, had proven unproductive for conflict transformation. Numerous analyses of what contributed to the violent breakup of Yugoslavia have been made so far. Obviously, it would be pointless even to consider a fully comprehensive overview of the elements which contributed to the escalation of violence in the country that had previously had a reputation of a bright exemplary model of the then bloc divisions. In any case, the new sovereign territories that emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia were all intensely marked by war and violence. As with any case of violence, we wish to draw lessons and attempt to create social mechanisms that might indicate an early warning sign to prevent potential bloodshed in the future. It would be wrong to delude ourselves into believing that a simple model containing indicators that could send mathematically precise distress signals about potential escalations of violence can be created. However, it is possible to learn from the mistakes of the past, not only to avoid repeating them, but to gain a better understanding of what happened on the former Yugoslav territories at the time. Many of those mistakes are more likely noticeable today than they were in the socio-political context of that time. For example, the high level of militarization in the former Yugoslavia (GDP earmark rates, officers influencing political decisions, etc.) looks frightening in hindsight, but at that time, increasing levels of militarization were typical even for some democratic countries. Most political analysts agree that high levels of militarization were ultimately the only thing the Yugoslav countries had in common,



se logi no pokazala kao puno tvr a prepreka koja je pod krinkom "o uvanja Jugoslavije" našla novog zapovjednika, Slobodana Miloševića.

Primjer (ne)transformacije tadašnje Jugoslavenske narodne armije samo je jedan od niza mogućih argumenata zašto je došlo do nasilja u raspadu Jugoslavije. Ali uz taj primjer, jedan od dominantnijih argumenata, svakako je izrazito loš proces suočavanja s prošloš u građana/ki tadašnje Jugoslavije. Naime, zanimljiva je činjenica da su u Jugoslaviji generacije ljudi odgajane na antifašisti kim filmovima u kojima partizani suvereno kalašnjikovima ubijaju fašiste, izvode diverzantske akcije, a ti filmovi istovremeno prikazuju i strahote nacističkih logora u kojima je živote izgubilo na tisuće ljudi. Čitave generacije odgajane su na gotovo indoktriniranim posjetima koncentracijskim logorima, na učenju o pogubnosti fašizma, i onda, odjednom, preko noći, te iste generacije grade neke nove logore i u njima provode mučenja kakva su gledali i na filmovima. Nešto je bilo pogrešno, a to je bio selektivan pristup povijesti u kojem brojni društveni konflikti nisu komunicirali zbog deficita demokracije u javnom prostoru, a komunikacija se odvijala unutar emigracijskih skupina ili obiteljskih krugova. Dakle, Jugoslavija je svakako poivala na dijelu prešućene povijesti, isto kao što se šutnja nametala i po završetku ratova pri raspadu Jugoslavije, a pogotovo u novonastalom postratnom vremenu kada je bilo na tisuće primjera zataškavanja zločina i ekstremnog nasilja. Proces suočavanja s prošloš u bio je potpuna nepoznanica za tadašnju Jugoslaviju, kao i za novonastale države. Ipak, vremena se mijenjaju i na globalnom planu dolazi do osnivanja Međunarodnog kaznenog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju (MKSJ) koji pokušava individualizirati krivnju i pokušava pristupiti nasilju više iz pozicije ljudske, nego nacionalne sigurnosti. Naravno, u tome teško uspijeva jer se prvenstveno doživljava kao prijetnja nacionalnim sigurnostima zemalja nastalih raspadom Jugoslavije, ali istovremeno dolazi do utvrđivanja činjenica koje je nemoguće više osporavati. Kasnije se osniva i Međunarodni kazneni sud (MKS) koji nema jurisdikciju nad "balkanskim sukobom", ali je važan novi instrument progona zločina koji će biti počinjeni u nekim novim sukobima. Oba spomenuta suda nisu postojala, niti je netko mogao o njima razmišljati za vrijeme početka raspada Jugoslavije. Ali čak i danas, nekoliko godina nakon prestanka konflikta, postaje jasno da samo taj sudsko-kazneni pristup kažnjavanja zločina ne može biti dovoljan, već da je potrebno paralelno razvijati komplementarne modele tranzicione pravde po uzoru na ideju osnivanja Regionalne komisije za utvrđivanje činjenica o ratnim zločinima i teškim povredama ljudskih prava na području bivše Jugoslavije (REKOM). Utvrđivanje činjenica, bilježenja tj. dokumentiranje zločina pokazuju se kao iznimno važna komponenta, kako u ratnom tako i u postratnom periodu. Naime, možemo govoriti da je kvalitetno bilježenje zločina i otvaranje rasprave o pojedinim zločinima, u mirnodobskom vremenu, važan osigurač preveniranja sukoba. Upravo zbog toga je potrebno u javne politike ugraditi kvalitetne mehanizme utvrđivanja činjenica o zločinima, pogotovo o onima koji se na lak način mogu generalizirati i pretvoriti u šire sukobe. Tako danas, u 21. stoljeću u prijetnje teroristi kim napadima ne smiju ostati samo u domeni rada obavještajnih zajednica, već se i oko svakog potencijalnog terorističkog napada moraju utvrditi činjenice, što se, kada i gdje dogodilo te o tim oblicima nasilja treba razgovarati u javnosti.

while government institutions were gradually becoming more disintegrated. The disintegration of army and the disintegration of the state developed at different paces. Politicization of the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia through revolutionary national upheavals had, in a way, anticipated the collapse of both government and military institutions. On the other hand, the military logically turned out to be a much formidable obstacle; under the guise of "safeguarding Yugoslavia", a new leader emerged: Slobodan Milošević.

The situation with the Yugoslav People's Army is only one in a series of possible arguments for the escalation of violence during the fall of Yugoslavia. Another strong reason is Yugoslav people's extremely distorted way of dealing with the past. One particularly interesting example is the fact that several generations of Yugoslavians were raised on antifascist films depicting partisans heroically conducting commando raids and killing fascists with Kalashnikovs, while at the same time portraying the atrocities of Nazi concentration camps, where thousands of people had died. These same generations brought up on indoctrinating crusades to concentration camps and teachings on disastrous nature of fascism, suddenly, overnight, turned to constructing their own torture camps, just like the ones they have seen in the movies. There was something very wrong. Their selective approach to history was just as erroneous: numerous social conflicts were never publicly communicated due to the lack of democracy; this type of communication occurred only within emigrant groups or within family circles. Yugoslavia was, therefore, clearly founded on suppression of parts of its history. That same suppression was imposed during the breakup of Yugoslavia and the beginning of the war, and especially in immediate post-war period of covering up thousands of cases of crimes and extreme violence. Yugoslavia, as well as the newly founded states, had an extremely hard time facing the past. Times change, however, and with the founding of the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) attempts were made at the individualisation of guilt and approaching violence from a less national and more human viewpoint. These attempts still operate, although, naturally, under considerable difficulties, because the newly founded states primarily see the Tribunal as a threat to their national securities, but, at the same time, new facts are being established beyond the point of refutation. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been established at a later date. Although it has no jurisdiction over "the Balkan war", it still represents an important new device in battling crimes committed in further conflicts. Neither ICTY nor ICC existed (or could have existed) at the time when Yugoslavia started falling apart. However, years after the war had ended, it became clear that judicial criminal proceedings alone would not suffice, and that dealing with this matter would require parallel developing of complementary models of transitional justice. One of such models is founding of the Regional Commission for Establishing Facts about War Crimes and other Serious Human Rights Violations in the former Yugoslavia (RECOM). Establishment of facts and documentation of crimes have proven to be an essential component in both war and post-war periods. On principle, we might say that carefully rendered accounts of crimes and open debates on particular cases provide a safety device for prevention of

## REKOM KAO MODEL POSTRATNOG OPORAVKA, ALI I MOGUĆNOST PREVENCIJE SUKOBA

Jedna od najdinamičnijih inicijativa civilnog društva s područja bivše Jugoslavije, svakako je pokušaj uspostavljanja Regionalne komisije za utvrđivanje činjenica o ratnim zločinima i teškim povredama ljudskih prava na području bivše Jugoslavije (REKOM). Države nastale raspadom Jugoslavije nisu kroz državne/stranake strukture uspjele na i snagu pokrenuti tako važan proces suočavanja s prošlost, u, nakon brojnih ratnih razaranja. Srećom, tu aktivnost preuzeli su građani i građanke okupljeni u razne nevladine udruge. Ciljevi REKOM-a su (prema još neusvojenom statutu):

- A/ utvrđivanje činjenica o ratovima/oružanim sukobima i o ratnim zločinima i teškim kršenjima ljudskih prava počinjenim na području SFRJ u razdoblju od 1. siječnja 1991. do 31. prosinca 2001. godine;
- B/ doprinos rasvjetljavanju sudbine nestalih;
- C/ priznanje nanesenih nepravdi žrtvama i obnova njihovog dostojanstva, uspostavljanje mehanizama i razvijanje prakse suosjećanja i solidarnosti;
- D/ doprinos uspostavljanju povjerenja među narodima, pojedincima i državama nastalim nakon raspada SFRJ i doprinos trajnom miru i stabilnosti u regiji;
- E/ doprinos afirmaciji demokracije i kulture ljudskih prava kroz daljnji rad na unapređenju odgovornosti pravnih i političkih institucija, medija i obrazovnog sustava u državama ugovornicama.

Bez obzira hoće li REKOM u konačnici uspjeti ili ne, već sam konzultacijski proces oko ideje osnivanja REKOM-a, kroz koji je prošlo preko 5.000 građana/ki s područja bivše Jugoslavije, iznimno je važan mehanizam postratnog oporavka. Za istim stolom konzultirale su se brojne "zarađene strane", od udruga za zaštitu prava do udruga veterana i udruga žrtava rata. Pokazalo se koliko je važno razgovarati o onome što se događalo u ratu, i već same konzultacije doprinijele su smanjenju tenzija između različitih društvenih skupina, nastalih kao posljedice rata. REKOM ne doprinosi samo postratnom oporavku društva, već radi i na sprječavanju budućih sukoba, koji bi mogli biti motivirani na nečinjenim tvrdnjama o nasilju iz povijesti.

Ovdje možemo postaviti pitanje zašto bi Europskoj uniji, odnosno zašto bi građanima i građankama Europske unije trebalo biti važno da postoji REKOM? Argument koji se često javlja u javnom prostoru je svakako potreba za stabilizacijom i demokratizacijom regije. Radi se o vrlo važnom političkom argumentu s kojim se manje–više slažem, ali mi se čini da postoji ipak još nešto više. Građanima i građankama Europske unije nije u interesu, kao ni političarima i političarkama Europske unije, sama stabilizacija i demokratizacija regije (koju nazivamo raznim imenima: Balkan, jugozapadna Europa, zemlje nastale raspadom bivše Jugoslavije itd.), već se čini da postoji još neka dodatna potreba za razumijevanjem onoga što se dogodilo nakon raspada Jugoslavije. Ta potreba ne leži nužno samo u postratnoj regiji, već i u samoj Europskoj uniji, a uočava se kroz propitivanje ima li potrebe da dje-

conflict during peacetime. It is, for this exact reason, necessary to incorporate quality mechanisms for establishing facts about war crimes, particularly those that are susceptible to generalizations and can easily result in wider conflicts, into public policies. Today in 21<sup>st</sup> century, terrorist attack threats must not remain solely inside the domain of central intelligence investigation, but the facts (when, where and what happened) surrounding every potential terrorist attack has to be firmly established, and these forms of violence have to be publicly discussed.

## RECOM – A MODEL FOR POST-WAR RECOVERY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

The establishment of the Regional Commission tasked with establishing the facts about war crimes and other serious violations of human rights committed during the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM) is unquestionably one of the most dynamic civic initiatives in the post-Yugoslav countries. The newly emerged states' government institutions were not able to initiate such an important process of facing the past after war devastations. Fortunately, the citizen members of various non-government organizations took on this initiative. RECOM's goals (according to the Statute that is still not officially adopted) are:

- A/ establishing the facts about wars/armed conflicts and war crimes and other serious violations of human rights committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the period between 1<sup>st</sup> January 1991 and 31<sup>st</sup> December 2001;
- B/ contributing to resolving the fate of the missing;
- C/ recognizing injustices inflicted upon the victims and restoring their dignity, developing the practice of compassion and solidarity;
- D/ contributing to establishing mutual trust among the nations, individuals and the countries formed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and to maintaining peace and stability in the region;
- E/ contributing to affirmation of democracy and the culture of human rights through continuation of work on promoting responsibilities of legal and political institutions, the media and educational system in post-Yugoslav states.

No matter what the outcome of the RECOM initiative eventually turns out to be, the very consultative process about the establishment of RECOM, counting over 5.000 participants from the former Yugoslav territories, represents an extremely important mechanism of post-war recovery. The consultations brought together representatives of various "warring parties": from associations for the protection of human rights, to war veterans associations and associations of victims. The consultations demonstrated the importance of dialogue about everything that happened during the war, and they contributed to the decreasing of war-induced tension among different social groups. RECOM does not only work on post-war social recovery, but also towards preventing any potential conflicts in the future motivated by non-factual assertions about the violence that occurred in the past.

aci i djevojice Europske unije možda u e o doga ajima u Srebrenici, ili u Vukovaru, ili u Kninu, kao i o mnogim brojnim mjestima stradanja. Naime, mi i dan danas u regiji vodimo brojne polemike kada i kako teme vezane uz zadnje sukobe trebaju u i u obrazovne kurikulume. Moje je mišljenje da je jednako važno pitanje ho e li i kada, dje aci i djevojice u Belgiji, u Njema -koj, Francuskoj u iti o onome što se dogodilo raspadom Jugoslavije. Time dolazimo do važnog argumenta zašto je REKOM važan, ne samo za nas na Balkanu, nego i za Europsku uniju, i injenica je da e Europska unija, htjela ili ne htjela, morati graditi dio svog identiteta i na temelju sukoba koji se dogodio na Balkanu, kao što ga i djelomi no gradi na temelju sukoba koji se dogodio u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Kako sada stvari stoje države nastale raspadom bivše Jugoslavije vrlo vjerojatno e prije ili poslije postati lanice Europske unije. Ukoliko su demokratizacija i stabilizacija, a ja bih rekao i nenasilje, nešto što Europska unija prepoznaje kao svoju vrijednost, tada je u svakom slu aju, ratni sukob nešto što je neizbježno o emu se mora u iti u osnovnim i srednjim školama jer povijest tog sukoba postaje i dio povijesti proširenja Europske unije. U tom smislu, ako je Balkan bio laboratorij nasilja u devedesetim godinama prošlog stolje a, sada imamo novu priliku da Balkan i Europska unija postanu laboratoriji pokušaja kreiranja politike izgradnje mira koja e se temeljiti na ljudskoj sigurnosti. Naime, unutar Europske unije i dalje se puno diskutira kako kreirati vanjsku i sigurnosnu politiku, a dobra je vijest da danas sve više prepoznavamo komponente onoga što zovemo ljudskom sigurnoš u i izgradnjom mira i upravo je REKOM jedan od mehanizama koji bi mogao pomo i Europskoj uniji u izgradnji demokratizacije, stabilizacije i prevencije sukoba.

Naravno, oko uspostavljanja REKOM-a postoje brojni izazovi i opasnosti da itava inicijativa ne uspije. Ovdje bih izdvojio, po osobnom mišljenju, jednu važnu, na elnu prepreku, a to je da se na vrijeme ne prepoznaju važne poruke koje esto dolaze upravo od gra ana/ki, tj. da te poruke dobivaju politi ku podršku onog trenutka kada postaju nasilne. Jedan takav primjer odavno nam je poznat s podru ja tadašnje Jugoslavije u kojoj su još 80-tih godina prošlog stolje a gra ani i gra anke današnjeg Kosova masovno nenasilno demonstrirali i pružali nenasilan otpor tadašnjoj vrlo restriktivnoj politici koja se nad njima provodila. Njihov otpor apsolutno nitko nije shva ao ozbiljno do onog trenutka kada se oni nisu po eli naoružavati. Militarizacijom svojeg otpora dobivaju na politi kom legitimitetu. Takva praksa mora postati neprihvatljiva. Tako mi se ini sada i za REKOM. Iza ideje o osnivanju REKOM–a, dakle, ne stoji nikakva vojska, REKOM nema svoje tajne službe. Kad bi REKOM postao teroristi ka organizacija možda bi dobio više legitimiteta, nego što ga ima sada, što je naravno potpuno besmisleno. Zato je važno mijenjati diskurs i shvatiti da ono što nazivamo *mehanizmom ranog upozorenja* mora biti prepoznato kao gra anska inicijativa te je bitno primarno prepoznati nenasilan otpor, kao nešto što je politi ki relevantno. Stoga je potrebno da se donositelji odluka ne fasciniraju nasiljem, ve upravo suprotno, da budu fascinirani nenasiljem, tj. da se na vrijeme ponudi politi ki legitimitet onim inicijativama koje ve jesu nenasilne i koje su gra anske.

Here we could ask why the European Union, or its citizens, should care about the existence of RECOM. One of the recurring public arguments is most certainly the need to stabilize and democratize the region. It is a very important political argument which I more or less agree with, but I think there has to be something more. Stabilization and democratization of the region (which bears numerous names – the Balkans, south-western Europe, countries formed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, etc.) are not the only points of interest for citizens and politicians of the European Union. There is also the need to understand what happened after the breakup of Yugoslavia. This need is not only present in the post-war region, but also in the European Union itself, where it is reflected in the question of whether the children in the European Union should learn about the events in Srebrenica, Vukovar, Knin, and many other war-stricken territories. Even in the region there are still discussions about when and how the topics related to the most violent aspects of the war should be included in the educational curricula, although in my opinion it is equally important whether and when the children in Belgium, Germany, or France will learn about the events ensuing from the fall of Yugoslavia. Here we encounter a crucial reason for the importance of RECOM not only for us in the Balkans, but also for the European Union, which is the fact that the European Union will necessarily build its identity in part on the Balkan armed conflict, as it already does on the Second World War. Judging from the present state of things, the countries formed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia will probably eventually become members of the European Union. Since democratization, stabilization and, in my opinion, non-violence are recognized values of the European Union, then war conflict is an inevitable part of elementary and high-school curriculum, because the history of that conflict enters the history of the expansion of the European Union. In that sense, if the Balkans were a breeding ground for violence in the 1990s, now we have a new opportunity to make the Balkans and the European Union a breeding ground for the creation of the politics of peace building that would be based on human safety. Within the European Union, the issues of its foreign and safety policies are still actively discussed, and the good news is that today these discussions pay more attention to the elements we call human safety and peace building. RECOM is one of the mechanisms that could contribute to stabilization, democratization and conflict prevention within the European Union.

Of course, numerous challenges and dangers of failure surround the RECOM initiative. I would like here to place emphasis on one principal obstacle, which I find to be of extreme importance: most often, important messages coming from the citizens are not politically recognized and endorsed until the moment they become aggressive. One such notable example happened in the 1980s Yugoslavia, when the citizens of today's Kosovo held peaceful mass demonstrations giving non-violent resistance to the restrictive politics imposed on them. Nobody took them seriously until the moment they decided to arm themselves. By militarizing their resistance, they gained political credibility. This type of practice has to become unacceptable. In my belief, this could also be applied to RECOM. The idea of founding RECOM is not backed by any army; RECOM does not have its secret intelligence. If RECOM



## VAŽNOST DOKUMENTIRANJA NASILJA

Svako društvo obiluje brojnim sukobima i oblicima nasilja koji nisu nužno vidljivi na površini ili koji se zbog različitih interesa prešućuju. Gotovo da ne postoje sustavni izvještaji o opsegu nasilja u pojedinim zemljama i jedna od ideja je svakako pošteniji i kvalitetniji i sustavniji monitorirati pojavnosti nasilja u našim društvima. Ulogu u tom procesu moraju imati i države i civilno društvo. Temeljem analize pojavnosti nasilja potrebno je otvarati javne rasprave koje se govore što otvorenije o sukobu koji je podloga za navedenu pojavnost nasilja. Istovremeno, da bi se o sukobu moglo konstruktivno razgovarati potrebno je da sudionici rasprave posjeduju i vještine upravljanja sukobom i razumijevanja nenasilja. Te vještine primarno se mogu steći i kroz sustavnu mirovnu edukaciju koja je i danas na marginama obrazovnih sustava. S vremenom, edukacija za ljudska prava postaje konstitutivni dio obrazovnog sustava, ali samo u onim zemljama gdje i potrebne vještine za upravljanje sukobom. Štoviše, u različitim dijelovima svijeta u kojima je paradigma ljudskih prava nije uzela toliko maha kao u preostalim dijelovima svijeta, može se pojaviti otpor prema obrazovanju za ljudska prava, premda te zemlje mogu biti otvorenije za mirovno obrazovanje.

O važnosti pravovremenog otvaranja sukoba i prikupljanja činjenica o pojavnosti nasilja svjedoče i tri javne rasprave koje su sprovedene u sklopu skupljanja preporuka s prostora bivše Jugoslavije za sigurnosnu politiku Europske unije. Naime, gotovo svaka rasprava bila je opterećena "suočavanjem s prošlosti", na način da je bilo teško fokusirano govoriti o temi te su govornici sudionici/ca rasprave stalno bježali u povijesne činjenice ili tvrdnje. Tu se postavlja pitanje je li uopće moguće voditi bilo kakvu raspravu u postratnom periodu koja na neki način ne može biti opterećena prošlosti? To nije, samo ovaj mali primjer pokazuje koliko je važno raditi na transformaciji sukoba i traumama nastalim ratnim stradanjima.

Kao zaključak izdvajam konkretne prijedloge koji nam možda mogu pomoći i kako pri prevenciji sukoba tako i pri ublažavanju posljedica nasilja:

- 1/ potrebno je sustavno pratiti pojavnost nasilja u društvu kroz praćenje i izvještavanje o manifestiranju nasilja i svih njegovih oblika (uvesti godišnje izvještaje o pojavnosti nasilja) te prikupljati činjenice o nasilju neovisno o količini sukoba i sudskih procesa koje prate određene pojavnosti nasilja;
- 2/ temeljem primijećenih oblika nasilja organizirati što više javnih rasprava na temu određene vrste nasilja i na taj način otvarati sukob u društvu;
- 3/ kvalitetno upravljati otvorenim sukobima i pravovremeno osigurati da sudionici rasprave budu dobro educirani kako upravljati sukobima – uvoditi mirovno obrazovanje u obrazovne sustave;
- 4/ u slučaju veće eskalacije nasilja ili međunarodne intervencije, od početka same pojave nasilja potrebno je osnaživati aktere za nadziranje povreda ljudskih prava i pojave nasilja. Dakle, nije dovoljno čekati da nasilje prođe pa onda krenuti s prikupljanjem podataka, već to prikupljanje mora biti organizirano (u granicama mogućnosti) od početka do kraja nasilja;

was to become a terrorist organization, perhaps it would gain credibility a lot sooner, which is, of course, completely absurd. For this reason, it is important to change the current discourse and to recognize that the so-called *early warning* mechanism most often begins with civic initiatives, which only stresses the importance of taking non-violent resistance as politically relevant. It is necessary here that the decision makers are not fascinated by violence, but on the contrary, that they are fascinated by non-violence. In other words, political legitimacy should be given to those initiatives that are civic and non-violent.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF DOCUMENTING VIOLENCE

Every society abounds in numerous conflicts and forms of aggression that are not necessarily visible on the surface, and are often, for various reasons, ignored. There are virtually no systematic reports on the scale of violence in individual countries, and one particular idea is to initiate a better and more systemic monitoring of the occurrence of violence in our societies. Both governments and civic society should have a role in this process. Based on the analysis of the occurrences of violence, it is necessary to open public debates that would allow free discussions of the conflict underlying a particular instance of aggression. At the same time, in order to enable a constructive discussion about the conflict in question, it is important that the participants of that discussion possess conflict managing skills and deeper understanding of non-violence. Those skills can be acquired through systematic peace education, which still remains on the margins of educational system. With time, as human rights education increasingly becomes constitutive part of an educational system, it still does not provide the skills for managing conflicts. More so, in different parts of the world, where the entire human rights paradigm is comparatively undeveloped, it is possible to meet resistance towards education on human rights, while at the same time those countries could be much more open to peace education.

Three public debates were conducted on the former Yugoslav territory as part of collecting recommendations for the European Union security policy. Almost every discussion was burdened with "facing the past" in a way that made it difficult to focus on the subject at hand, and the participants continually digressed into historical facts or claims. The question arises whether it is at all possible to have a discussion in a post-war period that would in no way be burdened by the past. This small example demonstrates how important it is to work on the transformation of conflict and trauma resulting from war atrocities.

Let us conclude this text with concrete examples that may help us in the prevention of conflict or alleviation of the consequences of aggression:

- 1/ it is necessary to systematically track the occurrences of violence within society by monitoring and reporting on manifestations of violence in all its forms (introducing annual reports on the occurrences of violence), and to collect factual information about violence independent of the quantity of conflicts and judicial procedures following particular occur-

- 5/ osim već usvojenih sudskih procesa sankcioniranja nasilja potrebno je razvijati komplementarne modele tranzicione pravde iz pozicije žrtava, koji doprinose upravljanju sukobom;
- 6/ pojavnost nasilja primarno razumijevati kroz koncept ljudske sigurnosti – razumjeti što ono čini svakom čovjeku, a ne nužno samo kolektivnim identitetima;
- 7/ pravovremeno dati politici legitimitet nenasilnim građanskim inicijativama koje upozoravaju na društvene nepravde;

- 2/ to organize, based on collected factual information, as many public discussions on particular types of aggression as possible, thus making all social conflicts open to public;
- 3/ providing quality management of open conflicts by assuring that the participants of debates about conflicts have better education in conflict management – to incorporate peace education into official educational systems;
- 4/ in cases of major escalation of violence or international intervention, it is crucial to immediately start developing and strengthening mechanisms for the monitoring of human rights violations and aggression. Therefore, it is inadequate to wait for the violence to stop in order to start collecting data. The process of collecting data must be organized (within limits of possibility) from the very beginnings of aggression;
- 5/ Complimentary to the established judicial procedures for the sanctioning of violence, dealing with this matter requires developing victim-centred models of transitional justice that would contribute to conflict management;
- 6/ To comprehend violent occurrences through the concept of human security – to understand what it does to an average person, and not only to collective identities
- 7/ To adequately recognize political legitimacy of non-violent civic initiatives that can make us aware of social injustice;

# POSLIJERATNA IZGRADNJA MIRA U ISTOJ HRVATSKOJ

/ MIROVNI TIMOVI KAO PRIVREMENA MIROVNA STRUKTURA

AUTORICA:  
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KATARINA KRUHONJA DUGOGODIŠNJA JE MIROVNA AKTIVISTICA, JEDNA JE OD OSNIVAČICA CENTRA ZA MIR, NENASILJE I LJUDSKA PRAVA IZ OSIJEKA (CZM) – ORGANIZACIJE KOJA JE NASTALA 1992. KAO DIO ARK-A. KATARINA SE UNUTAR CZM BAVI POSLIJERATNOM IZGRADNjom MIRA U RATOM ZAHVAENIM LOKALNIM ZAJEDNICAMA, ZAŠTITOM I PROMOVIRANJEM LJUDSKIH PRAVA I SLOBODA, TE PROMICANJEM KREATIVNIH METODA RJEŠAVANJA SUKOBA NA INDIVIDUALNOJ, GRUPNOJ I POLITIČKOJ RAZINI.

Misija UNTAES-a<sup>1</sup> smatra se jednom od najuspješnijih mirovnih misija UN-a, kako u Hrvatskoj tako i u svijetu. Isto na Slavonija, Baranja i zapadni Srijem su jedino ratom zahvaeno područje RH koje je kroz četiri godine bilo pod kontrolom tzv. "Srpske Krajine" i zaštite UN-a, a u RH reintegrirano mirnim putem. Provedbu mirovnog sporazuma između u RH i predstavnika srpskog stanovništva potpisanog u Erdutu<sup>2</sup> 1995. godine provodio je UNTAES tijekom dvogodišnjeg mandata (1996. – 1998.). Uspjeh mandata pripisuje se postojanju političke volje na obje strane, cjelovito postavljenom mandatu s jasno definiranim ciljevima te odlučnom provedbom plana od strane karizmatičnog umirovljenog generala Jacques P. Kleina u svim područjima - vojnom, civilnom (uključujući i političko) te civilnodruštvenom. Civilnodruštvena nastojanja manje su poznata i priznata iako su bila važna komponenta mirovnog procesa prije, za vrijeme i nakon UNTAES-ovog mandata mirne integracije.<sup>3</sup>

Dvogodišnji mandat UN-a okončan je provedbom lokalnih izbora i postav-

- 1 Prijelazna uprava Ujedinjenih naroda za istočnu Slavoniju, Baranju i zapadni Srijem
- 2 Erdutski sporazum – osnovni sporazum o području Istočne Slavonije, Baranje i Zapadnog Srijema potpisan je 12. studenog 1995. godine
- 3 U ljeto 1994. godine suradnjom lokalnih i međunarodnih mirovnih organizacija otpočeli su susreti u Martinskoj, na neutralnom terenu, prvo mirovnih aktivista/tica, a kasnije građana razdvojenih crtom bojišnice (u razdoblju od 1994. – 1996. godine susrelo se je 1.600 osoba na dijaloškim radionicama u "Kući" i susreta u Mohaču). Tim je preuzeo mandat, generalu Kleinu je predstavljena koordinacija od 10 mirovnih organizacija iz Hrvatske i tri iz Srbije koje su sudjelovale u organiziranju tih susreta. Dobili smo dozvolu da svoje aktivnosti prebacimo u UNTAES zonu te je oko stotinjak mirovnih aktivista/ica svakodnevno ulazilo u Podunavlje. Pratili smo prognanike u prvim posjetama njihovim selima i kućama, organizirali smo susrete mještana, radili smo na sprječavanju incidenata te pružali pomoć srpskom stanovništvu da dobije hrvatske dokumente.

# POST WAR PEACE BUILDING IN EASTERN CROATIA

/ PEACE TEAMS AS AN INTERIM PEACE STRUCTURE

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KATARINA KRUHONJA IS AN EXPERIENCED PEACE ACTIVIST AND ONE OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE CENTER FOR PEACE, NON-VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS FROM OSIJEK – AN ORGANISATION FORMED IN 1992. AS A PART OF THE CROATIAN ANTI-WAR CAMPAIGN (ARK), KATARINA'S MAIN INTEREST IS POST-WAR PEACE BUILDING IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES, PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROMOTION OF CREATIVE METHODS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ON PERSONAL, GROUP AND POLITICAL LEVEL.

The UNTAES<sup>1</sup> mission is considered one of the most successful UN peace missions, both in Croatia and the world. Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium were the only war-affected areas of the Republic of Croatia under the control of so called "Srpska Krajina" and the UN protection to be peacefully reintegrated into Croatia. Implementation of the peace agreement between the Government and representatives of the Serbian population, signed in Erdut<sup>2</sup> in 1995, was conducted by the UNTAES during the two year term (1996 -1998). Its success is attributed to the existence of political will on both sides, a clear mandate with clear objectives and, finally, decisive implementation of the plan by the charismatic retired General Jacques P. Klein in all three areas: military, civilian (including political) and civic society. The efforts of the civil society are less known and recognized although they were important component of the peace process before, during and after the UNTAES mandate of peaceful integration<sup>3</sup>.

- 1 United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
- 2 Erdut Agreement – the Basic Agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, signed on the 12<sup>th</sup> of Nov 1995
- 3 As a result of cooperation between local / regional and international peace organizations the meetings between the peace activists started to take place in Hungary, which was considered a neutral ground, in the summer of 1994. It was soon to be followed by the meetings of citizens separated by the front line. 1,600 people met at dialogue workshops in the "Meeting House" in Mohacs during the period 1994 to 1996. Upon taking over the mandate, General Klein was introduced to a coordination of ten peace organizations from Croatia and three from Serbia that participated in organizing these meetings. We received permission to shift our activities to UNTAES zone and about a hundred peace activists would enter the Danube basin on a daily basis. We accompanied the refugees when they first visited their villages and homes. We also organized the meetings of the locals and worked on preventing incidents, as well as assisted the Serbian population in obtaining Croatian documents.

ljanjem lokalne vlasti. Međutim, povratak prognanika trebao je tek otpočeti. Obzirom na visoku razinu predrasuda, nepovjerenja i strahova između u ratom razdvojenog stanovništva, postojala je realna prijetnja od incidenata i mogućeg daljnjeg odlaska srpskog dijela stanovništva.

Petogodišnji projekt koji su zajednički oblikovali Centar za mir, nenasilje i ljudska prava – Osijek i Life&Peace Institut iz Upsale, **Izgradnja demokratskog društva temeljenog na kulturi nenasilje – poslijeratna izgradnja mira u istočnoj Hrvatskoj** (1998. – 2003.) imao je za cilj premostiti razdoblje neposredno nakon odlaska UNTAES-a. Naime, iako je na papiru postojao, Nacionalni program za povratak i obnovu povjerenja, nikada nije zaživio – bio je tek argument za međunarodnu zajednicu. Nije bilo ikakve sustavne podrške obnovi povjerenja ili prevenciji međuetničkih sukoba (osim rada policije).

Projekt se temeljio na početnim iskustvima rada CZM-a na povratku prognanika u mjesta s multietničkim sastavom stanovništva i na iskustvima međunarodnih mirovnih timova, prilagođenih okolnostima i mogućnostima koje pruža međunarodna intervencija u sukob. Oblikovanje projekta trajalo je oko godinu dana, a prijelazna ga je uprava UN-a ocijenila vrlo korisnim. Na žalost, nije ga mogla podržati materijalno niti je uspjela pomoći u ulazak projekta u Nacionalni program za povratak i obnovu povjerenja Vlade RH.

Temeljne konceptijske postavke projekta, a koje je praksa potvrdila, bile su sljedeće:

- / Za zaustavljanje, preusmjeravanje sukoba i obnavljanje društvene zajednice nakon sukoba do razine održivosti mirnodopskog života potrebno je razdoblje podjednako dužini trajanja sukoba.
- / Tijekom i neposredno nakon nastavka mirovnih misija međunarodne zajednice nužno je planski, kreativno, dovoljno dugo i sveobuhvatno raditi na pozitivnom preusmjeravanju sukoba na svim razinama društva, pri čemu je u poslijeratnim situacijama civilno društvo gotovo u pravilu potpuno razoreno ili nerazvijeno.
- / Radi se o prijelazu iz rata ka miru i prema demokraciji koja se ne postiže proglašom, koja se ne može "dogoditi" sama od sebe nego je potrebno jačati odgovornost i sudjelovanje građana.
- / Relevantno je kakvom društvu težimo: odabrali smo pridonijeti građaninju pravednijeg društva koje njeguje mir nenasilnim putem (koje je rezistentnije na rješavanje nepravdi i problema nasiljem i ratom). Napredovanje prema takvom društvu je, vrijednosno određeno s obzirom na: ulogu pojedinca u društvu (aktivno sudjelovanje građana); na način i smisao organiziranja skupine (samoorganiziranje i drugačije dijeljenje moći – možemo "sa" umjesto "moći" i "nad"); i s obzirom na viziju društva – zajednice/civilnog društva (koje podrazumijeva solidarnost i brigu o slabijima, neupitnost ljudskih prava, promicanje kulture odbijanja autoritarnih modela organiziranja, odlučivanja i postizanja cilja, kao i razbijanje straha od javne izloženosti i vidljivosti)<sup>4</sup>.
- / Rat je gotovo posve uništio zajednicu kao mjesto zajedništva i povjerenja

4 Ana Raffai, trenerica nenasilnog djelovanja

The two-year UN mandate ended with the holding of local elections and forming a local government. However, the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) was yet to begin. Given the high level of prejudice, mistrust and fear among the population divided by war there was a real threat of further incidents and the possible departure of the Serbian population.

The five-year project that was formed by the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights (CFP) from Osijek and the Life and Peace Institute from Uppsala, called **Building a Democratic Society Based on the Culture of Nonviolence - the Post war Peace Building in Eastern Croatia** (1998-2003), was aimed at overcoming the period immediately after the departure of UNTAES. In fact, although it existed on paper, the National Programme for Return and Restoration of Trust never came to life - it was just an argument for the international community. There was not any systematic support for restoration of trust or interethnic conflict prevention (other than policing).

The project was based on the initial experience of CFP's involvement in the return of IDPs to places with a multi-ethnic composition of the population. It was also based on the experience of international peace teams, adjusted to conditions and opportunities offered by international intervention in conflict. Designing of the project lasted about a year and it was marked as very useful by the transitional UN administration. Unfortunately, they were not able to financially support the project or help it become a part of the Croatian Government National Programme for Return and Restoration of Trust programme.

The basic conceptual settings of the project, confirmed in practice, were as follows:

- / To stop and divert the conflict and restore the community after the conflict to the level of sustainability of a peaceful life, we need a period of equal duration of the conflict.
- / During and immediately after the continuation of the international community peace missions it is essential to work creatively, comprehensively, long enough and to plan on a positive redirection of the conflict at all levels of society, whereas in post-war situations civil society is almost completely destroyed or undeveloped as a rule.
- / It is a transition from war to peace and democracy that cannot be achieved by proclamation, which will not "happen" by itself, but through strengthening citizen participation and accountability.
- / It is relevant to what sort of society we are aiming at: we have chosen to contribute to building a just society that nurtures peace through non-violent method (which is resistant to solving problems of injustice with violence and war). Progress toward such a society is value-determined with respect to: the role of the individual in society (active participation of citizens); the manner and goal of organizing groups (self-organizing and a different division of power - the power "with" instead of power "over"); and with regard to the vision of society - community / civil society (which includes solidarity and care for the powerless, an unquestionable respect of human rights, promoting the culture of rejection of

(zajednicu razumijevamo kao prostornu i funkcionalnu povezanost oko dobara, kulture i tradicije u kome postoji svijest o tome da kvaliteta života, poželjna budućnost i zajednička nada ovise o ljudskoj povezanosti i povjerenju). Zato je bilo, po našem mišljenju, nužno graditi i "od dole" i biti s ljudima koji se fizički vraćaju/ostaju u tako razorenim zajednicama.

Stoga smo izgradnji mira u ranom post-konfliktnom i prijelaznom razdoblju pristupili na razini lokalnih multi-etničkih zajednica s ciljem **osnaživanja građana za suradnju na izgradnji mira u vlastitoj zajednici** oslanjajući se na **privremenu mirovnu strukturu** – mrežu mirovnih timova multi-etničkog i međunarodnog sastava. Imaju i u vidu kako je za izgradnju održivog mira neposredno nakon intervencije treće strane u sukob (u ovom slučaju UN misija) potrebno uložiti značajne vremenske, ljudske i materijalne resurse, projekt je planiran za 2-5 godišnje razdoblje.

### MIROVNI TIMOVI – PRIVREMENA MIROVNA STRUKTURA

Odlučuju se za formiranje multi-etničkih mirovnih timova koristili smo ranija iskustva iz svijeta, posebno međunarodnih monitoring timova za vrijeme izbora u Južnoafričkoj Republici kada je srušena vlada aparthejda te primjer organiziranja zajednica u Americi usmjerenog na prevladavanje rasne netrpeljivosti i segregacije programom aktivnog slušanja pri čemu su u timovima bili zajedno bijelci i crnci<sup>5</sup>. Također, za obuku mirovnih timova, korišten je kurikulum za trening mirovnih radnika (Osnaživanje za mirovnu službu<sup>6</sup>) koji je nastao na temelju ranijih iskustava i suradnje veće međunarodne skupine trenera za nenasilno djelovanje i izgradnju mira (u toj su grupi iz Hrvatske bili prof.dr. Ladislav Bogнар i Katarina Kruhонja iz CZM-a). Naime, pojedinačna iskustva na različitim mjestima i u različitim okolnostima prošlog stoljeća ukazuju na potencijal nenasilnog djelovanja te na postojanje potrebe da se izgradnji mira nakon rata, ili u prevenciji oružanih sukoba, pristupi jednako skrupulozno kao i stvaranju i održavanju vojnih struktura. Logičan i nužan korak bio je obuka, odnosno razvijanje kurikuluma za obuku za izgradnju mira.

Mirovni timovi CZM-a u istočnoj Hrvatskoj bili su poput implantata otok i a "živog tkiva" koji će u lokalnim zajednicama biti model suradnje preko etničkih granica, djelovati poput katalizatora za osnaživanje i uključivanje mještana i mještanki u gradnju mira u vlastitoj zajednici nenasilnim putem, povezivati ta mjesta –odnosno mirovna nastojanja ljudi iz tih malih (slabo poznatih) mjesta međusobno i sa međunarodnom mirovnom mrežom.

Provedba projekta započela je, dakle, obukom budućih članova i članica mi-

- 5 Organizacija "Rural Voice of the South for Peace" iz SAD-a je ovu metodu koristila u svom radu. Herb Walters je poučavao Mirovne timove o metodi i pomogao da se prilagodi potrebama na terenu. Detaljnije u "Grassroot Listening and Organizing"; Walters, Herb; Rural Southern Voice for Peace, 1992
- 6 Empowerment for Peace Service, A Curriculum for Education and Training in Violence Prevention, Nonviolent Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding, Christian Council of Sweden, 1996

authoritarian models of organizing, decision making and achieving goals as well as breaking the fear of public exposure and visibility)<sup>4</sup>.

- / The war has almost entirely destroyed the community as a place of togetherness and trust (community is understood as the spatial and functional relationship around the property and goods, culture and tradition in which there is awareness that the quality of life, a desirable future and common hopes depend on human relationships and trust). Therefore, it was, in our opinion, necessary to build from grass root level and be with people who are physically returning / remaining in the ravaged communities.

Thus, our approach to peace building in the early post-conflict and transitional period was at the level of local multi-ethnic community with the aim of **empowering people to collaborate on peace building in their own community**, relying on an **interim peacekeeping structure** - a network of peace teams of multi-ethnic and international composition. Bearing in mind that building a sustainable peace immediately after the third-party intervention in conflict (in this case, the UN mission), significant time, human and material resources are needed to be invested, the project was scheduled for 2-5 year period.

### PEACE TEAMS - INTERIM PEACE STRUCTURE

When deciding about the formation of multiethnic peace teams we used some earlier experience in the world, especially those of the international monitoring teams during the elections in South Africa when the apartheid government was brought down. We also used the example of community organization in United States of America focused on overcoming racial intolerance and segregation through the program of active listening; the teams involved were comprised of representatives of both white and black communities<sup>5</sup>. Also, for the purposes of training the peace teams, a training curriculum for peace workers (Strengthening the Peace service<sup>6</sup>) was used. It was the result of previous experience and cooperation between major international group of trainers for nonviolent action and peace building (the Croatian contingent of the group comprised dr Ladislav Bogнар and Katarina Kruhонja, both from CFP). In explanation, individual experience gained in different places and under different circumstances of the last century point out the great potential of nonviolent action. It also shows the existence of a need for an approach to peace building after the war to be as scrupulous as the creation and maintenance of military structures. Thus, training was the logical and necessary step to take, that is, to develop curriculum for peace building training.

- 4 Ana Raffai, a coach of Non-violent actions
- 5 US organisation called 'Rural Voice of the South for Peace' used this method in their work. Herb Walters taught the Peace teams about the method and helped to adjust it to the needs in field. More details in 'Grass root Listening and Organising'; Walters, Herb; Rural Southern Voice for Peace, 1992
- 6 Empowerment for Peace Service, A Curriculum for Education and Training in Violence Prevention, Nonviolent Conflict Transformation and Peace Building, Christian Council of Sweden, 1996



rovnih timova. Kroz desetotjednu obuku u lloku tih dvadesetiosam muškaraca i žena su se upoznali, utvrdili zajedničke vrijednosti, stavovi i vizije povezuju, raspravili su – ili bar otvorili pitanja koja su bila prepreka međusobnom povjerenju (radilo se o mladim ljudima različitih etničkih pripadnosti i iskustva rata na različitim stranama), gradili to povjerenje te stekli uvid u vještine korisne za rad u ratom razdijeljenim i povrijeđenim zajednicama. Sami su se, prema međusobnim sklonostima, formirali u timove i odabrali zajednice u kojima su željeli raditi. Zatim su, kroz tjedan dana, na temelju analize stanja i trendova u tim zajednicama i okruženju, oblikovali viziju poželjne budućnosti mirovnih timova u tim zajednicama te, u skladu s tom vizijom, napravili plan rada.

Rad mirovnih timova na terenu započeo je početkom 1999. godine u zajednicama Tenja, Dalj, Beli Manastir, Vukovar i Okučani. Mirovni su timovi kroz tri godine u ratnom poslijeratnom razdoblju, i kroz idućih tri godine, radili kao potpora procesima oporavka i mirnodopskog organiziranja u 10 multietničkih zajednica u istočnoj Hrvatskoj te Posavini, BiH (Bilje, Beli Manastir, Berak, Dalj, Tenje, Vukovar, Okučani, te Novo Selo, Kolibe i Zborište u Posavini).

Nekoliko je osnovnih aktivnosti koje su mirovni timovi provodili u zajednicama:

- / program slušanja,
- / aktivnosti obnove zajednice proizašle iz programa slušanja,
- / obrazovanje odraslih i psihosocijalni razvitak,
- / tečajevi izgradnje kapaciteta i zajednice,
- / izgradnja mira osnaživanjem žena, mladih i članova/ica vjerskih zajednica,
- / izgradnja mira kroz medije i kulturu,
- / procjena utjecaja na lokalne zajednice.

### TEMELJ MIROVNOG RADA – POVJERENJE I UVAŽAVANJE: PROGRAM SLUŠANJA

Za građenje povjerenja i ulazak u zajednice te otpočinjanje aktivnosti mirovnih su timovi koristili metodu koju nazivamo **program slušanja**<sup>7</sup>. Riječ je obliku interaktivnog istraživačkog pristupa izgradnji mira i zajednice tj. oružju u organiziranju zajednice. Osnovni i najvažniji princip programa slušanja je aktivno nenasilje i pokušaj suočavanja s problemima i ljudima u duhu povjerenja i istine. Osnovu metode programa slušanja čini razgovor koji provodi tim od dva mirova radnika s jednom osobom iz zajednice koristeći pri tom vještine aktivnog (empatijskog) slušanja. Intervjui su otvorenog tipa, sa polustrukturiranim upitnicima. Pitanja su podijeljena u nekoliko tematskih cjelina među kojima izdvajamo: život prije rata; ratno iskustvo; komunikacija između i unutar grupacija; stavovi prema perspektivama pomirenja; problemi zajednice; sugestije za rješenja prepoznatih problema te osobna spremnost za

7 Metoda razvijena od strane Herba Waltersa iz organizacije "Rural Voice of the South for Peace" iz SAD-a. Prvi put metodu smo primijenili u projektu potpore povratka u Pakrac i Bilje sredinom 1990-ih.

CFP peace teams in eastern Croatia were like implant islets of "living tissue". It would be the model of cooperation between local communities beyond ethnic boundaries and would act as a catalyst for empowerment and involvement of the locals in building peace in their own communities through nonviolence. This model would help people from small places to connect more efficiently with each other and the international network in their efforts to maintain peace.

The implementation of the project began with the training of future members of peace teams. Through ten weeks of training in Ilok, twenty eight men and women were acquainted. They found their common ground, what values, attitudes and visions connected them. The teams also discussed, or at least opened, the issues that were obstacles to mutual trust (the participants were young people of different ethnicities and experience of war from both sides). Soon, they built confidence and gained an insight into useful skills for working in war-divided and hurt communities. According to their mutual affinities they formed themselves, by themselves, into teams and chose the communities which they wanted to work in. Within a week time they shaped the vision of desirable future peace teams, based on analysis of the situation and trends in the communities. In accordance with that vision a working plan was also made.

The work of the peace teams on the ground began in the early 1999 in the communities of Tenja, Dalj, Beli Manastir, Vukovar and Okučani. In the following six years the peace teams worked as a support to the healing processes and peacetime organisation of the 10 multi-ethnic communities in eastern Croatia (Bilje, Beli Manastir, Berak, Dalj, Tenja, Vukovar, Okučani) and Posavina, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Novo Selo, Kolibe and Zborište). There were several basic activities that the peace teams carried out in the communities:

- / listening project,
- / actions to restore the community; arising from the program of listening
- / adult education and their psychosocial development
- / courses and capacity building community
- / peace building through empowering women, youth and the members of the religious community
- / building peace through the media and culture
- / assessment of impacts on local communities.

### THE FOUNDATION OF PEACE WORK - TRUST AND RESPECT: THE LISTENING PROJECT

To build trust, join the community and start with the activities, the peace teams used a method called the **listening project**<sup>7</sup>. It is a form of interactive research approach to peace and community building, that is, a tool of

7 A method developed by Herbert Walters from the organisation 'Rural Voice of the South for Peace', USA. The first time we applied this method was during the project of support to return to Pakrac and Bilje in mid 1990-ies.

ukljućivanje u razvoj zajednice i aktivnosti izgradnje mira. Vrlo važan element programa slušanja je analiza i izrada detaljnog izvještaja o tomu što se u zajednici čulo te vraćanje informacije zajednici – to je prvi korak kako jedna grupacija čuje drugu.

Naime, u ranoj poslijeratnoj fazi, neposredno nakon povratka, nije bilo moguće mještane jedne grupacije izravno suočiti s drugom. Potreban je bio posrednik i tu su ulogu preuzeli članovi mirovnih timova. Ukupno je provedeno 1027 osnovnih intervjua u 9 zajednica te 312 tematskih intervjua (program slušanja sa specifičnim ciljevima i na specifičnoj populaciji).

Nakon oko godinu dana započelo se s uključivanjem članova/ica lokalnih zajednica u program slušanja u ulozi slušača/ica. Oni mještani/ke koji su imali poticaj čuti "drugu stranu" prošli su obuku i u paru sa članom mirovnog tima i sami obavljali intervjue. Ta se faza, "mještani slušaju mještane", smatra važnim korakom koji vodi osnovnom cilju – uspostavi komunikacije i obnovi povjerenja u zajednici. Istovremeno, to predstavlja i mogućnost potpunog osamostaljenja lokalnih inicijativa u građenju civilnog društva. Ukupno je provedeno 632 intervjua o ovoj fazi (u Baranji, Berku, Tenji i Okučanima).

Nakon dvogodišnje primjene programa slušanja provedena je procjena primjene i u inakve metode. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju da program slušanja zajedno s drugim mirovnim aktivnostima osnažuje one koji ga provode, kao i one koje se sluša i to tako da se reduciraju njihove predrasude i strahovi u odnosu na drugu etničku skupinu, da se unaprijeđuje komunikacija s drugom etničkom skupinom i da se pojačava njihova motivacija za sudjelovanje u mirovnim aktivnostima.<sup>8</sup>

Također, ispituju i utjecaj svih mirovnih aktivnosti na zajednice u kojima je proveden program slušanja, ustanovljeno je da je misija mirovnih timova u zajednicama prepoznatljiva, uglavnom su izgradili odnos povjerenja te postali prepoznatljivo mjesto susreta. Uočena je, međutim, velika psihička izloženost mirovnih radnika/ica sekundarnom stresu te je upozoreno na potrebu sustavnijeg nadgledanja i kontrole pregaranja.<sup>9</sup>

### OSNAŽIVANJE ZA RAD U ZAJEDNICI – PRVI KORACI KA SURADNJI

Program slušanja je bio polazište za sveobuhvatne aktivnosti izgradnje zajednice koje su odraz potreba zajednice i u kojima mještani/ke imaju motivaciju (a u ranom postkonfliktnom razdoblju i hrabrosti) sudjelovati. Mirovni timovi su na temelju rezultata programa slušanja pokretali aktivnosti uvažavajući i nalaze intervjua te su ove bile različite od zajednice do zajednice. No sve su temeljene na istim vrijednostima i istim principima tj. osnaživanju – **osnaživanje nije rad za zajednicu, već rad sa zajednicom.** Pored obnav-

8 "Utjecaj Programa slušanja na osnaživanje onih koji slušaju, kao i onih koje se sluša, za mirovni rad u zajednici"; Mandić, S., Osijek, 2000

9 "Impact Assessment – Procjena utjecaja"; Jordan, J.; Škrabalo, M.; Društvo za psihološku pomoć; Osijek, 2000.

how to organise a community. The basic and most important principle of the program of listening is active non-violence and the attempt of coping with problems and people in a spirit of trust and truth. Fundamentals of this program are comprised of a conversation conducted by a team of two peace workers with one person from the community using the skills of the active (emphatic) listening. The interviews were of an open type, with semi-structured questionnaires. Questions were divided into several thematic groups of which we would like to highlight the following: life before the war; wartime experience; communication between and within groups; attitudes toward the prospects of reconciliation; problems within communities; suggestions for the solution of identified problems and personal willingness to engage in community development and peace building activities. A very important element of the listening project is the analysis and preparation of detailed reports on what has been heard in the community. A feedback is then given to the community on gathered information - this is the first step in finding out how one group hears the other.

In the early post war phase, immediately after their return, it was not possible to directly face the locals of one group with the other. There was a need for a mediator and this role was taken by the members or peace teams. A total of 1,027 primary interviews were conducted in 9 communities and 312 thematic interviews (listening program with specific objectives and aimed at specific population). After about a year we started with the involvement of locals in the program as listeners. Those residents which had an incentive to hear the "other side" have passed the training. In pairs, with a member of the peace team, they performed their own interviews. This phase, "the locals listen to local people," is considered an important step that leads to the main objective - the establishment of communication and restoration of trust in the community. At the same time, it also represents the possibility of complete independence of local initiatives in building civil society. A total of 632 interviews were conducted in this phase (in Baranja, Berak, and Tenja and Okučani).

After two years of implementation of the listening project an assessment of its implementation was carried out, the effects of this method were also evaluated. The results indicate that together with the other peace building activities the listening project empowers those who are conducting it, as well as those who are being listened in a way that reduces their prejudices and fears towards other ethnic groups, promote communication with amongst the groups and increases their motivation to participate in peacekeeping activities.<sup>8</sup>

Also, evaluating the impact of peace building activities in the communities in which the listening project was implemented, the conclusion was that the mission of peace teams was recognisable within communities. In most cases they managed to build a relationship of trust and became a well known

8 "Influence of the listening project on empowering those who listen, as well as those who are being listened, for a community peace work"; Mandić, S., Osijek, 2000

ljanja odre enog stupnja povjerenja u zajednici, te su aktivnosti imale elemente me uetni ke suradnje. U kasnijim fazama lanovi zajednice postaju inicijatori i nositelji aktivnosti.

Primjeri aktivnosti u pojedinim zajednicama su:

#### BELI MANASTIR:

- / Radionice iz programa Alternative nasilju
- / Tematski program slušanja romske zajednice
- / Program za umirovljenike u selu Popovac

#### BERAK:

- / Igraonice za predškolsku djecu
- / Program slušanja "Slušajmo naše stare"
- / Ure enje mjesnog doma
- / Otvaranje kluba mladih

#### DALJ:

- / Predstavljanje kreditnih programa
- / Tribina o ovisnosti i nasilju u obitelji
- / Informati ke radionice
- / Rad kluba mladih
- / Obnavljanje prostora za vatrogasce
- / Radionice za o nenasilnoj komunikaciji za mlade i aktiviste vatrogasnog društva

#### OKU ANI:

- / Oku ani u cvije u – prva zajedni ka akcija mještana
- / Me uvjerni ka suradnja na obnovi povjerenja
- / Rad s braniteljima na proradi traume i angažmanu na obnovi zajednice
- / Obnova najstarije zgrade u Oku anima (uz volonterski doprinos mještana)
- / Dani kulture mira

#### SLAVONSKI BROD (ZA ZAJEDNICE NOVO SELO I KOLIBE):

- / Radionice krojenja
- / Kreativne radionice za žene
- / Frizerski te aj

#### TENJA:

- / Akcija iš enja Tenje
- / Obnavljanje šahovskog kluba
- / Prikupljanje igra aka za dje ji vrti
- / Akcije solidarnosti – humanitarna pomo za najsiromašnije
- / Edukacija o uzgoju povr a u plastenicima

meeting place. However, a large mental exposure to secondary stress was established among peace workers and concerns were raised regarding the need for more systematic monitoring and burnout control.<sup>9</sup>

#### EMPOWERING IN ORDER TO WORK IN THE COMMUNITY - THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD COOPERATION

The listening project was a starting point for comprehensive community building activities that were the reflection of community needs and in which the residents will have the motivation to participate (in the early post-conflict period courage was also required). Based on the results of the listening project peace teams started to implement listening activities taking into consideration the interview results and were different from community to community. Still they were all based on the same values and principles, that is, empowerment - **empowerment is not working for the community but working with the community**. In addition to restoring some degree of trust in the community those activities had elements of inter-ethnic cooperation. In later stages community members became initiators and proponents of activities.

Examples of activities in the communities are:

#### BELI MANASTIR:

- / Workshops from the program Alternatives to Violence
- / Themed program of listening to the Roma community
- / Program for retirees in the village of Popovac

#### BERAK:

- / Playgroups for preschool children
- / Listening project 'Listen to our elders'
- / Decoration of a local lodge
- / Opening of Youth Clubs

#### DALJ:

- / Presentation of the loan programs
- / Discussion about addiction and family violence
- / Computer Workshop
- / Youth Club activities
- / Renovation of the fire fighters' house
- / Workshop on non-violent communication for young people and Fire Brigade activists

#### OKU ANI:

- / Oku ani in Flowers - the first joint action by the locals
- / Inter-religion cooperation to rebuild trust
- / Working with veterans to help them deal with their traumas and involve them in community restoration

9 'Impact Assessment': Jordan, J; Skrabalo, M; Society for psychological help: Osijek, 2000



## OSOBNI RAZVOJ - OSNAŽIVANJE ZA SUDJELOVANJE U MIROVNOM RADU

**Obrazovanje i psiho-socijalni razvitak** planirani su kao jedan od ključnih elemenata sveobuhvatnog programa izgradnje mira. Radionice i predavanja bile su namijenjene članovima lokalnih zajednica, posebno uglednim i utjecajnim mještanima i mještankama. Zanimljivo je da rano poslijeratno razdoblje oblikovano je pet tematskih radionica za specifične potrebe područja. Teme su birane s ciljem izdizanja iz uloge žrtve i stanja apatije na razinu pozitivnog psiho-socijalnog razvoja koji vodi k aktivnom sudjelovanju u različitim načinima izgradnje mira i demokratizacije:

- / Upravljanje sukobom – kreativni odgovor na sukob
- / Civilno društvo i demokracija
- / Isključenje i zagrljaj (radionica o pomirenju)
- / Trauma i samo-pomoć
- / Participatorno dizajniranje i upravljanje organizacijom

Radionice su uvijek bile višednevne, neke i u više ciklusa, rezidencijalnog tipa kako bi se stvorilo okruženje socijalnog "otoka" poticajnog za rad na sebi i razmjenju sa drugim sudionicima/cama. Kroz te je programe u 5 godina prošlo 215 osoba.

Procjenjujući i uvođenje obrazovnih programa na sudionike i zajednicu istraživači ističu da je projektu uspjelo u ruralna područja uvesti neformalne obrazovne metode utemeljene na nenasilju, ljudskim pravima, individualnoj i kolektivnoj akciji.<sup>10</sup>

Istaknuli bismo kako je za uključivanje, povezivanje i suradnju od velike pomoći i koristi bio program participatornog dizajniranja i upravljanja organizacijom. Organizirana je trodnevna radionica za pet novonastajućih organizacija koje su mirovni timovi podržavali na terenu. Tijekom radionice svaka se od uključenih organizacija usuglasila oko poželjne budućnosti za svoju organizaciju, zajedničke misije i vizije, strategijskog plana te način upravljanja. U drugoj fazi projekta (četvrte-pete godine) uspjeli smo organizirati participatorno planiranje poželjne budućnosti lokalnih zajednica u kojima su do tada već postojale lokalne građanske inicijative (Beli Manastir, Tenje, Osijek, Dalj). U svakoj od tih zajednica ovaj je interaktivni, participatorni program pridonio boljem razumijevanju izmeđusobnih odnosa lokalne zajednice, posebno, izmeđusobne samouprave i građanskih inicijativa što je rezultiralo redukcijom predrasuda i otvaranjem za odnose temeljene na partnerstvu i suradnji<sup>11</sup>.

## NEUTRALNI OBRAZOVNI TEČAJEVI KAO INSTRUMENT IZGRADNJE POVJERENJA

Oslanjajući se na međunarodna iskustva, pretpostavili smo da u situacijama

<sup>10</sup> "Impact Assessment – Procjena utjecaja"; Jordan, J.; Škrabalo, M.; Društvo za psihološku pomoć; Osijek, 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Predstavnici organizacija civilnoga društva iz Belog Manastira doslovce opisuju da je nakon tog planiranja nastala "nova era" u odnosima sa lokalnom samoupravom. Danas, primjerice, imaju kućnu upravu koju im je na korištenje dala lokalna uprava.

- / Restoration of the oldest buildings in Okučani (with voluntary contribution from the locals)
- / Days of Culture and Peace

## SLAVONSKI BROD (FOR THE COMMUNITIES OF NOVO SELO AND KOLIBE)

- / Tailoring Workshops
- / Creative Workshops for Women
- / Hairdressers' course

## TENJA:

- / Action of Cleaning Tenja
- / Restoration of the Chess Club
- / Collecting toys for kindergarten
- / Solidarity actions - humanitarian aid for the poorest
- / Education on growing vegetables in greenhouses

## PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT - EMPOWERMENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN PEACE WORK

**Education and psycho-social development** are planned as one of the key elements of comprehensive peace-building. Workshops and lectures were held for members of local communities, especially the prominent and influential locals. In the early post war period five thematic workshops were formed on specific areas of need. Themes were selected with the aim of rising from the role of victim and the state of apathy to the level of positive psycho-social development that leads to active participation in various forms of peace building and democratization:

- / Conflict management - a creative response to conflict
- / Civil Society and Democracy
- / Exclusion and Embrace (workshops on reconciliation)
- / Trauma and self-help
- / Participatory design and organization management

Workshops always lasted several days, some even in multiple cycles. They were of residential type in order to create a social environment "islands" which would enable participants to work on themselves and exchange experience with other participants. In the period of five years 215 people participated through these programs.

Evaluating the effects of educational programs on community participants, researchers emphasize that the project managed to introduce non-formal educational methods based on non-violence, human rights, individual and collective action in rural areas.<sup>10</sup>

We would like to point out that the program of participatory design and organisation management was of great help when it comes to inclusion, contacting and cooperation. A three-day workshop was organised for five newly established organizations that supported the peace teams in the field.

<sup>10</sup> "Impact Assessment"; Jordan, J.; Škrabalo, M.; Society for psychological help; Osijek, 2000

koje su prenapete za direktnu raspravu o pitanjima sukoba ljudi ipak mogu biti spremni susresti se kako bi dijelili neosobno, **neutralno obrazovno iskustvo** koje im je u interesu. Tako smo organizirali tečajeve iz popularnih područja (tzv. neutralne aktivnosti) nakon što su se mirovni timovi dobro integrirali u zajednicu te je njihova misija postala prepoznatljiva i prihvatljiva mještanima. Takva se strategija pokazala korisnom jer je željeni učinak postignut – okupljene su etnički miješane skupine s dobrom grupnom dinamikom. Isti se princip koristio i za procese izgradnje povjerenja između mještanina susjednih zajednica, različitog etničkog sastava stanovništva. Organiziranje neutralnih aktivnosti poput informativnih ili kreativnih radionica, tečajeva stranih jezika i organske poljoprivrede su korištene i u svrhu izgradnje povjerenja između mirovnih timova i mještanina jedne etničke skupine u slučajevima izražene podijeljenosti i međuetničke napetosti u vrlo malim zajednicama (npr. u Berku). Neposredna je evaluacija učinaka ovakvih aktivnosti na umanjivanje predrasuda i strahova te otvaranje komunikacije vrlo pozitivna. Pri tome se podrazumijeva da su takve aktivnosti i planirane, a i provedene tako da budu instrument obnove komunikacije i povjerenja. Sudionici fokusnih grupa su naglašavali potrebu za više susreta oko “konkretnih” stvari.

### OSNAŽIVANJE ŽENA ZA IZGRADNJU MIRA

U urbanim sredinama žene više uključene u organizacijama civilnog društva, bilo da je riječ o mirovnim, humanitarnim ili organizacijama za zaštitu ljudskih prava. Ova je činjenica u vrijeme postavljanja projekta bila razlogom da se dio aktivnosti fokusira na okupljanje i **osnaživanje žena za izgradnju mira** i zajednice u mjestima u kojima su djelovali mirovni timovi. Oko 200 žena bilo je uključeno u različite programe osnaživanja i potpore kako bi dobile znanja i vještine potrebne da djeluju kao posrednice promjena i preobrazbi u svojim mikro-sredinama. U prvoj fazi provedbe projekta su u gotovo svim zajednicama okupljene manje skupine žena. Svrha tih okupljanja bila je građenje osobnog i skupnog povjerenja, a različiti interesi pojedinih skupina kretali su se od kreativnog rada ili molitvenih skupina do humanitarnog rada. Dvije su ključne teškoće s kojima su se mirovni timovi suojavali pri osnivanju i podržavanju takvih skupina: etnička podijeljenost tj. društveni pritisak vezan uz etničku podijeljenost i tradicionalni odgoj. Koliko je god bilo teško okupiti više-nacionalnu skupinu žena iz istog mjesta, podjednako je teško bilo i nadvladati ustaljene odnose i načine ponašanja skupina mještanica makar pripadnice iste etničke skupine. U oba slučaja pokazalo se korisnim okupiti žene iz različitih, makar susjednih, mjesta. Kako su same sudionice istaknule, bilo im je lakše, barem u početku, susresti se i započeti komunikaciju sa ženama koje do tada nisu poznavale.

### RAD S DJECOM I OSNAŽIVANJE MLADIH

Sve su zajednice u programu slušanja ocijenile da je rad s **djecom i mladima** ključan – kao izraz brige jer su uvjeti života djece i mladih u tom poslijeratnom periodu bili posebno teški i kao zalag za bolju budućnost. Vrlo dobrim aktivnostima su ocijenjene rad Kluba mladih u Dalju, kampovi za djecu te razni seminari. Odrasli su svjesni da mladi iz takvih aktivnosti donose kući

During the workshop each of the participating organizations agreed about a desirable future for their organization, shared mission and vision, strategic plan and management methods. In the second phase of the project (fourth-fifth year), we managed to organize the participatory planning of a desirable future of local communities in those communities which local civil initiatives had previously been strengthened up (Beli Manastir, Tenja, Osijek, etc.). In each of these communities this interactive, participatory program contributed to a better understanding between different stakeholders of the local community, particularly between local authorities and civil initiatives, which resulted in the reduction of prejudice and open to relations based on partnership and cooperation.<sup>11</sup>

### NEUTRAL TRAINING COURSES AS AN INSTRUMENT OF BUILDING TRUST

Relying on international experience, we assumed that in situations that are tense for a direct discussion of issues of conflict, people can still be willing to meet to share impersonal, **neutral educational experience** that is in their interest. Therefore we organized courses in popular areas (known as a neutral activity) after the peace teams got well integrated into the community and their mission has become a recognizable and acceptable to the locals. Such a strategy proved useful because the desired effect was achieved - the crowd was ethnically mixed with good group dynamics. The same principle is used for the process of building trust between residents of neighbouring communities of different ethnic composition of the population. Organizing neutral activities such as information technology or creative workshops, courses of foreign languages and organic agriculture were used in order to build trust between the peace teams and local people of an ethnic group in the cases of visible fragmentation and inter-ethnic tensions in very small communities (e.g. Berak). Immediate evaluation of the effects of these activities aimed at the reduction of prejudice and fear, and opening of communication is very positive. Thereby it is understood that such activities are planned and implemented so as to be an instrument of restoration of communication and trust. Participants in focus groups stressed the need for more meetings to discuss “concrete” things.

### EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN FOR PEACE-BUILDING

In urban areas women make up the majority of civil society, whether it is a peacekeeping, humanitarian, or human rights organisation. At the time of the project this fact was the reason that some activities will focus on bringing together and empowering women to peace building and community in places where the peace teams were active. Approximately 200 women were included in various programs of empowerment and support to gain knowledge and skills necessary to act as agents of change and transformati-

<sup>11</sup> Representatives of civil society organizations from Beli Manastir described the period after the planning as a “new era” in relationship with the local self-administration. Nowadays, for example, they have a house that has been given to them by the local government.

druk i ja mišljenja i stavove i da ih se u e iskazivati, poti u i tako prakticirane tolerancije. Kako u našoj kulturi postoji tendencija ka prevelikoj zaštiti mladih, članovi mirovnih timova su morali imati na umu dvije stvari: potrebu zajednice da brine o svojoj djeci i mladima te potrebu mladih za razvojem i samostalnošću. Važno je mudro balansirati između navedenih potreba, što u ovom slučaju nije bilo nimalo lako, naročito zato što su rad s mladima provodili uglavnom mladi članovi timova, osposobljeni za ovo, ali bez puno iskustva. U prvo ime vrijeme bilo lakše raditi za mlade, a ne sa mladima, što se pošlo mijenjati tek fokusiranjem na osnaživanje pri strategijskom i akcijskom planiranju aktivnosti.

### ODNOS MIROVNIH TIMOVA I VJERSKIH ZAJEDNICA

Bilo smo svjesni kako je **rad s vjernicima i suradnja s crkvama** izuzetno važna za građenje mira i zajednice iz dva osnovna razloga: vjerski je identitet vrlo važan i usko povezan s nacionalnim identitetom, a vjerski vođe imaju poziciju neformalnih vođa u zajednici. Ozbiljno shvativši ovaj izglednu i potencijalnu ulogu vjerskih zajednica u procesu izgradnje mira, i imajući na umu ograničene kapacitete mirovnih timova, pokušali smo u svoju strategiju rada u lokalnim zajednicama integrirati odnose, suradnju i rad s vjerskim zajednicama. Prvenstveno i minimalno nastojali smo njegovati dobre odnose. U nekim je mjestima postignut izuzetan pomak – od potpunog odbijanja do aktivnog sudjelovanja u programima međuvjernih dijaloga (Okružnici), ili se postigao odnos tolerantnog suživota između crkve i mirovnih timova (Tenja, Vukovar, Berak).

### DESET GODINA POSLIJE - NEKI Naglasci

Projekt *Poslijeratna izgradnja mira u Istočnoj Hrvatskoj – Mirovni timovi* je bio prvi tako veliki civilnodruštveni mirovni projekt koji je u Hrvatskoj financirala EU. Osiguravši dovoljno sredstava omogućeno je da mirovni timovi rade dovoljno dugo na relativno velikom broju lokalnih zajednica u istočnoj Hrvatskoj kako bi utjecaj postao moguć i održiv.

Projekt je odredio **razvoj zajednice kao glavnu strategiju izgradnje mira**. Sve aktivnosti unutar tog modela trebaju promicati angažiranje ratom podijeljenih skupina u definiranju zajedničkih potreba, u izradi nacrti i ostvarenja projekata za izgradnju zajednice tj. u zajedničkim projektima.

Specifičnost mirovnih timova CZM-a bila je prvenstveno u njihovoj ulozi privremene **mirovne strukture**, bili su **primjer međuetničke suradnje** na izgradnji mira te **katalizator** za osnaživanje i uključivanje mještana i mještanki u građenje mira u vlastitoj zajednici nenasilnim putem. Mirovni timovi su bili mostovi suradnje nakon rata (kao pojedinci i pojedinke su osnaženi da sami pridonose uključenoj promjeni prema održivom miru), a u zajednicama u kojima su radili postali su modelom. U mjestima u kojima su radili osnažene su i motivirane građanske inicijative, obnovljene udruge ili osnovane nove koje, na različite načine, nastavljaju pridonositi boljem životu i miroljubivijim odnosima u vlastitoj zajednici – počevši od svoje obitelji ili susjedstva, kvarta ili mjesta u kome žive, države – ali i međunarodno (posebno mislim na regiju Jugoistočne Europe).

on in their micro-environments. In the first phase of project implementation small groups of women were gathered in almost all communities. The purpose of these meetings was to build personal and collective trust and different interests of individual groups ranged from creative work or prayer groups to humanitarian work. There were two major difficulties faced by the peace team during the establishment and support of such groups: ethnic divisions, that is, the social pressures associated with ethnic divisions and traditional upbringing. Regardless of how difficult it was to assemble a multi-national group of women from the same place, it was equally difficult to overcome the established relationships and ways of behaviour of the members of different groups even if they belonged to the same ethnic group. In both cases it proved useful to bring together women from different places, even neighbouring ones. As the participants pointed out themselves, it is easier for them, at least initially, to meet and start to communicate with women whom they had never known before.

### WORKING WITH CHILDREN AND YOUTH EMPOWERMENT

All communities involved in the listening project marked the work with children and young people as crucial – as an expression of concern, for the living conditions of children and youth in the post war period were particularly difficult, and as a pledge for a better future. Youth Club in Dalj, camps for children and various seminars were evaluated as very good. Adults are aware that young people bring home different opinions and views from such activities and that they also learn how to express themselves through encouraging practice of tolerance. Since there is a tendency toward excessive protection of youth in our country the members of peace teams had to bear two things in mind: a need of the community to take care of their children and a need of youth for development and independence. It is important to wisely balance between these needs, which in this case was not easy, especially because the work with young people was carried out by mostly young team members, trained to be the leaders, but without much experience. At the beginning it was easier for them to work for the youth, and not with the young, which only began to change by focusing on empowerment in the strategic and action planning activities.

### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEACE TEAMS AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

We were aware that working with believers and cooperation with the churches was essential for peace and community building for two basic reasons: religious identity was very important and closely linked with national identity and religious leaders had the position of informal leaders in the community. Having seriously realised the obvious and potential role of religious communities in the process of peace building, and bearing in mind the limited capacity of peace teams, we tried to integrate relations, cooperation and activities we developed with religious communities in our strategy of working in local communities. Primarily we tried to cultivate good relations with them. A remarkable shift was reached in some places - from a complete refusal to

Izdvajamo **osnaživanje za osobni razvoj radi suradnje na izgradnji mira** u vlastitoj zajednici jer se priziva vrlo jednostavnim pitanjem: “Što ja mogu učiniti, kako mogu pridonijeti rješavanju određenog problema? Što ja mogu učiniti za mir?” Tako smo i došli na ideju mirovnih timova, tako su mirovni timovi stvorili svoj plan rada u zajednicama, a započeli su ga postavljajući i to pitanje mještanima i mještankama.

CZM je bilo povezan s međunarodnom mirovnom mrežom koristeći njihova znanja i iskustva, ali smo se najviše dijelom oslanjali na vlastite resurse<sup>12</sup>. Zajednički projekti i metode koje su korištene bile su jasno prepoznatljive kao mirovne inicijative, za razliku od tradicionalnog razvoja zajednice i tradicionalnih pristupa mladima, ženama, ekumenskim ili humanitarnim aktivnostima.

Sve aktivnosti koje su provodili mirovni timovi pokazale su dobar potencijal kao instrumenti izgradnje mira, posebice kada su vezane za male ekonomske programe, ili se radi o neutralnim obrazovnim programima. Važno je, međutim, naglasiti da su sve aktivnosti bile, ujedno, instrument osnaživanja pojedinaca/ki te predstavljale početak procesa koji će se nastaviti i nadograđivati.

Mobilizacija mirovnih timova išla je nakon javnog natjecanja što je u početku reduciralo strah od javne izloženosti i značajno pridonijelo vidljivosti i pozitivnoj percepciji javnosti te oprez kod vlasti jer da se, izgleda, radi o ozbiljnoj akciji koju podupire EU.

Projekt je koncipiran razvojno, tj. mirovnim su timovima kontinuirano osiguravane dodatne edukacije i mentoriranje, a same aktivnosti su prilagođavane potrebama i interesima svake pojedine zajednice. Uočena je, međutim, velika psihička izloženost mirovnih radnika/ica sekundarnom stresu te je upozoreno na potrebu sistematičnijeg nadgledanja i kontrole pregaranja.<sup>13</sup>

Imaju li uvida u situaciju u Istočnoj Hrvatskoj i danas, dvanaest godina nakon početka mirne integracije, mišljenja smo da je rad na ratnoj traumi te na obnovi povjerenja na razini lokalnih zajednica još uvijek potreban. Potrebno je i dalje stvarati okruženje u kome će se dijaloški i konstruktivno otvarati konkretna pitanja suočavanja s prošlošću (traganje za nestalima, stvaranje atmosfere poticajne sa svjedočenjem u procesuiranju ratnih zločina bez obzira na etničku pripadnost žrtva, odnosno počinitelja – osudu svih zločina). Nacionalni program za povratak i obnovu povjerenja koji bi se bavio zaostalim ili novonastalim problemima u obnovi povjerenja i stvarnoj integraciji ljudi nije

12 Centar za mir inicirao je razvoj ideje mirovnih timova u Hrvatskoj u skladu s konkretnim okolnostima, a oslanjajući se na već postavljene temelje (na pripremi za mirnu integraciju i na podršci mirnoj integraciji surađivalo je stotinjak aktivista i aktivistica iz desetak organizacija).

13 “Impact Assessment – Procjena utjecaja”: Jordan, J.; Skrabalo, M.; Društvo za psihološku pomoć; Osijek, 2000.

active participation in programs of inter-religious dialogue (Okučani). Also, a ratio of tolerant coexistence between church and peace teams was achieved (Tenja, Vukovar, Berak).

## TEN YEARS LATER - SOME HIGHLIGHTS

*The post-war peace building project in eastern Croatia - The peace teams* was the first civil society peace project in Croatia of that magnitude and was financed by the EU. Having ensured sufficient resources it was possible for the peace teams to work long enough in a relatively large number of local communities in eastern Croatia to make the impact possible.

The project designated **community development as a major strategy for peace building**. All activities within this model should promote the engagement of the war-divided groups to define common needs in the drafting and realization of projects for community building, that is, in joint projects. The specificity of the CFP peace teams was primarily in their role as temporary peacekeeping structure. They were an example of interethnic cooperation in peace-building and catalyst for the empowerment and involvement of locals in building peace in their own community by non-violent means. Peace teams were bridges of cooperation after the war (as individuals they were empowered to contribute to a key change towards a sustainable peace themselves), and became the model in the communities in which they worked. In places where they worked citizens' initiatives were strengthened. Old organisations were renewed, or new ones were established, which, in different ways, continued to contribute to a better life and more peaceful relationships within the local community - starting with their own family or neighbourhood, place in which they live, the state or internationally (especially the region of South-east Europe).

We would like to point out the importance of the **empowerment of personal development for cooperation in building peace** in one's own community because it invokes a very simple question: “What can I do? How can I contribute to solving a specific problem? What can I do for peace?” This is exactly how we came up with the idea of peace teams, how these teams created their peace plan in the community - by asking the locals these same questions. CFP was linked to an international peace network using their knowledge and experience, but we mostly relied on our own resources<sup>12</sup>. Joint projects and methods used were clearly recognisable as peace initiatives, as opposed to traditional community development and approaches to youth, women, ecumenical and humanitarian activities. All the activities conducted by peace teams showed good potential as instruments of peace-building, especially when associated with small economic programs or neutral educational programs. It is, however, important to stress that all activities were, at the same time, an instrument of empowerment of individuals and represen-

12 Centre for Peace initiated the development of the idea of peacekeeping teams in Croatia in accordance with specific circumstances, and relying on already established foundations (hundreds of activists from dozens of organizations collaborated in preparation for the peaceful integration and support for peaceful integration).

zaživio. A problema ima, primjerice, pravo na obrazovanje na srpskom jeziku rezultiralo je podijeljenim školama bez ikakvih mekulturalnih razmjena te posljednjom podjelom mladih po etnoj pripadnosti.

No, ključni izazov strategijama izgradnje mira nakon rane faze povratka, normalizacije i obnavljanja minimuma povjerenja u ratom razorenim zajednicama je povezivanje izgradnje mira s aktivnostima za stjecanje dohotka i razvojnim strategijama. Na taj izazov nije moguće odgovoriti samo sa razine lokalne zajednice, potrebno je bilo definirati politiku razvoja na razini cjelokupne države kao mirovni projekt. Takav pristup razvoju nije nikada zaživio, iako su ga artikulirale i promovirale organizacije civilnoga društva u Hrvatskoj i trebao bi biti temelj euointegracijskim procesima.<sup>14</sup>

#### PROJEKTNI TIM ILI MIROVNI TIM SAČINJAVALI SU:

Ljubica Beri, Angel Babarkapa, Milena Dragišić, Miroslav Dvornić, Igor Čorović, Blaženka Gazafi, Ranka Jindra, Sonja Kersten, Katarina Kruhonja, Bojan Lalić, Vesna Liermann, Marija Lovaković, Biljana Ljubović, Zdravka Matej, Ivana Matijević, Ivana Milas, Olivera Petrović, Mirta Pucek, Martina Uglić, Nebojša Uglić, Željka Valjete i Tatjana Vidaković-Gal.

14 Nacionalna platforma za izgradnju mira: Inicijativa za izradu Platforme izgradnje mira u Hrvatskoj nastala je na Nacionalnoj konferenciji o izgradnji mira i sprječavanju nasilnih sukoba (Zagreb, 28. i 29. svibnja 2004.) održanoj u sklopu globalne inicijative koju je pokrenuo European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP). Inicijativu je u Hrvatskoj pokrenula udruga Nansen Dijalog Centar iz Osijeka.

ted the beginning of a process that would continue to build on. Mobilization of the peace teams went ahead after a public tender. This initially reduced the fear of public exposure and significantly contributed to the visibility and positive perception of the public but was treated with caution by the government as it seemed like a serious action supported by the EU to them.

The project was conceived as a developing process, that is, peace teams were continually given additional training and mentoring, and the activities were adjusted to the needs and interests of each community. However, a large mental exposure to secondary stress was established among peace workers and concerns were raised regarding the need for more systematic monitoring and overheating control.<sup>13</sup>

With an insight into the situation in eastern Croatia today, twelve years after the peaceful integration, we think that the work on war traumas as well as on rebuilding trust in the local community is still needed. It is necessary to continue to create an environment in which the questions are discussed in a dialogue and constructive manner especially those dealing with the past (searching for the missing, creating an atmosphere of incentive to testify in the prosecution of war crimes regardless of the ethnicity of the victim or the perpetrator - the conviction of all crimes). The National Programme for Return and Restoration of Trust which is supposed to deal with residual or emerging problems in rebuilding trust and the actual integration of people has never really come to life. Problems are many, for example, the right to education in Serbian language have resulted in mixed schools with no intercultural exchange and the consequent division of young people by ethnicity. However, the key challenge of peace-building strategies after the early stages of return, normalization and restoration of minimum trust in the war-torn communities, is connecting peace-building with activities for the acquisition of income and development strategies. This challenge cannot be solely faced by the local community. It is necessary to define the policy of development as a peace project at the state level. Such an approach to development has never come to life, although it was articulated and promoted by civil society in Croatia, and it should be the foundation of the euro-integration processes.<sup>14</sup>

#### THE PROJECT TEAM OR PEACE TEAMS WERE:

Ljubica Beri, Angel Babarkapa, Milena Dragišić, Miroslav Dvornić, Igor Čorović, Blaženka Gazafi, Ranka Jindra, Sonja Kersten, Katarina Kruhonja, Bojan Lalić, Vesna Liermann, Marija Lovaković, Biljana Ljubović, Zdravka Matej, Ivana Matijević, Ivana Milas, Olivera Petrović, Mirta Pucek, Martina Uglić, Nebojša Uglić, Željka Valjete and Tatjana Vidaković-Gal.

13 'Impact Assessment'; Jordan, J; Skrabalo, M; Society for psychological help; Osijek, 2000

14 National Platform for Peace Building: an initiative to create a platform of peace-building in Croatia was created at the National conference on peace building and prevention of violent conflict (Zagreb, 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> of May 2004) held as part of a global initiative launched by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP). The initiative was launched in Croatia by NGO Nansen Dialogue Centre in Osijek.



# VOLONTERSKI PROJEKT PAKRAC: PREKRETNICA MIROVNOG AKTIVIZMA U HRVATSKOJ

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GORAN BOŽIČEVIĆ JE JEDAN OD OSNIVAČA I TRENUTNI VODITELJ MIRAMIDA CENTRA – REGIONALNE RAZMJENE IZGRADNJE MIRA U ISTARSKOM GROŽNJANU-GRISIGNANA, HRVATSKA. AKTIVAN JE U IZGRADNJI MIRA OD 1993. GODINE RADE I ŠIROM POST-JUGOSLOVENSKOG PROSTORA OD 1996. GODINE.

## UVOD

Nema jasnog datuma koji se uzima kao početak rata u Hrvatskoj. Više događaja i datuma uzimaju se kao javnosti važni, dok se zakonskim aktima to moralo regulirati u više navrata. Počim o nimo ovaj tekst s citatom preuzetim s jednog od braniteljskih portala na internetu: *"Pakrac, 28. veljače 2009.g. - Domovinski rat nije počeo na Uskrs 1991. godine na Plitvicama, nego srpskom oružanom pobunom, uključenjem JNA i intervencijom specijalnih postrojbi hrvatske policije u Pakracu 1. ožujka 1991. godine - istaknuto je to ponovno i danas na skupu branitelja u Pakracu, prilikom obilježavanja ove vrijedne obljetnice Pakraca i novije hrvatske povijesti"*.

Grad Pakrac u zapadnoj Slavoniji, udaljen 120 km od Zagreba, sa svojih 8000 stanovnika prije rata, teško je stradao u ratu, fizički - kako kažu statistike - čak 75%. Rat je u Pakracu bjesnio od kolovoza 1991. g. do početka siječnja 1992. g. Oružane formacije RH ratovale su s oružanim formacijama samoproglašene, takozvane Republike Srpske Krajine (RSK) i onim što je ostalo od JNA. 1993. godinu Pakrac dočeka razrušen i podijeljen, smješten u novopostavljenom UNPA – UN zaštitenom području, Sektoru Zapad. Snage misije UNPROFOR nadziru primirje. Grad ima oko 2000 stanovnika na "hrvatskoj" strani dok na "krajinskoj" ima dosta prognanika Srba iz drugih dijelova zapadne Slavonije. Komunikacija izmeću u dva dijela grada gotovo da i ne postoji, nekoliko kontrolnih točaka nadziru po tri oružane formacije: Hrvatska policija, UN-ovi vojnici i Milicija RSK. Ipak, UNPA Zapad je jedina od 4 UNPA zone u RH koja je dijelom i pod kontrolom hrvatskih vlasti. To omogućuje da UN hrabrije krene sa svojim civilnim programima. Zapažena je uloga prvog voditelja odjela civilnih poslova UNPROFOR-a za Sektor Zapad, Švicarčina Gerarda Fischera. On ne samo da je vjerovao da je UN-ova zadaća izgradnja mira, a ne samo otklanjanje primirja, već je i neumor-

# VOLUNTEER PROJECT PAKRAC - TURNING POINT IN PEACE ACTIVISM IN CROATIA

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## INTRODUCTION

There is no exact date that marks the beginning of the war in Croatia. While several events and dates are considered to be publicly relevant, the issue was legally regulated on more than one occasion. Let us begin this text with a citation from a war veterans' web site: *"Pakrac, February 28, 2009 – the Homeland War did not begin at Plitvice at Easter in 1991, but in Pakrac, on March 1, 1991, with the Serbian armed assault, the involvement of Yugoslav National Army (YNA) and the intervention from Croatian police special forces. This was pointed out again today at the war veterans' convention in Pakrac, held in memory of Pakrac and recent Croatian history"*.

The town of Pakrac in western Slavonia, situated 120 km away from Zagreb, with population of 8000 before the war, suffered heavy losses during the war, physical damage reaching up to 75%, according to statistics. The war in Pakrac raged since August 1991 until the beginning of January 1992. The armed forces of Croatian Republic fought against the armed forces of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Krajina (SRK) and whatever was left of YNA. In 1993, Pakrac was devastated and divided, located within the Western Sector of the newly-formed UN Protected Areas (UNPA). UNPROFOR peace corps were supervising the cease-fire. The "Croatian" side of the town had the population of 2000, while Serbian refugees from different parts of Western Slavonia populated the side of "Krajina". There was almost no communication between the two sides. Several check points were controlled by three armed formations: Croatian police, UN soldiers and the SRK militia. Still, UNPA West sector was the only one of the four UNPA sectors in Croatia partially controlled by Croatian authorities. This enabled a more eager development in the UN civil programs. Gerard Fischer, the first UNPROFOR civil affairs division manager for the West sector, had a distinguished role. Not only

no na tome radio. Godinama su kružile priče kako je sam razoružao manju (para)vojnu jedinicu naoružanu puškama na "krajinskoj" strani, citiraju i im mandata snaga UNPROFOR-a i zabranu nošenja dugih cijevi za sve, osim za UN. Zajedno s argentinskim generalom Carlosom Zabalom pokrenuo je niz civilnih projekata pod patronatom UN-a, u svrhu normalizacije odnosa u podijeljenoj, ratom stradaloj zapadnoj Slavoniji: susrete obitelji na kontrolnim točkama (*check-point meetings*), posjete svojim domovima na "druvoj strani" crte razgranice (*village visiting programme*), plan korištenja pakračke bolnice za sve stanovnike toga područja, značaja i s "krajinske" strane, obnovu "ulice nade" na samoj crti razgranice itd. Kulminacija neobičajno vitalnog rada UN-ove misije i agencija na izgradnji mira vjerojatno je bilo potpisivanje Daruvarskog sporazuma u veljači 1993. g. od strane RH i vlasti "RSK", koji je sadržavao mnoge elemente normalizacije. Taj je sporazum ipak bio prevelik korak i prenapredan za vrh vlasti "RSK" u Kninu, sam nije zaživio, a potpisnici sa strane "RSK" su pali u nemilost.

Zanimljivo je koliko i paradoksalno da se u zamahu angažmana UN-a u zapadnoj Slavoniji vode razgovori, traži se lokalni NVO partner iz RH za suradnju na programima "društvene obnove" (*social reconstruction*), kako je UN zvao svoje napore u izgradnji mira. Razgovori donose plod i 6. srpnja 1993. g. kada prva grupa međunarodnih volontera, 14 mahom mladih ljudi iz 7 zemalja stiže u Pakrac – počinje *Volonterski projekt Pakrac (VPP)*. Ono što tada nismo znali je da upravo u to vrijeme prestaju susreti na kontrolnim prijelazima, obustavljaju se posjete svojim domovima na "druvoj strani", ukratko: zamah UN-ovih napora na normalizaciji života i odnosa "dviju strana" gotovo skroz zamire. Gerard Fischer ubrzo odlazi u UNTAC u Kambodžu, da bi se nastavio privatno vraćati u zapadnu Slavoniju, a poslije i preuzeo civilne poslove u misiji UNTAES-a, vjerojatno najuspješnijoj UN-ovoj misiji dosad. Volonterski projekt stiže u Pakrac nošen zamahom inovativnog pristupa izgradnji mira, no ubrzo ostaje gotovo sam, naravno uz logistiku potporu, prije svega Beograda i ureda UN-a (UNOV) u Pakracu.

## O ČEMU NIJE RIJEČ?

Vrlo malo "običajnih" (u smislu ne-mirovnjaka) ljudi u Hrvatskoj zna za njega – tek nešto više mirovnih aktivista je za njega sudjelovalo, no *Volonterski projekt Pakrac (VPP)*, najveći mirovni projekt u Hrvatskoj u devedesetim, i dalje je nepoznanica i široj i stručnoj javnosti u Hrvatskoj. Oni koji su za njega čuli ili su ga površno upoznali, klasificiraju ga najčešće krivo: u rasponu od projekta humanitarne pomoći do glorificiranja izravnog rada na pomirenju. Na njega se gleda kao na UN-ovu aktivnost, a također i kao na projekt (fizičke) obnove. Mnogi "lokalci" povlače ili su paralelu s Omladinskim radnim akcijama, državnim projektom volonterskog rada omladine u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji. Sve te odrednice nisu netočne, no svaka za sebe se fokusira na manje bitne dijelove ovoga značajnog projekta.

VPP je imao dimenziju humanitarnog rada, a procjena napravljena nakon godine i pol rada projekta upućivala je na vrijednost od oko 2 milijuna DM u humanitarnoj pomoći i volonterskom radu (tada je 2 DM/h austrijski CARE

did he believe that, besides maintaining the truce, the UN mission was also peace-building, but he worked tirelessly towards achieving that goal. Particularly emblematic is the story of him single-handedly disarming a smaller paramilitary unit of "Krajina" by quoting to them the UNPROFOR mandate and the ban on carrying long-barrelled weapons for everyone, excepting the UN. Together with the Argentinean general Carlos Zabala, the UN started a series of civil projects aimed towards stabilizing the relations in war stricken and divided western Slavonia. These projects included: meetings of families at check-points, visiting homes on the "other side" of the division line (village visiting program), the plan of making the town hospital available to the residents of both sides, the reconstruction of "Hope Street", situated on the division line itself, and so on. Essential efforts by the UN mission and the peace building agencies culminated in the signing of the Daruvar Agreement in February 1993 by Croatian authorities and local Serb leaders. Included in the Agreement were various elements of normalization. This, however, turned out to be too big a step to take for "RSK" authorities in Knin. The agreement never took effect and the Serbian perpetrators were arrested.

Interestingly, as well as paradoxically, in the heat of the UN western Slavonia undertakings, indigenous non-government organizations were invited to cooperate on Social Reconstruction programs (the UN term for their peace-building activities). As a result of the campaign, the first group of international volunteers, 14 young people from seven countries, arrived in Pakrac on July 6, 1993 – this is the beginning of *Volunteers Project Pakrac*. We were not aware at that point that check-point meetings and village visiting programs were being cancelled. The UN activities in stabilizing the existence and relationships between the two sides have come to a halt. Gerard Fischer leaves shortly for Cambodia on an UNTAC mission. He continued visiting western Slavonia unofficially, and afterwards he took charge of Civil Affairs in UNTAES mission, probably the most successful UN mission so far. The volunteer project arrived in Pakrac as a result of an innovative approach to peace-building, but it soon remained a solitary effort, under the auspices of the UN regional office in Vienna (UNOV).

## WHAT IT IS NOT ABOUT?

Very few "common" (as in not involved in any form of peace activism) people in Croatia have heard about it, a few more peace activists are aware of it or have been involved in it. Both specialized and wide public are still largely unacquainted with *Volunteer Project Pakrac (VPP)*, – the largest peace-building project in Croatia during the '90s. Those familiar with it often classify it wrongly – ranging from a humanitarian aid agency to glorifying it as a direct effort at reconciliation. It is also considered as a UN activity, as well as a (physical) reconstruction project. Many of the local folk compared it to youth work activities; a government sponsored volunteered youth labour undertakings in Socialist Yugoslavia. All of these markers are partially correct, but each of them focuses on lesser aspects of this remarkable project. VPP had a somewhat humanitarian character – estimated value, according to an assessment made a year and a half into the project's activity, was

procjenjivao vrijednost rada na fizi koj obnovi grada). U današnje doba bio bi to ekvivalent od bar 2 milijuna EUR-a, sigurno i mnogo više jer je projekt ukupno trajao 3 i pol godine. VPP je imao atraktivan *appeal*, gotovo seksualnu privlačnost izravnog rada na pomirenju dvije, crtom razgraničena, UN-ovim trupama, minskim poljem i ratnim strahotama podijeljene zajednice. Stotine znatizeljnika iz svijeta privlačio je taj *image* – “mirenja doju erašnjih neprijatelja”. Svi su ti posjetitelji uvelike otežavali ionako zahtjevan rad projekta koji je od prvog dana odustao od “velikih” riječi i djela i usredotočio se na solidarnost s gradom i ljudima koje je rat iznenadio, devastirao, vjeru u dobro uništio i umnogome unazadio. VPP zasigurno jest važan u procesima uspostave povjerenja i u zajednicama rada na pomirenju, ako ni zbog čega drugog, onda zbog toga što smo svi rano shvatili da se radi o dugotrajnim procesima, da su uključene mnoge politike i mnogobrojne akteri, da je prošlo i godine dok se ne stvore uvjeti da se otkočno avanju s prošlosti u procesima pomirenja ozbiljno pokušamo govoriti. Bez UN-a ne bi bilo ni VPP-a i svako negiranje toga je iskrivljivanje činjenica. No bilo je važno zadržati svoju autonomiju izvan UN-ovog mega sustava i zadržati kredibilitet u ratom pogojenoj zajednici sa samo 150 DEM za hranu i smještaj (toliko su volonteri plaćali za 3 tjedna volonterskog kampa) i graditi – nasuprot velikim novcima koji su se vrtjeli u UN-ovim i drugim krugovima.

VPP je svoju vjerodostojnost na fizičkom radu pokušao graditi i nije od njega odustao do samog kraja. Dolazilo je i do konflikata s Gradskom upravom jer se na donacije za VPP ponekad gledalo kao na otimanje novca za fizičku obnovu grada, za koju je bio nadležan Ured za obnovu. Bilo bi potrebno napisati nekoliko doktorata na temu bliskosti fizičkog i mirovnog rada jer veza nije niti jednostavna, niti bezazlena, no daleko od toga da bi se jedna (radikalno) pacifistička grupacija poput Antiratne kampanje Hrvatske (ARK) išla uključivati u lukrativni *business* obnove. VPP je surađivao s radnim grupama, koje su bile jednako podcjenjivane i zaboravljane, (financirane od Ministarstva Obrane!) a nastojale su vratiti smisao ostanka i nadu ljudima u razrušenom i podijeljenom gradu, pomoći im da naučeno posao, radile su na prevenciji PTSP-a i obnavljale i obnovile grad. Radne grupe obnovile su krovove veličine dvadesetak nogometnih igrališta (procjena iz 1994./95. g.) i zajedno s 20-tak meunarodnih volontera u punom su naponu, svako jutro okupljale preko 200 ljudi na desetak različitih lokacija.

Šale na račun sličnosti s Omladinskim radnim akcijama (ORA) sadržavale su, uz doze simpatije i implicitnu diskvalifikaciju koja je katkad djelovala i eksplicitno. ORA-e su godinama i decenijama nakon Drugog svjetskog rata sve više “gradile” bratstvo i jedinstvo, a sve manje (napretkom tehnologije) puteve i rijeke nasipe. Bodlja upućena VPP-u (bar na tzv. hrvatskoj strani Pakraca) bila je ogorčeno - *dviju nacija* - iz mnogo razloga, a najviše zbog brojnih Srba i ostalih nacionalnih manjina na tzv. hrvatskoj strani grada. Onaj tko želi graditi neko novo bratstvo i jedinstvo ubrzo nakon tako krvavog devastirajućeg sukoba je ili beskonačno naivan ili beskonačno zlonamjeran, a VPP ipak vjerojatno nije bio sagledavan u ovoj drugoj kategoriji. Paralele s ORA-ma

about 2 million DEM in humanitarian aid and volunteer work (the Austrian branch of CARE estimated the value of labour done on physical reconstruction of the town to be 2 DEM/h). Nowadays, this would be an equivalent of at least 2 million euros and much more, since the project lasted for a total of three and a half years. The appeal of VPP, its almost sexual attraction, was in a direct work towards the truce between the two communities divided by the cease-fire line, the UN troops, mine fields and war atrocities. Hundreds of people throughout the world were attracted by this image of “reconciliation between two enemies”. All those visitors made the already demanding work on the project even harder. Solidarity with the devastated town and its people traumatized by the war was made the focus of the project from the beginning, while “big” words and gestures were deliberately avoided. One of the main reasons for VPP’s importance in the trust-forming and peace-building process is its approach founded on the realization that this would not be a quick fix and that years would pass until the right conditions were created for the reconciliation processes to be taken seriously. Without the UN there would be no VPP – any attempt to negate that would mean distorting the truth. However, the issue of maintaining autonomy was essential – how to keep one’s position outside of the UN mega-system, and build some sort of credibility in a war-stricken community with only 150 DEM at disposal (this was the amount of money volunteers paid for three week long work camps) – despite of great amounts of capital that went around in the UN circles.

VPP started building its credibility through physical labour, and continued to do so until the end. The donations to VPP were sometimes a source of conflict with the town authorities, because that money was seen as belonging to the Reconstruction Office, whose jurisdiction included physical reconstruction of the town. Relation between physical and humanitarian work could provide the material for several doctorates for it is neither simple nor innocuous. However, the assumption that a (radically) pacifistic affiliation such as Croatian Anti-War Campaign (ARK) would get involved in some sort of lucrative reconstruction business could not be any further away from the truth. VPP also co-operated with equally forgotten and underestimated Work Groups (financed by the Ministry of Defence), whose main goal was to help people find meaning in returning to and staying in this devastated and divided town. They worked on ensuring jobs for people, preventing PTSP, cleaning and rebuilding the town. The amount of roofs covered by Work Groups could be compared to the size of about twenty football fields (according to a 1994/95 survey). When at their best, they would bring together over 200 people and 20 international volunteers at a dozen locations every morning.

Remarks on VPP’s similarity to Youth Work Activities contained both a dose of sympathy and implied disqualification, with varying degrees of explicitness. During years following World War II, Youth Work Activities increasingly concentrated on building “brotherhood and unity”, rather than roads and river dams, as the latter was made easier by technological development. VPP operated within a hostile atmosphere that was full of bitterness caused by

zajedljivo su asociirale na ideologiju socijalističkih ORA-a, njihove omladinske političke rukovodioce i patronat države i (jedinu) Partiju nad njima. Mirovni aktivisti, a naglasak je bio na 'aktivisti' poistovjetivani su ponekad s 'aktivistima' iz doba socijalizma, koji su radili na ostvarenju ciljeva koje bi odredila država/ Partija. Iako nije bilo lako odrediti tko je novi nalogodavac u slučaju VPP-a, nespecificirani, ali zato "vrlo jasni" patroni vidjeni su među stranim donatorima, stranim vladama i općenito u onom stranom novcu koji je tadašnji hrvatski predsjednik Tuđman olakao, ali ne i neopasno označio kao "judine škode".

## O ČEMU JE RIJEČ?

Sada, kada smo se pozabavili nizom (krivih?) gledanja na VPP i ono što on nije bio, probajmo odrediti što to VPP zapravo jest bio.

### A) VELIKA ŠKOLA IZGRADNJE MIRA

Edukacijski značaj VPP-a je golem. Najčešće se spominje kako su iz njega izrasli utjecajni zagrebački Centar za mirovne studije i Miramida, u kojima su obavljani prvi treninzi izgradnje mira s tisućama ljudi u postjugoslavenskim zemljama. Spominje se da su mnogi strani volonteri, upravo u VPP-u izrasli u istaknute mirovne aktiviste i odgovorne djelatnike velikih međunarodnih organizacija. Rjeđe se spominje da je VPP bio jedna od prvih suradnji UN-ovog sustava s malim, lokalnim NVO-ima (nakon dobrih iskustava s PRODERE programom u Centralnoj Americi). "Početni suradnje" - izvorno i dobro, smisleno i optimistički, no 1993. g., a i kasnije u zapadnoj Slavoniji ta je suradnja gotovo konstantno bila puna komunikacijskih nesporazuma, nejasnih ingerencija, svakodnevnih frustracija i ukratko, velike nekompatibilnosti partnera. Trebalo je pričekati 1995. g. i vojno policijsku akciju *Bljesak* te drastične promjene u mandatu UN-a, u novim okolnostima povratka djela tzv. Republike Srpske Krajine u društveno-pravni poredak RH. Dolazak Graham Day-a na čelo civilnih poslova (Civil Affairs) UN-ove misije u zapadnoj Slavoniji značilo je veliko otvaranje UN-a organizacijama civilnog društva u Hrvatskoj i mnogo više i zreliju fazu međusobne suradnje. Uspjeh UNTAES misije na istoku Hrvatske, par godina kasnije, dijelom je imao ishodište u iskustvima s UN-om pa i s hrvatskim (i srpskim) civilnim udrugama u procesu izgradnje mira u zapadnoj Slavoniji. VPP je kao "idealno smješten" projekt (cinizam autora neka ne utječe i značajnije na čitatelje/ice) u podijeljenom i razrušenom gradu, pod okriljem UN-a, nedaleko od metropole - Zagreba, i podjednako udaljenom od Bosne i Maršarske, privlačio mnoge: novinare, avanturiste, mirovnjake svih strana spektra, humanitarce, akademike i umjetnike. Od VPP-a mnogi su u čitavom životu u stradalom gradu, o solidarnosti s ljudima koji su izgubili (gotovo) sve, o sporosti i preuranjenosti za mnoge akcije, a pogotovo za mirenje, s time da se najviše može naučiti od ljudi koje i sami etiketiramo kao "žrtve", "ratne veterane", "nacionaliste" itd. VPP i njegova osjetljivost korijene vuku iz iskustva i prisustva Wama Kata, karizmatičnog mirovnjaka i blogera koji je svoje dnevničke: *Zagreb Diary* i *Pakrac Diary* počeo pisati još 1992., mnogo godina prije nego što se pojavio prvi blog. Osjetljivost na potrebe domaćeg stanovništva, VPP duguje i mirovnim edukacijama ARK-a te *Malog Koraka*,

the bloody "divide" of the two sides. For many reasons one is more inclined to talk in terms of two separate political factions than *two nations*, especially considering numerous Serbs and other national minorities populating the so-called "Croatian" side of the town. In a period immediately following such a violent and devastating confrontation, any attempt at recreating some form of brotherhood and unity would be either infinitely naive or equally malicious, the latter of which could in no way be applied to VPP. Analogies to youth work activities biting pointed towards the ideological character of their socialist counterparts, their political leaders, and the sponsorship of the State and its (sole) Party. Peace activists – with emphasis on activists – were at times identified with socialist activists, who worked towards achieving the goals established by the State/Party. Although it was not easy to determine the new governing body in the case of VPP, the unofficial role of patrons was "clearly" ascribed to various foreign donors, foreign governments and foreign capital in general, which the then Croatian president, Tuđman, too lightly and somewhat dangerously referred to as "Judas' coins."

## WHAT IT IS ABOUT

Now that we have dealt with a series of (incorrect?) interpretations of VPP and what it did not stand for, let us try and determine what VPP actually was about.

### A) A GREAT SCHOOL OF PEACE-BUILDING

VPP possesses an enormous educational value. It is most often seen as the source of *Centre for Peace Studies Zagreb* and of *Miramida* – First Training in Peace-building in Post-YU Countries. These projects have succeeded VPP and have already educated thousands of people from post-YU regions in peace-building. Many foreign VPP volunteers have grown to become distinguished peace activists and responsible members of great international organizations. It is less known that VPP was one of the first local NGOs to collaborate with the UN (following a positive experience with the PRODERE programme in Central America). Despite of the positive and optimistic sound of this "collaboration", in 1993 and afterwards in western Slavonia, this partnership experienced numerous communication breakdowns, jurisdiction problems, everyday frustrations and, in short, extreme degree of incompatibility. Only after the military and police action "Operation Flash" in 1995, when part of "Serbian Republic of Krajina" was returned to the social and legal order of Croatian Republic, did significant changes in the UN mandate occur. The arrival of Graham Day at the head of Civil Affairs of the UN mission in western Slavonia marked the beginning of a more mature phase in co-operation between the UN and Croatian civil organizations. The success of the UNTAES mission in eastern Croatia was partly due to numerous experiences of the UN, as well as Croatian (and Serbian) civil organizations concerning peace-building in western Slavonia. As an "ideally situated" project (readers should not be too affected by the author's cynicism), in a divided and devastated town, under the UN patronage, in the vicinity of Croatian capital (Zagreb), not far from Bosnia and Hungary, VPP attracted many: journalists,



dijelom autentičnim, no u mnogo čemu potaknutim od raznih prijatelja mirovnjaka iz svijeta: britanskih *Kveker*a, njemačkih *Bund für Soziale Verteidigung*, *Kurve iz Wustrowa*, austrijskog mirovnog centra u Stadtschlainingu, međunarodnih *War Resisters* i *Peace Brigades International*a, američkog *Marshall Rosenberga* i *Kai Ericssona* te mnogih drugih. Struktura ARK-a, matične organizacije VPP-a, omogućila je VPP-u da bude svoj i samostalan. Uz pomoć brige (kako raditi bez viših instanci? kako znati da radimo dobro? od koga dobivati savjete i kritike, smjernice?), fleksibilnost ARK-ovih struktura pogodila je kreativnom i inovativnom pristupu VPP-a, bez da je Zagreb odlučivao za Pakrac kako je to bivalo u svim ostalim sferama javnog života. Način vođenja Vesne Teršelić, prve i dugogodišnje koordinatorice programa i mreže ARK-a, poticao je liderstvo u svima nama, ukazivao na aktivno slušanje kao prvo i osnovno oruđe svake komunikacije i suradnje i poticao na timski rad, što je bilo nužno u zahtjevnim okolnostima tih godina. U i oko VPP-a svi su uistinu jedni od drugih na dnevnoj bazi. Kada je taj proces zapinjao i konflikti su se množili, a frustracije su rasle te su se slušanje i uzajamno podupiranje pokazali najučinkovitijima u transformaciji istih.

#### B) JASNA PORUKA SOLIDARNOSTI "MALIH" LJUDI S "MALIM" LJUDIMA

U intervencijama "treće" strane (to nije n+1 strane) nalazimo UN-ove misije i agencije, OSCE te niz drugih međunarodnih NVO-a. Nalazimo vojsku, civilne eksperte, vjerske posrednike, eksperte za rješavanje sukoba, specijalizirane medije i općenito niz educiranih, treniranih (ili bi bar trebali biti) ljudi u jasnom organizacijskom okruženju na terenu ili izvan njega. VPP poput padobranca ulije se u to područje mijenjajući u mnogo čemu paradigmu intervencije treće strane u zajednice opterećene ratom/nasilnim sukobom. VPP je prije svega bio skup ljudi s kojima su se doma i ljudi mogli identificirati, komunicirati na jednakopravnoj osnovi (na osjećaju jednake razine moralnosti), a ponekad (bez cinizma) im i pomoći (nahriniti ih, oprati im odjeću, popraviti im nešto u kući). Druženje i se s volonterima, doma i ljudi nisu se imali potrebe osjećati žrtvama, stoga su s volonterima (dakle "malim" ljudima iz raznih zemalja koje nisu odavno osjetile rat) ljudi u Pakracu mogli biti ono što jesu. Iako i nešto više. Kako bi volonteri dolazili u Pakrac na neko vrijeme i radili zajedno s domaćim ljudima, donosili bi dah normalnog života, smijeh ljudi neopterećenih ratnom traumom, brige koje su mirnodopske, a ne (post)ratne. Djelatnica WHO-a u Hrvatskoj, Jadranka Mimica, ohrabрила je nas pripadnike VPP-a spoznajom da svjetska iskustva pokazuju uistinkovitiji tretman PTSP-a kada su prisutni "ne eksperti", nego kada su prisutni "ljudi u bijelim mantilima". Bit VPP-a bila je potreba mnogih "malih" ljudi, koji su u svojim mirnim domovima gledali rat u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, da uistinu nešto aktivno kako bi zaustavili ili smanjili ratne strahote. Humanitarna pomoć ubrzo im je bio nedostatan odgovor. VPP je pružio ruku i rekao: "dođite, trebamo vas, imamo okvir za vas i pripremni trening. Ne tražimo posebne vještine od vas, samo transparentnu motivaciju i spremnost da živite i radite na društvenoj obnovi bar 3 tjedna u Pakracu". Pokazalo se da su ti "mali ljudi", koji su sami sebi platili put, hranu i smještaj bili pravi odgovor na potrebe ljudi u Pakracu. U moru ljudi u misijama i s misijom, eksperata i predstavnika raznih moralnih sila i aktera pojavio se konačno netko "običan", netko poput nas, netko tko je bio spreman saslušati me i stvarno ga/je zanimalo kako sam kada me to pitao.

adventurists, and various sorts of peacemakers, humanitarians, academics, and artists. VPP taught many about living in a town ruined by war, about solidarity with those who have lost almost everything, how peace-building is a long-term process. It also showed us how we can often learn the most from the very people we label as "victims", "war veterans", "nationalists", etc. VPP's sensibility has its roots in the presence and experience of Wam Kat, a charismatic peace activist and blogger, who had been writing his Zagreb Diary and Pakrac Diary since 1992, years before the appearance of first blogs. VPP owes its sensibility for the needs of the local populations to peace education provided by ARK and 'Mali Korak' (Small Step), partly authentic, but mostly encouraged by various friendly peace activists from all over the world: British Quakers, German 'Bund für Soziale Verteidigung' and KURVE Wustrow, Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Stadtschlaining, international War Resisters and Peace Brigades International, Marshall Rosenberg and Kai Ericsson, and many others. The structure of ARK, VPP's head organization, allowed VPP to maintain its autonomy. Along with numerous concerns (How to work without higher authorities? Is the work done properly? To whom should we turn for advice, criticism, and directions?), flexibility of ARK's structure offered VPP space for creative and innovative approaches, without allowing Zagreb to make decisions for Pakrac, as was the case in all the other public spheres. Vesna Teršelić, the first and long-standing coordinator of ARK network and program, inspired by example leadership in all of us. She stressed the importance of active listening as the primary means of every communication and cooperation, and encouraged team-work – a necessity posed by hard circumstances of those years. In and around VPP, everybody learned from each other on daily basis. Whenever the process would come to a halt, conflicts would multiply, and frustrations would grow. Active listening and mutual learning proved to be the most efficient remedy for those kinds of situations.

#### B) A CLEAR MESSAGE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG THE 'LITTLE' PEOPLE

Interventions from a 'third' party (or rather, n+1 party) come from the UN missions and agencies, the OSCE and a series of other international NGOs. These include army, civilian experts, religious mediators, experts on conflict resolution, specialized media, and generally a whole array of educated, well trained (or so they should be) people in a clear organizational surroundings both on and off the field. Just like a parachute, VPP lands into the afflicted area, significantly shifting the paradigm of the third party intervention in a war stricken community. Above all, VPP was a group of people with whom the locals could identify and communicate on an equal basis (no sense of inferiority), and to whom they could sometimes (no cynicism) even provide assistance (with food, laundry, small repair work). Associating with the volunteers, the local people were less inclined to feel like victims. With them ('little' people from various countries that had not recently been affected by war), the people of Pakrac could be their true selves. Even more: the volunteers that came to Pakrac to spend some time working together with the locals brought with them a breath of normal life, laughter of people not traumatized by war, and worries of people untroubled by (post)war circumstances. An employee of WHO in Croatia, Jadranka Mimica, encouraged our



### C) SMJER U KOJEM SE MORA I I AKO SE ŽELI GRADITI ODRŽIVI MIR

VPP je rano odustao od rada na pomirenju u Pakracu i tako uspješno započeo taj isti rad. Tako nekako bi se u šali mogao opisati taj važan aspekt postojanja samog VPP-a. Svakako važan, jer bez njega VPP ne bi bio to što je bio. A bio je, kako smo znali reći:

"(možda) jedina službena suradnja jedne hrvatske (ARK) i jedne srpske (Centar za antiratnu akciju/ grupa Most) organizacije" tih godina. VPP je, kad god je mogao, djelovao na obje strane linije razgraničenja: na hrvatskoj i na srpskoj/krajinskoj. VPP je upirao prstom prema pomirenju i kada nije na njemu radio, a možda je i to bio rad? Možda bi trebalo reći: VPP je mogao upirati prstom prema pomirenju baš zato što nije o tome niti govorio niti vidljivo radio i ljudi su to znali cijeniti. "Ne zamjerite ako vam izgleda da vas mi ne razumijemo. Mi dolazimo iz druge priče, ali ovo što vi radite je jako važno za našu djecu, za mir, da rata više ne bude." To su riječi jednog od, *dugim puškama* naoružanih policajaca iz Požege koji su svoju 14-dnevnu smjenu odrađivali 1994. g. na samoj liniji razgraničenja u Pakracu. Razgovarao sam s njim i njegovih 10-tak kolega u proljeće 1994. g. o VPP-u, volonterima, nenasilju, pacifizmu i koje mu. Umjesto podsmijeha stiglo je nekakvo, no utoliko vrjednije priznanje.

### ŠTO ZNAČI KADA KAŽEMO NAJVEĆI MIROVNI PROJEKT?

Više je razloga za ovakvo opisivanje VPP-a. Pogledajmo što možemo naučiti iz njih, a da ne upadnemo u pogrešno shvaćanje termina. Naglasak je na riječi «projekt», VPP se nikada nije osamostalio od ARK-a iako je za to bilo i poticaja izvana (pomalo bizarnih nagovaranja utjecajnog pakracanina iz inozemstva koji je predlagao registraciju VPP-a u Pakracu "kako bi postali neovisni o Zagrebu", što, kako je i navedeno, nije bio nikakav problem projektu) i iznutra – pred sam kraj projekta dokumentacija za registraciju je bila pripremljena, no tada se već gasio entuzijazam i smisao dovođenja stranih volontera u područje koje je vapilo za ekonomskom obnovom i civilnim inicijativama domaćih ljudi. Dakle, VPP je u 3 godine i 8 mjeseci svog postojanja, od srpnja 1993. g. do kraja veljače 1997. g., bio i ostao projekt ARK-a, mirovne udruge iz Zagreba. Koliko je to i kako utjecalo na učinkovitost i način djelovanja samog projekta trebalo se analizirati. Ono što se nam čini sporno je da je projekt puno lakše zatvoriti nego udruhu, a to se VPP-u i dogodilo početkom 1997. g. VPP je svoju misiju obavio, okolnosti su se u društvu i u lokalnoj zajednici promijenile i trebalo je tražiti druge načine osnaživanja civilnih inicijativa u Pakracu i okolici.

*Najveći!* Ima i svoju brojčanu dimenziju. Kroz VPP prošlo je nekoliko stotina volontera koji su proveli najmanje 3 tjedna u Pakracu (barata se brojkom od više od 400 volontera, no kako je dosta ljudi dolazilo više puta, a ni dokumentacija nije kompletirana, niti arhivirana, točan broj nije lako utvrditi). Volonteri su dolazili iz 30-ak zemalja Europe, uključujući Rusiju i Sjevernu Ameriku, Australiju te Novi Zeland i Južnu Ameriku. U ljeto 1994. g. kada je VPP bio najveći, okupljao je 70-ak volontera (surađivao je sa švicarskom mirovnom udrugom GsoA – grupa za Švicarsku bez oružja) što je bila prevelika brojka za grad koji je tada brojio 2000 žitelja.

efforts by informing us that experiences of people around the world show that PTSP treatment is more effective in the presence of a non-expert than in the presence of 'people in white coats'.

VPP provided opportunity for the 'little' people who sat in the comfort of their homes, watching the war raging in former Yugoslavia, wishing they could do something to help stop or lessen the atrocities. Providing humanitarian aid soon became insufficient. VPP reached out and asked people to come, confessing the need for help and offering preparation through training. They did not ask for any special skills. Their only requirements were transparent motivation and willingness to live in Pakrac for at least three weeks, while working towards social reconstruction. Those 'little people' who paid their own trip, food and lodgings turned out to be the real answer to the needs of people in Pakrac. From a sea full of people on a mission and with a mission, experts and representatives of various instances of power, finally someone 'ordinary' had emerged, someone who was ready to listen to them and was genuinely interested in what they had to say.

### C) WAYMARK OF ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE PEACE

VPP gave up early on the attempts at achieving truce in Pakrac – hence successfully instigating that very process. This is how that important aspect of VPP's existence could be jokingly described. Important, because without it VPP would not have been what it was. And it was, as we used to say, "(probably) the only official collaboration between a Croatian (ARK) and Serbian (Centre for Antiwar Action / Grupa MOST) organization" during those years. Whenever possible, VPP was active on both sides of the division line: Croatian as well as Serbian. VPP pointed their finger towards the achievement of truce even when they did not actively work on it – but maybe even that was work? Perhaps it should be said that VPP was able to point their finger towards the achievement of truce precisely because they neither talked about it nor visibly worked towards it, and people knew how to appreciate that. "Do not hold it against us if it appears that we do not understand you. We come from a different story. But what you are doing is very important; for our children, for peace, for this war to end once and for all." These are the words of one of the policemen from Požega, who carried long-barrelled guns while working their 14-day-long shift on the division line in Pakrac in 1994. In the spring that year, I talked to him and his colleagues about VPP, volunteer work, non-violence, pacifism, etc. Instead of a scoff I received an unexpected, but all the more valuable recognition.

### WHAT DO WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY 'THE BIGGEST PEACE PROJECT'?

There are several reasons for such description of VPP. Let us consider what we can learn from these reasons without misinterpreting the terms. The emphasis is on the word 'project'. VPP had never become completely independent from ARK, although it was not for the lack of encouragement from the outside (somewhat bizarre insistence of an influential emigrant from Pakrac whose proposal was to register VPP in Pakrac, "so as to become in-

## ŠTO SMO NAUČILI?

**PRIPREMA je jako važna.** VPP je imao jako dobro organizirani proces pripremno treninoga za volontere. To ne znači da je sve funkcioniralo kako treba, i to zato što je s vremenom značajan dio volontera dolazio individualno, a ne preko svojih volonterskih organizacija, najčešće preko SCI-a (*Service Civil International*). Ti su ogranci (SCI-a) u svojim zemljama organizirali info-susrete s bivšim pakrackim volonterima te pripreme za nove volontere. Oni su, naravno imali i obavezna 2-3 dana priprema u Zagrebu prije odlaska u Pakrac. Na pripremama se vodilo razgovora o izgradnji grupe, povjerenju između volontera, timskom radu, procjenjivala se psihička stabilnost volontera. Važan dio bio je upoznavanje s političkom situacijom, raspadom SFRJ-a, ratom u Hrvatskoj, situacijom u UNPA Zapadu. Pripreme su bile temelj sigurnosti VPP-a, trajale su 2-3 dana, vodilo ih je 2-3 ljudi iz ARK-a i VPP-a. Važno je bilo naći i ravnotežu: održati visoku motivaciju volontera "da pomognu" (ma što to znači), a istovremeno ih upozoriti na niz manjih i veći opasnosti koje vrebaju na njih u Pakracu odnosno šteta koju bi oni svojim ponašanjem mogli počinjavati. Upozoriti, no ne i uplašiti, bilo je više nego potrebno. Trebalo je skrenuti pažnju na:

- A/** emocionalnu zahtjevnost rada s ljudima koji su proživjeli rat i imaju potrebu o tome pričati (pa je neznanje zajedničkog jezika znala biti prednost jer se tražila empatija na sugovornica, no nije bilo jako bitno da se svaki detalj razumije);
- B/** konačnost vremena provedenog u Pakracu i neumitnost povratka svojoj kući, najčešće nakon 3 tjedna kampa, ma kako se jake i bliske veze s ljudima uspostavile;
- C/** neprimjerenost ulazanja u političke razgovore o raspadu SFRJ. Naglasak na aktivnom slušanju, što je vjerojatno najznačajnije oruđe izgradnje povjerenja i uspješne komunikacije. Kako je VPP od samog početka kanio raditi na obje strane linije razgranjenosti, trebalo je naći i modus kako izgraditi odnose sa suprotstavljenim stranama;
- D/** brojne fizičke opasnosti su samu egzistenciju projekta cijelo vrijeme držale u neizvjesnosti: opasnost približavanja minskim poljima, redovite noćne pucnjave iz automatskih pušaka (u zrak), pogotovo prvu godinu projekta, rad na gradilištima bez elementarnih sredstava zaštite na radu (što je koštalo života švicarskog volontera Ursa Webera u srpnju 1994. g. kada je nesretno pao s prvog kata "Jankovićku" u "Kuće", zaštićenog spomenika u samom centru grada). Trebalo je pronaći i ravnotežu u slobodnim druženjima i izlascima u kafićima i izloženosti identiteta "volonter koji radi na neprijateljskoj strani" u atmosferi alkoholnih pića i mnogo trauma itd.;
- E/** važan dio priprema postajalo je i ukazivanje na kulturnu osjetljivost (cultural sensibility). Dobra volja volontera i visoka motiviranost da doprinesu boljitku života ljudi, brzo i značajno, u pravilu je korespondirala sa znatno usporenim ritmom života zajednice, koja je i prije rata živjela sporo, koja se pomalo vraćala sebi i gradila vlastito samopoštovanje, s činjenicom da doma i ljudi žive ovdje stalno, a volonteri se se ubrzo vratiti svojim domovima. Znakovit je primjer jako frustrirane kanadske volonterke kojoj ravnatelj škole nije dozvolio da organizira novogodišnju priredbu sa

dependent from Zagreb," which, as already mentioned, posed no problem to the project) or the inside. At the very end of the project the documentation needed for registration was finally prepared, but by then, the enthusiasm had already started to decrease, and there was no more point in bringing foreign volunteers into an area crying for economic revival and local civilian initiatives.

Therefore, throughout the three years and eight months of its existence, from July 1993 to the end of February 1997, VPP remained the project of ARK, a peace organization from Zagreb. The amount and sort of influence this had on the project's efficiency and methods are yet to be analyzed. It goes without saying that a project is more easily shut down than an organization, which was precisely what happened to VPP at the beginning of 1997. VPP had completed its mission. Circumstances had changed within the local community, and they required new kinds of civilian initiatives in Pakrac and its surroundings.

*The biggest* – it has its own numerical dimension. Several hundreds of volunteers made their way through VPP, spending at least three weeks in Pakrac (it is assumed that the number exceeds 400 volunteers, but since many people came more than once, and there is no complete and archived documentation, the exact number is difficult to determine). Volunteers came from about 30 European countries, Russia, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South America. At its peak, in the summer of 1994, VPP gathered about 70 volunteers (cooperation with Swiss peace organization GsoA – Group for a Switzerland without an Army), which was too many for a town with population of only 2000.

## WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED?

**PREPARATION is very important.** VPP had a very well organized preparational volunteer training programme. This does not mean that everything went according to plan. With time, a great many volunteers started arriving individually, instead of through their volunteer organizations – most frequently SCI (Service Civil International). Their branches organized informational meetings with former volunteers from Pakrac and preparational trainings for new volunteers in their own countries. They also provided an additional mandatory two or three day training in Zagreb before proceeding to Pakrac. The preparations included teambuilding, building of trust among the volunteers, teamwork, and assessment of psychological stability. An important part was learning about the political circumstances, the fall of SFRY, the war in Croatia, and the UNPA West situation. The preparations represented the basis for stability within VPP. They lasted for two - three days and were managed by two - three members of ARK or VPP. It was important to find a balance: maintain high levels of motivation among the volunteers, while at the same time warn them against certain dangers lurking in Pakrac, but also damages potentially caused by irresponsible behaviour. To warn but not to frighten, more than necessary. Their attention was drawn to:

- A/** the emotionally demanding task of working with people who have lived

acima. Važno je bilo stvari staviti u pravi kontekst, kako se dobra volja volontera ne bi omalovažila, a domaća zajednica ipak zaštitila od brojnih brzih "intervencija" sa strane. Pitanje bilo u Kanadi ravnatelj škole dozvolio stranom volonteru da organizira priredbu s učenicima pokraj svog nastavnog osoblja možda nije bilo najprikladnije, no svakako je ponudilo širu perspektivu sagledavanja onoga što se u teoriji zove "Intervencija treće (to nije n+1) strane".

Pripremni su treninzi činili temelj sigurnosti VPP-a i jamčili su da volonteri ne e u initi štetu svojim ponašanjem. No, ubrzo smo uvidjeli da pravi problemi mogu nastati nakon povratka u svoje sredine, ratom neopterećene, "normalne" zajednice.

**FOLLOW UP je također jako važan.** Sam dolazak u Pakrac iz sigurnosti svojih domova, neopterećenih ratom, slabo funkcionirajućim državnim institucijama i siromaštvom bio je veliki stres za volontere. No kako se radilo o procesu predpriprema za volontere (upoznavanje s pisanim materijalima), pripremnim treningom te stalnom brigom za vrijeme trajanja kampa (tri tjedna) volonteri od strane voditelja kampa te drugih volontera, taj je stres rijetko bio neugodan i ubrzo se pretvarao u iskreno oduševljenje nizom stvarima:

- A/** moguće je doći u da se samim njihovim boravkom nekome uljepša život ili bar donese dah nade, da se nagovještajem normalnog života iskaže solidarnost s ljudima kojima je rat drastično pokvario kvalitetu življenja;
- B/** moguće je doći u da se njihovim radom napravi vidljiva promjena, da se neka srušena kuća očišćuje od smeća, da se očišćuju i spase cigle, da se održi niz igračonica s djecom ili tečaj engleskog, da se nekome nacijepaju drva, organizira koncert ili tečaj e-maila (to je bilo vrijeme prije uvođenja interneta), da se očišćuje neki zid, popravi prozor;
- C/** lako je doći u om kontakta s dojučeršnjim nepoznatim ljudima, njihovim gostoprimstvom, brigom za volontere, iako su sami posjedovali manje nego volonteri u svojim zemljama, ljudskošću u kontaktu koji nije opterećen razgovorima o materijalnom, već je nerijetko pun slavljenja života takvog kakav jest, dolaskom proljeća, životom na, i, uz zemlju (riječ je o plodnoj Slavoniji), uzajamnim poštovanjem jer volonteri su došli pomoći, a zato su i davali novac, koji je domaćim ljudima tada bio velik. Rat je prošao, no život ide dalje, kao i nesalomljivost ljudskog duha i relativnost značenja svih onih dilema koje inače ispunjavaju njihove živote u Belgiji, Nizozemskoj, Njemačkoj itd. Jedan volonter je tu misao sažeo u rečenicu: *"Mislio sam da je važno koje ću cipele obući, a ovdje sam naučio da sam sretan što imam obje noge"*.
- D/** izvjesnom dozom herojstva, koja je svakako postojala kod volontera, i to je bio određeni adrenalin. "Dok smo mi u kafi u Škorpija stotinjak metara od kontrolne točke uživali u Staročeškom pivu iz Daruvarske pivovare, pokraj nas se provezao direktor nacionalne TV u zaštitnom prsluku na putu za Požegu. I djelatnici lokalne banke sastajali su se sa zagrebačkim kolegama u obližnjem Daruvaru, iz sigurnosnih razloga." Važno je napomenuti da sigurnosne procjene odgovornih osoba VPP-a nikada nisu izlagale volontere nepotrebnom riziku, radilo se najčešće o percepciji grada na liniji razgraničenja u koji je bolje ne ići.

through war and feel the need to talk about it (sometimes not having a common language would turn into advantage, because to be an emphatic listener a person did not necessarily have to understand every detail of a conversation)

- B/** the fact that their stay in Pakrac would eventually come to an end (in most cases, after three weeks), and they would have to return home, regardless of the close connections established with the locals
- C/** the inappropriateness of participating in political discussions about the fall of SFRY. The stress was placed on active listening – probably the most important means of trust-building and successful communication. As VPP intended to be active on both sides of the division line from the very beginning, an appropriate way of forming relations with both sides needed to be established.
- D/** due to physical dangers, the existence of the project was held in suspense the entire time: the danger of approaching mine fields, regular automatic gunfire during night time (in the air), especially during the first year of the project, the lack of elementary workplace safety during construction work (which cost a Swiss volunteer Urs Weber his life when he fell from the first storey of Janković Castle, a protected monument in the town centre, in July 1994). A balance needed to be found between leisure time spent socializing and visiting coffee bars and the exposure of a volunteer as 'someone who works on the enemy side' in an atmosphere brimming with alcohol and trauma, etc.
- E/** paying attention to cultural sensibility, which gradually became an important part of the preparations. Volunteers' high motivation and willingness to make a quick significant contribution to the lives of the local people usually corresponded to the slow rhythm of life led by the community, which had only recently started to regain their self-respect. It was important for volunteers to bear in mind that they would eventually return to their homes, while the locals would continue to live there. This is reflected in the example of an embittered Canadian volunteer whose proposal to organize a New Year's school play was denied by the school principal. Everything needed to be placed within a proper context, so as not to underrate a volunteer's good will, as well as to protect the community from numerous rash interventions on the side. Perhaps it would not be appropriate to ask whether a Canadian school principal would allow a foreign volunteer to organize a school play with his pupils when the school has its own staff, but it certainly offered a better vantage point when it comes to the problem of interventions from a third (or rather n+1) party.

Preparational trainings represented the basis of VPP's safety system and they guaranteed that precautions would be taken to avoid any possible damage caused by a volunteer's inappropriate behaviour. But we soon came to realize that real problems can appear after the return to one's own 'normal' community unaffected by war.

**FOLLOW UP is just as important.** The very arrival to Pakrac from security of their war-intact homes, and the encounter with deficiently functioning

**E/** samim odnosima u volonterskom kampu, razinom brige jednih o drugima, pronađene estime grljenjem, prvotno uvedenim od Annette O'Gorman, sitne stasom, ali velikog srca, iz njezina nadležnog ureda UNOV-a, koja je iz predanosti i znanja redovito grlila svakoga, uključujući i lokalne i državne dužnosnike, a oni su iskazivali veliku bliskost sa svima uključujući i članove VPP. U razrušenom gradu, okruženi minskim poljima, uz redovite noćne rafale, važno je bilo biti povezan i to moći pokazati i tjelesno, grljenjem ili dijeljenjem obroka. To je razina bliskosti s kolegama/icama koja je strana nekom normalnom mirnodopskom okruženju i utoliko vrjednija i snažnija.

Povratak iz Pakraca svojim kućama, ubrzo se pokazao kao mnogo veći stres za mnoge volontere, nego sam dolazak. Boravak u Pakracu u VPP-u bio je poput radijacije, izlaganja intenzivnom zračenju negativnog i pozitivnog. Volonteri su se svojim kućama vraćali promijenjeni (ne svi, no značajan uzorak). Imali su potrebu govoriti o svojim iskustvima, ali i smislu života, ratu i miru, pomaganju, solidarnosti među ljudima... Nerijetko su ubrzo postajali dosadni svojim pričama o Pakracu, o Hrvatskoj, o ratu, o UN-u, kao i raznim pitanjima. Svoju potrebu da ostanu povezani s ljudima i iskustvom u Pakracu, mnogi su realizirali prikupljanjem i donošenjem humanitarne pomoći, ponovnim dolaskom u posjet prijateljima u gradu i na projektu, studiranjem mirovnih studija, transformacijom sukoba ili sličnog te, nerijetko i angažmanima u drugim postratnim područjima. U svakom slučaju i sami SCI-evi ogranci uvidjeli su potrebu da ostanu u kontaktu s bivšim volonterima, da im ponude mjesto za razgovor ili savjet. Važno je napomenuti da koliko god je ponekad bilo teško uklapanje volontera u vlastitu svakodnevnicu nakon pakračkog iskustva, to je više znao biti odraz praznoće te svakodnevnice i života u sretnim (jesu li?) zajednicama, nego "greške" kod volontera koji bi se prestali zanimati za materijalne stvari ili zadovoljavati ispraznim razgovorima.

**Organizacija kampa - Nenasilje kao osnova svog djelovanja** Kako organizirati kamp među narodnih volontera na samoj liniji razgraničenja dvije (politički) neprijateljske zajednice ili, još bolje, na obje strane? Kako uskladiti UN-ove procedure i anarhiju jedne pacifističke udruge? Kako na pravi način pristupiti radu na pomirenju u zajednici koja se od rata tek oporavlja? Dugo smo tražili odgovore na ta pitanja, slične primjere iz prošlosti, savjete, iskustva. Najbolji savjeti došli su kroz pitanja iz knjige Nicka Lewera i Olivera Ramsbothama, na temu: *Etika intervencije "treće" strane*. No, odgovore smo morali tražiti svakodnevno, zajedno, najčešće i na zajedničkim sastancima svih uključujućih u VPP, svih 20-tak ili više osoba bi se našlo u krugu, navečer, tri puta tjedno i duže od dva sata ako je bilo potrebno. Nenasilje nas je uvalovalo i uvalovalo pakračane od nas, nevjericu da se silom i nasiljem može doći do trajnih rješenja. Javnost rada nam je bila velika zaštita, kao i otvorenost domaćim ljudima u svakom trenutku, da budu u nekoj od volonterskih kućama, zatim dnevnicama Wama Kata koji su bili objavljeni poput današnjih blogova na mnogim javnim e-mail listama (tada su se zvale "konferencije" i APC/YUGO/ANTIWAR je bila najsrelevantnija) i naša otvorenost u dilemama u razgovorima s lokalnim dužnosnicima. Svi veći problemi i napetosti u okolišu problema proizlazili su iz nedostatka informacija koje je lokalna zajednica

government institutions and poverty, created great amounts of stress for the volunteers. However, several factors, such as preliminary processes (familiarizing with written material), preparational training, and constant support given to volunteers from camp managers and more experienced volunteers, helped reduce the discomfort and turn it into sincere enthusiasm about a whole variety of things:

- A/** the opportunity to make someone's life easier, or at least bring them a breath of hope, give a hint of a better life, to display solidarity towards the people whose lives have been drastically disrupted by the war.
- B/** the ability to make a visible difference by making an effort to clean up a demolished house, clean and save building bricks, chop some wood, paint a wall, fix a window, to hold playgroups for children, English lessons, to organize a concert, or conduct e-mail lessons (and this was in the pre-Internet era!)
- C/** the easiness of making contact with the locals, who only a day before had been complete strangers to them; their warm hospitality and attentiveness towards the volunteers, regardless of their material hardships. Unburdened by conversations about material things, this human contact celebrated life as it was, the coming of spring, living off and with the land (this was, after all, the fertile soil of Slavonija). The respect was mutual, for the amount of money volunteers had to pay in order to come and help was quite significant for the locals at the time. The war had ended and life went on, showing the strength of the human spirit, but also the relative nature of those everyday problems belonging to lives in Belgium, Netherlands, Germany. One volunteer summed it up: "I used to worry about which shoes I would wear, but here I have learned how lucky I am to have both my legs."
- D/** The heroism coming from high levels of adrenalin. As we were sitting in 'Škorpija' café, enjoying our Daruvar brewed 'Staro eško' beer, the director of the national TV drove right past us, wearing a bulletproof vest, heading for Požega. For reasons of safety, even the employees of a local bank held meetings with their partners from Zagreb in a nearby town of Daruvar. It should be mentioned that VPP's safety evaluations never put the volunteers at unnecessary risks. The issue here was a generally shared perception of the town as a place to be avoided due to its being situated exactly on the division line.
- E/** The relationships within the volunteer camp, high levels of mutual concern, often accompanied by group hugs. This way of expressing intimacy shared by everyone at VPP was first introduced by Annette O'Gorman from UNOV, who, though small in stature, possessed a great heart, knowledge and commitment. She hugged everyone, including local and government officials. Residing in this devastated town, surrounded by minefields and regular night time gunfire, it was important to feel connected and be able to show it physically, by hugging or sharing meals. This level of intimacy would feel strange in a typical non-war environment, and this only made it more valuable to us.

Leaving Pakrac and returning to their homes soon proved to be a much greater stress for many volunteers than it had been to come to Pakrac in



(ili netko u njoj) imao o nama. Djelovali smo u preosjetljivim političko-sigurnosnim uvjetima da bismo smjeli išta tajiti. Nesporazumi su se lako rješavali razgovorima i otvorenosti, u dosluhu i neposluhu, kako danas po injemo nazivati pristup izgradnji mira koji je VPP razvijao još od 1993. g.; u dosluhu s lokalnom zajednicom, njenim ritmom, onim za što je spremna, a za što još treba pripreme i vremena: u neposluhu s onim ponašanjima i vrijednostima koje nisu temeljne niti za spomenutu, a niti za ijednu drugu zdravu prosperitetnu zajednicu. Sada to zvuči smisleno, no brojni nesporazumi utirali su put u enja tom pristupu. Jednom prilikom smo saznali da su kolege iz beogradskog *Centra za antiratnu akciju*, koji su radili na "krajinskoj" strani Pakraca htjeli pokazati gestu dobre volje ljudima na "hrvatskoj" strani. Međusobna komunikacija nam je bila otežana, a fizički smo se sretali samo u kućini *Most mira* (Peace bridge) u Mohačsu u Mađarskoj. Ideja je bila da se veliko uskršnje jaje, napunjeno uskršnjim estetikama i dobrim željama djece s "krajinske" strane Pakraca spusti nizbrdo prema kontrolnoj točki na "hrvatskoj" strani. Ideja je, dakle, i draga i simpatična, vjerojatno je zahtijevala mnogo truda, no sama glasina da će se veliko jaje kotrljati prema *check-pointu* uznemirila je mnoge na "hrvatskoj" strani. Uloženo je mnogo sastanaka u kasne večernje sate i mnogo razgovora kako bi se razjasnilo da ideja nije bila razmatrana, niti koordinirana s naše strane, kako bi se akcija spriječila, kao i neželjeni incident. Radilo se, naprosto, o kompletno različitim društvenim i političkim realnostima na dvije strane grada, fizički tako bliskih, a u stvarnosti tako dalekih. Sjajna ideja mogla je, zbog nedostaka osluškivanja bila one druge zajednice, prouzročiti suprotni efekt.

**Izvori nadahnuća i podrške** Znanje, inspiraciju, resurse i podršku u 90-tima u ARK-u, VPP-u, Miramidama i ostalim aktivnostima izgradnje mira u Hrvatskoj crpili smo iz barem tri izvora:

iz našina rada i odnosa unutar same organizacije, odnosno inicijative, grupe, projekta. Bilo je tu nedostatka hijerarhije, međusobnog uvažavanja, prostora za razgovor, refleksija, dilema i često je samo veselje rada proizlazilo iz tih oaza tolerancije, različitosti i nenasilja u rigidnom, kolektivističkom autoritarnom okruženju; iz komunikacije i suradnje s drugim udrugama, organizacijama, grupama, projektima. Solidarnost i suradnja na civilnoj sceni, bili su, bar unutar mreže ARK-a, koja je bila vrlo labava, možda i ključni sastojci međusobnog ophoćenja i percipiranja. Tu se misli kako na povezanost unutar Hrvatske, tako i veze s mirovnim, ženskim i ljudskopravaškim udrugama u Srbiji, Sloveniji, BiH pa i ostalim ex-YU zemljama;

iz mreža i pokreta izvan same Hrvatske, mahom sa zapada. Termin "domaći" i "strani" u 90-tima su bili predmetom mnogih naših razmatranja. Odnosili su se, uglavnom na geografske pa čak i administrativne odrednice, no brzo smo uvidjeli da je najvažnija i prava odrednica bila vrijednosna bliskost: posvećenost nenasilju, poštovanje života i njegove različitosti, horizontalne raspodjele moći i slušanja, radije nego poučavanja itd.

the first place. The stay in Pakrac with VPP was somewhat like radiation. One was exposed to both positive and negative emissions. Many of the volunteers returned to their homes as different people. They felt the need to talk about their experiences, the meaning of life, war and peace, helping others, solidarity among humans, etc. Often they would bore others with their questions and stories of Pakrac, Croatia, the war, and the UN. Many fulfilled their need to stay connected with the people and experiences from Pakrac by repeated involvement in humanitarian aid projects, visiting their friends in Pakrac and VPP, enrolling in Peace Studies or similar programmes, and often visiting other post-war areas. Even SCI branches saw the need to stay in contact with former volunteers and offer them a place for conversation or guidance. Their lack of interest for material things and empty conversations were hardly a symptom of the volunteers' own 'defect'. The difficulties that they encountered while returning to their normal lives after the Pakrac experience, were more of a reflection of the emptiness of everyday life in (seemingly) ordered communities.

### CAMP ORGANIZATION – NON-VIOLENCE AS THE BASIS OF ITS ACTIVITY

How to organize a camp for international volunteers on the very line dividing two (politically) conflicted communities, or even better – how to organize it on both sides? How to align the UN procedures with the anarchism of a pacifistic organization? What is the right way to initiate reconciliation in a community that has only just begun to recover from the war? We have spent a long time searching for the answers to these questions, similar examples from the past, advice, and experiences. The best advice was offered to us by Nick Lewer's and Oliver Ramsbotham's book that deals with the ethics of third party intervention. We searched for the answers on a daily basis, holding regular meetings in the form of evening attended by everyone from VPP, three times a week. We sat around in a circle, debating for hours if necessary. Non-violence, a belief that a permanent solution cannot be reached through force and violence, kept us safe and kept people of Pakrac safe from us.

Transparency of our work gave us security; the doors of our volunteer houses were always open to the local people; Wam Kat's diaries were published on public e-mail lists, in the form of today's blogs (we called them 'conferences', and APC/YUGO/ANTIWAR was the most relevant one for us); we openly approached all dilemmas in our discussions with the local authorities. All our serious problems and tensions arose from the local community's lack of knowledge regarding our work. The political and safety conditions in which we operated were too fragile to keep anything secret. Misunderstandings were easily resolved through conversations and open attitude.

In collusion and disobedience – this is how we address today the peace-building approach developed by VPP since 1993; in collusion with the local community and its rhythm, recognizing when more time is needed for certain adjustments; in disobedience of the attitudes and values not appropriate for this or any other healthy thriving community. It may sound meaningful now,



but on the road of learning this approach we encountered many obstacles. On one occasion we found out that our Belgrade colleagues from Centre for Antiwar Action, who were working on the 'Krajina' side of Pakrac, have been planning a show of good will to the people on the 'Croatian' side. We had some difficulties in our communication channels, and the only place we would meet physically was at the Peace Bridge establishment in Mohacs, Hungary. Their idea was to fill a giant Easter egg with greeting cards and best wishes from the children of 'Krajina', and send it downhill towards the check-point and the 'Croatian' side. This idea of a giant egg rolling towards the check-point, although sweet and benevolent in all intents and purposes, caused quite a lot of commotion on the 'Croatian' side of town. It took several late night meetings and exhaustive dialogues to clarify that this idea was neither considered nor coordinated by us, and to prevent the undesired incident. Clearly, social and political situations on the two sides of town, physically close but in actuality so far away from each other, were entirely different. What had started out as a great idea could have ended up causing an entirely opposite effect, simply because of lack of knowledge of what was happening on the other side.

#### SOURCES OF INSPIRATION AND SUPPORT

ARK, VPP, Miramida, and other Croatian peace-building organizations in the 1990s drew their knowledge, inspiration, resources and support from at least three sources: from the work of and relationships within the organization itself (or an initiative, group, project). Absence of hierarchy, mutual respect, room for discussion, reflection, dilemmas – the very pleasure of work often derived from these oases of tolerance, diversity and non-violence in an otherwise rigid, collectivistic, authoritative surroundings; from communicating and cooperating with other organizations, groups, projects and initiatives. Solidarity and cooperation on the civilian scene were, at least within a loosely structured ARK network, the essential ingredient of mutual recognition and appreciation. This implies connections within Croatia as well as connections to peace, feminist, and human rights organizations in Serbia, Slovenia, BiH, and other ex-YU countries; from networks and initiatives outside of Croatia, mainly those from the West. The terms 'home' and 'foreign' were frequently subjected to reconsideration in the 1990s. They primarily implied geographical or administrative determinants. However, we soon learned that the truest determinant were the things we valued the most: a dedication to non-violence, respecting life and its diversities, horizontal distribution of power: power with others, listening rather than preaching, etc.

# MEURELIGIJSKI DIJALOG KAO NAČIN IZGRADNJE POMIRENOG DRUŠTVA

/ PREPORUKE ZA EU NA TEMELJU ISKUSTVA IZ REGIJE  
JUGOISTOČNE EUROPE

AUTORICA:  
ANA RAFFAI

ANA RAFFAI JE KATOLIKAZNA TEOLGINJA, TRENERICA I MENTORICA IZ PODRUČJA NENASILJA I MEDIJACIJE ZA VIŠE OD 500 MIROVNIH AKTIVISTA U ZADNJIH DESET GODINA. OSMISLILA JE I VODILA MNOGE RADIONICE ISPRED CENTRA ZA MIROVNE STUDIJE. NEKI OD NJIHOVIH STUDENATA/ICA SADA SU I SAMI TRENERI IZ PODRUČJA MIROVNOG OBRAZOVANJA. ANA TAKO RADI U ORGANIZACIJI RAND – REGIONALNA ADRESA ZA NENASILNO DJELOVANJE NA OBRAZOVANJU ZA MIR ZA RAZLIČITE VJERSKE SKUPINE.

Dolazim iz RAND-a, mirovne organizacije čiji puni naslov glasi *Regionalna adresa za nenasilno djelovanje* i govorit ću o onome što zapažam kao mirovna radnica, a što može poticati izgradnju mira odozdo na području meureligijskog dijaloga u svrhu razvoja suživota u multikulturalnom kontekstu. Pozvat ću se na iskustvo izgradnje mira u programima u koje sam trenutno uključena a to su:

- / Meureligijski edukativni / dijaloško edukativni susreti: četverodnevni treninzi nenasilne komunikacije u meureligijskom dijalogu koje organizira RAND za svjetonazorno heterogene grupe;
- / Djelovanje nevladine organizacije *Ekumenska inicijativa žena* iz Omišaja koja sam trenutno predsjednica Upravnog odbora: *Ekumenska inicijativa žena* (EIŽ) podržava izgradnju mira odozdo s fokusom na području pomirenja, meureligijskog i ekumenskog dijaloga te ženska ljudska prava i specifičnost vidljivosti teologinje u lokalnoj zajednici i javnosti općenito;
- / Mreža *Vjernici za mir*, inicijativa mirovnih aktivista iz regije Zapadnog Balkana koja je najvidljivija kroz konferenciju "Grade i mir, slavimo Boga". Konferenciju organiziramo svaku drugu godinu s ciljem promocije nenasilnog djelovanja vjernika i njihovog aktiviranja za pomirenje i suživot.

## IZGRADNJA MIRA NIJE INDIVIDUALNA VEĆ TIMSKA PRIČA

Na početku svog kratkog izlaganja želim podsjetiti na ono što se lako može zaboraviti kada se sistematizira i kada se na način ovako frontalnog izlaganja prenose iskustva praktičnog mirovnog djelovanja, a to je pitanje autorstva ovog iskustva. Ja sam govornica koja je sabrala određene "pouke" ili uvide.

# INTER-RELIGION DIALOGUE AS A MEANS OF BUILDING A RECONCILED SOCIETY

/ RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE  
FROM SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

AUTHOR:  
ANA RAFFAI

ANA RAFFAI, ROMAN CATHOLIC CROATIAN THEOLOGIAN, HAS BEEN TRAINING AND MENTORING OVER 500 PEACE ACTIVISTS ON NONVIOLENCE AND PEACE MEDIATION OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS. SHE HAS DESIGNED AND LED VARIOUS WORKSHOPS FOR THE CENTER FOR PEACE STUDIES. SOME OF THEIR TRAINEES ARE NOW TRAINERS IN PEACE EDUCATION THEMSELVES. SHE ALSO WORKS WITH ORGANIZATION RAND – REGIONAL ADDRESS FOR NON-VIOLENT ACTION IN PEACE EDUCATION FOR DIFFERENT FAITH GROUPS.

I represent RAND, a peace organization whose full name is Regional Address for Nonviolent Action, and I will be presenting my observations as a peace worker on the possible catalysts in the process of grass-roots peace-building in the field of inter-religion dialogue aimed at building a peaceful coexistence in a multi-cultural context.

My observations are based on my personal peace-building experience in the programs I am currently involved in, which include:

- / Inter-religious educational dialogues: four-day trainings of non-violent communication in an inter-religious dialogue, organized for ideologically heterogeneous groups by RAND;
- / The work of the *Ecumenical Women's Initiative* NGO from Omišalj, whose Board of Directors I am currently chairing: The Ecumenical Women's Initiative (EIŽ) supports grass-roots peace-building with a focus on the field of reconciliation, inter-religious ecumenical dialogue and women's rights, specifically on the increase of female theologians' presence both in local communities and in society in general;
- / The Believers for Peace network, an initiative of peace activist from the West Balkans which is most notable for its conference entitled "In building peace, we celebrate God". The conference is organized biannually in order to promote non-violent believer activism and work on reconciliation and coexistence.

## PEACE-BUILDING IS NOT AN INDIVIDUAL BUT A TEAM-EFFORT

At the beginning of my short presentation I wish to point out a fact that is easily forgotten in the process of systematically and frontally presenting

Probat u istaknuti neke to ke koje smatram klju nima. One se pak teme-  
lje na radu koji su osmišljavali i provodili mnogi suradnici RAND-a, EIŽ-a ili  
mreže *Vjernika za mir*. Centar za mirovne studije nas je pozvao da na ovaj  
stol posložimo sva naša iskustva koja bi mogla biti od koristi itavoj našoj za-  
jednici. Ovo što govorim rezultat je rada mnogih ljudi i teško da e ikada biti  
pravedno popisano kome to no pripada odre eni doprinos. Mir nikada ne  
radi jedan ovjek, mir gradi grupa, tim, zajednica. Možda je to mogu e sažeti  
i u preporuke, ali ovdje na samom po etku želim naglasiti da osim izlaganja  
na ovakvim skupovima ili pisanja lanaka, gotovo nikada nisam radila sama.  
Niti bih to voljela. Zajedništvo je bitno za izgradnju mira. Ovim ujedno želim  
izraziti priznanje, moje poštovanje tamskom radu iz kojeg crpim inspiraciju  
i snagu za mirovno djelovanje. Primjer takvog zajedništva je upravo mreža  
*Vjernici za mir* koja je nositelj konferencije koju sam ve spomenula. Ve  
petu godinu, konferenciju priprema jedanaestero lana organizacijska grupa.  
Velika ve ina angažmana je bez nov ane naknade premda je izuzetno viso-  
ka stru nost uklju enih osoba. Radi se o iskusnim aktivisticama/ima, ima nas  
s dvoznamenkastim "stažem" u mirovnom radu, koji svoje bogato iskustvo  
preta u u ovaj projekt. Svakako da je za uspjeh našeg rada upravo bitna  
sinergija koja nas povezuje i nadahnjuje. Isto vrijedi i za druge projekte ili  
aktivnosti o kojima u ovdje govoriti.

Sadržaj mog izlaganja podijelila sam u tri dijela:

- A/** što je ono o emu govorim kada kažem me ureligijski dijalog u izgradnji  
mira;
- B/** što smo prepoznali kao pretpostavke našeg rada radi mogu e koristi za  
sli ne mirovne projekte nekoga od vas;
- C/** što bismo rado preporu ili institucijama, udrugama, pojedincima koji žele  
podržati dugoro nu izgradnju mira u ovoj regiji. Gdje je po našem mišlje-  
nju danas mogu e podržati mirovni me ureligijski rad i razvijati ga.

### VJERNICI U IZGRADNJI MIRA – ŠTO TO ZNAČI U NAŠEM KONTEKSTU

Kao što je op eprihva eno mišljenje u edukaciji za nenasilje da je svaki o-  
vjek sposoban za nenasilje, tako i svaki vjernik, koji se u tome prepoznaje,  
može nešto u initi za mir. Ne samo da je sposoban za izgradnju mira, nego  
je i "oboružan". On je oja an svojom osobnom vjerom, a isto tako i mnogim  
sadržajima koje krije tisu ljetna vjerska tradicija ne samo u svetim knjigama,  
ve i u iskustvima uzornih pripadnika njegove/njene vjerske zajednice kroz  
povijest (neke tradicije te likove sistematiziraju kao svece, a neke na dru-  
ge na ine obilježavaju važnost njihovog iskustva kao primjernog obrasca).  
Vjera nije samo ono što je nama obi no poznato u našoj regiji, nešto što  
automatski vežemo uz naciju ili uz o uvanje svog identiteta, svoje grupe u  
suprotnosti prema drugome.

Postoji još niz drugih aspekata, sadržaja vjere koji su nama u svakodnevnom  
iskustvu manje poznati ili skoro nepoznati, a jednako su relevantni za vjerski  
identitet ili za ono što u svojoj biti vjera jest. O vjerskom identitetu rijetko piše  
vjerski pa i svjetovni tisak, premda je jednako legitiman oblik ostvarenja vjere  
kao ovaj više tradicionalni. Sje am se jedne zanimljive primjedbe iz 2003. g.

personal experiences of practical peace-building work, which is the question  
of the authorship of this entire experience. I, as the speaker, have collected a  
number of conclusions or insights. I will try to emphasize some points which  
I consider to be crucial. They are in turn based on the work conceived and  
implemented by associates of both RAND and the EIŽ. The center for peace  
studies has invited us to present our experience here so that it may benefit  
our entire community. The impressions I will present are the product of the  
efforts of many people and it is unlikely that many of them will be properly  
credited for their contributions. Peace is never achieved through the actions  
of an individual: peace is always the result of the work of a group, a team, a  
community. Maybe this could be included in my finishing recommendations,  
but nevertheless I wish to emphasize here that, except for these types of  
presentations and writing articles, I have never worked alone. Nor would I  
like that. Unity is crucial to the peace-building process. Hereby I would also  
like to express my respect and admiration for the teamwork which is the  
source of my inspiration and strength for my peace-building work. The Be-  
lievers for Peace network, the organizer of the aforementioned conference,  
is a good example of such a unity. For the fifth year running, the confer-  
ence is organized by a 11-member organizational committee. Most of the  
work is done on a volunteer basis although most of the contributors are  
highly trained professionals. The people in question are experienced activ-  
ists, some with a double-digit number of years of peace-building experience,  
which they use to enhance this project. This synergy which connects and  
inspires us is definitely an important element in the success of our work. The  
same can be said of the other projects or activities I will be discussing.

I have divided my presentation into three sections:

- A/** A clarification of my usage of the concept of inter-religion dialogue in  
peace-building;
- B/** an explanation of the core concepts of our work and the way they might  
be used in similar peace projects in other regions;
- C/** our recommendations to other institutions, associations and individu-  
als who wish to support long-term peace-building in this region, and our  
vision of the perspectives for supporting and developing inter-religion  
peace work.

### BELIEVERS IN PEACE-BUILDING: WHAT DOES IT MEAN IN OUR CONTEXT?

Just as it is widely accepted in non-violence education that every person is  
capable of non-violence, we believe that everyone who considers him- or  
herself a believer can do something for peace. He or she is not only capable,  
but also "armed" for peace-building. He is strengthened both by faith and  
the wisdom of a tradition spanning thousands of years. This is not only the  
wisdom of books, but the wisdom of the experience of virtuous members of  
his or her religious community throughout history (some traditions classify  
them as saints; others honor their experience and appropriate behavior in  
different ways). Religion is not just the behavior we are accustomed to in  
our region; it is also something that is tied to our nation and our identity, a  
characteristic of our group in opposition to others.

kad smo organizirali internacionalnu konferenciju *Church and Peace* u Osijeku. Poslala sam obavijest o tom događaju na mirovnu mrežu ZAMIRnet. Jedna kolegica je sasvim spontano reagirala: "Crkva i mir, kaj tog ima negdje?" Njezina reakcija dala mi je uvid u to što je prva asocijacija na pojam "crkva" među onima koji ne idu u crkvu. O čemu nije mir.

Ako je neobično da je mir vezan uz pojam "crkva", onda mi vjernici imaju problem. To bi trebala biti crvena lampica za uzbunu. Budući da postoje nebrojena teološka, dogmatska mjesta koja Boga i vjeru vežu uz mir. Što se to dogodilo u našoj praksi, da ta mjesta nisu u javnosti prepoznata niti poznata?

Među religijski dijalog kao dio izgradnje mira, upravo je praktično djelovanje vjernika koji žele da oni sami, a postepeno i njihove zajednice doprinose pomirenju društvu i da budu prepoznate kao mirotvorne, da daju mirovne odgovore. Stoga mi pokušavamo u našem kontekstu osmisliti kako kao članovi raznih vjerskih zajednica možemo povezivati naš mirovni angažman s vlastitom vjerom. Zato nam se i konferencija zove *Gradeći mir, slavimo Boga*. To znači i da time što gradimo mir, pokazujemo da vjerujemo u Boga. Pojam "slaviti Boga" možemo razumjeti kao "štovati Boga", kao i "ispovijedati Boga" odnosno vjeru u Boga. Budući da je kontekst u kojem živimo bogat raznim religijskim pripadnostima i naš mirovni rad je ne samo vezan uz kršćanske raznih denominacija, nego i uz suživot kršćana i muslimana, najbrojnijih vjerskih zajednica u ovoj regiji.

Druga samorazumljivost koju želimo razbiti jest poistovjetivanje vjerskih/crkvenih zajednica s njihovim vođama ili pastirima. Vjernici koji su aktivni u svojem ispovijedanju vjere znaju da to nije točno. Oni su kao članovi svoje crkve ili svoje vjerske zajednice odgovorni za osobnu odgovornost u svojoj zajednici. Uloge voditelja su jasno definirane i pravno regulirane. Ipak u našem kontekstu još je dominantna hijerarhijska slika zajednice, a zanemarena ona egalitarna, premda je ravnopravnost važno načelo, ali središnji motiv kako u kršćanstvu tako i u islamu. Za naše razumijevanje među religijskog dijaloga u izgradnji mira važan je upravo princip ravnopravnosti jer smo svjesni da je svaka osoba važna bez obzira koji status u društvu nosi. Svaka osoba ima mogućnost nešto uiniti za suživot, svaka je potencijal za izgradnju pomirenja. Zbog toga ne radimo na način da se obratimo prvo vođama određenih zajednica, nego se obraćamo onim osobama koje zanima izgradnja mira, koje zanima nenasilje, s time da vjerski vođe nisu isključeni, ali oni u toj prijedlozi ne igraju neku presudnu ulogu. Oni su onoliko bitni koliko sebe kao osobe prepoznaju u izgradnji mira.

### TEOLOŠKI TEMELJI IZGRADNJE MIRA

Teoretski naš rad je podržan jednom promjenom ili razvojem u teološkoj misli. Na primjeru katoličke teologije ilustrirao ću o čemu govorim. Kada je u pitanju rat i mir, u kršćanskoj tradiciji od davnina postoji rasprava vezana za pitanje kako se nositi s ratom, obranom, zaštitom sebe, kada prijeti opasnost ratnog, oružanog sukoba. Jer u prvim stoljećima ima kršćanstva čak je i

There is a number of other aspects and elements of faith with which we are unfamiliar or less familiar in our daily lives, but are equally relevant to our religious identities or to the essence of our faith. This is something that is rarely discussed in religious or secular media, although it is every bit as much a legitimate expression of faith as the more traditional acts of faith. I remember an interesting remark I heard while organizing the international Church and Peace conference in Osijek in 2003. I posted an announcement of this event to the ZAMIRnet peace network. One of my co-workers spontaneously commented: "Church and peace, how do they fit together?" Her reaction opened my eyes: what is the first thing we think of when the word "church" is mentioned in the company of non-churchgoers? "Peace" is obviously not it. If it is unusual to mention peace in the same context as the word "church", then we believers have a problem. That should be cause for alarm, because there are innumerable theological and dogmatic instances tying God and faith to peace. What happened in practice that these aspects of faith are not publicly familiar and recognized?

Inter-religion dialogue as a part of peace-building is the practical work of believers who wish to make themselves, and consequently their communities as well, active in the process of building a society of reconciliation and to become renowned as peace-building communities. They wish to be called upon to provide peace-building answers. In our context, we, as members of various religious communities, are trying to envision a way to connect our peace-building activities to our faith. That is why our conference is entitled *In building peace, we celebrate God*. It means that through the act of building peace, we are showing our faith in God. The concept of "celebrating God" can be understood both as "showing respect to God" and as "confessing our faith in God". Because the context we live in is filled with diverse religious identities, our peace-building work is based not only on the various Christian denominations, but also on the coexistence of Christians and Muslims, the two most numerous religious communities in the region.

We also wish to disprove a notion which is considered self-evident: the fact that religious communities are equated with their leaders or pastors. Believers who are active in their worship know that not to be true. Members of churches or religious communities are taught personal responsibility in their community. The roles of leaders are clearly defined and legally regulated. Still, in our context the hierarchical image of this community is dominant, while its egalitarian nature is marginalized even though equality is an important, maybe even crucial element of both Christianity and Islam. For our understanding of religious dialogue in peace-building the principle of equality is important because we are aware that every person is important, irrespective of their social status. Every person has the capability to contribute in building coexistence, and everyone has the potential to work on reconciliation. Because of this we do not approach community leaders but people with an interest in peace-building and non-violence. Religious leaders are of course not excluded but they do not play a crucial role in this process. They are relevant if they can see themselves as participants to the peace-building process.

vjernicima bilo zabranjeno vršiti vojnu službu. S uspostavom državne religije (Konstantin 313.) krš anstvo se po tom pitanju mijenja. Najistaknutiji me u misliocima je sv. Augustin ( 4./5. st.) koji se pita kako definirati krš ansku poziciju da bude pravedna u situaciji rata. Pitanje rata postavlja u vremenu kada je Rimsko carstvo ugroženo upadima barbarskih naroda/plemena, dakle u kontekstu osje aja ugroženosti i straha pred nepoznatim napada ima. Osmislio je nekoliko kriterija prema kojima je dozvoljen rat, što nazivamo teorijom pravednog rata. Njegova teorija pravednog rata poslužila je do naših vremena za opravdavanje rata. Preuzeo ju je i razvio sv. Toma Akvinski u 13. st., utemeljitelj skolastike koja je kao teološka nauka dominirala prakti no do sredine 20. st. Pravila su trebala poslužiti kontroliranju rata, kako ne bi došlo do stihije. Danas neki eti ari smatraju da nikada nisu bile ispoštovane sve te ke, no ratovi su se vodili i smatrani su opravdanima.

Pokazalo se da teorija pravednog rata kao "ultima ratio"/" posljednje sredstvo kada su sva druga iscrpljena" nije dovela do mira, ve do toga da na kraju sukobljene strane naj eš e izabiru ono posljednje sredstvo ili rat.

Danas teorija ide prema tome da traga za usmjerenjem pozornosti prema pravednom miru. Pitate se što je pravedan mir? Koje on komponente ima? Kako se može teološki opravdati? U koncilijarnom procesu, u službi miru isti u se tri klju na pojma:

**Pravda**  
**Mir**

**Briga za svekoliko stvorenje** (mi bismo rekli - o uvanje okoliša, održivi razvoj).

Ova tri pojma to niji su opis ili zbir zna enja koja nosi starozavjetni i novozavjetni pojam SALOM. Salom ima isti korijen rije i kao ISLAM, koji tako er zna i mir, mir s Bogom i s ljudima.

Dakle promjena koja se doga a u naše doba je promjena u teoriji od pravednog rata prema teoriji pravednog mira.

Na teološkom planu svaka religija, konkretnije mogu govoriti o krš anstvu i islamu jer sam s njima više u dodiru, ima neiskorišteni mirovni kapital. Radi se o sadržajima koji postoje ali kao da su zakrčljali, ne razra uju se, ne upoznaju. Postoje razvijene ne samo teorije, nego i metodologije pomirenja i u krš anstvu i u islamu. Mislim na centralno mjesto oprostata za navedene vjerske sustave, na neumornost u pozivanju na pomirenje i miroljubivost, prihva anje razli itosti, solidarnost. Mislim na šansu koju ima vjernik jer iskorak prema drugome, koji je uvijek rizik, a poslije teških sukoba i velik rizik, inu u pouzdanju u Božju pomo . Sam iskorak je motiv tradicije proro kog kretanja koji nosi u sebi aspekt rizika, kretanja u novo, nepoznato s velikim povjerenjem u Boga koji nikada ne napušta svog miljenika – kako se prikazuje Božji odnos prema ljudima.

## THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE-BUILDING

The theoretical foundations of our work rely on a theological change or development. Let me illustrate this with an example from Catholic theology. When talking about war and peace, there has been a long-standing debate in Christian tradition on the topic of dealing with war, defense and self-defense from the dangers of war or armed conflict. In fact, in the first several centuries of the history of Christianity, believers were not allowed to join armies. After it was established as the state religion (by Constantine in 313) the attitude of Christianity on that matter changed. The most notable among Christian thinkers, St Augustine (4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> century AD), pondered on how to formulate a righteous Christian position in times of war. The question of war arose in an age when the Roman Empire was under constant attack by barbarian tribes and peoples, in the context of danger and fear of these unknown raiders. He established a number of criteria under which war is allowed, formulating the theory of "just war".

His theory of just war has been used to justify war to this very day. In the 13<sup>th</sup> century it was adopted and developed by St Thomas of Aquinas, the founder of scholastics which was the dominant theological school of thought up until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These rules were intended to limit the spread and intensity of warfare. Some contemporary ethicists believe that these rules were never fully obeyed, but in any case wars were conducted and considered justified.

The theory of just war as an "ultima ratio", a last resort solution, ultimately did not lead to peace; in fact, it did quite the opposite: these rules more often led to war being considered the only means of resolving a conflict.

Contemporary theories are looking for a way to direct public attention to achieving a just peace. But what is just peace? Which components does it consist of? How can it be theologically justified? In the process of reconciliation aimed at achieving peace, there are three key principles:

**Justice**  
**Peace**

**A sense of responsibility for the environment and sustainable development**

These three concepts are a more accurate description or sublimation of the meaning of the old-testament and new-testament word "SHALOM". Shalom shares its lexical roots with the word ISLAM, which also means peace, peace with God and peace with others.

So there is a shift occurring today, from the theory of just war towards a theory of just peace.

Theologically speaking, every religion – specifically, I will be discussing Christianity and Islam, having had the most contact with these two – has a yet unused peace-building potential. These are religious aspects which exist but



## RIZIK, ODGOVORNOST, IZBOR I NAPOR – ZAJEDNIČKI POJMOVI TEOLOŠKOG I MIROVNJAČKOG RJEČNIKA

Kada danas gledate ljude koji se zalažu za društvenu promjenu, zar nema onih koji su angažman platili svojim životom? Za dva dana, 24. ožujka, obilježava se godišnjica jednog takvog biskupa - Oscara Romera iz San Salvadora koji je ubijen jer se zalagao za prava siromašnih i obespravljenih. Danas se neki kršćani zalažu da ga se proglasi svecem. Biskup Romero je za svoj iskorak našao temelj u teologiji. Nije je trebao izmišljati. Svejedno u praksi njegovin je tražio spremnost na rizik.

Kada skupljamo vjernike za izgradnju mira, ono što je specifično jest njihov vjerski identitet. Mi zapravo radimo na temama iz područja izgradnje civilnog, pluralističkog društva, radimo na usvajanju metodologija slično kao što smo radili s mirovnim aktivistima. Važno nam je prenositi demokratski bazisan način organiziranja i odlučivanja. Specifično dolazi iz samog vjerskog identiteta. Važno nam je da taj vjerski identitet sa svojim specifičnim pitanjima ima svoj prostor, i da "u" i "mi" kako koegzistirati s drugima u zajedničkom javnom prostoru u kojemu se, skupa s njima izgraditi civilno društvo. U našim prvim projektima sa ciljnom grupom došlo je do nesporazuma jer smo bili okarakterizirani kao vjerska aktivnost. Međutim, mi zapravo nismo vjerski projekt jer ne radimo na evangelizaciji društva. Mi radimo na izgradnji civilnog društva sa specifičnim pitanjima i polazištima koja dolaze iz našeg vjerskog identiteta.

Naš cilj, problem koji "napadamo" ili stanje koje svojim djelovanjem želimo promijeniti je pasivnost građana (a među njima su mnogi vjernici) u odnosu na probleme koji nas aktualno muče u društvu ili u vlastitoj vjerskoj zajednici. Pri tom naglašavamo kako je važan osoban pristup vjeri jer vjera je u osobnog opredjeljenja. Ne vidim kako bismo mogli zaobići osobnu odgovornost. Isto tako, nenasilje je stvar osobnog ponašanja, osobnog opredjeljenja, ne vidim kako bih mogla "delegirati" osobnu odgovornost na neku ulogu ili opravdati svoje ponašanje nekom ulogom. Nenasilje, i tu postoji sličnost s vjerskom praksom, traži od pojedinca osobni napor.

Imali smo prilike raditi sa župama koje, u pravilu broje na tisuće članova. No, svejedno župnik vrlo teško nekoga uspije animirati. Župa se sastoji od ljudi, kvantiteta je zadovoljena, ali nije riješeno pitanje pasivnosti koja postaje veliki problem ukoliko zajednici prijeđe u naviku. Tu župnik ne može sam gotovo ništa, njegova uloga više nam ne pomaže. Zato idemo drugim putem: kada se članovi zajednice aktiviraju, pozvani kao pojedinci, koji su se probudili u svijesti vlastite odgovornosti za nepoželjno stanje, oni će sami tražiti promjene. Tim putem se nadamo utjecati na mijenjanje navika i odnosa u zajednicama i takve promjene želimo u društvu.

have withered away and become forgotten due to neglect. Both Christianity and Islam have not only theories of reconciliation but methodologies as well. I am referring to the central position forgiveness has in these religious systems, to their insistence on reconciliation and peacefulness, acceptance of others and solidarity. I am also referring to the opportunity this presents for the believer: making this leap of faith towards another is always a risk, and after heavy conflicts even a great risk, but it is a leap made with trust in God's help. The leap of faith is a prophetic act, which carries with itself a great aspect of risk, of heading into the unknown protected by faith in God, who will never abandon his favored children, which is how God's relationship towards humans is described.

## RISK, RESPONSIBILITY, CHOICE AND EFFORT: THE COMMON TERMS OF THEOLOGICAL AND PEACE-BUILDING VOCABULARIES

If you look at the people who advocate social change, are there any examples of people who lost their lives because of their activism? March 24<sup>th</sup> is the anniversary of one of those people, a bishop - Oscar Romero from San Salvador was murdered because he was fighting for the rights of the poor and disenfranchised. Some Christians suggest that he should be proclaimed a saint. Bishop Romero found the foundation for his leap of faith in theology. He didn't have to make one up. But his practical actions still required a willingness to take risks.

When we gather the faithful to work on peace-building, what is specific is their religious identity. In fact, we are tackling issues pertaining to the process of building a civil, pluralist society. We work on building methodologies, much as we did with peace activists. It is important to uphold and impart a democratic basis of decision-making and organizing processes. Specifically, this basis is found in the religious identity itself. It is important for us that this religious identity and its specific question be provided with a space of its own, so that it could learn how to coexist with others in a common public space in which it could cooperate with others in building a civil society. In our first projects with religious target groups some misunderstandings occurred, because our activities were interpreted as religious activities. However, we are not a religious project: our goal is not the evangelization of society. Our goal is the formation of a civil society based on issues and foundations specific to our religious identity.

Our goal, the problem which we are tackling or the condition which we are trying to change through our work is the passivity of citizens (believers included) towards a number of problems which actively plague both our society in general and our religious communities in particular. I wish to emphasize the importance of a personal expression of faith in this process, because faith is an act of personal choice. The involvement of one's private personality and personal responsibility is unavoidable here. Likewise, non-violence is a matter of individual behavior, personal choice, and I cannot see how this personal experience could be "delegated" to a certain role or how a certain

## PRETPOSTAVKE ILI ŠTO PREPOZNAJEMO KAO OBRAZAC KOJI SE PONAVLJA U NAŠEM ISKUSTVU MEĐURELIGIJSKOG MIROVNOG RADA

### A) OSIM STAVA TREBA I ALAT ZA MIROLJUBIV DIJALOG

Smatramo da je potrebno imati nešto poput alata, nešto ime bi se po e- lo djelovati, upustilo u dijalog pa i u me ureligijski dijalog. Alat ima više namjena. On je nešto poput po etne sigurnosti u nesigurnosti zapo injanja. Ali alat daje usmjerenje. Shvatili smo da mi ne želimo bilo kakav na in vo enja dijaloga. Želimo mirotvorni dijalog koji e stvarati miroljubive odnose. Do sada se u tu svrhu pokazala uspješnom i korisnom nenasilna komunikacija (uglavnom metodologija M. Rosenberga, no i drugih autora/ica ) kao i znanje i vještina nenasilne transformacije sukoba. MES (me ureligijski edukativni susret) je jedan od RAND-ovih programa koji povezuje usvajanje nenasilne komunikacije i prakticiranje me ureligijskog dijaloga. Mislim da smo ovim programom unijeli novost na podru ju me ureligijskog dijaloga, prisjetim li se MES-a i na ina dijaloga iz vremena mog studija teologije.

### B) SUSRET – ISKUSTVO KOJE MIJENJA

Susret je nešto što mijenja, sama mogu nost da se ljudi sretnu, da se upoznaju, da direktno jedan drugome postavljaju pitanja, izraze što cijene kod drugih, a što kod sebe, da iznesu svoje vlastite poteško e, kao i one tu e. Ti procesi imaju puno ve u mo promjene nego li sam pretpostavljala kada smo osmišljavali ovaj program. Mnoge “to ke” programa sudionici/e sami organiziraju, od toga da žene isprobavaju kako je to biti pokrivena, do posjeta i šetnji u vrijeme pauze. Direktna komunikacija je nezamjenjiva, moglo bi se re i arobna. Mi ne znamo što sve to no utje e na promjenu, ali je zamje- ujemo. Smatram da nije naš zadatak da kontroliramo razvoj tih procesa. Na nama je odgovornost da uprili imo ili organiziramo susret, a dalje stvari idu svojim tokom: neki od sudionika/ca dalje se druže, a neki zajedno rade. Mi smo samo jedan kamen i u mozaiku njihovih promjena.

### C) PROMJENA – PO INJE OD LJUDI

Problemi se ne mijenjaju odmah. Ali se ljudi promijene i druga ije odnose prema problemima. Dok na po etku o ekuju da se sve oko njih promijeni i kako e se smiriti po završetku treninga, esto primje ujem kako se promijenio njihov govor o problemima. Smanjuje se koli ina sveop eg optuživanja, pove ava se motivacija da se sami uklju e u neku aktivnost. Problemi još postoje, ali ljudi postaju ja i da se s njima nose. Ne bježe od toga da nešto ine. Primijetili smo, kao jedan od pokazatelja osobne promjene kako, kada se vrate u svoje zajednice, više nisu neutralni s obzirom na razli ite na ine diskriminacije i govora koji ne odaje poštovanje prema drugima. esto sudionici treninga naprosto reagiraju ako svjedo e govoru koji širi predrasude.

### D) POŠTOVANJE RAZLI ITIH SVJETONAZORA – PROMICANJE VRIJEDNOSTI

Smatram da je obilježje me ureligijskog mirovnog rada nenasilno djelovanje, a to zna i da se ne radi o prenošenju ideoloških matrica. Nenasilno

type of behavior can be justified by one's social role. Non-violence, like religious practices, demands a personal effort from an individual.

We have had the opportunity to work with parishes which usually have thousands of members. In spite of this, their parsons often have difficulties in animating even a handful of believers. The parish has the manpower, the quantities are satisfactory, but the problem of passivity is still unresolved, which can become a large problem if it becomes the norm in a certain community. The parson can do nothing on his own: his role of leader does not help us here. So we need to approach the problem from a different angle: when members of a community become active, when they are called upon as individuals who have become aware of their own responsibility for this unfavorable state of affairs, they will seek to initiate change on their own. In this way we hope to initiate the needed changes in habit-formation and social relations.

## HYPOTHESES RECOGNIZABLE RECURRING PATTERNS IN OUR INTER-RELIGION PEACE-BUILDING WORK EXPERIENCE

### A) IN ADDITION TO ATTITUDES, PEACEFUL DIALOGUE REQUIRES INSTRUMENTS

Instruments of some sort are necessary in order to start acting or participating in any dialogue, and inter-religion dialogue is no exception. These instruments are multi-functional. They serve as a source of security in insecure initial environments. These instruments can provide us with direction. We have decided that we do not desire just any kind of dialogue. We want a peace-building dialogue, which will produce peaceful relationships. To this end, the skill of non-violent communication (according to the methodology of M. Rosenberg and other authors) has been proven to be useful, and so has the skill of non-violent conflict transformation. The MES – International Educational Meetings - is one of RAND's programs which combine non-violent communication education with inter-religion dialogue practices. I believe that this program has broken new ground in the field of inter-religion dialogue in comparison to the dialogue models which existed at the time of my theology studies.

### B) MEETINGS: LIFE-CHANGING EXPERIENCES

A meeting is an encounter which changes you: the mere possibility to meet people, to get to know them, to ask them questions directly, and express what they appreciate in others and in themselves, and, conversely, what troubles them about themselves and others. These processes have a significantly greater potential for change than I projected they would while I was designing this program. A number of the program's activities are organized by the participants themselves, from dressing up in Moslem robes to get an impression of what it is like to be covered, to taking walks and dropping in on each other during the breaks in the program. Direct communication is irreplaceable. It is almost magical; we are not aware of all the elements

djelovanje senzibilizira, analizira i osposobljava za odre ena in ponašanja i za vrijednosti koje su inherentne razli itim svjetonazorima i razli itim ideologijama. Rade i s ljudima, primje ujemo da oni zapravo ostaju u svojim zajednicama i pronalaze u svojim tradicijama razloge da se razvijaju prema aktivistima u izgradnji mira. Za vjernike je jako važno da ih se ne "odvla i" u druge zajednice. I nama je važno da ne "preodgajamo" nego da se svatko osobno nadogra uje i oboga uje stvara nešto novo po svojoj mjeri i u svom tempu.

#### E) NE TEORIJSKI, NEGO PRIMIJENJENO ZA MIR

*Vjernici za mir* – može zavarati koli ina rije i koje govore o miru i koje se mogu uti prigodom vjerskih blagdana, ali i u tjednim molitvama u bogomoljama. No nas zanima nešto drugo. Zanimaju nas kompetencije za takvo djelovanje, ponašanje koje gradi mir u zajednici, koje pomaže u svakodnev-nim sukobima da se transformiraju u dublje i iskrenije odnose i ponašanje koje poziva na pravdu i solidarnost. Iako i vjerski tisak i predstavnici vjerskih zajednica pa i vjerski na in izražavanja na op enitom nivou govore o miru i mirotvorstvu, naše je iskustvo da su primjenjiva znanja i vještine nenasilnog djelovanja kod vjernika i njihovih predstavnika u velikoj ve ini slu ajeva za-pravo nepoznata. Ovdje podrazumijevam vještine i znanja nenasilnog djelovanja, transformacije sukoba i rad s predrasudama. Sve je to novo podru je za veliku ve inu vjerskih zajednica.

Istovremeno, radimo li s vjericima kao ciljnom grupom, možemo ra unati na ljude koji su esto odgajani za osobnu odgovornost i razumiju kada im se obratimo s pitanjima o vlastitoj odgovornosti ili odgovornosti njihove vjerske zajednice za mir, vrlo brzo razumiju o emu se radi.

#### PREPORUKE PRIJATELJIMA IZ EUROPSKE UNIJE

Naslovila sam adresate s "prijatelji" jer time želim re i: tko god želi u ovoj regiji podržati izgradnju mira, prijatelj joj je. Kao što dugoro nom zdravlju puno više donosi prevencija, a ne saniranje bolesti, i kao što se bolest lije i nakon što je uklonjena upala, tako je i u društvenim procesima potrebno raditi na miru kada je mir. Mirovni rad koji smo po injali u vrijeme rata bio je samo nužno saniranje ili zapo injanje dugoro ne investicije. Ako sada nastavimo, tek e nam se isplatiti ulaganja protekla dva desetlje a. Tako er rije ju "prijatelji" želim artikulirati kakav odnos o ekujem izme u nas, uklju enih u izgradnju mira u regiji i njih u Europskoj uniji. O ekujem prijateljski, partnerski odnos. Znam da je lako mogu e da se partnerstvo izvitoperi u neravnopravne odnose mo i i da vreba opasnost od onih koji financiraju i "komandiraju" pa i kada ne znaju pravo ni gdje su, ni kamo trebaju i i. No, isplati se truditi oko partnerskog odnosa i uvijek postoje pojedinci, a gdje god i institucije koje traže suradnju, a ne dominaciju.

Ova situacija davanja preporuke asocirala me na situaciju u kojoj me prijateljica pita za savjet što da pokloni de ku, a ni sama ne zna zapravo što bi mu poklonila.

which will work together in bringing about change, but we are aware of the change itself. I believe that it is not our duty to control the development of these processes. Our responsibility is simply to influence them by organizing these meetings. After that we must let things proceed naturally: some of the participants are still friends, others work together. We are only one facet in the mosaic of changes they have experienced.

#### C) CHANGE STARTS WITH PEOPLE

Problems are not resolved instantly. But people do change and react to problems differently. Initially they expect things to change on their own, but after participating in these meetings, they are at peace, and their attitudes to problems also change. The number of recriminations is reduced while the motivation to get involved in activities increases. Problems still exist, but people are better equipped to handle them. They do not run away from taking action. We have noted one particular indicator of personal change: upon returning to their respective communities, they are no longer neutral to the various types of discrimination and disrespectful speech towards others. Participants of our workshops often spontaneously react when they witness prejudiced speech.

#### D) RESPECTING DIFFERENT WORLDVIEWS – INSTILLING VALUES

I believe that inter-religion peace-building is characterized by non-violent agency, which does not include imparting ideological matrixes on others. Non-violent agency has a positive impact on sensitivity and analytic abilities, and enables participants to be more open to different worldviews and ideologies. During the course of our work we have found out that they remain in their communities and try to find reasons within their tradition to engage in activist or peace-building work. It is important not to drag believers away from their communities. It is equally important to avoid "schooling" them, but rather to let them develop and grow as individuals and allow them the freedom to create at their own pace.

#### E) NOT THEORETICAL BUT APPLIED PEACE-BUILDING

The sheer amount of peace-related words one can hear in times of religious holidays and weekly prayers in churches can be misleading. This is not what we are interested in. We are interested in the potential for peace-building activities in communities. This sort of agency can help resolve everyday conflicts and transform them into more honest and meaningful relationships. We seek to encourage behavior which fosters justice and solidarity. Although the religious press, religious community representatives, and the general religious rhetoric do invoke the concept of peace and peace-building, we have discovered that in most cases believers and their representatives possess no concrete skills for non-violent agency. Here I am referring to skills pertaining to non-violent agency, conflict transformation and eliminating prejudice. This is mostly unfamiliar ground for the vast majority of religious communities.

However, when working with believers as a target group, we can count on

Mislim da mi koji smo aktivni i koji neposredno kontaktiramo s ljudima kroz treninge ili kroz rad u lokalnim zajednicama, imamo privilegiju vidjeti i saznati nešto što ne piše niti u jednoj knjizi, niti se može "skinuti" s interneta. S druge strane, suradnici europskih institucija imaju privilegiju donositi odluke koje mogu olakšati i unaprijediti naš rad. U tom smislu bi im mogle koristiti sljede e preporuke:

- 1/ Iznimno je važno da se pripadnici raznih grupnih identiteta, u ovom slučaju vjerskih zajednica, mogu susresti, **da se omogući susret međureligijskih različitih ljudi**, da se upoznaju, vježbaju na in komuniciranja jer je to aktivnost koja promi e mir. Pritom ponajviše mislim na susrete grupa koje nisu masovnih razmjera, u kojima je mogu e stvoriti siguran prostor za razgovor i koje podržavaju izricanje svoje posebnosti, a istodobno ostavljaju vrijeme i snagu da se radi na onome što je zajedni ko. Kada u imo komunicirati, mi vodimo dijalog zato da bismo mogli zajedno živjeti, zanima nas suživot, a ne intelektualisti ka gimnastika. Pred o ima su mi lokalne zajednice u Bosni, u kojima u zadnje vrijeme, e sto boravimo. Rade i s grupama nama je cilj da sudionici istražuju kako mogu zajedno živjeti, ne na na in prije rata, nego bolje. Na taj na in u naš kontekst prevodim globalnu viziju koju izražavamo sloganom "druga iji svijet je mogu ". Kako bismo ga, korak po korak i ostvarivali, potrebno je stvarati prostore susreta i razmjene. Dijalog služi za osnaživanje afirmacije sebe i poštivanje drugoga.
- 2/ Ako želiš mir, u i kako ga možeš graditi. Ovo misao asocira na ispravljen navod stare poslovice o odnosu mira i pripremanja rata. **Učiti mir kroz treninge u grupama koje su pregledne (optimalno 12 osoba)**, zna i primijeniti nove metodologije prenošenja novih znanja, vježbati vještine komunikacije, suradnje, sukobljavanja, organiziranja... Treninzi za nenasilno djelovanje su potrebni danas, jednako kao i kada smo po injali sredinom devedesetih godina sa sustavnim ponudama mirovnih edukacija. Ima još mnogo ljudi koji žele i trebaju postepeno u iti kako djelovati nenasilno. Ako bi svaka grupa od nekolicine sudionika/ca dala i više od pola kompetentnih gra ana/ki, koji bi se aktivno uklju ili u društvene promjene (ako su sposobni pokrenuti u svojoj okolini mirovne postupke i "zarotirati" dijalog na podru jima koja su ranije djelovala beznadno), onda bi se isplatili novac i vrijeme uloženi u njihovo osposobljavanje. Ova preporuka dolazi iz konteksta RAND-ove borbe za dokazivanjem da se po etna ulaganja u pregledne grupe primjerene veli ine, na kraju više isplate nego masovne, kratke obuke. Te ajevi od pola dana ili jednog dana mogu dati informaciju o svemu što ulazi u mirovno djelovanje, ali ne mogu "doraditi" i njegovati nenasilno djelovanje. Jer sve što raste, pa tako i kompetencija, traži vrijeme, taloženje iskustva i znanja, a ponajviše posve enost pojedincu.
- 3/ Ako Europska unija želi me ureligijski dijalog, o ekujem da u njega i financijski investira. Financiranje ne isklju uje entuzijazam i obratno. Entuzijazam ne može nadomjestiti potrebna materijalna sredstva. Postoje ve modeli kao što su na primjer: *Friedensfachkraefte/Mirovne stručne snage* u Njema koj koje se financiraju iz državnog budžeta. Takvo financiranje je potrebno i kod nas. Ako smo mi zemlja koja je osjetila koliko košta rat, možemo lako razumjeti da je izgradnja mira nešto u što nam

people who are often taught personal responsibility from an early age, and who understand the need for personal responsibility or the responsibility of their religious communities to foster peace; they quickly understand what we are trying to accomplish.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OUR FRIENDS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

I am using the term "friends" here because I wish to emphasize that we consider everyone who wants to help build peace in this region to be our friend. Much like in healthcare, prevention is much more efficient in the long run than trying to cure the disease itself, and recovery can only begin after the inflammation is gone, in social processes we need to work on building peace even in times of peace. The peace-building efforts during times of war were both a short-term fix and the foundation of a long-term investment. Only if we continue our efforts will the work done in the last two decades pay off. The word "friends" is also used to describe the relationship I expect between the people involved in peace-building in this region and the European Union. I expect a relationship based on friendship and partnership. I know how easy it is for a partnership to turn into a state of inequality, and I am aware of the danger posed by the tendency of those who fund the operation to take control of it even though they do not know the direction it should take. But a partnership is a worthy investment, and there are always individuals, as well as institutions, who seek cooperation rather than domination.

This situation is similar to advising your friend on what kind of present to give to her boyfriend, because she herself is not sure. I think active participants who deal with people directly through training and community work are privileged to witness events which aren't described in any book or available via the Internet. On the other hand, members of European institutions have the privilege of making decision which can improve and aid our work. In that light, the following recommendations might be useful:

- 1/ **It is vital that members of different groups or religious communities have the opportunity to meet each other.** Enabling followers of different religions to meet, get to know each other, and learn how to communicate is a peace-fostering activity. I am mostly referring to meetings on a smaller scale, where it is easier to create s safe space for discussion, and where it is possible to maintain one's own identity and at the same time work on building common foundations. While we are learning how to communicate, we are engaged in a dialogue whose aim is to secure a coexistence: we are focused on fostering unity rather than intellectual gymnastics. I am referring to local communities in Bosnia, where we have been spending a great deal of time lately. In our work with groups we have been focusing on finding out how the participants can coexist, not in the way they did before the war, but even better. This is local interpretation of a global concept expressed in the slogan "A different world is possible". In order to achieve that world, step by step, we need to create for meeting and sharing. Dialogue is the means to achieve both personal growth and mutual respect.



se isplati ulagati. Preporuka EU budžetima, ako žele sustavno i redovno podržavati izgradnju mira, jest da dio pažnje poklone mirovnim organizacijama koje ne žele postati mirovne firme. Ovdje isti em mirovne organizacije koje nisu velike i trebaju **financijske potpore srednjih veličina od 5000 do 10000 eura**. Za ove potpore nije potrebno pisati *logframe*, niti tekstove na engleskom. Bazi ne organizacije koje rade na me ureligijskom dijalogu trebaju potpore ovih razmjera i trebaju redovitu podršku. U tom području postoje bogata iskustva u "Ekumenskoj inicijativi žena". Navedene velike potpore prati i **kommunikacija na terenu**. Dvije stvari koje idu skupa: ljudski kontakt i novac koji redovito dolazi. Važno je da mirovne organizacije ne prate ritam financijskog tržišta, tj. da ne postaju poput profitnih poduzeća. Važno je da ne budu preopterećeni birokratskim poslovima i da ne ulaze u velike projekte, da ne prevagne u vođenju knjigovodstva nad onim aktivnostima zbog kojih je organizacija osnovana. Bez takve inicijative postoji stvarna opasnost da izumre *grass root* izgradnja mira.

- 4/ Umjesto da se naglašava odredeni sekularizam, kao na primjer zaštite društva od nasilnih sukobljavanja potpomognutih religijskim pripadnostima, držim da je za održavanje miroljubivog suživota korisno poticati pluralizam unutar vjerskih zajednica. Zahtijevanje da se javni prostor isključivo sekularno obilježava i da religiozne zajednice odustaju od njega, ima kao posljedicu kod vjernika nešto samo zbijanje redova. Što više napada i zabrana dolazi izvana, to je više kolektivističkog reagiranja unutar zajednica.

Smatram da bi umjesto toga bilo korisno **podržavati pluralizam unutar vjerskih zajednica**. Započeli smo s me ureligijskim osnovnim treninzima za izgradnju mira početkom 2001. Sudionici su kroz diskusije prepoznali da im je osim interreligijskog dijaloga potreban i intrareligijski razgovor, dakle, dijalog koji poštuje različitosti izmeđ u pripadnika iste zajednice. Tako bi se stvorio prostor razmjene i artikulacije za članove zajednice i ojačale bi sigurnost i sloboda svakog pojedinca. Jednako tako vjerujem da bi pluralizam unutar pojedine vjerske zajednice osposobljavao njihove članove za pluralizam u društvu. Manje bi bili nesigurni, manje bi se bojali različitih stavova u javnom prostoru, nego što je to slučaj sada.

- 5/ Naslov jednog prijedloga o nenasilnoj komunikaciji glasi: "Ne budi pristojan, budi autentičan". Preneseno u kontekst me ureligijskog dijaloga, ovo bi značilo da je nas komunikacija, a ne ustrojanje voditi naprijed. Prema dijalogu nas ne vodi izbjegavanje pitanja kako bi se izbjegle povrede. Upravo šutnja odvaja. Pitanja se možda dovesti i do sukoba, ali ako se znamo nositi sa sukobima, ona se nas voditi preko sukoba do dubljeg međusobnog razumijevanja, do blizine koja može biti trajnija zaštita. Tražiti prostor prikladan za komuniciranje, ovdje mislim i na duhovni, a ne samo na fizički prostor, ulagati napor da se približimo, pa i ako se malo "trknemo", bolje je nego držati neutralnu distancu. Ima smisla **mijenjati kulturu pristojnosti u kulturu iskrenog dijaloga**.

- 2/ If you desire peace, learn how to build it. This is an update of the old proverb on the relationship between peace and war. **Learning about peace through manageable groups (optimally 12 participants) means applying new methodologies of imparting lessons and practicing communication, cooperation, conflict resolution and organization skills.** Non-violent action trainings are just as necessary today as they were in the 90s when we started systematically offering peace education. A large number of people still need to gradually learn how to act non-violently. If at least half of every group of a dozen participants take upon themselves to involve themselves actively into social change, and if they are capable of initiating peace-building processes in their own communities and get a dialogue going in places where dialogue was considered impossible, then the time and money invested in them will pay off. This recommendation stems from RAND's struggle to prove that initial investments in manageable groups pay off more substantially than investments in short courses for larger numbers of participants. Half-day or one-day courses can provide basic information on the scope of peace-building, but they cannot refine or foster non-violent agency. Everything that needs to be cultivated – competence as well – requires time for experiences and skills to settle in as well as attention to each individual.

- 3/ If the European Union desires inter-religion dialogue, it should be willing to financially invest in it. Financing does not exclude enthusiasm, and enthusiasm cannot replace the necessary financial resources. There are existing models, such as the Friedensfachkraefte organization in Germany, which are financed from the state budget. Such a model of financing is necessary here as well. We, as a country, have experienced the costs of war, so we are aware that peace-building is a worthy investment. We would like to recommend to the EU to devote some attention to financing peace-building organizations which do not wish to become peace-building corporations, if they wish to systematically support peace-building. **I am referring to smaller peace organization which require medium-sized budget of 5.000 to 10.000 Euros.** This form of support does not require logframes or texts in English. Grassroots organizations who work on inter-religion dialogue need this type of regular support. The "Ecumenical Women's Initiative" has ample experience in this field. This amount of financial support would **ensure communication in the field**. These are two things which go hand in hand: human contact and a steady influx of finances. It is important for peace organizations not to follow the rhythm of the financial market, so as not to become like profit-oriented companies. They must not be burdened by excessive bureaucracy and should refrain from larger projects, so that accounting does not take the spotlight from the organization's basic activities. This poses a serious danger for grassroots peace-building.

- 4/ Instead of emphasizing secularism as a way of protecting society from religious conflict, I believe we should support peaceful coexistence by fostering religious pluralism. Insisting that public space be exclusively secular and that religious communities be absent from it only fosters internal cohesion within religious communities. Collectivist behavior within the communities increases when said communities are subject to attack



- or persecution. **Thus I believe we should support pluralism in religious communities.** We started with basic inter-religion peace-building training in early 2001. Participants in these discussion realized that in addition to inter-religion dialogue, they need intra-religion dialogue as well, as a way of acknowledging and respecting differences between members of the same community. This would create a space of sharing and communication for the members of that community and foster the safety and freedom of each individual. Conversely, I believe that pluralism within religious communities would train its members for pluralism elsewhere in life. Their insecurities would be reduced, and their fears of certain public attitudes would be much less intense than they are today.
- 5/ There is a handbook on non-violent communication entitled "Don't be polite, be authentic". In the context of inter-religion dialogue, this means that the way forward lies in communication and not in politeness. Avoiding the issues to avoid confrontation will not lead us to dialogue. Tackling these issues may lead to conflict, but if we are able to resolve these conflicts, they will lead to a deeper understanding of ourselves and others, to a closeness which can ensure a lasting security. Seeking an appropriate space for communication in this context refers to both spiritual and material space: it means investing an effort in order to grow closer to others; even if we bump into each other on the way, it is still better than a neutral, aloof attitude. **The point is to change the culture of politeness into a culture of honest dialogue.**

# PROGRAMI ZA POTICANJE KULTURE MIRA I NENASILJA U ŠKOLI

AUTORICA:  
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MAJA UZELAC JE FILOZOFKINJA, PROFESORICA, PEDAGOGINJA, PREVODITELJICA, UREDNICA I AUTORICA. SUOSNIVA ICA JE I PREDAVA ICA NA CENTRU ZA ŽENSKÉ STUDIJE, SUOSNIVA ICA NEKOLIKO ORGANIZACIJA CIVILNOG DRUŠTVA, STRUČNJAČINJA I TRENERICA NENASILNE KOMUNIKACIJE I MIRNOG RJEŠAVANJE SUKOBIA, VODITELJICA "MALOG KORAKA - CENTRA ZA KULTURU MIRA I NENASILJA", SURADNICA UNICEF-A I UNESCO-A TE AUTORICA BROJNIH PRIRUČNIKA O LJUDSKIM PRAVIMA I NENASILNE KOMUNIKACIJE.

## SAŽETAK

U članku su opisani uobičajeni dvaju programa usmjerenih na djecu i mlade uz uključivanje nastavnika osnovnih škola, a od 1995. godine nose nazive: "Miroljubivo rješavanje problema u školi i ublažavanje trauma" (prvi program) i "Rješavanje sukoba - medijacija u školi – mladi protiv nasilja" (drugi program), a kreirala ih je autorica rada u suradnji sa svojim projektnim timom. Program je kontinuirano provodila udruga "Mali korak" zajedno s educiranim učiteljima i nastavnicima u 87 osnovnih i nekoliko srednjih škola u Hrvatskoj, kao dugoročni projekt sve do 2001. godine. Programi su provedeni u izvannastavno i nastavno vrijeme kao izborna nastava, najprije u ratom stradalim područjima, a kasnije u područjima tzv. dvostrukog povratništva, prvo s ciljem olakšavanja posljedica ratnih trauma i nasilja nad djecom, a zatim s ciljem pospješivanja prosocijalnog ponašanja i proaktivnog djelovanja, stjecanja različitih psihosocijalnih vještina te osobnog razvoja (osobito razvoja samopouzdanja i pouzdanja u druge te odgovornosti i brige za sebe naporedno s odgovornošću u brigom za druge). Budući da su se ova dva modela programa etablirala najprije kao tzv. "mirovne radionice" ili mirovno obrazovanje, a onda su tijekom rada u školama programi imenovani kao "pedagoške radionice" (ili radionice odgoja za razvoj), te na kraju dobili priznanje kao radovi na djeci i ljudskim pravima, u ovome su tekstu, osim psihosocijalnih komponenti, skicirana teorijska i konceptualna polazišta te mirovne i pedagoške lokacije programa.

# PROGRAMS FOR THE PROMOTION OF A CULTURE OF PEACE AND NONVIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS

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## SUMMARY

The paper describes the effects of two programs aimed at children and youths, conducted with the assistance of elementary school teachers, entitled, respectively, "Resolving problems peacefully and reducing trauma in schools" (program no.1) and "Conflict resolution – mediation in schools – youths against violence", which the paper's author created in collaboration with her project team. The programs were implemented in 87 elementary and several high-schools in Croatia from their inception until 2001, by the "Mali korak" association and with the assistance of trained teachers. The programs were implemented as both curricular and extracurricular activities, first in war-ravaged areas and then in areas with large numbers of post-war returnees. The initial goal was to mitigate the effects of war traumas and violence against children, while secondary goals included the encouragement of social awareness, proactive behavior, the acquisition of various psychosocial skills and personal development (especially raising self-confidence and trust towards others and taking personal responsibility while demonstrating a responsible and caring attitude towards others). These two models first became known as "peace workshops" or "peace training", but during their implementation in schools they were renamed to "pedagogical workshops" (or developmental workshops), and were ultimately praised for their contribution in the field of children's rights and human rights in general. This paper, in addition to its psychosocial elements, provides a theoretical and conceptual outline of the program as well as the peace-building and pedagogical goals of the program.

## KONCEPCIJA MIROVNOG OBRAZOVANJA I KULTURE MIRA

Kome i zašto trebaju mirovne radionice? Kako argumentirati ili opravdati rad na mirovnom obrazovanju za vrijeme ili poslije rata, kada je jasno da nikakva poduka o miru ne može zaustaviti rat, niti popraviti ono što je rat u inio? ak se sam govor o miru onima koji su prošli rat inie asnom hipokrizijom. Kako smo se onda usudili mi iz organizacija civilnog društva ponuditi djeci program mirovnih radionica!?

Upravo nas je rat ponukao da se potrudimo pokazati (djeci i odraslima) da ljudi nisu samo destruktivni, puni mržnje i bijesa, strahova i nasilja. Djeca su odrastala u toj atmosferi – ona su bila prije svega (kao i danas) "zapuštena". Djeca su svjedoci i sudionici gospodarskih, migracijskih i kulturnih promjena u kojima su odrasli (njihovi roditelji, rodbina, susjedi) su eljeni s krizom osobnih vrijednosti i promjenom svog unutrašnjeg modela svijeta. Prvo rat, a uz to tranzicijske promjene cijelog ustrojstva društva u inile su život provizornim i nesigurnim. Djeca su u toj atmosferi i takvom okruženju bila najdirektnije pogo ena u svom emocionalnom, intelektualnom, socijalnom i moralnom razvoju. I u današnjoj neoliberalnoj jagmi za osobnim probitkom ili barem zaposlenjem, djeca su izložena onim obrascima ponašanja koji se temelje na uzajamnom nepovjerenju, neprijateljstvu, netolerantnosti i nasilju.

Do njih je trebalo doprijeti s programima "mirovnih radionica" i to u podru - ja najtežih životnih uvjeta, etni ke i druge podijeljenosti u zajednici. To su i danas podru ja stalnih ili potencijalnih sukoba, optere ena predrasudama i me usobnim isklju ivanjem i nepovjerenjem odnosno teško ama socijalne adaptacije, zbog vala doseljavanja izbjeglica i povratnika (nazvana i podru - jima od posebne državne skrbi).

Programi mirovnog obrazovanja pojavili su se 80-tih godina prošlog stolje a paralelno s cijelim nizom novih, inovativnih programa u okviru novog pristupa obrazovanju i u enju unutar Europe (ili Vije a Europe i EU tijekom njezinog procesa integracije). Ti su programi izazov tradicionalnome u enju i obrazovanju, a podjednako se provode u neformalnom, kao i u formalnom obrazovanju (kao kroskurikularna ili integrirana nastava odnosno kao slobodne i izvannastavne aktivnosti). Kao što je vidljivo iz niže navedene sheme (citirane prema izdanju priru nika "Compass", ur. Brander, Keen, Lemineur, izdanje Vije a Europe, 2002. g.) ti programi su me usobno povezani, a unutar njih je i mirovno obrazovanje. Izraz "odgoj/obrazovanje" zamjenjuje se u posljednje vrijeme terminom "u enje" u skladu s koncepcijom cjeloživotnog u enja Vije a Europe.

No što se podrazumijeva pod pojedinim podru jem i pojmom ("globalno u enje", "interkulturalno", "mirovno...") predmet je rasprava. Stoga valja pojasniti na kojoj se koncepciji mira i mirovne edukacije zasnivaju naši programi "Miroljubivog rješavanja sukoba" i "Medijacije u školi". I što zna i sintagma "kultura mira"?

## THE CONCEPT OF PEACE EDUCATION AND A CULTURE OF PEACE


Who needs peace workshops and why? How does one explain or justify working on peace education during or after a war, when it is clear that no amount of education can stop the war or repair the damage already done? To those who lived in times of war the very notion of talking about peace might seem dishonorable and hypocritical. So why did the members of civic society or organizations even dare to offer a peace workshop program to children?

The war itself provided us with the motivation to explain to both children and adults that there is more to humans than such destructive, hateful, rage-filled, violent and terrifying behavior. Growing up in such a climate amounted – and still does – to growing up neglected. Children are witnesses to and participants of economic, demographic and cultural changes which challenge and erode the personal values and worldviews of the adults who surround them - their parents, families and neighbors. Human lives have been made to seem ephemeral and unsafe by both the war and the ensuing societal changes. This climate is directly harmful to the development of emotional, intellectual, social and moral faculties in children. In the contemporary neoliberal struggle for personal gain or at least employment children are exposed to behavioral patterns based on mutual mistrust, hostility, intolerance and violence.

It was important to reach these children with our peace workshop community programs, especially in the areas that were hit the hardest by difficult living conditions and ethnic and other divisions in the community. These areas remain prone to continuous or intermittent conflicts, bigotry, mutual exclusion and mistrust. Social adaptation is also difficult to achieve in these areas (labeled "areas of special state concern") due to the numerous returning internally displaced persons and refugees.

Peace education programs first started in the 1980s alongside a series of new, innovative programs connected to a new approach to education and learning in Europe (or the European Council and the EU during the process of integration). These programs presented a challenge to traditional learning and education, and are equally suited to formal and informal education (as cross-curricular or integrated courses, or extracurricular activities). The following diagram (quoted from the "Compass" handbook, edited by Brander, Keen, Lemineur, and published by the Council of Europe in 2002) demonstrates that these programs are interconnected, and peace education is one of their important elements. The word "education" is now being replaced by the term "learning" in accordance with the Council of Europe's concept of lifelong learning.

The respective scopes of these particular terms and areas ("global education", "intercultural education," "peace education") are, however, still the subject of debates. Therefore we need to clarify the concept of peace and peace education that is the basis of our programs of "Peaceful conflict reso-




"Ideja mira povezana je s načinom na koji ljudi djeluju među sobom i koji tip strukture društva određuje taj proces interakcije. Takvi procesi i strukture mogu se analizirati na svim razinama interakcije, od interpersonalne do transnacionalne." (Haavelsrud, 1996. g.)

Prateći razvoj pojma i stvarni razvoj različitih pristupa i uzimajući u obzir ključnu distinkciju koju su uveli istraživači mira između "negativnog mira" (kao suprotnosti ili odsutnosti rata) i "pozitivnog mira" (kao prisutnosti pravde, ekološke ravnoteže i drugih vrijednosti), u temelju gornjih programa nastala je ideja pozitivnog mira (vidi shemu 2/).

Riječ je o koncepciji mira koja nadilazi binarnu opoziciju "mir-rat" i uvodi termin "kultura mira" - transformacijski proces koji pretpostavlja promjenu koja zahvaća sve vrste i razine odnosa, promjene obrazaca komunikacije i društvene organizacije, mijenjaju sliku o sebi i drugima. Upravo ta transformacijska snaga ili potencijal je ono što određuje pojam "kulture mira". U tom smislu mirovno obrazovanje nastoji biti pokretač globalne transformacije koja podrazumijeva najprije najdublju promjenu osobnih stavova i ponašanja, šireći se na različite prakse društvenog upravljanja i razvoja.

Prema vodećim istraživačima u miru Johannu Galtungu (1976), **glavni problemi** u vezi s mirom (lijevi stupac) i s njima povezane odgovarajuće **vrijednosti (desni stupac)** su:

1.	NASILJE I RAT	NENASILJE
2.	NEJEDNAKOST	EKONOMSKO BLAGOSTANJE
3.	NEPRAVDA	SOCIJALNA PRAVDA
4.	NARUŠAVANJE/UNIŠTAVANJE OKOLIŠA	EKOLOŠKA RAVNOTEŽA
5.	OTUĐENJE	PARTICIPACIJA



lution" and "Mediation in schools". And what does the phrase "a culture of peace" really signify?


"The concept of peace is connected to the way people interact and what type of social structure is the framework for this process of interaction. These processes and structures can be analyzed on all levels of interaction, from interpersonal to transnational ones." (Haavelsrud, 1996.)

By following the development of this term, the actual developments in the different approaches, and taking into consideration the key distinction, coined by peace theoreticians, between "negative peace" (the absence of war) and "positive peace", we have incorporated the concept of positive peace into the basis of the aforementioned programs (see fig. 2). This concept of peace transcends the binary opposition between peace and war and propagates the concept of a "culture of peace": a transformational process constituting of a change in all types and levels of interaction, a change in patterns of communication and social organization, bringing about a different perspective on oneself and on others. This transformational power or potential is the defining aspect of the "culture of peace". In that sense peace education tries to be the agent of a global transformation aimed at thoroughly changing personal attitudes and behavioral patterns in various areas of social management and development.

According to leading peace theoretician Johann Galtung (1976), the **key problems** regarding peace (the left-hand column) and their respective **values (right-hand column)** are:

1.	VIOLENCE AND WAR	NONVIOLENCE
2.	INEQUALITY	ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE
3.	INJUSTICE	SOCIAL JUSTICE
4.	ENVIRONMENTAL DEVASTATION	ECOLOGIC BALANCE
5.	ALIENATION	PARTICIPATION

HEMA 2.  
DEFINIRANJE MIRA  
(HICKS, 1988)



Isto tako, u poimanju mirovne edukacije (*peace education, Friedenserziehung*) postoji cijeli niz pristupa, od kojih nisu svi kompatibilni. Prvi poiva na ideji mira kao snage/sile koja se održava ravnotežom mo i, odnosno **naoružanja**. Tu se u programu mirovnog obrazovanja stavlja naglasak na suvremenu ili bližu povijest i potrebu da se unutar neke podjele svijeta zadrži vojna prevlast.


Drugo shvaanje mirovne edukacije ima u središtu analizu sukoba, od osobnog do globalnog te različite strategije kako da se ti sukobi riješe (pregovaranjem, sporazumima, medijacijom, dijalogom).

Treće shvaanje mirovnog obrazovanja polazi od koncepcije osobnog mira, a usredotoeno je na potrebu za empatijom i suradnjom.

Ikraj, edukacija za mir može biti shvaena kao proces rekonstrukcije postojećih odnosa mo i, što onda ima težište na podizanju svjesnosti o strukturalnom nasilju. Takvo bi obrazovanje podrazumijevalo pružanje otpora bilo kojoj vrsti opresije. Taj najširi pojam mirovne edukacije koju bismo mogli nazvati i politikom svjesnosti (Mindell, 1995. g.), polazi od sljedećeg: **svi temati vode računa o tome da se osvijeste socijalne, političke i ekonomske kontradikcije/rascjepi u vlastitoj i široj zajednici zajedno s osvještavanjem posljedica svojih vlastitih izbora i odluka i da se vide opcije za nenasilnu akciju za društvene promjene institucija opresivnog karaktera.**

Ovdje opisani programi uzimaju onu koncepciju mirovnog obrazovanja koja se oslanja manje na izbor sadržaja, a više na načela / polazišta / karakteristike mirovnog obrazovanja kako su oni ovdje skicirani (prema B. Reardon, 1999. g.).

FIG 2.  
DEFINING PEACE  
(HICKS, 1988)



Likewise, the process of conceptualizing peace education (*Friedenserziehung*) is burdened by a whole range of not always compatible approaches. The first one is based on the idea of peace as a force/power which should be maintained through a balance of power, or **arms**. The program of peace education emphasizes contemporary or recent history and the need to maintain military supremacy within the framework of a certain global division of power.

The second concept of peace is based on conflict analysis, from personal to global conflicts, and the various strategies of resolving these conflicts (through negotiation, agreements, mediation, dialogue...).

A third concept of peace education stems from the concept of personal peace, and is focused on the need for empathy and cooperation.

Finally, peace education can be understood as a process of reconstructing existing relations of power, which focuses on raising awareness about structural violence. This type of education would entail resisting any type of oppression. This type of peace education is the widest in scope and can also be called politics of awareness (Mindell, 1995), and is based on the following premise: all themata is based on raising awareness of social, political and economic contradictions or gaps in your immediate and wider community, as well as raising awareness about the consequences of personal choices and decisions while presenting options of non-violent methods of bringing about social change to oppressive institutions.

These programs are based on a concept of peace education which focuses



HEMA 3.




Prema toj koncepciji mir je zbiljski, aktivan, živi PROCES pa je i u skladu s tim mirovna radionica sli na soto-zenu ponajviše po tome što je sam NA IN RADA cilj.

### KONCEPCIJA PEDAGOŠKIH RADIONICA

U razvijanju i provedbi programa odgoja za kulturu mira zauzimam se za stav da je *radionica jedini djelotvoran način rada*. Obilježje "pedagoška" dolazi od njenog specifi nog usmjerenja, cilja rada, a to je odgoj za razvoj sposobnosti i potencijala i preuzimanja odgovornosti za razvoj zajednice. Danas se radionici na in rada ve toliko uvriježio i raširio da se ini suvišnim pojašnjavati ga. No upravo zbog popularnosti radionica u poplavi edukacija koje danas vladaju u podru ju formalnog i neformalnog obrazovanja valja ponovno naglasiti teorijsko ishodište i GLAVNI SMISAO tog na ina rada, stoga što se naziv koristi previše fleksibilno. Naime, esto se i frontalni na in rada i predavanje s grafoprojektorom naziva radionicom, kao što se tako zovu i igraonice ili grupne psihoterapijske seanse.

Radionica kao metoda/na in u enja bitno se razlikuje od klasi nih metoda i oblika rada. Rije je o interaktivnoj i participativnoj metodi koja po iva na modelu **iskustvenog ili doživljajnog** u enja, o ijem zna enju govore razli iti

FIG 3.



more on the ideals/concepts/characteristics of peace education as outlined above (B. Reardon, 1999) than on the selection of the activities themselves.

This concept considers peace to be a real, active, living process. In accordance with that, the peace workshops are similar to soto-zen in that the form of the activity is in itself the goal of the activity.

### THE CONCEPT BEHIND THE PEDAGOGIC WORKSHOPS

In developing and implementing the Culture of peace education programs I wish to emphasize the fact that workshops are the only effective method of work. The pedagogic aspect stems from its specific goals and aims; specifically, developing abilities and potentials and instilling a sense of responsibility for community development. Today, the workshop method is so widely accepted and spread that explaining it may seem superfluous. However, due to the popularity of workshops in the deluge of educational courses available today as part of formal and informal education I believe we need to emphasize the theoretical background and principal purpose of this method, because the term is being used more and more loosely. Even frontal work methods and lectures with projectors are being called workshops, as are play-groups or group psychotherapy sessions.

teoretičari, prvo filozof John Dewey (1984. g.), a koje kao model najdosljednije razvija David Kolb (1984. g.). On govori o tome kako procesiramo iskustvo: ciklus počinje doživljajem, pa refleksijom iza koje slijedi akcija koja se pretvara u konkretno iskustvo odnosno apstraktnu konceptualizaciju, tako da je svaka sljedeća akcija aktivno eksperimentiranje na temelju dobivenog zaključka/spoznaje.

Radionice su posebno značajne za razvoj mlade osobe ako sadrže aktivnosti u području tzv. narednog razvoja, a to znači da su malo iznad/ispred sadašnjih mogućnosti polaznika (Lav Vigotski, 1978. g.).

Što je tu drugačije od klasičnog pristupa učenju? Prije svega, tu je onaj koji sudjeluje **izravno uključen** u neki događaj (situaciju, proces, aktivnost) i iz njega **sam izvodi zaključke**. Ti zaključci su zapravo "lekcije". To nije učenje koje se zasniva na iskustvu drugih, kao što je to većina konvencionalnih metoda učenja (putem predavanja, knjiga i sl.). Iskustveno učenje usmjereno je na **proces**, a ne na neposredni ishod (učinak, rezultat); na **osobno izgrađeno**, a ne preuzeto znanje. Ova metoda učenja ne stvara samo doživljaj (koji integrira sve psihofizičke funkcije: tjelesno izražavanje, osjetilnost, emocije, želje, imaginaciju, volju, spoznaju, intelekt i intuiciju), nego formira vrijednosnu orijentaciju i ono što zovemo nenasilnim djelovanjem. Jasno je da taj proces i interakcija zahtijevaju izuzetnu pripremu i svjesnost ("pedagogija mira"), osobito vještinu da onaj koji vodi ne intervenira u konceptualizaciju djetjeg iskustva. Onima koji sudjeluju u radionici valja omogućiti artikulaciju niza vrlo značajnih unutrašnjih iskustava u odnosu na sebe, druge i svijet u cjelini.

Pedagoške radionice su najdjelotvornija **metoda socijalnog i globalnog učenja** (Susan Fountain, 1995. g.). Grupna interakcija i komunikacija, u kojoj se mogu podijeliti iskustva među ljudima, u kojoj se povećava naša osjetljivost za tuđe osjećaje i doživljaje, razvija suradnja, suosjećanje i tolerancija, razumijevanje i povjerenje, a odgovornost i briga za sebe razvijaju naporedno s odgovornošću i brigom za druge, u čijim vrijednostima zajednice. Ovaj oblik interaktivnog učenja ima u samoj svojoj strukturi načelo suradnje i uzajamnosti te demokratičnosti, a ne hijerarhijsku paradigmu obrazovanja. Ona/onaj koji vodi radionicu odriče se uloge onoga koji zna više, koji ocjenjuje, presuđuje, kudi, savjetuje. On daje samo jasnu osnovnu uputu za kreiranje procesa. Djeci valja omogućiti da **sama** kroz svoje doživljaje nauču tumačenje (značenje) bilo naših postupaka, svojih i tuđih reakcija i cijelog zbivanja u radionici. Takve mirovne radionice onda postižu svoj cilj i svrhu: razvoj samopouzdanja i samopoštovanja, tolerancije, empatije te osjećaja odgovornosti za svoje postupke. One su temeljno ishodište svih programa o kojima ovdje govorimo.

#### KRATKI OPIS PROGRAMA, NOSITELJA I TOKA PROVEDBE

U periodu od 1993.g. do 2002. g. razvijena su tri autonomna programa koja su iskušana u radu s djecom/mladima i odraslima u neformalnom i formalnom obrazovanju.

The workshop as a method or way of education differs greatly from classical methods and forms of educational work. It is an interactive and participatory method based on the model of learning through experience whose importance is highlighted by various theoreticians; it was first introduced by philosopher John Dewey (1984), but developed as a model more consistently by David Kolb (1984). He discusses the way we process experience: the cycle begins by experiencing an event, which is followed by reflection which leads to the actions that become the actual experience, an abstract conceptualization; therefore, every ensuing action is an active experiment based on the acquired conclusions or cognitions.

Workshops are particularly important for the development of young people if they contain activities in the field of advanced education, i.e. if they are slightly beyond the current abilities of the participants (Lav Vigotski, 1978). What is the key difference from the classical approach to learning? Firstly, the participant is directly involved in the experience (a situation, a process, an activity) and allowed to draw his own conclusions. These conclusions are in fact "lessons". This type of learning is not based on the experience of others, like the majority of conventional teaching methods (such as lectures, books, etc.) Experience-based learning is focused on the process and not on the immediate result: it produces knowledge which is personally constructed and not acquired. This method of learning does not only produce the experience (which integrates all psychophysical functions: body language, sensitivity, emotions, memory, will, cognition, intellect and intuition) but also forms an orientation towards values and an inclination toward what we call non-violent agency. It is clear that this process and interaction demands outstanding preparation and awareness ("pedagogy of peace"), and especially the ability of the workshop's supervisor to refrain from interfering in the children's conceptualization of the experience. The participants in the workshop must be allowed to freely articulate a series of important inner experiences of the self, others and the world in general.

Pedagogic workshops are the most efficient method of social and global learning (Susan Fountain, 1995). It's a form of group interaction and communication which facilitates the sharing of experience among people, increases our sensitivity towards other people's feelings and experiences, and develops cooperation, compassion, tolerance, understanding and trust. In these workshops, the care and responsibility for oneself is developed alongside the care and responsibility for others, thereby instilling community values in the participants. This structure of this form of interactive learning is based on the concept of cooperation and reciprocity, and on a democratic paradigm of education rather than a hierarchical one. The supervisor of the workshop does not assume the position of authority; their task is not to provide knowledge, grade, judge, admonish, or advise. He merely provides clear basic instructions for creating the process. The children must be allowed to interpret their and other people's actions, reactions, and the general nature of the activities in the workshop based on their own personal experience. Only then do these peace workshops achieve their goal and purpose: the development of confidence and self-respect, tolerance, empathy and a

**Prvi program** "Budimo prijatelji" (razrađen u istoimenom priručniku, autori: Uzelac, Bognar, Bagi, izdanje "Slon", Zagreb 1994. g.) smjerao je na stvaranje osjetljivosti na nasilje, predrasude, nejednakosti, kršenje prava i isključenosti uz vježbanje razumijevanja situacija sukoba u obitelji, školi i susjedstvu. Osnovna struktura programa reflektira ne samo ratno okruženje, nego i ono tranzicijsko. Autori su htjeli pokazati da polazište više nije kolektivizam, nego da se sada respektira pojedinac: počinjemo s pojedincem i njegovim osobnim potrebama i prosperitetom pa se onda okrećemo drugome/drugoj, a potom k zajednici, uzajamnim odnosima i odgovornostima.

Zato je prvi program, slično svima koji su nastajali netom poslije rata i dječjom pod utjecajem eksperata iz Zapadnog svijeta, započeo s temom JA pa prešao na TI, zatim na MI ili odnose JA protiv TEBE itd. Riječ je o preuzimanju liberalno-demokratske koncepcije društva s idealom nove tržišne ekonomije i individualizma kao polazišta. No taj se program bitno razlikuje od onih koji doslovno prenose (prevode) donirane programe iz SAD-a, Velike Britanije ili neke druge zemlje u našu sredinu (zajedno s njihovim priručnicima i materijalima). Njegov izbor aktivnosti, igara, radnih listova, pitanja za razgovor i refleksiju slijedi potrebe djece ove kulturne sredine i njihovih novonastalih životnih uvjeta. Nisu promijenjena samo imena i lokacije, kao u sličnim "uvezenim" programima "Soros" fondacije, nego su za simulacije situacija i igre uloga kompilirane priče iz različitih kultura (od Priče o samuraju – do naše Šume Striborove, Ivane Brlić Mažuranić). To je proizašlo iz anketiranja jedne grupe učitelja, odgojitelja i pedagoga koji su se koristili priručnikom "Budimo prijatelji". Naime, taj prvi program nije sustavno implementiran, niti valoriziran pa su i podaci o učenicima prikupljeni neplanski. Ali prema njima, program je vrlo dobro prihvaćen i kod djece i kod učitelja. Učitelji su izvijestili da je postigao osnaživanje djece i njihovu bolju komunikaciju vršnjacima i školom. Ovdje ćemo međutim biti govora uglavnom o drugom i ponešto o trećem programu, koji su implementirani kroz duže vrijeme u većem broju škola i koji su sustavno supervizirani i svake godine, sve od pilot faze pa do 2001. godine, evaluirani. Evaluaciju je radila ekipa vanjskih stručnjaka (kvantitativnu i dječjom kvalitativnu).

**Drugi program** kombinirao je rad na sukobima i suočavanje s traumatskim iskustvima i primijenjen je nakon pilot faze u velikom broju škola isto u zapadne Slavonije, odmah nakon reintegracije. Uz stalne dorade i modifikacije s obzirom na različite potrebe djece (urbane i ruralne sredine, djece povratnika i djece izbjeglica, različitih nacionalnosti i vjera) taj je program doživio najširu i najkonkretniju primjenu u našim školama pa o njemu i njegovim učenicima, zahvaljujući i potpori UNICEF-a, imamo i najviše objektivnih podataka.

**Nastao je u okviru projekta "Miroljubivo rješavanje problema u školi i ublažavanje trauma", a provodila ga je udruga "Mali korak" - Centar za kulturu mira i nenasilja. Scenarij za izvedbu radionica s djecom razrađen je u priručniku "Za Damire i Nemire - vrata prema nenasilju" priredila: Uzelac, MK Zagreb 1997. g., a preveden je na engleski te je u okviru međunarodne organizacije HREA i njihove zbirke priručnika dostupan za "download" bez naplate.**

sense of responsibility for one's actions. These values are the basis of all the programs involved.

## A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAMS, PROGRAM MANAGERS, AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION

From 1993 till 2002 three autonomous programs were designed and tested with both children and adults in both informal and formal education.

**The first program**, "Let's be friends" (detailed in the eponymous handbook, by Uzelac, Bognar, Bagi, published by Slon, Zagreb in 1994) was aimed at building a sensitivity to violence, prejudice, inequality, human rights offenses and exclusion, through activities designed to improve the understanding of conflicts at home, in school and in the neighborhood. The basic structure of the program reflects not only the war conditions of that time but also the realities of the transitional period. The authors wanted to emphasize that the collectivist ideology is being replaced by a state of respect towards the individual: first we pay attention to individual needs and the prosperity of the individual; then we can turn to others, and only later does the community and its reciprocal relations and responsibilities come into play.

This is why the first program, much like all programs developed shortly after the war and under the influence of Western experts, takes the subject of ME as a starting point, and only later includes the subjects of YOU and US or relationships such as ME versus YOU, etc. This is typical of a liberal-democratic concept of society fueled by the ideology of the new market economy and individualism as its cornerstone. However, this program differs greatly from donated programs which have, along with all their respective handbooks and materials, been simply imported (translated) into our region from the US, Great Britain or any other environment. Its choice of activities, games, worksheets, discussion and reflection questions reflects the needs of children from this cultural environment and their recently established living conditions. The changes include more than simple names and locations, like in similar imported programs of the Soros Foundation: the situational simulations and role-playing games consist of stories adapted from diverse cultures (from A Samurai's Tale to Stribor's Forest by Ivana Brlić Mažuranić). This was learned from a poll of teachers, pedagogues and counselors who used the "Let's be friends" handbook. This program was not systematically implemented or evaluated, so the data on its achievements also had to be acquired non-systematically. But this data does show that the program had a positive reception amongst both teachers and children. Teachers reported that the program managed to consolidate the children and facilitate their communication both with their peers and with the schools' personnel.

However, we will mainly be focusing on the second and, to a lesser degree, the third program, which have been implemented over a longer period and in a greater number of schools, and which have been systematically supervised and evaluated every year since their inception up until 2001. The quantitative and partially qualitative evaluation was conducted by a team of independent experts.

Projekt je obuhvatio:

- 1/ pripremu instrumenata za evaluaciju programa i samog procesa provedbe;
- 2/ pripremu priručnika i drugih radnih materijala za model edukacije nastavnika;
- 3/ sustavno stručno osposobljavanje (kroz dva rezidencijalna seminara) učitelja razredne i predmetne nastave te stručnih suradnika (pedagoga, psihologa) u okviru jednogodišnjeg programa miroljubivog rješavanja problema i sukoba. Dio koji se odnosio na traumatska iskustva bio je glavna tema na početku provedbe programa (neposredno nakon rata), zatim je stavljen na drugo mjesto, a postupno su ga učitelji integrirali u program prema svojoj procjeni potreba djece;
- 4/ nakon prvog seminara učitelji ili stručni suradnici javljali su se dobrovoljno kako bi započeli jednogodišnji grupni rad s djecom, koji je podrazumijevao kontinuiranu prorađu programa od najmanje 20 radionica (10 + 10) tijekom dva polugodišta: Program se provodio bilo kao program izvannastavnih aktivnosti ili sat razrednog odjela ili kroz projektnu nastavu, no tijekom svih ovih godina on je bio stalno superviziran i evaluiran;
- 5/ superviziranje provedbe programa (dvije supervizije) godišnje;
- 6/ razmjenu iskustava kroz susrete svih nositelja programa - učitelja;
- 7/ praćenje i evaluaciju programa (kvalitativnu i kvantitativnu) i
- 8/ radionice s roditeljima i kolegama.

Kako je svake godine stručno osposobljeno oko 80 novih nastavnika iz novih i/ili starih škola, prosječno je polovica njih započela iste školske godine rad s barem jednom grupom djece. Brojke u **Tablici 1.** pokazuju samo one koji su sustavno radili program i bili supervizirani kroz UNICEF-ov projekt od strane "Malog koraka". No brojke su mnogo veće uzmu li se u obzir edukacije koje su po istoj knjizi ili programu radili sami prosvjetni djelatnici sa školama, kao i niz drugih nevladinih organizacija (Centar za mir iz Osijeka i drugi).

TABLICA 1.  
PODACI O PROVEDBI  
PROJEKTA  
"MIROLJUBIVO  
RJEŠAVANJE PROBLEMA  
U ŠKOLI I UBLAŽAVANJE  
TRAUMA"  
1995/96 – 2000

ŠKOLSKA GODINA	BROJ ŠKOLA KOJE PROVODE PROGRAM	BROJ ŠKOLSKE DJE- CE KOJA SU PROŠLA JEDNOGODIŠNJI PRO- GRAM (20 susreta)	BROJ UČITELJA KOJI SU <b>SUSTAVNO</b> EDU- CIRANI ZA PROVOĐE- NJE PROGRAMA
Pilot faza 1996./97.	3	75	18
1997. – 1998.	<b>26 novih + 3 stare</b> (manje seoske škole)	<b>320</b>	<b>52</b>
1998. – 1999.	<b>31 novih + 16 starih</b>	<b>826</b>	<b>70 + 66</b>
1999. – 2000.	<b>27 novih + 37 starih</b>	<b>1600</b>	<b>72 + 53</b>
<b>UKUPNO:</b>	<b>87</b> različitih škola (najviše u područjima od posebne socijalne skrbi) ***	<b>2821</b> školske djece (od 8 – 15 godina) razli- čite vjerske, spolne, nacionalne/etničke, društvene i kulturne pripadnosti	<b>331</b> učitelja/pedago- ga/ psihologa tako- đer razli- čite dobne, etni- čke, vjerske i kulturne pripadnosti

The second program combined work on conflicts and dealing with traumatic experiences and was implemented in a large number of schools in Eastern and Western Slavonia, shortly following their reintegration into Croatia. With constant improvements and modifications in accordance with the different needs of different children populations (urban and rural environments, returnees and refugees, different national and religious identities), this was the most widely and thoroughly implemented program in our schools, so its activities and effects have been documented the most thoroughly, thanks to the support of the UNICEF.

It was created as part of the "Resolving problems peacefully and reducing trauma in schools" program and conducted by the "Mali Korak" Center for Culture of Peace and Nonviolence. The scenario for the children's workshop activities was elaborated in the manual "Za Damire i Nemire – Opening the Door to Nonviolence", created by Maja Uzelac and published by MK Zagreb in 1997, which was translated into English and is available for free download as part of the HREA international organization's collection of manuals.

This project consisted of the following steps:

- 1/ the preparation of instruments for the evaluation of the program and the implementation process itself;
- 2/ the creation of the manual and other work materials for the education of teachers;
- 3/ the systematic professional education (through two residential seminars) of both teachers and professional associates, such as pedagogues and psychologists, in the skills required to lead a one-year program of peaceful conflict resolution. The issue of dealing with traumatic experiences was the central topic at the beginning of the program's implementation (immediately after the war), but was subsequently relegated to a secondary position, leaving it to the teachers' discretion to integrate it into the program according to their assessment of the children's needs;
- 4/ After the first seminar, the teachers and associates were volunteers working on one-year group courses with children which entailed continuous work on a program consisting of no less than 20 workshops (10+10) in the course of two semesters. The program was implemented either as an extracurricular activity, as a series of class community meetings or as project-based class-work, but in any case it was constantly supervised and evaluated throughout the years;
- 5/ The supervision of the implementation of the program (two supervisions per year);
- 6/ The exchange of experience through meetings of all the teachers leading the programs;
- 7/ The evaluation and assessment of the programs (both qualitative and quantitative) and
- 8/ Workshops with parents and colleagues.

With 80 new teachers being introduced to the program every year, at least half of these immediately started working with at least one group of children. The data in Table 1 shows only those teachers who conducted the programs systematically and who were supervised by the "Mali korak" Center

Premda se projekt tijekom vremena najviše rukovodio potrebama djece u krajevima koji su na različit način bili pogođeni ratom, on se od početka usmjeravao više proaktivnim, no reaktivnim ciljevima. Tako je od prvotnog cilja povezivanja tehnika, rješavanja problemskih situacija i situacija sukoba s ublažavanjem traumatskih iskustava djece, program preoblikovan u onaj koji nastoji olakšati probleme socijalne adaptacije djece povratnika/prognanika i ostalog ratom pogođenog stanovništva te pomoći im u pomirbu i razumijevanje. S obzirom da se temeljio na jednoj drugoj obrazovnoj paradigmi (Freire, 1970. g.), no što je bila ona našeg odgojno-obrazovnog sustava, u naš školski sustav unosi se ne samo inovacijske metode rada, nego i kompletno drugačija pedagogija (pedagogija kulture mira) i drugačija demokratsko-izolacijska je. (\*\*\*) fusnota na str. 7.)

Radi što boljeg prikaza razvojne linije ovog projekta i postignutog se o njemu ne samo u njegovoj evaluaciji (realizaciji ciljeva), nego ponajviše u sveobuhvatnoj zainteresiranosti u itelja za ovu vrstu edukacije i rada.

**Treći program** namijenjen je mladima koji ili kao posrednici u nesporazumima i sukobima pomažu svojim vršnjacima da sami pronađu rješenja i izlaz iz svojega problema ("Medijacija u školi") ili educiraju svoje vršnjake kako bi ih ohrabрили u jednostavnijoj i bržoj artikulaciji njihovih problema, aspiracija, odluka i potencijala te vještini zagovaranja aktivnog nenasilja (edukacija među vršnjacima).

Programi su kreirani u okviru dva projekta koja su oba dobila potporu UNICEF-a: prvi je bio "Medijacija u školi" (započeo 1998. g., a završio 2000. g.), a drugi "Mladi protiv nasilja" (2000./2001. g.).

U projektu "Medijacija u školi" najprije se detaljno razradila logistika, zatim svi osnovni koraci za provedbu programa, a pripreme za početak škole/tečajja za tzv. "Spajalice" trajale su gotovo godinu dana.

Projekt je obuhvatio redom ove aktivnosti:

- 1/ detaljnu razradu akcijskog plana, izbor škola i metodologije izbora učenika za tečaj medijacije;
- 2/ izradu INFO-materijala/brošure "Medijacija u školi" namijenjene učiteljima i roditeljima;
- 3/ snimanje situacije na izabranim školama (3 osnovne škole iz 3 različitih županije/grada: Vukovar, Pakrac, Zagreb) i priprema svake škole za provedbu programa "Spajalice" (uz pomoć INFO-brošure);
- 4/ izobrazbu manjeg broja učitelja u vještinama medijacije prema pripremljenom materijalu/priručniku "Za Svemire", u kojemu su koraci i upute za trening djece-medijatora s kratkim vodičima za same učenike – medijatore;
- 5/ anketiranje učenika izabranih odjeljenja u ciljanim školama kojim se dobio izbor učenika i učenica prema kriteriju tzv. pozitivnih i negativnih vođa, koji su zajedno krenuli na tzv. školu medijacije u Selce u travnju 1999. g.;
- 6/ tečajja za učenike – medijatore na kojem učitelji koji su prošli izobrazbu

TABLE 1.  
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATA "RESOLVING PROBLEMS PEACEFULLY AND REDUCING TRAUMA IN SCHOOLS" 1995/96 – 2000

as part of UNICEF's project. The numbers would grow significantly if we were to include educational programs conducted in accordance with the program or its manual by independent education work in schools as well as other non-government organizations (The Osijek Center for Peace and others).

SCHOOL YEAR	NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM	NUMBER OF CHILDREN COMPLETING A ONE-YEAR COURSE (20 SESSIONS)	NUMBER OF TEACHERS SYSTEMATICALLY EDUCATED FOR THE PROGRAM
Pilot-phase 1996/97	3	75	18
1997 – 1998	26 new + 3 old (small village schools)	320	52
1998 – 1999	31 new + 16 old	826	70 + 66
1999 – 2000	27 new + 37 old	1600	72 + 53
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>87</b> Different schools (mostly in Areas of special government concern)	<b>2821</b> School children (age 8 – 15) of various religious, sexual, national/ethnic, social and cultural backgrounds.	<b>331</b> Teachers/pedagogues/psychologists of various religious, sexual, national/ethnic, social and cultural backgrounds.

Although the project has over time mostly been focused on the needs of children who have in one way or another been adversely affected by war, its goals were, from the very beginning, proactive rather than reactive. Thus, the program's original goal of combining problem-solving techniques with methods of conflict resolution in order to alleviate the effects of traumatic experiences in children was gradually transformed into a program aimed at easing the social adaptation of refugee and returnee children and other segments of population adversely affected by war, and helping inter-ethnic reconciliation and understanding. Being based on an educational paradigm (Freire, 1970) different from our own educational system, it introduced not only innovative work methods but a completely different approach to pedagogy (a pedagogy of peace culture) and a different, more democratic atmosphere into our school system<sup>1</sup>.

The growth of this project and its accomplishments is evident not only in the evaluation of its methods and accomplished goals but also in the increasing

1 Program implementation data (year one only, 1995/96)  
The program "Resolving problems peacefully and reducing trauma in schools" started in 1995/96 as a pilot-project, first in 4 elementary schools (in Pakrac and Osijek) and then in the 26 elementary schools in the Croatian Danube region (local schools included). During 1997 and 1998 the elementary schools in Knin, Topusko, Vojni, Karlovac, Zagreb, Vinkovci i Cerna also started implementing the program. In the first semester of the 1998/99 school year the project was implemented in the following schools: OŠ "V. Žganca" - Kozari Bok Zagreb; OŠ "Braće Radić", Pakrac; II. OŠ Vukovar; IV. OŠ Vukovar; V. OŠ Vukovar; OŠ Dalj; OŠ Vojni; OŠ A. Šenoa, Osijek; OŠ D.Česari, Osijek; II. OŠ Knin; OŠ Bijelo Brdo; OŠ Bobota; OŠ A.G.Matoš, Vinkovci; OŠ Borovo; OŠ Tenja; OŠ Popovac; OŠ Ernestinovo; OŠ V.Becića, Osijek; OŠ V.Nazor, Topusko; OŠ Sv. Ana, Osijek; OŠ T.Ujević, Osijek; OŠ Saregrad i OŠ Cerna.



medijacije zajedno s projektnim timom treniraju djecu koja postaju posrednici drugoj sukobljenoj djeci. Educirano je 11 učenika u 5 škola, a oko 50 učenika iz 3 škola je tijekom 1999. g. završilo tečaj, od kojih je cca 24 htjelo dragovoljno preuzeti ulogu medijatora - posrednika pri tužnjavama i drugim sukobima svojih vršnjaka;

- 7/ tiskanje priručnika "Za Svemire" s razradom programa i opisom provedbe, kao i iskustava svih sudionika: učenika, učitelja, roditelja, supervizora i drugih članova projektnog tima. Detaljan opis učenika inače moguće je naći u knjizi Uzelac (2000. g.) "Za Svemire".

Isto tako, "Mladi protiv nasilja" je kao projekt kratko opisan u knjizi zasebno, na drugome mjestu, jer se odnosio na specifičnu aktivističku metodologiju rada, a nositelji su bili srednjoškolci iz Zagrebačkih predgraja. Taj je projekt pokrenut s namjerom da mladi daju svoj osoban udio za zaštitu prava mladih na siguran život. Za takav naum valjalo je mobilizirati na suradnju sve ključne aktere na relaciji ŠKOLA - LOKALNA UPRAVA – POLICIJA- CENTRI ZA SOCIJALNU SKRB – NEVLADINE UDRUGE MLADIH – MEDIJI.

### PODACI O NOSITELJIMA PROVEDBE (SAMO PRVA GODINA 1995./96. G.)

Program "Miroљjubivo rješavanje problema u školi i ublažavanje trauma" započeo je kao pilot-projekt 1995./96. g. najprije u 4 osnovne škole (u Pakracu i Osijeku), a zatim i u tadašnjih 26 osnovnih škola hrvatskog Podunavlja (u tu brojku su uključene i područne škole/odjeljenja). Tijekom 1997. g. i 1998. g. s programom su započele i osnovne škole u Kninu, Topuskom, Vojniču, Karlovcu i Zagrebu, Vinkovcima i Cerni. Tako su tijekom I. polugodišta 1998./99. g. projekt provodile sljedeće škole:

OŠ "V. Žganca" - Kozari Bok, Zagreb; OŠ "Braće Radić", Pakrac; II. OŠ Vukovar; IV. OŠ Vukovar; V. OŠ Vukovar; OŠ Dalj; OŠ Vojnić; OŠ A. Šenoa, Osijek; OŠ D.Cesarić, Osijek; II. OŠ Knin; OŠ Bijelo Brdo; OŠ Bobota; OŠ A.G.Matoš, Vinkovci; OŠ Borovo; OŠ Tenja; OŠ Popovac; OŠ Ernestinovo; OŠ V.Becić, Osijek; OŠ V.Nazor, Topusko; OŠ Sv. Ana, Osijek; OŠ T. Ujević, Osijek; OŠ Sa-rengrad i OŠ Cerna.

### O UČINCIMA PROGRAMA

Kontinuiranim praćenjem i evaluacijom dosadašnje provedbe programa "Miroљjubivog rješavanja problema i sukoba u školi" došlo se, ponajprije do uvida što u programu treba modificirati, koliko ga otvarati kroskurikularnoj primjeni, kako adaptirati za različite potrebe korisnika (djece različitih uzrasta, djece s posebnim potrebama, različitih nacionalnosti i vjeroispovijesti, potrebi rada s roditeljima te kolegama nastavnici).

Bilo je zanimljivo promatrati i pratiti promjene kod nastavnika: onih koji su uporno i ustrajnije radili program (3 - 4 godine), a to su bili uglavnom učitelji razredne nastave. Oni su nakon rada s grupom djece iz svog ili susjednih razreda poželjeli eksperimentirati s grupama djece iz viših razreda ili nekom drugom oblikom formiranom grupom. Poneki su se umorili pa bi pauzirali godinu dana i onda opet započeli taj jednogodišnji program. No ono što smo ovdje

interest among teachers for this type of education and work.

The third program was aimed at helping youths mediate in misunderstandings and conflicts in order to help their peers find solutions or resolve their problems ("Mediation in schools"), and to educate their peers in order to encourage them to more easily and quickly articulate their problems, aspirations, decisions and potentials and train them in the skill of promoting active nonviolence ("Education among peers").

The programs were created within the framework of two projects supported by the UNICEF, entitled "Mediation in schools" (1998 - 2000) and "Youths against violence" (200-2001), respectively. The project "Mediation in schools" started by drawing a logistic blueprint detailing all the steps necessary for the implementation of the program, and the preparations for the start of the so-called "Paperclip" course lasted for almost a year.

The project consisted of the following activities:

- 1/ Designing a detailed work-plan, choosing the schools and pupils for the mediation course;
- 2/ Designing an informational brochure entitled "Mediation in schools" intended for teachers and parents;
- 3/ Surveying the atmosphere in the chosen schools (three elementary schools from three different towns in three different counties: Vukovar, Pakrac, Zagreb) and preparing each of the schools for the implementation of the "Paperclip" program with the help of the informational brochure;
- 4/ Educating a small number of teachers in mediation skills according to the "Za Svemire" manual which details the steps in the process of educating student-mediators, including a short guide for the students themselves;
- 5/ Polling the pupils in the selected schools in order to select students according to the criterion of so-called positive and negative leaders, which were then enrolled in the so-called "Mediation school" in Selce in April 1999;
- 6/ Educating the chosen students to act as mediators for other children in conflicts by means of a course conducted by teachers who had completed their education with the project team. 22 teachers from 5 schools were educated, and 50 students from 3 schools completed the course in 1999. Approximately 24 of them volunteered to take on the role of mediators in fights and other conflicts among their peers;
- 7/ Printing the "Za Svemire" manual, detailing the program and describing its interpretation, as well as including the experiences of all participants: students, teachers, parents, supervisors, and other members of the project team. A detailed description of the effects is available in the 2000 book "Za Svemire" by Maja Uzelac.

The "Youths against violence" project was also briefly described in another section of the book because of its specific activist methodology and the fact that the project leaders were high-school students from the periphery of Zagreb. This project was started in order to give an opportunity to young people to participate in the preservation of the right to a safe existence.

odabrali re i o u incima programa bit e izvadci iz evaluacijskog izvješ a za godinu 1998./99., gdje se oprimjeruju uvidi koji se naj eš e ponavljaju. Radi opsežnosti kvantitativne analize ovdje izostavljam tablice i podatke iz kvantitativne analize. No spominjem s razlogom neke mjerne instrumente.

U enici su nakon svake od pet cjelina (program sadrži ukupno 20 radionica) ispunjavali *Upitnicu za učenike: samoprocjene učenika u grupi*. U itelji su nakon svakog grupnog susreta ispunjavali *Upitnicu za učitelje: procjena grupnog susreta*. Ti su instrumenti, osim svoje osnovne evaluacijske funkcije, imali izvanrednu motivacijsku vrijednost za u enike budu i da su po ivali na kontinuiranom pra enju i samoprocjeni vlastitog i grupnog rada, vlastitih reakcija i me usobnih odnosa, iskoraka i teško a tijekom prolaženja kroz proces. Usu ujemo se napomenuti da je ovo jedan od najtrajnije pra enih eksperimentalnih programa u našoj obrazovnoj praksi od 1995. g. do danas (kojeg je radila jedna organizacija civilnog društva u suradnji sa školama i za to odgovornom institucijom Ministarstva obrazovanja, Zavodom za školstvo). UNICEF je svake godine nanovo tražio evaluacijski izvještaj o postignutom i novi projekt koji je išao na natje aj za sljede u godinu.

Na konferencijama UNICEF-a projektni tim je dobivao zadatak prikazivanja pojedinih faza provedbe programa i njegovih u inaka na u enike, nastavnike i školsko okruženje. Tako se stalno pratila provedba programa, tijekom svih 6 godina provedbe projekta s UNICEF-ovom potporom u Hrvatskoj te poslije toga, trogodišnja provedba u osnovnim školama BiH, uz potporu danskog Crvenog križa (2001. - 2003. g.) što je zna ilo da se svaka godina (tog jedno-godišnjeg programa) mogla zasebno vrednovati i tako iš itavati i respektirati u svim svojim specifi nostima i razlikama i uspore ivati s rezultatima dobi-venima ranijih ili kasnijih godina. Program je sa svim mjernim instrumentima prenesen 2003. g. i na Kosovo, no u edukaciji u itelja i provedbi programa po školama nije sudjelovao tim "Malog koraka". No, ini se da su mišljenja nastavnika, u enika i supervizora potvrdila vrijednost programa i da je zbog svojih u inaka prenesen u sredinu kao što je Kosovo, gdje su tenzije i sukobi u zajednici utjecali na psihi ki razvoj djece i mladih.

Uspjeh programa u okviru UNICEF-ove potpore tijekom 6 godina odrazio se i na me unarodni ugled NVO-a "Mali korak", koji je dobio poziv da lanovi njegovog projektnog tima sudjeluju u pripremnim sastancima organizacija civilnog društva UN-a u New Yorku za planiranu posebnu Generalnu skupštinu UN-a posve enu djeci. Na toj sjednici Generalne skupštine pravo nastupa za glavnom govornicom, u ime organizacija civilnog društva iz jugoisto ne Europe, dobila je voditeljica projekta Maja Uzelac.

Sumiraju i ovdje, na temelju rezultata, evaluacije putem mjernih instrumenata na kraju provedbe programa 2001. g., što je doživljeno kao glavni u inak projekta "Miroљubivo rješavanje problema i sukoba u školi" (kroz 20 radionica), došli smo do toga da je zajedni ka i iznova ponavljana tvrdnja **promjena**, koju podjednako percipiraju obje grupe glavnih direktnih korisnika projekta kod sebe samih i kod onih drugih, a to su u enici i u itelji - voditelji mirovnih radionica. U itelji navode kao glavne elemente promjene kod u enika: porast samopouzdanja i samopoštovanja, ve u autonomiju i inicijativu u radu u

To that end, we had to ensure the cooperation of key actors in schools, the local administration, the police, social care centers, non-government youth organizations, and the media.

## ON THE EFFECTS OF THE PROGRAMS

The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the program for "Resolving problems peacefully and reducing trauma in schools" has provided us with many insights as to which aspects of the program should be modified, how much it should be made available for use in cross-curricular courses, and how to adapt it for the different needs of different users (children of different ages, children with special needs, children of different nationalities and religious beliefs, working with parents and fellow teachers).

Tracking and monitoring changes in teachers was interesting: primary school teachers were the ones who were the most devoted and persistent, working for three or four years. After working with children from theirs or other teacher's classes these teachers started experimenting with groups of pupils from higher grades or with groups with different compositions. Some of them would grow tired and take a year off before beginning the one-year program once again. But what we have chosen to present in this paper regarding the effects of the program will be excerpts from our evaluation report for the year 1998/99, which exemplifies our most common observations. Due to the scope of the quantitative analysis I will leave out tables and hard data from the quantitative analysis. However, I have reason to bring up certain measuring instruments.

After each of the five units (the program consists of 20 workshops altogether) the students answered a poll entitled *A student poll: self-evaluation of the students*. After each group workshop, the teachers answered a poll entitled *A student poll: an assessment of the group session*. These instruments, in addition to their basic function of evaluation, also had a strong motivational effect on the students since they were based on continuous assessment and the personal evaluation of both the student's own and the group's progress, of their own reactions and relationships, breakthroughs and difficulties in course of the process. We wish to emphasize that this is one of the longest-running monitored experimental programs in our educational system since 1995 up until today (performed by a civil society organization in cooperation with schools and the relevant institution of the Ministry of Education, the Board of Education). Each year, the UNICEF required an evaluation report on yearly accomplishments and a new project plan to be submitted for the following year. At UNICEF's conferences the project team was asked to present some of the particular phases of the implementation of the program and elaborate on their effects on students, teachers, and the school environment. In this way the implementation of the program was continuously monitored, during all 6 years of its collaboration with UNICEF, and afterwards during the three years of its implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the support of the Danish Red Cross (2001-2003), which meant that every year could be assessed independently and be analyzed

školi, bolje suočavanje s problemskim situacijama i njihovo rješavanje, bitno povećanu motivaciju za učenje (bolji školski uspjeh), bolji odnos i povjerenje prema učiteljima, veću toleranciju i uzajamnog razumijevanja (među učenicima u školi i van škole), veću prisebnost i svjesnost pri donošenju odluka, bolje prihvatanje drugih i više solidarnosti te želju za suradnjom.

### KAKO SU UČENICI PERCIPIRALI SEBE I KAKO SU DOŽIVJELI MIROVNE RADIONICE?

Djeca/ucenici izuzetno su visoko ocijenili i prihvatili ovaj program: u grupi se osjećaju ugodno, prihvatno, opušteno, spremni su suradivati i doprinositi radu, teme/cjeline su im zanimljive i zabavne, škola im je postala veselje. Djeca također svoj školski uspjeh, odnos s drugom djecom i roditeljima procjenjuju boljim, kao i ukupno osjećanje otkad idu na mirovnu grupu.

Zanimljivo je da su i nastavnici i roditelji izrazito pozitivno ocijenili program i njegovo djelovanje na djecu, ali i njih same. Izjave učitelja jasno su ukazale na svjesnost kako su se sami promijenili u odnosu prema djeci i roditeljima, a također i u percepciji vlastite uloge i metodama rada. Osjećali su napredak u profesionalnom razvoju i posebno zadovoljstvo svojim radom. Počeli su sami tražiti i dizajnirati nove scenarije za rad u razredu, nisu više imali problema s disciplinom, premda su djeca tijekom rada bila glasna. Navikli su se na drugačiji način rada, demokratičnije odnose i više su vremena ulagali u pripremu radionica. Imali su, također, svijest o cijelom procesu i značenju socijalnih vještina za dječiji i njihov vlastiti razvoj. Počeli su jasnije izražavati svoje potrebe i osjećanja i osluškivati osjećanja i potrebe učenika. "Sada vidim djecu, uživam njihove strahove i radost, volim s njima razgovarati." Najveći uspjeh za učitelje je povjerenje koje osjećaju da se razvilo između njih i djece, njih i roditelja (koje su prije doživljavali kao "drugu stranu"). Promjene su nastale i u njihovom percipiranju roditelja Roma ili Janjevaca, roditelja druge vjeroispovijesti: općenito su bolje i češće suradivali s roditeljima.

Svi ovi učinci i promjene nastaju, međutim, jedino kroz sustavnu primjenu određenog broja mirovnih radionica, a trajanje susreta nije 45 min. nego 1,5 sat. Mozaik ili slijed preporučenog programa može se mijenjati i učitelji su adaptirali program prema uzrastu i potrebama učenika.

Ono na što valja paziti, odnosno izbjegavati jest donošenje zaključaka ili pouka nakon svake aktivnosti, a što je sklonost mnogih učitelja.

Primjena ovih radionica doista djeluje učinkovito na razvijanje empatije i prosocijalnog ponašanja kod svih direktnih korisnika programa. Jedini zadatak im je da oni sami moraju dragovoljno prihvatiti, voditi ili sudjelovati u ovom programu koji zahtijeva mnogo truda oko pripreme. Ono što bi školi došlo kao podrška lokalne zajednice je medijska pozornost za mirovno obrazovanje i one koji ih provode.

Najkontroverznija, a ujedno i indikativna za atmosferu u velikoj većini škola, u kojima su mirovne radionice bile suprotne uobičajenim metodama rada, je izjava jedne ravnateljice koja je supervizorici komentirala ponašanje učenika VII. razreda (koji su godinu ranije prošli program "Za Damire i Nemire", a potom i trening za "Spajalice" – učeničke medijatore): "Ah, ne mogu svi raditi

and valued according to its particularities and specifics and compared to the results achieved in preceding or following years. The program was, together with all its instruments, implemented in Kosovo in 2003, but the "Mali Korak" team did not participate neither in the education of teachers nor in the implementation of the program in schools. However, it seems that the opinions of teachers, students and supervisors testify to the value of the program and that this was the reason it was adopted in an environment such as Kosovo where the tensions and conflicts in the community adversely affected the psychic development of children.

The success of these UNICEF-backed programs during these 6 years is reflected on the international renown of the "Mali Korak" association: the members of its project team were invited to participate in the preparation meetings of the civil society organizations of the UN in New York, preceding the General Meeting of the UN dedicated to children. On that meeting, project leader Maja Uzelac was granted the privilege of speaking on behalf of the civil society organizations of South-East Europe.

To sum up the results of the evaluations conducted through our instruments at the end of the program's implementation in 2001, the chief accomplishment of the "Resolving problems peacefully and reducing trauma in schools" project (through 20 workshops), as is widely reiterated and agreed upon, is **change**, which is equally and mutually perceived by both groups of direct participants of the project: the students and the teachers who led these peace workshops. Teachers name the following changes to most noticeable among students: an increase in self-respect and self-confidence, a greater autonomy and initiative regarding school-work, a greater competence at tackling problems and solving them, a higher motivation for education (better performance in school), a more favorable attitude and trust towards teachers, a greater level of tolerance and mutual respect (towards peers both in and out of school), an improvement in concentration and awareness in decision-making processes, a more accepting attitude towards others and an increase in solidarity and the desire to cooperate.

### HOW DID THE STUDENTS PERCEIVE THEMSELVES AND WHAT WAS THEIR INTERPRETATION OF PEACE WORKSHOPS?

The children/students gave a very favorable review of this program: in groups they felt comfortable, accepted, relaxed, willing to cooperate and contribute, they found the topics and units to be interesting and entertaining, and school became enjoyable for them. The children also noticed an improvement in their school performances, their relationships with other children and their parents, as well as their general dispositions since joining the peace group.

What is interesting that the teachers and parents expressed a favorable opinion not only of the effects of the program on the children, but also on themselves. The teachers pointed out that they saw changes both in their own attitudes towards children and parents and in their perception of their own roles and work methods. They felt that they were progressing profes-

kao uiteljica, a i bolje da ne. S tim se nekadašnjim "njenim" učenicima ne može sada izaći na kraj. Svi se nastavnici na njih žale. Uvijek nešto pitaju, traže da im se nešto objasni, uvijek žele da se čuje i njihovo mišljenje, nikoga se ne boje. Svima su se popeli na glavu. Istina, osvajaju prva mjesta na natjecanjima, ali u sve se miješaju..."

Ova izjava naizokrenut način potvrđuje upravo ono što sami učenici (i roditelji) ocjenjuju kao uspješnost programa (i kako on na njih utječe). To drugim riječima znači da djeca koja su prošla program postaju samopouzdanija, aktivnija, sudjeluju u nastavi zainteresirano, motiviranija su, "zahtjevnija", bez straha od autoriteta, poduzetna, odgovorna, a ne žele da drugi za njih i u njihovo ime odlučuju. U školi imaju inicijativu.

sionally and discovered a renewed joy in their work. They also started looking for and designing new scenarios for class activities, and stopped having discipline problems even though the children tended to make a lot of noise while working. The teachers grew accustomed to a different style of work and to a more democratic environment, and started devoting more time to the preparation of workshops. They also developed an awareness of the whole process and of the importance of the development of social skills for both the children and themselves. They started expressing their needs and feelings more clearly and listening to the feelings and needs of students. "Now I really see the children, hear their fears and joys, I love talking to them." The greatest success for children is the trust they feel has developed between them and the children, and them and the parents (whom they used to perceive as "the opposing side"). The changes were also evident in their perception of the parents of Roma or Janjevci children, the parents of children belonging to other religious groups etc; generally speaking, the cooperation with parents increased in both quality and frequency.

However, all of these changes and improvements are only effected through the systematic implementation of a number of peace workshops, whose durations should be 1.5 hours, and not 45 minutes. The structure and flow of the recommended program can be changed and teachers have been adapting the program according to the age and needs of the students. One thing which teachers should be wary of, or even avoid, is insisting on coming to conclusions or morals after every activity, which is something most teachers are prone to. These workshops have a visible effect on fostering empathy and pro-social behavior in all direct users. The only requirement is that the participants willingly agree to lead or participate in this program, which requires extensive preparation. While schools receive support from their local communities, peace education and its agents must rely on the attention of the media for support.

The most controversial and also the statement most indicative of the atmosphere in the majority of schools in which peace workshops were incompatible with the usual methods of work, is the statement by a school headmistress who supervised the behavior of seventh grade students who had participated in the "Za Damire i Nemire" and "Paperclips" student-mediator trainings the previous year, that: "Not everyone can be a teacher, and rightfully so. These pupils (sometimes even from her own class) are out of control. They keep asking questions, they constantly require explanations, want their opinions to be heard, and are completely unafraid... Everybody's had enough of them already. True, they keep winning first places in competitions, but they interfere with everything..."

This statement (albeit unwittingly) reinforces the claims of teachers and their parents regarding the success and positive effects of the program. In other words, children who have participated in this program become more self-confident and active, they show interest in class, they are motivated, challenging, without fear of authority, enterprising, responsible, they do not want others to make decisions for them and in their name, and they take initiative in school.

# ISKUSTVA CENTRA ZA MIROVNE STUDIJE: POVEZANOST AKTIVIZMA I MIROVNOG OBRAZOVANJA

AUTORICE:  
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ŠLOSER  
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**IVA ZENZEROVIĆ ŠLOSER** RADI U CENTRU ZA MIROVNE STUDIJE KAO VODITELJICA PROGRAMA EDUKACIJE. DIPLOMIRALA JE PEDAGOGINJU I SOCIOLOGIJU, A 1997. GODINE UPISALA JE MIROVNE STUDIJE KOJI SU JOJ I NAKON PUNO GODINA NAJDRAŽI IZVOR INFORMACIJA, ZADOVOLJSTVA I IZAZOVA. VOLI PROUČAVATI I POUČAVATI, ALI JOŠ PUNO VIŠE VOLI SE BAVITI ODUŠAVANJEM OD TRADICIONALNIH I ZADANIH NORMI, PONAŠANJA I STAVOVA.

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Mirovno obrazovanje u Hrvatskoj javlja se u prvoj polovici 90-tih godina kao oblik obrazovanja temeljen na konceptu "pedagoških radionica"<sup>1</sup>, koja je vrijednost to što proces, predavanja i radionice provode ljudi s direktnim aktivističkim iskustvom. Ono je neposredno vezano uz ratne sukobe na području bivše Jugoslavije. Neformalno mirovno obrazovanje javlja se uz mirovni aktivizam kao građanski otpor prisutnom direktnom i strukturalnom nasilju, etničkim podjelama, prekinutoj komunikaciji među ljudima, rastu im stereotipima prema drugima i, nerijetko, diskriminaciji prema manjini. U **MIRamiDA treninzima izgradnje mira**, iznikli su u Antiratnoj kampanji Hrvatske<sup>2</sup>, kroz volonterski projekt Pakrac koji je detaljno prikazan u tekstu Gorana Božićevića.

Prvi MIRamiDA trening u Pakracu održan je djelomično po intuitivnom konceptu, prilagođenom potrebama sudionika i kapacitetima trenera. Tek je ka-

- 1 Uzelac, Maja: MIRamiDA podsjetnik, CMS, 2002. g.
- 2 Antiratna kampanja Hrvatske (ARK) mreža je organizacija i inicijativa koje su aktivno djelovale od 1992. do 1998. godine s ciljem izražavanja jasnog neslaganja s državnom politikom i nasiljem koje se događalo u ratu. ARK se aktivno bavio pravom na prigovor savjesti. Iz ARK-a je proizašao cijeli niz mirovnih, ženskih i zagovaračkih organizacija za ljudska prava.

# THE CENTRE FOR PEACE STUDIES PRACTICES: CONNECTION BETWEEN ACTIVISM AND PEACE EDUCATION

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**IVA ZENZEROVIĆ ŠLOSER** WORKS FOR CENTER FOR PEACE STUDIES AS A HEAD OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM. IVA GRADUATED PEDAGOGY AND SOCIOLOGY AND IN 1997 SHE ENROLLED IN PEACE STUDIES WHICH ARE STILL, AFTER MANY YEARS, HER FAVOURITE RESOURCE OF INFORMATION, CONTENTMENT AND CHALLENGE. SHE LOVES TO RESEARCH AND TEACH, BUT SHE LOVES MORE TO DISHABITUATE FROM TRADITIONAL AND GIVEN NORMS, BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDE.

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Peace education was first introduced in Croatia in the first half of the 1990s. It was based on the concept of "pedagogical workshops"<sup>1</sup>, which encompassed processes, lectures and workshops conducted by people with direct experience in activism. This was immediately connected to war conflicts on post-Yugoslavian territory. Informal peace education appeared, along with peace activism, as a form of civil resistance to the presence of direct and structural violence, ethnic divisions, suppression of communication, increasing stereotyping, and frequent discrimination against minorities. Croatian Anti-War Campaign<sup>2</sup>, through its volunteer project Pakrac (described in detail in Goran Božićević's book), encouraged the formation of MIRamiDA – Trainings in Peace-building.

The first MIRamiDA training in Pakrac was held partly according to an intuitive concept adapted to the needs of participants and to the trainers' capa-

- 1 Uzelac, Maja: MIRamiDA podsjetnik, CMS, 2002.
- 2 Croatian Anti-War Campaign (ARK) is a network of organizations and initiatives which had been active from 1992 to 1998, with the goal of expressing clear disapproval of government policy and of violence that occurred during the war. ARK actively fought for the right to conscientious objection. It produced a whole series of peace, feminist, and organizations advocating for human rights.



snije, povezivanjem s UN-ovim inicijativama postalo jasnije da se radi o konceptu izgradnje mira koji definira *spektar aktivnosti ljudskih prava, promocija političke participacije, stvaranje demokratskih državnih institucija, ekonomski i društveni razvoj koji eliminiraju političku potlačenost, ekonomsku depresiju i društvenu nejednakost i pružaju priliku za suradničko rješavanje problema i izgradnju povjerenja*. Izgradnja mira, pojam iz 1993. g., podrazumijeva *"prvenstveno akcije civila s ciljem prepoznavanja i potpore onim strukturalima društva koje će vjerojatno ojačati i učvrstiti mir i time spriječiti ponovni sukob"* te *"stvaranje novog okružja koje uključuje održivi suradnički rad na ekonomskim, društvenim, kulturnim i humanitarnim problemima čime se postignuti mir može postaviti na trajne temelje"*. Odabrane teme, kažu akteri *"bile su isprika da se sretnu ljudi i otvori komunikacija"*, da se osnaže u kritičkom mišljenju i da izraze svoj stav protiv rata i novih podjela, što je u skladu s preuzetim konceptom. Vodili su ih aktivisti/kinje za ljudska prava, mirovni aktivisti/kinje, pokoji profesor/ica.

Nakon 2 godine osnovnih treninga MIRamiDA (MIRamiDA Basic) u podijeljenim zajednicama u Bosni i Hercegovini i Hrvatskoj, stvorila se potreba da se stečena iskustva prenesu i drugim zainteresiranim građanima/kama. Na tom tragu 1997. g. započeo je s radom pilot-program Mirovnih studija u Zagrebu. Razvoj Mirovnih studija dogodio se paralelno s razvojem različitih MIRamiDA treninga iz "MIRamiDA obitelji"<sup>3</sup>: 1997. g. održan je prvi od 11 *MIRamiDA plus* naprednih treninga za aktiviste s područja bivše Jugoslavije, 1999. g. prvi od 8 treninga *Mlada MIRamiDA*, 2001. g. i 2002. g. proveden je eksperimentalni projekt *MIRamiDA partnerstvo*, a 2002. g. osnovan je i *MIRamiDA Centar* za regionalne razmjene mirovnih iskustava u Grožnjanu.

Kraj 90-tih u Hrvatskoj vrijeme je u kojem se koncept promocije i zaštite ljudskih prava tek razvija, u značajnoj mjeri je to direktna zaštita ljudskih prava odnosno fizička zaštita osoba, mahom srpske nacionalnosti kojima u Zagrebu prijete deložacija. Tada je građanski, a posebno mirovni aktivizam u svojoj ranoj fazi (*"gotovo da i nije bilo akcije na kojoj se svi ne poznajemo"*). U 90-tima, 'radioni arski' na in obrazovanja također predstavlja neku vrstu aktivizma. I njega je trebalo promovirati. On predstavlja mijenjanje poznatog i prevladavajućeg na in obrazovanja, uključivanje ljudi u proces, dijeljenje iskustava, promišljanje, propitivanje, kritičnost, poticanje osobne odgovornosti, dok se mnoge generacije s tim načinom rada tek se upoznaju.

Hrvatska je u to vrijeme iz jednog totalitarnog režima (Jugoslavija na čelu s Titom, a kasnije pod njegovim značajnim utjecajem), u ratnim uvjetima prešla u drugu vrstu totalitarizma (na čelu s Franjom Tuđmanom) koji se volio nazivati demokracijom. Aktivni građani koji su bili spremni kritički propitivati svoju zbilju i koji su se zalagali za društvenu promjenu temeljenu na nenasilju, poštivanju prava svih, a ne samo nekih, bili su marginalizirana skupina, uglavnom optuživana da želi obnoviti Jugoslaviju. U tom kontekstu razumljivo je da je i program Mirovnih studija u Zagrebu, koji nastaju u opisanom kontekstu, postavljen kao kolaž-programe nastao u želji da se s građanima podijeli do tada neobično i gotovo nepoznato aktivističko iskustvo koje ne

3 Božićević, Goran: U dosluhu i neposluhu, MIRamiDA Centar, 2010.

bilities. Only with subsequent involvements in UN-initiatives did this peace-building concept become more clearly defined, encompassing a *spectrum of human rights activities, advocating of political participation, founding of democratic government institutions, and economic and social development that would eliminate political subordination, economic depression and social inequality, while offering a chance for cooperative problem solving and building of trust*. According to a 1993 definition, peace-building primarily implies: "civic initiatives with the goal of recognizing and supporting those social structures that would stabilize and strengthen the peace and thus prevent further conflict," and "creating a new environment for collaborative efforts toward solving economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian issues, in order to provide a firm foundation for the established peace." The chosen topics, as the participants themselves say, "Were an excuse to meet people and open the communication channels," to encourage people to develop critical thinking and express their opinion against the war and further divisions, in accordance with the adopted concept. They were conducted by human rights and peace activists, and an occasional professor.

After two years of MIRamiDA Basic trainings in the divided communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, there emerged a need to share the acquired experiences with other citizens interested in the project. In 1997, this resulted in the start of a pilot-program, the Peace Studies Zagreb. Development of Peace Studies ran parallel to development of various "MIRamiDA family"<sup>3</sup> trainings: in 1997, the first out of eleven *MIRamiDA Plus* trainings took place – advanced trainings for ex-YU activists; in 1999, the first out of eight *MIRamiDA Youth* trainings; in 2001 and 2002, an experimental project *MIRamiDA Partnership*; in 2002 *MIRamiDA Center* for regional exchange of peace-building experiences was founded in Grožnjan.

During the late 1990s in Croatia, the concept of promoting and protecting human rights was only beginning to develop. This primarily included a direct protection of human rights – physical protection of people of mainly Serbian nationality, who were at the time facing eviction in Zagreb. Civic, especially peace activism was in its early stages ("There was practically no event where everybody did not know each other.") During the '90s, a 'workshop' form of education was by itself a form of activism, and it too had to be promoted. It represented a change in formal and prevailing educational system by inclusion of the people in the process, sharing of experiences, critical thinking, and the encouraging of personal responsibility. Many generations have never been familiarized with this way of work.

At that time, Croatia had transferred from one totalitarian regime (Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership, and his notable influence afterwards) to a different one (fronted by Franjo Tuđman), which was conditioned by the war, but called itself a democracy. Citizens with an active critical attitude towards their reality, who advocated social changes based on non-violence and consideration of everyone's rights, were marginalized and usually accused

3 Božićević, Goran: U dosluhu i neposluhu, MIRamiDA Centar, 2010.

želi ostati na margini društvenih zbivanja, već se usuđuje zalagati za društvenu promjenu.

Koncept obrazovanja za aktivne građane 90-tih godina 20.st. u Hrvatsku je ušao direktno iz potrebe i prakse. Za one kojima je bliža teorija, teorijska osnova za pojedina područja koja se predaju na Mirovnim studijima, nalaze se u radovima o mirovnom obrazovanju i obrazovanju za ljudska prava Betty Reardon, dok razumijevanje strukturalnog nasilja ima temelj u radovima Johana Galtunga, a želja za osnaživanjem manje moćnih i želja za nenasilnu promjenu temelji se na teorijskom i praktičnom radu Paula Freirea i Augusta Boala. Za neformalno mirovno obrazovanje u Hrvatskoj i regiji (do sada jedino i postoji kao neformalno), jednako važno kao i teorijska ishodišta, jest neposredno iskustvo i kontekst u kojem su programi i inicijative nastajale.

## MIROVNI STUDIJI

Iz iskustava MIRamiDA nastao je program Mirovnih studija u Zagrebu. Mirovni studiji u Zagrebu su neformalni program mirovnog obrazovanja za zainteresirane građanke i građane koji propituju, artikuliraju i prenose aktivistička iskustva iz područja izgradnje mira, aktivnog nenasilja, promocije i zaštite ljudskih prava. Program je zamišljen kao niz kolegija koji osvještavaju, educiraju i motiviraju građanke i građane: tematiziraju, propituju i daju vještine za doprinos nenasilnoj društvenoj promjeni. Također, program je zamišljen i kao poticaj za artikuliranje aktualnih i sakupljenih aktivističkih praksi u ratnom, poslijeratnom i tranzicijskom periodu. Program je nastao 1997. g. i u kontinuitetu se provodi do danas (2010. g.). Danas, kroz 6 modula i 20-tak kolegija, u 250 sati programa koji se odvija u dinamici akademske godine (od listopada do lipnja) sudionici/ice imaju priliku učiti i doživjeti neposredna aktivistička iskustva, usvajati znanja i vještine i osnažiti se za rad na nenasilnoj društvenoj promjeni.

Obrazovni moduli i kolegiji u godini 2009./2010. su: **Uvod u mirovne studije:** Uvod u komunikaciju i razumijevanje sukoba, Uvod u nenasilno djelovanje, Metodologija izrade završnog rada; **Ljudska prava:** Uvod u ljudska prava, Razvoj i mehanizmi zaštite ljudskih prava u RH, Međunarodni mehanizmi zaštite ljudskih prava; **Identiteti:** Etnički i građanski identiteti, Spol, rod i queer, Feministička politika antropologija; **Izgradnja mira:** Uvod u izgradnju mira, Suvremenje prošlosti, Ljudska sigurnost; **Civilno djelovanje:** Uvod u civilno društvo i tipovi civilnog djelovanja, Mediji i građani: društvena odgovornost medija i medijski aktivizam, Težina dijaloga i procesi javnih argumentacija; **Globalizacija, okoliš i održivi razvoj:** Svijet u procesu globalizacije, Zaštita okoliša i održivi razvoj. **I još:** Izgradnja mira i društvena promjena kroz male umjetničke forme: Boalov teatar potlačenih; Izrada kratkog angažiranog dokumentarnog filma.

**VODITELJI I VODITELJICE:** ANDRIJANA PARIĆ, ANA RAFFAI, OTTO RAFFAI, DUŠKA PRIBIĆ, EVI GELB, SANDRA BENIĆ, IVANA RADAČIĆ, MIRJANA MIKIĆ, ZEITOUN, DRAGO ŽUPARIĆ, ILJIĆ, AMIR HODŽIĆ, ANKICA AKARDIĆ, GORAN BOŽIĆ, EVIĆ, VESNA TERŠELIĆ, GORDAN BOSANAC,

of attempts at subverting the Republic. In this context, the Peace Studies program in Zagreb was arranged as a collage-program with the mission of sharing with the public the unusual and practically unfamiliar activist experiences, breaking out of the social margins and leading a bold campaign for social change.

The concept of education for active citizens in 1990s Croatia developed directly out of necessity and experience. Theoretical foundations for particular Peace Studies areas of teaching can be found in Betty Reardon's work on peace education and human rights education; Johan Galtung's work provides a ground for the understanding of structural violence, and aspirations towards empowering the weaker spheres and advocating non-violent change are founded on theoretical and practical work done by Paul Freire and August Boal. Immediate experience and the background in which the programs and initiatives have developed are just as important for informal peace education in Croatia and surrounding region (peace education programs have up until now remained informal) as theoretical framework.

## PEACE STUDIES

The Peace Studies program in Zagreb developed out of MIRamiDA practices. It is an informal peace education program for all citizens who question, articulate and share activist experiences of peace-building, active non-violence, promotion and protection of human rights. The program was conceived as a series of classes that raise awareness, educate and motivate citizens; they discuss, question, and develop the skills necessary for contributing to a non-violent social change. The program was also intended as an incentive to articulating both present and past activist practices during the war, post-war and transitional periods. It started in 1997, and it has been active until this day (2010). Today, it encompasses six modules and about twenty courses in the course of 250 hours of the academic year (from October until June), giving its participants the opportunity to hear about and directly engage in activism, thus gaining knowledge, skills, and encouragement to work towards a non-violent social change.

Educational modules and courses in academic year 2009/2010 are: **Introduction to peace studies:** Introduction to communication and understanding of conflict, Insight into non-violent action, Methodology of writing the final paper; **Human rights:** Introduction to human rights, Development and mechanisms of human rights protection in Croatia, International mechanisms of human rights protection; **Identities:** Ethnic and civic identities, Sex, gender and queer, Feminist political anthropology; **Peace-building:** Introduction to peace-building, Facing the past, Human security; **Civic activism:** Introduction to civic society and types of civic activism, The media and citizens: social responsibility of the media and media activism; The importance of dialogue and processes of public discussion; **Globalization, environment and sustainable development:** World in the process of globalization, Environmental protection and sustainable development. And more: Peace-building and social change through small art forms; Boal's theatre of the

SUZANA KUNAC, VESNA KESI , NATASA GOVEDI , DRAŽEN ŠIMLEŠA, TONI VIDAN, TOMISLAV TOMAŠEVI , IVA ZENZEROVI ŠLOSER.

Kroz dosadašnjih 12 godina uska veza aktivizma i edukacije, prakse i teorije djeluje kao glavna *differentia specifica* Mirovnih studija u Zagrebu, u odnosu na druge programe Mirovnih studija u svijetu. Njihov "zarazni" utjecaj po i-va na toj kombinaciji. Zbog te veze, Mirovni studiji u Zagrebu prepoznati su kao neka vrsta inkubatora za aktivizam i nenasilno djelovanje. Neposrednost i iskustvo voditelja motiviralo je više desetaka pojedinaca i pojedinki da se uklju e u rad na društvenoj promjeni. Uz Centar za mirovne studije profesionalno je vezano 15-tak bivših sudionika/ica ili kao vanjskih suradnika, a gotovo da i nema zagovara ke organizacije u Zagrebu u kojoj netko nije prošao program Mirovnih studija ili neku od MIRamiDA ili se nakon njih uklju io u neki vid aktivizma ili rada na društvenoj promjeni.

Mirovni studiji imaju solidnu evaluaciju od strane sudionika i sudionica programa. Konstanta te dobre evaluacije u 12 godina rada jesu voditelji. Voditelji na Mirovnim studijima, ali i u drugim vrijednosno utemeljenim edukacijama CMS-a su aktivisti i aktivistkinje, kao i oni pojedinci koji konstruktivno, ali kritički analiziraju aktualnu društvenu stvarnost.

Vanjska evaluacija Mirovnih studija<sup>4</sup>: *"Program neformalnog obrazovanja Mirovnih studija (MS) u potpunosti je u skladu sa svjetskim trendovima, obzirom na širinu područja koje zahvaća – od izgradnje mira, preko ljudskih prava, globalizacije i okoliša sve do feminizma i rodnih studija. Među drugim oblicima neformalnog obrazovanja u regiji ističe se otvorenosću za različite profile polaznika/ca – prema dobi, socijalnom i obrazovnom statusu i zanimanjima, a jedinstven je i primjer sustavnog uključivanja veterana u zadnjih pet generacija. Tri su osnovne smjernice koje MS slijede u svom radu:*

- / MS nisu izolirana disciplina, već impliciraju multidisciplinarni pristup i dio su napora usmjerenih ka odgoju i obrazovanju za demokratsko građanstvo;*
- / MS nisu vrijednosno neutralni, već imaju jasno artikuliranu vrijednosnu dimenziju;*
- / MS ne odjeljuju akademska znanja od prakse, već integriraju vrijednosti sadržaja i metodologije participativnog, ravnopravnog i transformativnog učenja i djelovanja.*

*U radu se koriste metode participativnog, interaktivnog i iskustvenog učenja, a značajka koja povezuje različite kolegije je radionički tip rada uz korištenje procesne metodologije. Edukacijski program MS i praktični rad Centra za mirovne studije (CMS) pružaju priliku polaznicima da primjenjuju nova znanja i vještine u praksi. Dobar primjer je rad na promicanju prava na azil u Hrvatskoj koji se temelji na idejama i završnom radu polaznika/ca generacije 2003./4. g., koji su svojim interesom i zalaganjem dali početni impuls za oblikovanje čitavog programa koji je obuhvatio kampanju, konferenciju, okrugle stolove, niz publikacija i direktan rad s tražiteljima azila.*

<sup>4</sup> Peura a, Branka, Izvještaj o vanjskoj evaluaciji programa Mirovnih studija, 2009.

oppressed; making a short socially engaged documentary film.

**COURSE LECTURERS:** ANDRIJANA PARI , ANA RAFFAI, OTTO RAFFAI, DUŠKA PRIBI EVI GELB, SANDRA BEN I , IVANA RADA I , MIRJANA MIKI ZEITOUN, DRAGO ŽUPARI ILJI , AMIR HODŽI , ANKICA AKARDI , GORAN BOŽI EVI , VESNA TERŠELI , GORDAN BOSANAC, SUZANA KUNAC, VESNA KESI , NATASA GOVEDI , DRAŽEN ŠIMLEŠA, TONI VIDAN, TOMISLAV TOMAŠEVI , IVA ZENZEROVI ŠLOSER.

Over the last twelve years, the close relationship between activism and education, practice and theory, seems to be the main *differentia specifica* of the Peace Studies in Zagreb when compared to other peace studies programs in the world. Their 'infective' influence rests upon this combination. Because of this relationship Peace Studies in Zagreb are recognized as a sort of incubator for non-violent activism. The immediacy and experience of lecturers have motivated several dozens of individuals to engage in exertions towards social change. About fifteen former participants remain connected to the Centre for Peace Studies, both professionally and as outside consultants, and there is practically no peace related organization in Zagreb that does not employ a former participant of Peace studies or MIRamiDA trainings. Almost everybody attending these programs proceed to be active in some form of social reconstruction activity.

Peace studies are positively evaluated by its participants on regular basis. The invariable elements of this positive evaluation throughout the twelve years of its existence are the lecturers. The lecturers at Peace studies, as well as in other CPS educational programs are activists and other individuals involved in critical and constructive analyzing of contemporary social reality.

According to an external evaluation of the Peace Studies<sup>4</sup> *"The informal education program of the Peace Studies (PS) completely corresponds to global trends, considering the scope in which it operates – from peace-building, through human rights, globalization and environment, to feminism and gender studies. What sets it apart among other forms of informal education in the region is its receptiveness of different profiles of participants – based on age, social and education status and occupations. There is also a unique example of systematic inclusion of veterans in the last five generations. PS follow three basic guidelines in their work:*

- / PS are not an isolated discipline, but imply a multidisciplinary approach and are contributive to other efforts concerning education for democracy;*
- / PS are not value neutral, but have a clearly articulated system of values;*
- / PS do not separate academic knowledge from practice, but integrate the values, content and methodology of participative, equal and transformative learning and acting.*

<sup>4</sup> Peura a, Branka, Izvještaj o vanjskoj evaluaciji programa Mirovnih studija, 2009.

*Nakon završenih MS, uključenost polaznika/ca u inicijative i organizacije civilnog društva postaje trajnija, a njihova uloga i odgovornosti značajnije, što je u skladu s njihovom procjenom da sada mogu bolje surađivati s ljudima različitih interesa, identificirati pravi problem, sagledati i analizirati njegovu kompleksnost, prepoznati i mobilizirati saveznike u onome što rade; riješiti sukobe na konstruktivan način, prenositi znanja i vještine drugima te pokrenuti ili sudjelovati u inicijativama za ispravak nepravde i/ili društvene promjene. Vanjski promatrači prepoznaju polaznika/ce MS po predanosti nenasilnoj komunikaciji i inzistiranju na demokratskim procedurama odlučivanja.”*

**MIRamiDA Plus!** Od 1997. g. provode se treninzi MIRamiDA Plus! za aktiviste iz zemalja bivše Jugoslavije. Do 2002. g. održano je 11 desetodnevnih treninga za aktiviste i aktivistkinje iz zemalja bivše Jugoslavije. **MIRamiDE Plus!** su bile mjesto za refleksiju i kritiku. Trening je vodio stalni tim, a nekoliko dana su gostovali gosti-predavači. Refleksija se održavala u manjim skupinama na kraju svakog radnog dana. Stalni sastav tima, što je važna odrednica svih MIRamiDA, omogućavao je individualni pristup sudionicima/cama, prilagodbu avanje potrebama grupe. Stalni sastav temeljnog tima omogućavao je na to da “sukob ima prednost”, jer se iz direktnih, postojećih sukoba, u pažljivo facilitiranom procesu može naučiti znatno više nego kroz rad na tekstovima ili čak simuliranim situacijama.

### MLADA MIRAMIDA

Polaznice Mirovnih studija pokrenule su 1999. g. program **Mlada MIRamiDA** – treninge izgradnje mira za mlade aktivne u svojim zajednicama. Osnovni trening Mlada MIRamiDA polazi od dva temeljna, međusobno komplementarna koncepta: 1) **izgradnje pozitivnog mira**, što podrazumijeva trajne napore u izgradnji zajednica, otvaranje i održavanje konstruktivne komunikacije i suradnje među pripadnicima i predstavnicima zajednice, kao i odgovornost pojedinaca za promicanje društvene pravde i participativne demokratije; koncept uključuje promoviranje pozitivnih društvenih vrijednosti koje potiču afirmativnu i održivu promjenu u društvu; koncept se ne temelji samo na odsustvu nasilja, koncept razvija održivu kulturu nenasilja i nenasilnih društvenih ponašanja; 2) **rada sa mladima za mlade**, što podrazumijeva tzv. *youth friendly* pristup ili pristup prilagođen potrebama, jeziku i životnom stilu mladih osoba, pri čemu svaka akcija prema poticanju i uključivanju mladih u nenasilne aktivnosti i nenasilni rad u zajednici ima pozitivan utjecaj i doprinosi afirmativnoj i održivoj promjeni u društvu; koncept podrazumijeva slobodnu artikulaciju mišljenja i doprinosu svake mlade osobe na ravnopravnim osnovama i daljnji angažman u područjima najrelevantnijima za te mlade osobe i njihove zajednice; koncept podrazumijeva okupljanje mladih aktivnih u lokalnim zajednicama u želji da ih se dodatno podrži u njihovim praktičnim znanjima i vještinama nenasilja primjenjivih u transformaciji nasilnih društvenih odnosa i brojnih društvenih problema (koji su prema našem mišljenju uglavnom uzrokovani primjenom nasilnih društvenih obrazaca, odnosno primjenom zatvorene, nasilne komunikacije).

Osnovni trening izgradnje mira za mlade aktivne u lokalnim zajednicama,

Here, the attendants learn through participation, interaction and experience, while different courses are connected through their workshop form and the use of process methodology. PS educational program and CPS practice offer their participants an opportunity to apply the newly acquired knowledge and skills in practice. A good example for this is the work done on promoting the rights to asylum in Croatia which is based on ideas and the final paper of generation 2003/04 participants. Through their interest and hard work, they provided the initial impulse for the forming of the entire program which in the end encompassed a campaign, a conference, round table discussions, a series of publications and direct cooperation with those seeking the asylum. After they finished PS, the attendants become more steadily involved in the initiatives and organizations of civic societies, while their role and responsibilities increase, which corresponds to their own assessment of becoming more skilled in cooperating with people with different interests, in identifying the real problem, analyzing its complexity and recognizing and mobilizing allies in what they do: dealing with conflicts in a constructive way, sharing their knowledge and skills with others and starting, as well as participating in, initiatives for correcting injustice and/or social change. Outside observers can recognize PS participants for their commitment to non-violent communication and insisting on democratic procedures in decision making.”

### MIRAMIDA PLUS!

MIRamiDA Plus! trainings have been conducted since 1997 – for activists from the countries of former Yugoslavia. Since 2002, eleven ten-day trainings have been held for activists from the countries of former Yugoslavia. **MIRamiDA Plus!** trainings have always been a place for reflection and critique. Trainings have been held by a fixed team, and there have also been guest lecturers who stayed for several days. At the end of each work day, participants would separate into smaller groups and reflect upon it. Having the same members in a team is a very important feature of MIRamiDA, since it enables individual approach to the participants and continual assessment of and adapting to the needs of a group. The fixed team structure also allowed the application of ‘the advantages of conflict’ principle which shows that one can learn more from direct, already existent conflicts played out in a carefully facilitated process, than from analyzing texts or through simulation.

### MIRAMIDA YOUTH

In 1999, the PS attendants started MIRamiDA Youth program – peace-building trainings for youth activists. Basic MIRamiDA Youth training rests on two mutually complementing concepts: **1) Positive peace-building** which implies permanent efforts towards rebuilding communities, opening and maintaining constructive communication and cooperation among the members and representatives of a community, as well as individual responsibility for promoting social justice and participatory democracy. This concept includes endorsing all positive social values that encourage affirmative and sustainable changes in society. It is not only based on the absence of violence, but also develops a sustainable culture of non-violence and non-violent social behav-



iskustvo crpi iz drugih MIRamiDA treninga i Mirovnih studija, a koristi i inovativne pristupe specifične za rad s mladima. Vrijednosno je utemeljen, primjenjivo je puna pažnja posvećena holističkom pristupu učenja, razumijevanju i primjeni vještina i spoznaja, participativnoj metodologiji rada, izgradnji sigurnog prostora otvorenog za učenje novih znanja i vještina te razmjenu iskustava uz primjenu naučenog. Osnovne komponente treninga su: **ja - ja i ti - ja i društvo**.

Osnovni sedmodnevni trening okuplja 20-tak mladih aktivnih u svojim lokalnim zajednicama, mladih koji aktivnim promišljanjem i primjerima mijenjaju svakodnevnicu svojih okruženja u pronalaženju boljih načina sudjelovanja, kvalitetnijih modela komunikacije i boljih uvjeta života. Sudionici/e treninga su oni koji misle da je drugačiji svijet moguć i da ga oni sami mogu mijenjati. Na trening Mlada MIRamiDA dolaze da razmjene dosadašnja iskustva i naučene primjenjive tehnike, modele i nove spoznaje o primjeni aktivnog nenasilja u svakodnevnom životu. Na dosad 8 održanih osnovnih treninga Mlade MIRamiDE sudjelovalo je blizu 100 mladih osoba iz cijele Hrvatske.

Pazeći na osnovne komponente treninga (ja, ja i ti, ja i društvo), teme koje obrađujemo na treningu su sljedeće: **nenasilna komunikacija** – uvod u korištenje tehnika i vještina nenasilne komunikacije u procesima izgradnje mira u svakodnevnom životu izmeđuu pojedinaca i grupa; **timski rad i zajedničko donošenje odluka** – tema je važna za grupne procese izgradnje zajedničkih ideja i vizija uz konstruktivnu komunikaciju i odnose: radionica prepoznaje oblike timskog rada, timske uloge te kvalitetu i korisnost grupne dinamike u zajedničkim procesima donošenja odluka; s tim da je naglasak na sudionici koji praksi i ravnopravnosti u timskom radu u kojem promičemo suradnju kao doprinos izgradnji mira; **razumijevanje i transformacija sukoba** – sukobe rijetko shvaćamo kao priliku, ova radionica uči nas osvještavanju vlastitih ponašanja u sukobu i prilikama za njegovu transformaciju u konstruktivan put za održavanje dugotrajnih odnosa i procesa, posebno se bavimo vještinama transformacije sukoba; **identiteti** – ukazivanje na postojanje različitih identiteta koje svakoga od nas čine posebnim i različitim, ukazujemo na stečene i identitete izgrađene tijekom života: naglasak je na izgradnji identiteta tijekom procesa socijalizacije i formiranja naših identiteta samostalnim odlukama, a poseban osvrt dajemo području povezanosti identiteta sa sukobima i tolerancijom; **različitosti, predrasude/stereotipi i diskriminacija** – polazimo od shvaćanja da različitost znači bogatu vrijednost; tema se bavi identificiranjem porijekla predrasuda i stereotipa te razloga diskriminacije pojedinaca i društvenih grupa, obrađujemo neke od pristupa proučavanju nepravednih oblika ponašanja i djelovanja; **rod i spol** – obrađujemo pojmove spola i spolnosti te roda u odnosu na društvene stereotipe i izgradnju vlastitih spolnih i rodnih identiteta, kroz ovu temu uočavamo brojna društvena očekivanja koja često postavljaju norme nepravedne prema različitim pojedincima i grupama ljudi; **ljudska prava** – naglasak je na društvenim i institucionalnim mehanizmima zaštite ljudskih prava u izgradnji održivog mira; **moć** – radionica se bavi razumijevanjem moći u odnosu na potencijal pojedinaca i društava u procesima izgradnje održivog mira, naglasak je na prepoznavanju individualne moći te moći SA – moći suradnje s drugima;

our. **2) Working with the youth for the youth** which implies a so called *youth friendly* approach, or an approach adapted to the needs, language and lifestyles of young people, where every act towards encouragement and involvement of young people in non-violent activities and non-violent work within a community has a positive influence and contributes to an affirmative and sustainable change in society. This concept offers young people the freedom to articulate their opinions and equal opportunities to make their own contributions, as well as allowing them further engagement in processes that are most relevant to those young people and their communities. It also includes gathering of youth who are already active within their own communities and showing them support by teaching them various non-violent skills applicable in processes of transformation of violent social conflicts and numerous problems within society (most of which are, in our opinion, caused by the application of violent social patterns, or, in other words, by applying closed, violent forms of communication).

Basic peace-building trainings for youth activists draw experiences from other MIRamiDA trainings and Peace Studies, but it also utilizes various innovative approaches which are characteristically employed while working with young people. The trainings are value based, which implies that emphasis is put on holistic approach towards learning, understanding, and application of skills and knowledge, participative methodology of work, building a safe environment for gaining new knowledge and skills, sharing experiences, and knowledge utilization. The basic training components are: **me – me and you – me and society**.

Basic seven day training gathers about twenty youth activists – young people who think actively and set examples to make positive changes within their communities towards finding better ways of cooperation, models of communication and improving quality of life. The participants believe in the possibility of a different world and their own potential to change it. They come to MIRamiDA trainings to share their acquired experiences and learn various techniques, models and new means of applying active non-violence in an everyday environment. Nearly 100 young persons from all over Croatia attended the eight basic trainings that have taken place so far.

With regard to basic training components (me, me and you, me and society), the trainings are focused on the following topics: **non-violent communication** – an introduction to using skills and techniques of non-violent communication in everyday peace-building processes among groups or individuals; **teamwork and shared decision making** – special emphasis on group processes of developing ideas and visions in cooperation with each other through constructive communication and relations; this workshop recognizes the importance of various forms of team work, and the advantages of a group dynamic during shared decision making processes; the emphasis here is placed on collaboration and equality in team work, where we promote cooperation as an important factor in peace-building; **understanding and transformation of conflict** – it is rarely that we see a conflict as an opportunity; this workshop teaches us to become aware of our own behaviour during conflict,



**nasilje i nenasilno djelovanje** – naglasak ove radionice je na važnosti pri-mjene nenasilja kao životnog stila i doprinosu razvoju kulture mira i nenasilja nasuprot rastu ojoj kulturi nasilja u svim društvenim poljima; **izgradnja mira i aktivizam mladih** – naglasak je na aktivnoj ulozi mladih u razvoju zajednica kroz izgradnju društveno-pravednih odnosa. Razlikujemo metode stvaranja, održavanja i izgradnje mira te gradimo temelje održivom miru kojemu mladi doprinose. Aktivizam mladih shvaćamo kao vrijedan društveni resurs koji stvara društvenu promjenu. Kroz ovu radionicu koristimo kreativne pristupe i tehnike planiranja i organiziranja angažmana u zajednici. Pored spomenutih tema, osnovni treninzi naglašavaju i sljedeće teme/koncepte: **liderstvo, odgovornost, umrežavanje** te **politike za mlade** kao posebno područje doprinosu mladih u zajednicama i šire.

Iako je program prerastao isključivo edukacijske aktivnosti i postao spoj edukacije, aktivizma i javnog zagovaranja te se proširio i u druge organizacijske oblike i suradnikeprojekte, uloga Centra za mirovne studije u osnovi je ostala edukacijski resurs, radeći i u ovom slučaju na vrijednosnim temeljima izgradnje mira te uskoj vezi aktivizma, obrazovanja i osnaživanja mladih za prihvaćanje aktivnije uloge u svojim zajednicama. Mlada MIRamiDA (kao program CMS-a i njegov tim) započela je s radom na jačanju kapaciteta mladih za rad na pozitivnom miru 1999. godine u vrijeme kada su kapaciteti i informiranost malobrojnih udruga mladih bili slabi, a njihova međusobna suradnja, povezanost i podrška gotovo nepostojeće. Od tog razdoblja do danas tim je sudjelovao u nizu aktivnosti i postizanju pozitivnih promjena u i za sektor mladih.

### DOPRINOS MLADE MIRAMIDE IZGRADNJI MIRA

Specifi na artikulacija rada mladih sa mladima na procesima i koracima izgradnje mira poprimila je ozbiljnost kroz treninge Mlade MIRamiDE<sup>5</sup>, kao pravca neformalnog mirovnog obrazovanja koji se njeguje unutar Centra za mirovne studije. Kao dio obitelji MIRamiDA treninga, Mlada MIRamiDA polazila je od istih vrijednosti, no u drugoj obli formi i prema drugoj ciljanoj skupini, koje su se potrebe uvažavale. Deset godina prakse i razvoja koncepta treninga Mlade MIRamiDE danas nas usmjerava novim temama, novim načinima i uvjetima rada sa mladima te nas upućuje na intenzivno razvijanje koncepta formalnog mirovnog obrazovanja u cjelokupnom obrazovnom sustavu pri čemu bi neformalni programi mirovnog obrazovanja bili dodatni prostor razvijanja vještina i kulture nenasilja, a time i specifičnije artikulacije izgradnje mira u zajednicama.

Od početka našega rada, s više od deset različitih voditelja tijekom godina, vodili smo se vrijednostima koje počinjavaju na kulturi nenasilja i izgradnji transformativnih odnosa, izgradnji mira u zajednicama. Dodatna vrijednost

5 Mlada MIRamiDA naziv je tima i treninga. **Tim Mlada MIRamiDA** djeluje unutar Centra za mirovne studije. Čine ga mlade osobe s iskustvom u području obrazovanja, aktivizma i politike za mlade koje u svom radu osnažuju mlade te suraduju s mladim aktivistima i ekspertima. Svoje aktivnosti tim Mlada MIRamiDA osmišlja i koncipira samostalno, prateći potrebe u sektoru mladih te vlastita iskustva i rezultate istraživanja koja se tiču mladih. Također konzultiramo relevantne stručnjake na području mladih i edukacije. Članica smo te i suradujemo s Mrežom mladih Hrvatske u brojnim aktivnostima.

and to recognize the potential for transforming conflict into a constructive way of establishing long term relationships and processes; we especially focus on developing skills for conflict transformation; **identities** – drawing attention to the diversity of identities that make each of us special and different; we make a distinction between an innate identity and the identity that we form in the course of our lives; we place emphasis on forming an identity through the process of socialization and through autonomous decision making; we pay special attention to the relationship between identity, conflict and tolerance; **diversity, prejudice/stereotype and discrimination** – our starting point is the understanding of diversity as rich in values; this topic deals with identifying the origin of prejudice and stereotypes and causes of discrimination against individuals and social groups; we work on some of the approaches to analyzing discriminatory behaviours and practices; **gender and sex** – we study the notions of sex, sexuality, and gender in relation to social stereotypes and formation of individual sexual and gender identities; we consider numerous societal expectations that often set the norms which discriminate against different individuals and social groups; **human rights** – the stress is put on the social and institutional mechanisms of human rights protection in building sustainable peace; **power** – the workshop deals with the understanding of power in relation to the potential of individuals and societies in the processes of building sustainable peace; we recognize the power of an individual and the power of WITH – the power of working with others; **violence and non-violent practice** – this workshop stresses the importance of practicing non-violence as a lifestyle and contributing to the development of the culture of peace and non-violence, as opposed to the growing culture of violence in all areas of society; **peace-building and youth activism** – we encourage the active role of youth in community development through structuring socially just relationships; we distinguish among the methods of creating, sustaining and building of peace, and we set the groundwork for sustainable peace, to which the youth contribute; youth activism is seen as a valuable social resource that leads to social change; this workshop uses creative approaches and techniques of planning and organizing community work. Besides the topics mentioned, basic trainings are also concerned with the following notions/concepts: **leadership, responsibility, networking, and youth politics** as a special field of youth contribution within their communities, and wider.

Although its program has overgrown exclusively educational practices, combining education, activism and public advocating for peace, taking various organizational forms and collaborating on numerous projects, the role of Centre for Peace Studies remains essentially educational. Nevertheless, it still continues to work on setting foundations for peace-building, and on close relation between activism, education, and encouraging young people to take on more active roles within their communities. MIRamiDA Youth (as CPS team and program) began to work on attracting young people to become more involved in positive peace-building in 1999, when youth organizations were few, weak and poorly informed, and their collaboration, interconnectedness and mutual support virtually non-existent. From then on, MIRamiDA youth has been involved in a series of activities, achieving positive changes within and for the youth sector.

ovih treninga jest usmjerenost prema mladima različitih životnih dobi (od 18 do 30 godina) s različitim potrebama, vizijama i kapacitetima za doprinos promjenama u svojim sredinama. Težili smo informiranju i obrazovanju o temama ključnim za razumijevanje društvenih i demokratskih procesa, procesima koji su važni za izgradnju mira, kao i osnaživanju i pružanju podrške mladima u izgradnji mira i aktivnom sudjelovanju u razvitku zajednica. Posebno je važno da su pri tome mladi polaznici/e imali svoje izbore njima najrelevantnijih područja u kojima su željeli doprinijeti pozitivnim promjenama u svojoj okolini.

Sve različite aktivnosti i sadržaji bili su neobičajno važni za razvoj koncepta i sadržaja naših treninga. Pri tome vodili smo se vizijom mladih kao aktivnih, odgovornih i ravnopravnih sudionika/ca društvene promjene. Misija Mlade MIRamiDE glasi: **Mlada MIRamiDA promiče kulturu nenasilja i društvenu promjenu** povezujući obrazovanje, istraživanje i aktivizam, a u fokusu ima mlade.

#### ŠTO KAŽU NEKI OD SUDIONIKA/ICA OSNOVNOG TRENINGA:

- / Dobila sam fantastične ideje za nove radionice, produbila sam svoja znanja o ovim temama te osvijestila moju ulogu u sebi i što sve s njom mogu postići. Naučila sam nenasilno komunicirati!
- / Jako puno novih vježbi te usavršavanje pristupa participativnog učenja i kritičkog mišljenja!
- / Motivaciju za nastavak rada u udruženjima i promjenu svog kutnog svemira i spoznaju da je društvena promjena moguća, da ja imam moć!
- / Dobio sam znanja koja u mojoj praksi iskoristiti, metode, poznanstva, drugi pogled na određene stvari!
- / Osviještenost o pojedincima koji su izloženi diskriminaciji i nasilju zbog svoje različitosti; potrebno je svima dati priliku! Dobila sam želju za radom na sebi i da doprinesem razvoju društva!
- / Nova saznanja prvenstveno u području mira, identiteta, nenasilja!
- / Metoda rada (vježbe i princip jednakosti trenerica i sudionika) je bila odlična: planiram je koristiti u svom daljnjem radu. Od samog sadržaja kao najbolje ocjenjujem sljedeće teme: rod i spol te timski rad i donošenje odluka (povezano s nasiljem i nenasilnim djelovanjem) ije u vrijednosti nastaviti prakticirati!
- / Najbolje je bilo upoznavanje grupnih uloga, grupna kohezija, puno smijeha i zabave, nova znanja o medijaciji, duge rasprave!
- / Dobila sam spoznaju da imam moć te da je vrlo tanka granica kada se govori o kršenju ljudskih prava!
- / Dobila sam mnogo uvida u vlastitu netoleranciju, diskriminaciju, dosta teorijske podloge, motivaciju (ogromnu) za daljnji rad!
- / Sve teme su bile vrlo zanimljive, a posebno su mi se sviđali različiti stavovi i razilaženja u mišljenjima sudionika/ca te su mi pomogle u osvješćivanju pojedinih osobnih stavova i vrijednosti!
- / Najdragocjenije iskustvo s treninga bilo je upoznavanje mnoštva kvalitetnih ljudi i razmjena ideja kao i mogućnost za daljnju suradnju!
- / Moje najdragocjenije iskustvo je vježbanje nenasilne komunikacije, upoznavanje ljudi sa različitim stavovima te daljnje umrežavanje s mirovnim aktivistima i razmjena iskustva!

## THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIRAMIDA YOUTH TO PEACE-BUILDING

The specific articulation of 'working with the youth for the youth' through peace-building processes formed into practice through MIRamiDA Youth<sup>5</sup> trainings, an informal peace education sub-section within Centre for Peace Studies. As part of the MIRamiDA trainings family, MIRamiDA Youth embraced the same set of values, but in a different form and according to the needs of a different target group. Ten years of practicing and developing the concept of MIRamiDA Youth trainings help us turn today to new topics, ways and conditions of working with young people, directing us towards the idea of formal peace education within the official education system. The informal peace education programs would thus represent additional space for developing the culture of non-violence and required skills, articulating plans for community peace-building more specifically.

From the very beginning of our work (with over a dozen different lecturers over the years), we acted according to the values resting on the culture of non-violence, transformative relations, and peace-building within communities. Additional value of these trainings lies in their focus on young people of different ages (from 18 to 30), with different needs, visions, and abilities to bring about changes in their communities. We strove to inform and educate them on the topics key to understanding social and democratic processes, and on the processes essential to peace-building. We worked on empowering young people and encouraging them to actively participate in peace-building processes within their communities. It is of special importance that the young participants made their own choices of fields they regarded as most relevant, and within which they wanted to contribute to positive changes in their environments.

The variety of activities and contents was highly important for the development of the concept of our trainings. Our driving force was a vision of young people as active, responsible, and equal participants in a social change. **The MIRamiDA Youth mission is: MIRamiDA Youth promotes the culture of non-violence and social change, linking education, research and activism, focusing on the youth.**

#### SOME STATEMENTS OF BASIC TRAINING PARTICIPANTS:

- / I have had fantastic ideas for new workshops, I have broadened my knowledge about these topics, and I have become aware of the power within me and everything it can accomplish. I have learned to communicate non-violently!

5 MIRamiDA Youth is a name for both the team and training. The **MIRamiDA Youth Team** is active within Centre for Peace Studies. Its members are young people with experience in the areas of education, activism and youth politics. Through their work they empower young people while cooperating with other young activists and experts. The MIRamiDA Youth Team conceive and organize their own activities, paying attention to the needs within the youth sector, and using their own experiences and results of research concerning young people. We also consult relevant experts in the area of youth and education. We are a member of Croatian Youth Network and cooperate with them on numerous activities.

Tijekom posljednjih godina, promjenama u sektoru mladih, na inima organiziranja mladih i djelovanjem unutar zajednica, stvorila se specifi na potreba za edukacijom i osnaživanjem mladih za sudjelovanjem u razvoju lokalnih politika za mlade, kao integralnoj komponenti izgradnje mira i pozitivnih društvenih promjena u zajednici. Sinergijskim pristupom tima Mlade MIRamiDE i Mreže mladih Hrvatske<sup>6</sup>, osmišljen je trening za mlade aktivne u lokalnim zajednicama, pod radnim nazivom *lokalni trening Mlada MIRamiDA*.

Do sada su održana 3 lokalna treninga za 40-tak mladih osoba iz slavonske, zagreba ke i primorsko-goranske regije. Ovi treninzi teže pokrenuti procese umrežavanja mladih iz lokalnih zajednica radi poticanja ve e društvene participacije i jasnije artikulacije potreba i problema mladih koji se kre u prema održivim rješenjima u okviru službenih dokumenata lokalne politike za mlade. Pri tome važna je suradnja s predstavnicima vlasti i suradnja pri oblikovanju prioriteta lokalnih politika za mlade u razli itim zajednicama koje bi trebale uvažavati specifi nost potreba mladih.

Tijekom petodnevog lokalnog treninga Mlade MIRamiDE, obra ujemo sljede e teme: nenasilnu komunikaciju, timski rad i zajedni ko donošenje odluka, mo i aktivizam mladih u zajednici. Vidljivo je da su teme iz osnovnog treninga zadržane i da ih vidimo kao temelj za stvaranje promjena u zajednici. Pored toga, obra ujemo i specifi nije teme: **mladi u lokalnoj zajednici** – naglasak je na identificiranju specifi nih problema mladih s obzirom na specifi nost zajednica iz kojih dolaze, potrebe mladih, prilike i mogu nosti te mogu a rješenja za zadovoljenje tih potreba; **lokalna politika za mlade** – radionica predstavlja modele sudjelovanja u oblikovanju i razvoju lokalnih politika za mlade te ideal-tipski model institucionalnog okvira lokalne politike za mlade; **javno zagovaranje i civilne kampanje** – u fokusu ove radionice nalaze se javno zagovaranje, kao alat za razvoj lokalnih politika za mlade te kreativna prakti na vježba planiranja i izvedbe civilne kampanje, kao na in javnog zagovaranja; **suradnja i umrežavanje** – suradnja kao temeljni korak razvoja zajednica, proširena je s prezentacijom prednosti procesa formalnog umrežavanja mladih subjekata u lokalnim zajednicama me usobno te s drugim akterima poput jedinica regionalne i lokalne samouprave; u fokusu je proces umrežavanja, ali i pozitivni ishodi suradnje.

Razlog lokalnom pristupu jest olakšana artikulacija zajedni kih interesa kroz proces 'ostanka' u vlastitoj zajednici, za razliku od osnovnog treninga izgradnje mira koji teži 'izdvajanju' iz mjesta življenja radi odmaka i mogu nosti lakše artikulacije. Lokalnim treningom želi se, upravo suprotno, suo iti sudionike/ce sa svakodnevicom i potaknuti procese stvaranja upravo u okruženju iz kojeg dolaze. Dodatna vrijednost ovakvog pristupa je lakše organiziranje i umrežavanje, nesmetana razmjena iskustava i ideja te sli nost procesa razvoja lokalnih politika za mlade.

6 Mreža mladih Hrvatske ([www.mmh.hr](http://www.mmh.hr)) od 2002. godine djeluje kao krovna organizacija mladih u Hrvatskoj. Od 2005. godine razvija program *Razvoj lokalnih politika za mlade* kroz razli ite edukacijske, istraživa ke i javno-zagovara ke sadržaje. 2006. objavila je publikaciju 'Koraci do uspješne politike za mlade', a kroz suradnju s udrugama Doma i i Centar za mirovne studije publikacija je reizdana 2007. godine

- / So many new exercises and ways of perfecting the approach to participative learning and critical thinking!
- / I am really motivated to continue working in organizations and to change my own corner of the universe! I have realized that social change is possible and that I have the power!
- / I have gained knowledge I can use, methods, acquaintances, different perspective on certain things!
- / I have become aware of the individuals who are exposed to discrimination due to their difference: it is necessary to give everybody a chance! I have become eager to work on myself and to contribute to the development of society!
- / New insights, especially concerning peace, identity, non-violence!
- / The method of work (exercises and equality principle regarding trainers and participants) was excellent! I plan on using it in my further work. As for the content, my favourite topics were: gender and sex, and teamwork and shared decision making (connected to violence and violent and non-violent practices), which I will continue to practice!
- / The things I liked the best were learning to work as a part of the group, group cohesion, plenty of laughter, new insights on mediation, and long discussions!
- / I have become aware of my own power, and I have learned that the line is very thin when we talk about violation of human rights!
- / I have gained a better understanding of my own intolerance and discrimination, plenty of theoretical background, and strong motivation for further work!
- / All the topics were very interesting, but I primarily loved hearing different opinions and attitudes from other participants. This had helped me become more fully aware of certain attitudes of my own!
- / My fondest experiences from the training were meeting plenty of talented individuals, sharing ideas, and possibility for further collaboration!
- / The experiences that I cherish the most were practicing non-violent communication, meeting people with attitudes similar to mine, further networking with peace activists, and sharing experiences!

During the last several years, changes occurred within the youth sector, in the ways of organizing the youth, and in working within communities. There emerged a specific need to educate and empower young people to take part in the development of local youth politics, which is integral to peace-building and creating positive changes within communities. Through synergetic approach, MIRamiDA Youth and Croatian Youth Network<sup>6</sup> teams have designed a training plan for youth activists in local communities, under a working title *MIRamiDA Youth local training*.

6 Croatian Youth Network ([www.mmh.hr](http://www.mmh.hr)) has been Croatian youth head organization since 2002. Since 2005, they have been developing the *Local Youth Policy Development* program through various educational, research, and public advocacy contents. In 2006, they put out a publication "Steps Towards Successful Youth Policy", and re-issued it in 2007, through collaboration with organizations Doma i and The Center for Peace Studies.

### NEKI OD SUDIONIKA/CA LOKALNIH TRENINGA O TRENINGU:

- / Obogatile su me teme: "lokalna politika za mlade" i "aktivizam mladih u zajednici zbog primjenjivih vještine"!
- / Veliko prakti no iskustvo; sažeta, ali bitna teorija. Ponu eni sadržaji su velika vrijednost!
- / Ponu eni sadržaji su u svakom slu aju bili dosta korisni, nešto smo nau- ili, a i puno mi je jasniji na in kako procijeniti svoje snage, kako uspjeti u namjeri da neku ideju sprovedemo u praksu!
- / Uvelike mi je koristilo, jer samim na inom primjene nekih od tih metoda proširio sam vidike i obzore, na ine djelovanja!
- / Trening mi je dao jako puno, dapa e, oduševljen sam pristupom i organi zacijom samog treninga!

Za nas u Centru za mirovne studije, treninzi MIRamiDA temeljni su okvir obrazovanja i osnaživanja za mir u suradnji sa gra анима/kama. Raditi trening MIRamiDE, bila to Mlada ili neka druga, zna i biti u korak s lokalnim problemima, lokalnim potrebama, naglašavati suradnju te facilitaciju i artikulaciju. Pored toga, naglasak je na razmjeni i vjerovanju da svaki pojedinac/ka može ravnopravno pridonijeti procesu u enja, specifi nim znanjima i ISKU-STVIMA. Stoga je neizmerno važno njegovati ravnopravan pristup, pristup koji stvara sigurnost i kreativnost, pristup koji odgovara potrebama, pristup koji osnažuje.

Mlada MIRamiDA se jednako tako odlu ila za pristup koji njeguje obrazova- nje i osnaživanje za nenasilnu akciju i aktivno sudjelovanje u društvenim procesima te za prijenos iskustava i stvaranje sigurnog prostora unutar kojeg svi možemo razmijeniti i osvijestiti svoja znanja. Svaka radionica kreira se, dakle, za odre enu grupu polaznika/ica, za odre eno mjesto, odre eno vri- jeme i sa specifi nim ciljevima.

Puno pažnje posve ujemo metodama rada, koje su jednako važne kao i sam sadržaj. Štoviše, vjerujemo da prijenos niti jednog sadržaja nije relevantan ako ga ne prate odgovaraju e metode. U treninzima, punu pažnju posve ujemo cjelovitom pristupu u enju (razumijevanju i primjeni vještina i spoznaja), participativnoj metodologiji rada, izgradnji sigurnog prostora otvorenog za u enje novih znanja i vještina te razmjeni iskustava uz primjenu nau enog. U nastavku teksta, predstavljamo tzv. "MENU" Mlade MIRamiDE.

### KAKO RADIMO?

**Radioničarski** - sjedimo u krugu kako bi mogli/e biti ravnopravni/e. Me u nama nema stolova i klupa koji bi nam bili prepreka u komunikaciji. Na po etku razbistrimo što o ekujemo od zajedni kog vremena i dogovorimo se oko zajedni kog rada - što nam je važno da bi vrijeme koje provodimo zajedno bilo ugodnije i produktivnije. Radimo u plenumu, malim grupama, parovima i individualno. Metode koje koristimo u radu motiviraju sudionike/ ce da misle, osje aju i govore te kao rezultat toga da rade za svoje vlastite potrebe.

So far, three local trainings have taken place, with over 40 young attendants from Slavonia, Zagreb, and primorsko-goranska region. These trainings aim to encourage networking among youth from local communities, in order to heighten the level of social participation and come to a clear articulation of needs and issues concerning young people, moving towards sustainable solutions within the framework of official local youth policy. It is important here to cooperate with government representatives, and to take into account the specific needs of young people while forming the priorities of local youth policies.

In the course of a five-day MIRamiDA Youth local training, we focus on the following topics: non-violent communication, teamwork and shared decision making, power, and youth activism in the community. These are all the topics from our basic training program, for we see them as fundamental to making changes within the society. Besides these, we deal with more specific topics: **the youth in a local community** – the emphasis is placed on identifying specific youth problems, considering local particularities, youth needs, opportunities, and possible solutions to those needs; **local youth politics** – this workshop introduces various models of participation in forming and developing local youth politics, and proposes an ideal-type model of an institutional framework for local youth politics; **public advocating and civic initiatives** – this workshop focuses on public advocating as a means of developing local youth politics, and serves as a creative exercise in planning and realizing civic initiatives; **cooperation and networking** – as a basic step towards the development of communities, the process of cooperation has been broadened through networking among young people in local communities and their further collaboration with other figures, such as regional and local self-governments. We focus on the process of networking, but also on a positive outcome of these collaborations.

The reason for this local approach is easier articulation of common interests through the process of 'staying' in one's own community, unlike the basic peace-building training which sees 'removal' from one's own surroundings as a means of distancing for the sake of easier articulation. Through local trainings we try to achieve the opposite, to face the participants with everyday life and encourage them to become creative and productive in their own surroundings. Another positive side of this approach is that it facilitates the processes of organization and networking, allows uninterrupted sharing of experiences and ideas and makes the development of local youth politics more similar.

### SOME STATEMENTS OF LOCAL TRAINING PARTICIPANTS:

- / The topics discussed, local youth politics, youth community activism and applicable skills that I have learned have made me richer!
- / Great practical experience; concise but important theory. The contents offered possess a great value!
- / All the contents have been quite useful, we have learned a few things, and I find it much easier to estimate my own strength and to successfully realize given ideas!



**Interaktivno** - kao poticaje za diskusiju koristimo - vježbe. Interakciju koncentriramo oko teme. U ovakvom načinu rada važna je dobrovoljnost i aktivnost svih, a kreativnost je svakako poželjna. Sama participativna metoda rada upućuje poruku da si upravo TI izvor na koje društvo može računati u procesu društvene promjene, radionica nudi mjesto izražavanja, mogućnosti sudjelovanja i odlučivanja.

**Iskustveno** - koristimo teme iz vlastitog života, radimo na primjerima koji su nam aktualni, životni i kompleksni. Školski primjeri i ideal-tipovi su često udaljeni od realnosti. Razumijevanje pojava u svojoj kompleksnosti važno je ako ih želimo transformirati. Ova metoda pokazuje da je važno raditi s ljudima i ZA njih, a ne samo za njih. Ime se ističe proaktivni pristup, radije nego pasivno primanje informacija. Kroz ovu vrstu edukacije želimo ohrabriti sudionike/ce da preuzmu kontrolu za svoje akcije i da se na taj način osnaže.

**Grupa** - grupni rad je odličan način za bolje razumijevanje vlastitog iskustva, znanja, vještina i stavova. Na ovaj način grupni rad je mehanizam koji osigurava da sve što jedna osoba nauči mora imati društveni utjecaj izvan onog osobnog.

**Evaluacija rada** - na (obo/višestranjoj) komunikaciji pokriva cijeli naš rad. Važna nam je povratna informacija kako bismo poboljšali i bolje prilagodili svoj rad. O zajednici koju provedenom vremenu dijelimo dojmove, analiziramo dobre i loše trenutke i zajedno zaokružujemo cjelinu.

Evaluacija rada iznimno je važna komponenta našega rada koja nas upućuje u kojim područjima i kako napredovati, razvijati metodologiju i sadržaj, odgovarati na potrebe, dodatno se obrazovati i osnaživati te razvijati nove pristupe iskustvenom učenju. 2009. godine Centar za mir i nenasilje iz Osijeka<sup>7</sup> izradio je vanjsku evaluaciju osnovnih treninga izgradnje mira Mlade MIRamiDA, koja je pored procjene kvalitete samoga treninga, imala i specifičan cilj dobivanja smjernica za oblikovanje prijedloga kurikuluma neformalnog mirovnog obrazovanja. Slijedi nekoliko isjeaka iz teksta izvješća o vanjske evaluacije:

- / S obzirom na svrhu treninga - jačanje vrijednosnog sustava utemeljenog na izgradnji mira, očekivanja sudionika u potpunosti su ispunjena. Mladi sudionici osmog po redu treninga Mlada MIRamiDA, složili su se da program treninga koji su pohađali, sadržajem i metodologijom rada osigurava prostor za upoznavanje osobnih i društvenih mogućnosti angažmana u zajednici.
  - / Raznolikost tema zastupljenih u programu omogućava upoznavanje različitih područja rada i prilika za društveno djelovanje. Ona, također potiče na analizu društvenih prilika te na sagledavanje utjecaja pojedinca i grupe na promjenu u zajednici. Sudionici posebno naglašavaju značaj treninga za osobni rast i razvoj, upoznavanje osobnih potencijala i
- 7 Izvješće o vanjske evaluacije: 'Mlada MIRamiDA – 8. nacionalni trening izgradnje mira za mlade aktivne u lokalnim zajednicama'; Nikoleta Poljak i Sonja Kersten

- / This training has been very useful, for by applying some of these methods, I have broadened my perspective and the way of doing things!
- / I have benefited a lot from this training; moreover, I am enraptured by its approach and organization!

For us in the Centre for Peace Studies, MIRamiDA trainings represent a basic framework for peace education and for the strengthening of peace in cooperation with the citizens. To participate in MIRamiDA training, no matter which one, means to keep step with current local issues, and to emphasize collaboration, facilitation and articulation. Besides that, we focus on exchange, a belief that every individual can equally contribute to the learning process – by sharing particular knowledge and EXPERIENCES. Approach based on equality is therefore essential: a method that ensures a safe and creative working atmosphere; a method that suits particular needs; a method that empowers.

MIRamiDA Youth uses that very same approach: promoting education, encouraging non-violent action and active participation in social processes, sharing experiences and creating a safe working environment. Each workshop is therefore designed for a specific group of participants, a specific location, a particular time, and with particular goals.

Considerable attention has been devoted to the methods of work, which are just as important as the content itself. More so, we believe that transference of certain content becomes irrelevant when not transferred by appropriate methods. We focus on a holistic approach towards learning (understanding and application of skills and knowledge), participative methodology of work, building a safe environment for gaining new knowledge and skills, sharing experiences, and knowledge utilization. Hereafter, we give a presentation of a so called MIRamiDA Youth MENU.

## THE WAY WE OPERATE

**Workshops** – We sit in a circle in order to feel more equal. There are no tables or chairs between us to hinder our communication. At the very beginning we clarify our expectations of the time spent together, and we arrange our mutual work schedule – what we feel would make the time we spend together more pleasant and productive. We work in plenary sessions, smaller groups, in pairs, and individually. The methods we use motivate our participants to think, feel, speak, and, consequentially, work towards resolving their needs.

**Interaction** – in order to stimulate discussion, we use – exercises. Interaction revolves around a particular topic. This method relies on every participant's voluntary activity, and any creative outburst is more than welcome. The participative method of work eventually shapes individuals who can be relied upon in a process of social change. The workshop provides a place to express oneself, to exercise the powers of participating and reaching decisions.



ograničenja te mogu nost preispitivanja stavova i vrijednosti vezanih za teme otvorene na treningu.

- / U odnosu na korisnost dobivenih znanja i vještina, najviše sudionika isti e nenasilnu komunikaciju, razumijevanje i transformaciju sukoba te organiziranje nenasilnih akcija u zajednici.
- / S obzirom na trenutno podru je interesa te ono kojim se žele baviti u budu nosti, nekoliko je pojedinaca istaklo sljede e teme: identitet, rod i spol te ljudska prava.
- / Kada se razgovara o dobrim stranama treninga, ono u emu se svi slažu je metodologija rada odnosno na in rada u kojem svi imaju jednaku mogu nost sudjelovanja, uz potpuno uvažavanje. Najve a specifi nost treninga je i njegova najve a vrijednost. Ovaj na in rada, isti u sudionici, otvara priliku svim lanovima grupe da jasno iskažu svoje stavove i mišljenja o razli itim temama bez bojazni od mogu ih negativnih posljedica (napada, izolacije, osu ivanja i sl.).
- / Na in vo enja grupe te znanje i iskustvo trenera, u velikoj su mjeri pridonijeli stvaranju sigurnog prostora za u enje i razmjenu. Gledaju i kako treneri vode proces te njihov odnos prema pojedincu i grupi, sudionici su dobili priliku vidjeti toleranciju, razumijevanje i uvažavanje u praksi. Proces u enja, zasnovan na participativnoj metodologiji, vrlo je važan element prepoznavanja i usvajanja vrijednosti mirovnog obrazovanja.

Grupa sastavljena od mladih iz cijele Hrvatske, aktivnih u razli itim organizacijama i zainteresiranih za razli ite teme, omogu ila je vrlo aktivnu razmjenu znanja i iskustava. Premda timski rad kao tema nije posebno naglašavan od strane sudionika, komunikacija i kontakti me u njima, razvijeni tijekom formalnog i neformalnog dijela treninga, ukazuju na me usobno povezivanje i stvaranje solidnih temelja za njihovu me usobnu razmjenu i mogu e razli ite oblike suradnje i umrežavanja u budu nosti.

Sami nalazi vanjske evaluacije, korisni su kao **preporuke** za razvoj neformalnih tipova mirovnih edukacijskih programa korisnih i za zemlje Europske unije.

## PREPORUKE

### 1. MIROVNO OBRAZOVANJE JEDNO JE OD VAŽNIH ELEMENATA OSVJEŠTAVANJA MLADIH O VAŽNOSTI I POTREBI NJIHOVOG AKTIVNOG I ODGOVORNOG DJELOVANJA U DRUŠTVU.

Mirovno obrazovanje zasnovano na participativnoj metodologiji, predstavlja jedan od važnih elemenata osvještavanja mladih o važnosti i potrebi njihovog aktivnog i odgovornog djelovanja u društvu. Koncept mirovnog obrazovanja osigurava znanja, vještine, stavove kao i razvoj ponašanja za život u miru sa samim sobom i drugima. Ono omogu ava osvještavanje pojedinca na osobnoj i društvenoj razini, otvara priliku za upoznavanje vlastitih sposobnosti i ograni enja te, istovremeno omogu ava razmatranje odgovornosti za odnos s drugima i poti e mlade na angažman u rješavanju problema u društvu. Na taj na in pridonosi ja anju kapaciteta za razvoj demokratskog društva zasnovanog na odgovornosti, solidarnosti, toleranciji i aktivnom sudjelovanju svih gra ana. Mirovno obrazovanje vidimo kao nadogradnju for-

**Experience** – we use topics from our daily lives; the examples we use are contemporary, complex, everyday occurrences. Textbook examples and ideal types are usually far removed from reality. Understanding the complexities of the issues we are dealing with is essential if we intend to transform them. This method demonstrates the importance of working WITH the people and FOR them, advocating a pro-active approach, rather than passive receiving of information. Through this type of education we wish to encourage our participants to take charge and empower themselves.

**Group work** – an excellent way of gaining better understanding of our own experience, knowledge, skills and attitudes. Group work functions as a mechanism that ensures that individual actions have their impact on social, and not just personal realm.

**Work evaluation** – communication is the groundwork of our entire organization. Feedback is very important, so we can improve and re-adapt our work. We share our impressions of the time we have spent together, analyze the good and the bad moments, and revalue the whole together. Work evaluation is an extremely important component of our work: it instructs us where and how to progress, on the ways of developing methodology and content, of meeting the participants' needs, to constantly reacquaint ourselves with new teachings, and to strengthen and develop new approaches to learning. In 2009, The Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights from Osijek<sup>7</sup> conducted an external evaluation of MIRamiDA Youth basic peace-building training. Alongside assessing the quality of the training, a particular agenda behind this evaluation was to offer guidelines for developing a proposal for the informal peace education curriculum. Here are several excerpts from the external evaluation report:

- / Concerning the purpose of the training, promoting a value system based on peace-building, the participants' expectations have been met completely. The young participants of the 8<sup>th</sup> MIRamiDA Youth training agreed that the training, both in its content and work methodology, provides a space for gaining insight into personal and social abilities for community activism.
- / The diversity of topics contained in the program introduces the participants to various areas of activity and offers them opportunities for social activism. It also encourages them to analyze social circumstances and the impact of the individual and the group on the changes in the community. The participants regularly mention the significance of the training for their personal growth and development. It allows them to discover their own potential and limitations, as well as to question their attitudes and values concerning the topics discussed during training.
- / In reference to the usefulness of the acquired knowledge and skills, most of the participants point out non-violent communication, understanding and transformation of conflict, and organizing non-violent actions in the community.
- / Concerning their current field of interest and plans for the future, several individuals mentioned the topics of identity, human rights, and gender and sex.

<sup>7</sup> External evaluation report, 'Mlada MIRamiDA – 8. nacionalni trening izgradnje mira za mlade aktivne u lokalnim zajednicama,' by Nikoleta Poljak i Sonja Kersten

malnih obrazovnih programa u enja o/za mir i nenasilje zbog specifi nog prostora namijenjenog iskustvenom u enju i artikulaciji potreba.

## 2. NEFORMALNI PROGRAMI MIROVNOG OBRAZOVANJA ZA MLADE OSIGURAVAJU STJECANJE UVIDA O RAZLI ITIM PODRU JIMA IZGRADNJE MIRA TE POVE AVAJU SENZIBILIZACIJU MLADIH ZA PREPOZNAVANJE POTREBA I PROBLEMA TE PRILIKA ZA DJELOVANJE POJEDINCA U ZAJEDNICI.

Zastupljenost razli itih tema u programu mirovnog obrazovanja omogu uje mladima saznanje o razli itim podru jima izgradnje mira te u skladu s tim i mogu nost uo avanja problema na razli itim razinama u društvu. Ujedno, raznovrsnost sadržaja je prilika za prepoznavanje podru ja za koje mladi imaju najviše interesa tj. ono podru je u kojem bi osobno voljeli pridonijeti promjeni.

## 3. PROGRAMI MIROVNOG NEFORMALNOG OBRAZOVANJA PROMOVIRAJU I JA AJU VRIJEDNOSTI NEOPHODNE ZA RAZVOJ ODGOVORNOG I AKTIVNOG GRA ANINA DRUŠTVA KOJE PO IVA NA PARTICIPATIVNOJ DEMOKRACIJI.

Kroz neformalne forme obrazovanja za izgradnju mira, otvaraju se brojna pitanja o vrijednostima mirovnog obrazovanja što utje e na preispitivanje vlastitog sustava vrijednosti, potiče mijenjanje i razvoj osobnih stavova te povezivanje vrijednosti sa životom. Poticanje na prakticiranje vrijednosti mirovnog obrazovanja u svakodnevnom životu pridonosi izgradnji društva aktivnih i odgovornih gra ana koji njeguju kulturu nenasilja.

## 4. PARTICIPATIVNA MIROVNA METODOLOGIJA NAJVAŽNIJA JE ODLIKA NEFORMALNIH MIROVNIH OBRAZOVNIH PROGRAMA. METODOLOGIJA U VELIKOJ MJERI PRIDONOSI USVAJANJU VRIJEDNOSTI MIROVNOG OBRAZOVANJA.

Metodologija rada zasnovana na interaktivnom pristupu omogu ava aktivno sudjelovanje svih sudionika. Me utim, najvažnija specifi nost primijenjene metodologije je prostor u kojem se njeguju suradnja, uvažavanje, tolerancija, pravo na iznošenje vlastitog mišljenja i dijalog. Metodologija potiče razgovor o vrijednostima, ali omogu ava i njihovu primjenu kroz prakti ne vježbe. Na taj na in, omogu eno je iskustveno u enje te se o ekuju trajnije promjene kod sudionika.

## 5. NOSITELJI NEFORMALNIH PROGRAMA MIROVNOG OBRAZOVANJA TREBAJU BITI I ORGANIZACIJE MLADIH. Njeguju i ovaj pristup osnažujemo mlade osobe na aktivnu izgradnju mira u zajednicama, sudjelovanje u iskustvenim edukacijskim procesima te razvijamo koncept *youth friendly* pristupa, odnosno pristupa mladih za mlade.

6. Da bi ovi procesi bili neposredni, u inkoviti i osnažuju i važno je da dolaze "iz prve ruke". VAŽNO JE POTICATI AKTIVISTE I AKTIVISTKINJE DA ARTIKULIRAJU I ANALIZIRAJU SVOJE ISKUSTVO, ulagati u njihovu edukaciju, omogu iti istraživanja i poticati na povezivanje aktivizma i edukacije u podru ju odgoja i obrazovanja za ljudska prava i demokratsko gra anstvo.

- / When discussing the good sides of the training, everybody agrees that the methodology of work is one of them. The most special characteristic of the training and at the same time its greatest value, is that everybody is equally accepted and have equal chances for participation. As they themselves point out, this enables all members of the group to clearly state their attitudes and opinions on various topics without the fear of possible backlash (attack, isolation, condemnation, etc.).
- / The trainers' knowledge, experience and ways of managing the groups largely contributed to creating a safe environment for learning and sharing. By observing their trainers, and their relationship toward the individual and the group, the participants were given an opportunity to see tolerance, understanding and acceptance in practice. The process of learning, based on participative methodology, is an essential part of recognizing and accepting the values of peace education.
- / Each group, containing young people from throughout the country, active in different organizations and interested in various topics, provided an active exchange of knowledge and experience. Although none of the participants singled out team-work as a topic, the communication and mutual contacts developed during both formal and informal parts of the training indicate mutual bonding and the creation of solid foundations for potential cooperation and networking in the future.

The results of the external evaluation can be very useful as a **recommendation** for the development of informal peace education programs for the countries of the European Union.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### 1. PEACE EDUCATION IS A VERY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN RAISING YOUNG PEOPLE'S AWARENESS CONCERNING THE IMPORTANCE AND THE NEED FOR THEIR ACTIVE AND RESPONSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIETY.

Peace education based on participative methodology represents a very important element in raising young people's awareness concerning the importance and the need for their active and responsible involvement in society. The concept of peace education ensures the knowledge, skills, and attitudes and behaviour necessary for living in peace with oneself and with others. It raises awareness of the individual in both personal and social levels. It introduces individuals to their own potentials and limitations, and at the same time it encourages the youth to take on an active role in resolving problems within society. In this way it contributes to the development of a democratic society based on responsibility, solidarity, tolerance and active participation of all citizens. We see peace-building as an extension of formal education programs, because of the specific space it gives to experiential learning and to the articulation of needs.

### 2. INFORMAL PEACE EDUCATION PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH ENSURE THE INSIGHT INTO VARIOUS AREAS OF PEACE-BUILDING AND INCREASE YOUTH SENSIBILITY TO RECOGNIZING VARIOUS PROBLEMS AND NEEDS, BUT ALSO OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE WITHIN A

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**COMMUNITY.**

The variety of topics included in peace education program enables young people to gain insight into various areas of peace-building and, with it, the ability to spot problems at different levels of society. Even more, the diversity of content allows them to find their own field of interest, where they would personally like to help bring change.

**3. INFORMAL PEACE EDUCATION PROGRAMS PROMOTE AND STRENGTHEN THE VALUES NECESSARY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RESPONSIBLE AND ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE SOCIETY RESTING ON PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY.**

Informal modes of peace-building education open numerous questions about values of peace education. This triggers the questioning of one's own system of values, thus generating change and development of one's personal attitudes, and linking value to life. Encouraging people to practice the values of peace education in everyday life contributes to the building of the society of active and responsible citizens who treasure the culture of non-violence.

**4. PARTICIPATIVE PEACE METHODOLOGY IS THE MOST IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTIC OF INFORMAL PEACE EDUCATION PROGRAMS. THIS METHODOLOGY GREATLY CONTRIBUTES TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF PEACE EDUCATION VALUES.**

The methodology of work based on interactive approach enables the active participation of all the participants. However, the most important characteristic of the applied methodology is space for nurturing cooperation, acceptance, tolerance, the right to express one's opinions, and dialogue. The methodology encourages discussions of these values, but also enables their application through practical exercises. This is how experiential learning is made possible, creating permanent changes in the participants.

**5. YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD ALSO BE THE BEARERS OF INFORMAL PEACE EDUCATION PROGRAMS.**

By nurturing this approach we empower young people for active peace-building within their communities, and for their participation in experiential education processes, and we develop the concept of youth friendly approach.

6. For these processes to be immediate, efficient and empowering, it is important that they are delivered "first hand". **IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENCOURAGE ACTIVISTS TO ARTICULATE AND ANALYZE THEIR EXPERIENCES**, to invest in their education, to enable research and establish a tight relation between activism and education in the areas of human rights and civil democracy.



### 3

## TRANSKRIPTI / TRANSCRIPTS

## PRVI OKRUGLI STOL: "ISKUSTVA RATNE PROŠLOSTI I NAUČENE LEKCIJE: MIRNA REINTEGRACIJA"

ZAGREB,  
27. SIJEČNJA 2010.

PRVI OKRUGLI STOL ODRŽAN JE NAKON OBILJEŽAVANJA DVANAESTE GODIŠNJICE MIRNE REINTEGRACIJE ISTOČNE SLAVONIJE I PODUNAVLJA KOJOM JE REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA OSTVARILA CIVILNU VLAST NAD CJELOKUPNIM DRŽAVNIM TERITORIJEM BEZ IJEDNOG ISPALJENOG METKA, BEZ LJUDSKIH ŽRTAVA I TEŽIH POVREDA HUMANITARNOG PRAVA. SLUŽBENIM OBILJEŽAVANJEM I VELIKIM ANJEM ISKLJUČIVO VOJNIH AKCIJA, POPUT "BLJESKA" I "OLUJE", DRŽAVNE INSTITUCIJE NEPRAVEDNO MARGINALIZIRAJU I IGNORIRAJU MIROVNE INICIJATIVE OD KOJIH JE JEDNA BILA I MIRNA REINTEGRACIJA.

UVODNI ZAKLJUCI I UVODNI ZAKLJUCI U RASPRAVI BILI SU: **KRUNO KADROV**, ASISTENT NA ODSJEKU ZA SOCIOLOGIJU S FILOZOFSKOG FAKULTETA SVEUČILIŠTA U ZAGREBU; **KATARINA KRUHONJA** IZ CENTRA ZA MIR, NENASILJE I LJUDSKA PRAVA IZ OSIJEKA; **GORDANA STOJANOVIĆ**, DOBITNICA PAX CHRISTI NAGRADE ZA MIR, PRAVDU I NENASILJE I **SVETOZAR SARKANJAC**, NOVINAR. OVDJE DONOSIMO DIJELOVE RASPRAVE.

### MILAN IVANOVIĆ:

Ja sam kao student pokrenuo nekakve novine u Osijeku i jedan moj kolega, onda student filozofije, završio je jedan tekst s misli koju citiram već više od 30 godina. Ona glasi: djelatne šanse htijenja su u njegovoj samoniklosti. Mislim da je to odlična misao kojoj upravo svjedočim i ova mirna reintegracija jer da nije bilo ovih mirovnih aktivnosti, da nije bilo ovih samoniklih stvari, vjerojatno to ne bi završilo kako je uspješno završilo.

...

Dakle, [u ratu na ovim prostorima] postoje tri etape. Jedna etapa je vrijeme u doba rata, negdje do '94., '95., druga etapa je reintegracija, od '95. do '99. i treća etapa je post-konfliktno doba, post-ratno doba i procesi tranzicije u kojima također ima značajnih aktivnosti i mislim da bi međunarodna zajednica na primjeru Hrvatske, a ovako strukturirano, mogla dobiti korisna iskustva i modele za druga konfliktna žarišta u svijetu. Mislim da su važne te djelatne šanse htijenja. Evo jedan primjer iz mog iskustva. U ratnom Osijeku počinje se primitivno prozivanje ljudi, pa onda, recimo, direktor nekakve tvrtke kaže: "Ja branim Osijek, a gdje je direktor, pa sad ime i prezime, koji je pobjegao u

## THE FIRST ROUND TABLE: "WARTIME EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED: PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION"

JANUARY 27TH, 2010,  
ZAGREB

THE FIRST ROUND TABLE WAS HELD IN HONOR OF THE TWELFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION OF EASTERN SLAVONIA AND THE DANUBE REGION, THROUGH WHICH CROATIA ESTABLISHED PEACEFUL CONTROL OVER THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE STATE, WITHOUT FIRING A SINGLE BULLET, WITH NO CASUALTIES OR SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW. BY COMMEMORATING AND CELEBRATING ONLY THE MILITARY ACTIONS SUCH AS "BLJESAK" AND "OLUJA", THE STATE INSTITUTIONS ARE UNJUSTLY MARGINALIZING AND IGNORING PEACE INITIATIVES, ONE OF WHICH WAS THE PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION.

THE DISCUSSION WAS INTRODUCED BY **KRUNO KADROV**, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE FACULTY OF THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN ZAGREB; **KATARINA KRUHONJA** FROM THE CENTER FOR PEACE, NON-VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN OSIJEK; **GORDANA STOJANOVIĆ**, THE RECIPIENT OF THE PAX CHRISTI AWARD FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND NON-VIOLENCE, AND **SVETOZAR SARKANJAC**, A JOURNALIST. THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION.

### MILAN IVANOVIĆ:

When I was a student, I founded a newspaper in Osijek, and one of my colleagues, who was a philosophy student at the time, concluded one of his articles with a thought I have been quoting for the past 30-odd years: "The active potential of willingness lies within its spontaneity." I believe that this is a fabulous thought, the veracity of which has been proven through this peaceful reintegration, because, had it not been for these peace-making activities, these spontaneous actions, the whole process wouldn't have ended the way it did.

...

[During the war in the region,] there have been three stages. The first stage was war-time, which lasted until '94 or '95; the second stage was reintegration, from '95 to '99. The third stage was the post-conflict period, the post-war age along with the transitional processes which consisted of many im-



Zagreb?", onda drugi dan u Glasu Slavonije: "Ja sam Ahmet Ahmeti, buregdžija, a gdje je onaj drugi buregdžija koji je pobjegao iz Osijeka?". Pošlo je takvo prozivanje, atmosfera proganjanja i tako dalje.

...

Ja sam novinar i napisao sam jedan tekst s naslovom "Kako će Os(ij)ek postati Os(ij)eka" upravo napadaju i taj način razmišljanja i primitivno prozivanje i stvaranje nekakvog osuđivanja. Tekst nije bio objavljen dva-tri mjeseca, nego tek 19. siječnja '92., kad je tadašnji zapovjednik Osijeka, Branimir Glavaš, smijenio glavnog urednika Glasa Slavonije. On [urednik] je tu noć uređivao zadnji subotnji broj Glasa Slavonije i onda je pustio taj tekst ... i moram reći da je tadašnji gradonačelnik Kramarić isto nešto na tu temu govorio, međutim, nakon tog mog teksta prestaju prozivanja, prestaje primitivno stvaranje nekakve zaoštrene situacije u već ratnom Osijeku. Druga stvar koja mislim da je važna za neke buduće Afganistane i druga konfliktna područja ... je da nisam kao Srbin koji je ostao u Osijeku i bio u Pakracu nakon Bljeska bio prokazivan kao medvjed. Ali primjer je bio, evo jednog Srbina koji je ostao u Osijeku, ustaše ga nisu ubile i tako dalje. To je dosta utjecalo na onaj živalj tamo koji je bio izmanipuliran sa svim mogućim dezinformacijama i predrasudama.

...

Iz procesa reintegracije izdvojio bih također jedan bitan model. Napravili smo projekt "Informatika bez granica", gdje smo u području UNTAES-a, u nekim selima držali radionice. Djeca nisu vidjela kompjuter u ono vrijeme. Inače, u slavonskim selima, pogotovo srpskim, žena je kuhinja, kuća, štala, krava, muzeš mlijeko. I sada, pravimo te radionice, donosimo kompjutere, ta predavanja drže mlade studentice, mlade žene, Hrvatice! I sad je to dvostruki šok. Civilizacijski, prvo, tu su neki kompjuteri, prvi put ih vide, imaju priliku da ih pipnu, a onda još i žene drže ta predavanja, u tom nekakvom ratnom dobu, velika stvar je bila moja edukacija. Znači, ja sam bio nekakav simpatizer Centra za mir, pa kasnije član, puno stvari sam morao u biti od kolega iz Centra za mir i ta edukacija mene i mojih kolega koji su bili pravnici, ekonomisti je strašno važna da bih ja onda mogao djelovati u situacijama mirovnjaci, ne samo stručno, već i s empatijom, to je vrlo važno. U ovom postkonfliktnom razdoblju od tih bitnih stvari je edukacija, mobilizacija ljudi, i transfer naših iskustava u susjedna konfliktna područja. Tako da sam bio na Kosovu, u Srbiji i u Bosni. Mislim da je to vrlo važno, da iskustva koja smo imali, naravno s vremenskim odmakom i nekakvom analizom, da onda "transferiramo" i dosta smo dobrih stvari napravili s transferom toga znanja, mada se to svakako moglo napraviti još bolje da je bilo studioznije, da je bilo strategijski osviješteno.

Ne bih sada dužio, bit će još prilike i da se o nekim drugim stvarima razgovara, ali bih zaključio da imamo veliko iskustvo u razrješavanju konflikata i u procesima stabiliziranja post-konfliktnih društava i to treba iskoristiti. I zato predlažem da se pokrene jedna edicija knjiga, nekakav "samizdat" što bi rekli Rusi. Svatko od nas neka pravi te svoje knjižice. Treba ograničiti na nekakvih stotinjak kartica na B5 formatu i neka se osiguraju novci za lektoriranje, recenziranje, tiskanje. Latinska izreka kaže *fama volant, scripta manet*, znači glasine kruže, ali zapisano ostaje. Mislim da je to strašno važno.

...

important activities, and I believe that the international community could use the example of Croatia to gain useful insights and models for other conflict hotspots throughout the world. I think the abovementioned active potential of willingness is important here. The following is an example from my personal experience. During the wartime in Osijek, recriminations abounded, so the director of a company would say: "I'm here, defending Osijek, but where is the other director so-and-so, who has run away to Zagreb?". The following day the Glas Slavonije newspaper would have a headline such as "I am Ahmet Ahmeti, a baker: where are the other bakers now, those that have run away from Osijek?" A series of such recriminations and persecutions ensued.

...

I am a journalist, and I have written a text entitled "Kako će Os(ij)ek postati Os(ij)eka", which tried to discourage this way of thinking and primitive recriminations and hatemongering. The text was not published recently, but on the 19<sup>th</sup> January 1992, when the war commander in Osijek, Branimir Glavaš, relieved the editor-in-chief of the Glas Slavonije newspaper. The editor was editing the Saturday edition of the newspaper and had published that text. I have to add that the mayor at that time, Kramarić, had also spoken out on that subject, but only after my text did the recriminations and primitive tensions end in the war-time atmosphere of Osijek. Another thing I wish to emphasize, which might be important for the Afghan region or, for that matter, any other area of conflict ... is that, as a Serbian who remained in Osijek and even in Pakrac after the "Bljesak" action, I was never subjected to harassment. However, I was made into an example as a Serbian who stayed in Osijek and was not killed by the *Ustaše*. This had an effect on the population of that area, which was being manipulated by all sorts of misinformation and prejudices.

...

I would like to point out a model which was conceived during the process of reintegration. We have created the "Information science without borders" project, which consisted of workshops being held in some villages of the UNTAES area. In Slavonian villages in general, and Serbian villages in particular, the woman's place is in the house and kitchen, and her duty is to tend to the animals in the sty and milk the cows. And there we were, holding workshops, bringing in computers, and the lectures were being taught by young students, women, Croatian women! This was a double shock. It was a culture shock, because not only did they have the chance, for the first time in their lives, to see and touch computers, but they were also taught by women. In such a time of war this education was a very important thing. I was always partial to the Center for Peace, and later became a member myself, I had a lot to learn from my co-workers from the Center for peace. The education I and my lawyer and economist colleagues received was very important as it enabled us to act not only professionally, but with empathy and a peace-building attitude. In this post-conflict period we must focus on education, mobilization, and the transfer of our experiences into neighboring conflict areas. In this function I visited Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia. I think it is important to transfer our experiences, tempered by time and a thorough analysis, into these regions, and we have achieved much in this respect, although we

Hrvatska još nije naučila da su mir i socijalna kohezija najvažniji privredni resursi. Nema razvoja i nema kvalitetnog života bez socijalne kohezije odnosno bez mira. Radili smo jedno istraživanje 2006. godine, koje je pokazalo toliko nepovjerenje ljudi u stranke, u Vladu, u Sabor, u institucije države, policiju, u institucije društva, u Crkvu, u udruge, u sindikate, u medije, strahovito nepovjerenje ... znači, mir i socijalna kohezija su elementarni za kvalitetu života. Mir smo nekakav postigli i sada sve ovo što budemo radili treba i u stvaranju tolerancije i nenasilnog društva, odnosno, stvaranju socijalne kohezije.

#### GORAN BOŽIČEVIĆ:

Pun sam utisaka... mi danas pričamo s distance, a zapravo je cijeli niz neprocesuiranih emocija i svega ... To su bila mrna vremena. Ali, slažem se, da smo imali današnju pamet vjerojatno se ne bismo upuštali ni u kakve mirovne stvari. Govorim o nama koji smo radili bazu izgradnju mira na terenu, s ljudima u ratnim područjima. Ali hvala bogu, nismo imali pamet pa smo išli to nešto raditi.

...

Dakle, nema baš primjera da jedna zemlja svoje ljude obaveza s ciljem da budu [mirovni] timovi u konfliktnim i postkonfliktnim žarištima, da grade kulturu nenasilja i onda ih podržavala. U redu, sa stranom novcem, uz pomoć prijatelja izvana, ali mislim na svoje ljude u svojim sredinama. Spomenut je volonterski projekt "Pakrac" gdje smo radili u podijeljenom gradu, gdje su nas izjavljivali sa svih strana svijeta pa smo poslužili kao studija slučaja za pristup "Ne nudi", odnosno "Do no harm", koji je danas jedan od glavnih etičkih kodeksa humanitarnih intervencija.

...

Ovdje su s nama danas i branitelji i ja sam bio dosta šokiran kad sam čuo da se u UN-ovim nekakvim standardima za ratne veterane smatra da je sve što oni trebaju napraviti u izgradnji mira nešto što oni zovu DDR: *disarmement, demobilization, reintegration*, dakle, otprilike, uzmite im oružje, skinite im uniforme i nekako ih ubacite u to društvo da ne rade gluposti i to je to. U Hrvatskoj je dio braniteljske populacije, koji je po meni puno značajniji od sporadičnih slučajeva, krenuo u izgradnju mira koja uključuje nenasilje, koja uključuje suočavanje s prošlosti, koja uključuje vrlo hrabre i teške korake. To je nešto teško, baš nema po svijetu.

...

Kad govorim o mirovnoj infrastrukturi, Jacques Klein je prvi visoki dužnosnik koji je došao među nas, mi smo bili nitko i ništa, ovako danas sad tu nešto pričamo, [ali onda] nismo imali nikakve resurse, niti znanja, ali imali smo srce, imali smo prijatelje koji su nas ušli nenasilju, imali smo posvećenost, imali smo jedni druge. On je došao u Crikvenicu na Dnevnu školu demokracije, sjeo je s nama na terasu i rekao: "Ja sam ovdje došao da vas slušam. Recite mi, civilne udruge iz Hrvatske, što vi mislite o procesu mirne reintegracije? Kako da to napravimo što kvalitetnije? Kako možemo Vas uključiti?"

#### TANJA ŠKRBIĆ:

Moje je ime Tanja Škrbić i na ovom skupu sam, u biti, u ime dvije organiza-

could have accomplished even more had the transfer been done more studiously and with a strategic background.

I won't go any further, there will be plenty of chances to discuss other topics as well, but I would like to conclude that we have accumulated a vast experience in conflict resolution and the processes of stabilization of post-conflict societies, and this experience should be put to use. That is why I propose that we publish an edition of books, a self-published one if need be. Each of us should compose their own booklets. The size should be limited to some one hundred pages, and the funds for editing, reviewing and printing them should be acquired. The Latin saying goes: "Fama volant, scripta manent," which means that rumors will always circulate but what is written down always remains. I believe this to be very important.

...

Croatia still hasn't learned that peace and social cohesion are the most important natural resources. There is no progress and no quality of life without social cohesion and peace. In 2006 we conducted a study which showed a great level of mistrust of the population towards the political parties, the Cabinet, the Parliament, the state institutions, the police, the social institutions, the Church, associations, unions, the media: all in all, an intense feeling of mistrust. ... This shows that peace and social cohesion are key elements needed for achieving a quality of life. We have achieved a peace of sort, and our future efforts must be directed towards creating a society of tolerance and non-violence, in other words, creating social cohesion.

#### GORAN BOŽIČEVIĆ

I am full of impressions. ... Today, we're speaking from a distance, but actually there's a whole plethora of unprocessed emotions. ... Those were dark times. But I agree, had we had the knowledge we have today, we wouldn't have embarked on any peace-building efforts. By "we" I am referring to those of us who worked on basic grassroots peace-building fieldwork, with people in war-torn areas. But, thank God, we didn't have this knowledge, so we went on with our efforts.

...

There are few examples indeed of countries training and supporting their people to be peace-builders in conflict and post-conflict hotspots, to build a culture of non-violence. There have been some efforts, aided by foreign investments and foreign investments, but I am referring to domestic citizens working in their own communities. The volunteer project *Pakrac* should be mentioned here: it consisted of fieldwork being done in a divided city, with constant education from foreign experts from all around the globe. This group was the basis of a study of the "Do no harm" approach, which is one of the key ethical codices of humanitarian interventions today.

...

Among us today we have some war veterans, and I was pretty shocked when I heard of the UN's war veteran policy, which states that, as far as peace-

cije u kojima sam, za vrijeme mirne reintegracije, aktivno djelovala. Jedna je osje ki Centar za mir, nenasilje i ljudska prava, ali i Akcijska grupa mladih koja je ustvari izrasla iz tog Centra za mir. Ne znam, dakle, što ste radili u ovom prijedpodnevnom dijelu, ali ono što meni sad trenutno fali istinska je demokracija koja je vladala u tom procesu mirne reintegracije. Dakle, postojala je suglasnost među narodne zajednice da se konačno staviti dobre ljude UNTAES-a koji se stvarno stvoriti uvjete za mirnu reintegraciju, postojala je politička volja, hrvatska i srpska, da se to ostvari na nekakvom višem nivou. Ali mislim da je ono što je donijelo pravo povjerenje i pravu integraciju i uspostavu povjerenja među ljudima, bila ona konkretna civilna inicijativa koju su započele nevladine organizacije, ali koju su nastavili oni zadnji smrtnici ... ja bih spomenula i podijelila iskustvo o kompletnom osoblju UNTAES-a zaduženo za *civil affairs*, civilne poslove, koje je bilo okrenuto ljudima. Oni su nas kao ljude doživljavali, pitali i slušali, Graham Day je imao smještaj u Osijeku, mi smo danima sjedili u njegovom privatnom smještaju i razgovarali o tome na koji način sad da napravimo taj-i-taj korak. Zašto to govorim? Zato što je to bio jedan ljudski pristup onom zadnjem smrtniku. Tako je ustvari nastao sponzorski program ... iz tih civilnih inicijativa je nastao sponzorski program jer smo mi dokazali da, kad smo došli s dobrim namjerama na tu drugu stranu, da smo bili ljudski prihvatljivi. Pa smo, konkretno suprug i ja, skoro bih mogla reći, razvili taksi-službu.

... Mislim da puno stvari nije slučajno bez obzira da li su donesene negdje u UN-u, u Americi ili na nižem nivou. Mi smo još od '94., s obzirom da se nismo mogli tada još vidjeti preko *check-pointa*, vodili mlade, žene, učitelje, prvo na kampove mladih gdje smo se vidjeli po Marševskoj... tamo smo se susretali, tamo smo ustvari vidjeli da drugoj strani ne rastu rogovi ni crni zubi i to nam je dalo snage, znači, kroz nekakve *bypass*-e preko trećih zemalja, preko uvjete Kuće i susreta u Mohaču, da smo vidjeli da je ta druga civilna strana sasvim jedna normalna osoba i mislim da je to jako važna dimenzija, da u svakoj toj nekoj mirovnoj misiji bude zastupljen uvijek koji želi oti i vidjeti svog susjeda i svoju kuću. Tu je UNTAES imao jako veliku ulogu, da su zaista obratili pažnju na te ljude.

#### LJILJANA CANJUGA:

Ponukalo me Goranovo izlaganje ... pitanje mira i mirovnog aktivizma kao neke planske aktivnosti ne bi smjelo biti elitistički pristup ... to je područje gdje se uključuje svaki uvijek dobre volje. Biti branitelj je iskustvo iz rata, iskustvo profesije, iskustvo aktivnosti, to nije političko usmjerenje ili uvjerenje. To je nešto što si odrađivao da bi napravio stabilni i održivi mir na ovim područjima. Kada se govori o DDR-u, demobilizaciji, razoružanju i reintegraciji, onda je ne treba gledati isključivo s vojne komponente jer vojnika je vrlo lako razoružati – povučete ga u vojarnu, razoružate ga, praktički ga stavite u "civiliku" i on je građanin. Međutim, najteže je razoružati civila! Pogotovo civila koji je bio dragovoljac, odnosno dobrovoljac, koji je bio paravojna formacija, koji je radio temeljem, nazovimo to, ideala, a zapravo je to koristio za plaćanje ili bilo koje nezakonite radnje koje je upakirao u radikalne nacionalističke ideje. To je teško! Međutim, nakon rata, mi u periodu od 3 godine govorimo o reintegraciji

building is concerned, the key process regarding veterans is what they call DDR: *disarmament, demobilization, reintegration*; in short, they claim that we should simply take away their weapons, strip them of their uniforms, and fit them into the society in such a way that they cause no more trouble. In Croatia, a large segment of the veteran population, which is in my opinion a lot more significant than the occasional random incidents, has become involved in peace-building activities which include non-violence, facing the past, and other difficult and courageous steps. This is something that is very rare indeed.

...

As far as peace-building infrastructures are involved, Jacques Klein was the first high official to come to us; back then we were nobodies – today we are discussing these matters but then we didn't have any resources or skills, but we had hearts we had friends to teach us about non-violence, we had dedication, we had each other. He came to Crikvenica to the Deni School of Democracy, sat on the terrace with us, and told us: "I have come here to listen. Tell me, civil associations of Croatia, how do you feel about the process of peaceful reintegration? How can we make it better? How can we involve you?"

#### TANJA ŠKRBIĆ:

My name is Tanja Škrbić and at this conference I represent two organizations in whose work I was actively involved during the process of peaceful reintegration. One of them is the Osijek Center for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights, and the other one is the Youth Action Group which has evolved from that very Center. I do not know which issues were tackled in the morning sessions, but what I must emphasize is that I miss the true democracy that was present in the process of peaceful reintegration, the international community was in agreement to allow the good folks at the UNTAES to create the prerequisites for a peaceful reintegration; the political will was there as well, from both the Serbian and Croatian sides, to work on this matter at a high level. But I believe that the cause of the real trust and cooperation that developed between those involved in the process was the concrete civil initiative which was started by non-government organizations, but continued by regular people. I would also like to mention and share my experience of the UNTAES staff in charge of civil affairs, those of them who dealt with people. They treated us as real people, asked for our opinions and listened to them; Graham Day had private accommodations in Osijek, where we spent days at a time discussing how best to implement a certain step. Why am I mentioning all this? Because it was a humane approach to ordinary people. This was how the sponsor program was created, from these civil initiatives, because we proved that, when you approach the other side with good intentions, you will be favorably received. My husband and I have, so to speak, developed a taxi-service of our own.

...

I believe that many things in life are not accidents, whether they were the results of decisions made in the UN, in the USA, or at a lower level. Back in 1994, seeing how we couldn't see them through check-points, we took

graciji, poslije toga govorimo o tranziciji. Mislim da je to isti proces, samo sa različitim razinama, nivoima i pristupima kada ih se promatra.

### MARIJA SLIŠKOVIĆ:

Ja sam Marija Slišković, Žene u Domovinskom ratu, ali ne braniteljica. Ja pripadam civilnom djelovanju od samoga početka nasludivanja agresije ... i meni mi se da s ovom mirnom reintegracijom počinjem kao od sredine filma ... Drago mi je da govorimo o hrvatskom "brendu" jer je sasvim sigurno da u Hrvatskoj imamo štošta ponuditi svijetu. Ja bih pošla s onom '90.-om kad pripadnica srpskog naroda, Olga Carević, poziva svoj srpski narod da rješava pitanje, u državnom Saboru. Pošla bih s majkom Višnjom Milas koja '91. u siječnju mjesecu organizira apel, potpisivanje pisma general-štabu Jugoslavenske narodne armije i gospodinu Kadijeviću s molbom da se nastali problemi na prostoru Jugoslavije riješe mirnim putem. Dakle, prije nego što je započeo pravi oružani sukob, hrvatske žene su krenule s traženjem mira. Nisu to tražile samo u Zagrebu, nisu to tražile samo u Hrvatskoj. Značajan je odlazak žena autobusima u Beograd, kada odlazi 29 autobusa koje traže u kasarni na Topčideru da se sinovi puste doma, polaze i od pozicije da ako se svi razidu iz te vojske, da rata neće biti. Nakon toga žene odlaze u sve europske centre mirova, i hodaju oko parlamenata i upozoravaju na rat. Mislim da je to za jedan narod vrlo značajno! Mi nismo prvo zveckali oružjem nego smo prvo tražili mir! Tu snagu žena zapravo nikada nismo svijetu prezentirali, a trebali bismo. Govoriti o svim mirovnim inicijativama, a ne započeti s tim od kuda je to krenulo je šteta za nas. Željela bih još jednom reći da ako govorimo o mirovnim inicijativama onda [moramo] iskoristiti svakako sve ovo što su hrvatske žene poduzele u slučaju agresije jer po meni je ipak najvažnije sprečavanje rata. Kad započne, onda me nemojte pitati kako u se braniti jer to zaista ne znam. I bitno je da se to nije odnosilo samo na hrvatske žene. U tim mirovnim inicijativama kada su se vadili sinovi iz vojske, mi smo na jednoj promociji imali i majke s Kosova i majke iz Bosne i to je bilo jedno solidarno djelovanje velikoga broja žena i mislim da bi to, kao jedan "brend", da se tako kaže, moglo biti nešto što Hrvatska može pokazati.

### SPASENIJA MORO:

Ja sam Spasenija Moro, dolazim iz Osijeka. Kao osoba koja nije bila educirana za bilo kakve akcije vezane za mirovno [djelovanje] ili bilo koji iskorak u onom ratnom okruženju, nisam imala zaista nikakvih znanja niti vještina, ali sam isto kao uvijek ponukana '92. godine sudjelovati u nečemu što bi meni pomoglo u onoj situaciji, u gradu koji je bio opkoljen, gdje se zveckanje oružja čulo nadomak vas samih ili u okruženju. Mi smo bili na kilometar udaljeni od rovova. Radila sam na Sveučilištu s puno mladih, imala sam dosta iskustava i meni su se te slike, u ono ratno vrijeme, uvijek iznova vraćale i pitala sam se što ja, kao pojedinac, mogu učiniti da spašavam nedužne, mlade, bilo da su djeca iz osnovnih, srednjih škola ili studenti, gdje sam radila te '91. Prvi iskorak uslijedio je '92. u 11. mjesecu preko osobe koju je spomenula i kolegica Stojanović. To je bila jedna delegacija koja je dolazila iz Njemačke, a s obzirom da ja predajem njemački pa je to bila neka moja prilika da stupim

young people, women, and teachers to youth camps in Hungary, where we would meet and realize that the other side is not populated by horned black-toothed devils, and that gave us the strength to see, through third-party bypasses of sorts, such as the famous House of Meeting in Mohacs, that this other side is a normal civil human being. I believe that this is an important aspect: every peace-building mission should involve ordinary people willing to meet their neighbors and see their homes. UNTAES has had an important role in this, by paying attention to these people.

### LJILJANA CANJUGA:

I was inspired by Goran's speech ... the issue of peace and peace-building activism as a planned activity shouldn't be tainted by an elitist approach ... it is an area which can use the efforts of every man of good faith. Being a war veteran is both a wartime experience, a professional experience, and an active experience: it is not a matter of politics. It is an effort one undertakes in order to create a lasting and sustainable peace in this area. When talking about DDR, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, it should not be considered exclusively from the military viewpoint, because a soldier is easy to disarm: recall him to the barracks, disarm him, remove his uniform and he is practically a civilian. The hard part is disarming civilians! Especially those civilians who were army volunteers, or who were members of paramilitary organizations, nominally fighting for an ideal but in reality using their forces for looting or any of a number of illicit activities under the cover of radical nationalist ideas. That is the hard part! However, after the war, we have had a three-year period of re-integration followed by the period of transition. I believe these to be two facets of the same process, albeit on different levels, approaches and viewpoints.

### MARIJA SLIŠKOVIĆ:

My name is Marija Slišković, from the Women in the Homeland War association, but I am not a war veteran. I have been engaged in civil activities from the earliest hints of aggression ... and I think that focusing on the process of peaceful integration is like starting watching a movie from halfway through. ... I am glad that we are discussing this Croatian *brand*, because I definitely believe that the Croatian experience is applicable elsewhere in the world. I would like to start with 1990, when Olga Carević, a Serbian national, invited her people to solve their problems in the Parliament. Or with Višnja Milas, a mother who, in January 1991, organized an appeal to the Yugoslavian National Army headquarters and general Kadijević, and sent a letter requesting a peaceful resolution of the problems in the Yugoslavian territory. Before the armed conflict began, Croatian women had already started seeking peace. They did not do this only in Zagreb, only in Croatia. An important event is the bus trip to Belgrade, where women in 29 buses went to demand that their sons be released from the barracks on Topčider, on the grounds that if everyone left the army, there would be no war. After that, the women travelled to all the European centers of power, picketed parliaments and warned about the upcoming war. I think this is a very important characteris-



u kontakt s ljudima koji su prošli iskustvo rata, a koji su imali i odredenu edukaciju, ali i jako dobru volju da nas posjete u Osijeku. Mi smo se tamo osjećali kao neka crna točka, kad se krene iz Zagreba, Osijek je bio predalek. Upravo oduševljena onim što sam učula na predavanjima, koja su bila organizirana na Evanđeoskom fakultetu i u uredu župne crkve u Osijeku, ja sam našla neko uporište za taj osobni angažman i uključivanje u inicijativu koja je već krenula u Centru za mir. To je bila prilika kad sam se i upoznala s kolegicom Mandom Prišing iz Sombora koja je zajedno s mojom mamom došla u posjet u jedanaestom mjesecu u Osijek preko Mađarske. U desetom, konac desetog mjeseca, meni su se neka vrata otvorila s dvije strane. Ova delegacija iz Njemačke mi je otvorila jedna vrata, a njihov posjet s one druge strane, preko Mađarske, ona druga vrata. Svoj doživljaj sam ja tako prenijela da se Manda zainteresirala i priključila jednom našem sastanku i tu mislim da je poželjna mirna reintegracija. Njezini dolasci iz Sombora u Osijek preko Mađarske i odlasci u Baranju preko Sombora su bili oni koji su otvarali vrata prema ljudima koji su bili isto u zatvorenom prostoru, što ja nisam ponekad mogla shvatiti, kako tako blizu, a tako daleko. Morate prevaliti put i tamo i oko toga. Što je Dirk Heinrichs rekao, najduži put je ponekad i najbolji put jer donosi neko rješenje. I to je upravo ono što znači mirna reintegracija: strpljiv rad, uporan rad ne donosi odmah rješenje. To su nas prvo naučili – kako da svoje emocije trenutno ne svladamo da ne bismo naštetili i sebi, ali i onima drugima. Puno je bilo manipulacija. Ja sam jako puno radila s prognanicima, izbjeglicama, s djecom. Moj je angažman trajao od 1992. sve do 2008. kada smo organizirali zajedničko ljetovanje djece iz Srbije, Bosne i Hrvatske u Švicarskoj na dva tjedna.

...

Da nije bilo naših koraka i iskoraka, obično njih malih ljudi ... Mislim da od njih sve počinje, pogotovo mirovne inicijative. I da završim, jako je važna komunikacija. Mi smo ratovali s onom drugom stranom zato što su tamo bili naši neprijatelji. Da smo razmišljali o tome jesu li ili nisu i oni takvi kao što smo mi ... upravo je važno da vi, ono što vidite u sebi, vidite i tamo negdje sa one druge strane. Evo, to su neki prvi koraci koji su se napravili. Nisam educirana, puno sam naučila, najviše strpljenju, medijaciji, ali isto tako, imala sam osjećaj da su me ljudi izuzetno prihvatili i imali u mene povjerenje. Mislim da je to osnovno za ovakve korake. Nemaju svi tu nadarenost, volju, niti uvjerenje, niti toliko veliko srce da idete i da vam uniformirane osobe pomažu.

...

Ako imate silnu želju, volju, srce i uvjerenje da vam onaj nije neprijatelj ... ako imate neku snagu, može se napraviti puno toga.

### VESNA TERŠELIČ:

Ja bih pokušala složiti stvari na način koji bi, ako bi postojala šansa da se "brendira" ovo naše iskustvo, trebali koristiti da bi to iskustvo prenijeli nekom drugom. To uopće nije mali izazov!

Imamo ogromno bogatstvo iskustava direktnog mirovnog rada i rada na dijalogu. Kad bismo sad to trebali prenijeti nekom drugom tko živi na drugom kontinentu ili možda na ovom, a evo sad izlazi iz rata pa mu treba neki

tic for a people! Our first impulse was not to rattle our weapons but to seek peace. This strength our women possess was never presented to the world, and it should be! It is a waste to talk about all these peace-building initiatives without mentioning where they came from. Once again I would like to emphasize that, when talking about peace-building initiatives, we must take advantage of all the work Croatian women have done in the face of looming aggression, because I believe preventing war should be our most important goal. Once war has started, do not ask me how I plan to defend myself, because I really don't know. What is important is that it was not only Croatian women who were active in this process. During the peace initiatives which aimed to rescue sons from the army, we've had mothers from both Kosovo and Bosnia at the same rally, which was a demonstration of female solidarity and a *brand* of sorts which can be showcased with pride.

### SPASENIJA MORO:

My name is Spasenija Moro, I come from Osijek. Having had no formal education in peace-building or any sort of active civil participation in war-time, I had no applicable skills or any useful knowledge, but was in 1992 nevertheless inspired to participate in activities which could help someone like me in that situation, in a city besieged, where the clang of weapons was heard in your immediate vicinity or your surroundings. We were situated one kilometer from the trenches. I worked at the University, with many young people, I had a lot of experience, and those images kept coming back to me in that time of war, making me ask myself what I as an individual could do to help innocent young people, whether they were children from elementary schools, high-schools, or college students with whom I was working at the time, in 1991. The first peace-building steps were taken in November of 1992, through a person already mentioned by Ms Stojanović. It was a delegation from Germany, and seeing how I teach German, I saw this as an opportunity to make contact with people who have had war-time experience, and who were both educated enough and good-willed enough to visit us in Osijek. We felt like somewhat underappreciated; as if we were too far from Zagreb to be worth visiting. Thrilled with what I had heard during these lectures, which were held at the Evangelical Faculty and the Parish of Osijek, I found a cornerstone for personal involvement in the initiative which had already been started in the Center for Peace. This was also when I met Manda Prišing from Sombor who, along with my mother, came to visit me in Osijek in November, via Hungary. In late October, I felt doors were opening for me from both sides. The delegation from Germany opened one of them, and the visit I received from the other side, via Hungary, opened another one. I expressed my thoughts so intensely that Manda got interested and joined one of our meetings; I believe that this was the moment that the peaceful reintegration began. Her visits from Sombor to Osijek via Hungary, and her trips to Baranja via Sombor, opened these doors to people who were living in such isolated spaces, which was unimaginable to me; they were so close yet so far away. You have to walk the long road, travel around. Dirk Heinrichs said that the longest road was sometimes the best one, because it brings you to a certain conclusion. This is exactly what peaceful reintegration entails:



koristan savjet, što bismo sad u toj situaciji trebali uiniti? Mislim da bismo se našli otprilike na onoj toki na kojoj smo se mi nalazili '90., '91., kad smo shvatili da s politike razine ne ujedemo prave pregovaračke glasove i da nema prave volje za dogovaranjem pa smo u to vrijeme pokrenuli inicijativu "Antiratna kampanja" i obratili se našim prijateljima u drugim zemljama. Dakle, s jedne strane je bilo u tome jako ključno da smo imali istomišljenike u ulici i u gradu, konkretno u Zagrebu, Rijeci i Poreču, kasnije u Osijeku, a s druge strane je bilo bitno da smo imali sugovornike u drugim zemljama koji su se negdje drugdje bavili mirovnim radom ili pak proturatnim radom, ali ih nije bilo puno. Ukrstivši te dvije struje još uvijek je bila riječ o istomišljenicima. Mi smo pokrenuli svoje prve inicijative i brzo otvarali dijalog prema neistomišljenicima u našoj ulici, u našem gradu i nekim drugim gradovima. Već je spomenuto ime Mate Šimića koji je bio otič sugovornik. On je vodio udrugu prognanih. Druga otič sugovornica je bila Štefica Krstić koja je vodila udrugu obitelji nestalih s kojom smo i danas u dijalogu, a spomenut u i tre u važnu grupu. To su bili naši kolege koji su prosvjedovali protiv rata, primjerice u Ženama u crnom u Beogradu ili, pak, prosvjedovali protiv rata u Bosni i Hercegovini. Mi smo odmah bili u situaciji da moramo komunicirati i lokalno i međunarodno kako bismo uopće nešto mogli raditi. I prvo ime smo se bavili je bilo zapravo iz jedne vrlo skromne pozicije u kojoj smo morali reći: "Pa mi zapravo ne znamo šta se radi sa sukobom, ne znamo što bi to bila nenasilna komunikacija!", i upustiti se u taj poduhvat u nje. Mislim da je u izgradnji mira to prvo i najvažnije, ta politična skromnost u kojoj sam sebi priznao: "Pa ja ovo zapravo ne znam napraviti". Možda ima netko drugi tko zna, možda mogu pitati, a možda taj netko drugi, tko po mom mišljenju zna, o sebi misli da ne zna, što se vrlo često pokazalo da je tako. I upustili smo se u taj poduhvat u nje, ali prvo shvativši da političari nisu odradili svoj posao pa sad mi nešto idemo raditi umjesto njih. A da bismo uopće predložili što napraviti, mi moramo malo više naučiti o tome. I stalno smo u toj poziciji. Ja sam suosnivačica više od 10 organizacija. Neke još uvijek postoje, druge više ne postoje koje se na ovaj ili onaj način bave izgradnjom mira, i one, zapravo, sve skupa jesu doprinijele izgradnji neke mirovne infrastrukture. Kad bih danas nekome davala savjet, u onom bazičnom smislu, moramo pogledati tri segmenta unutar kojih mislim da je bitno da te i neka mirovna operacija. Neizostavno je postojanje vojnog segmenta, dakle ono što u najmanju ruku radi vojska koja u najboljem slučaju sjedi u tenkovima jer je primirje već potpisano, ali garantira da se neće ponoviti oružani sukob. U drugom rade političari, vidjeli smo ih kako su pregovarali u vrijeme mirne reintegracije. A u trećem, u tom civilno-građanskom, zbiva se ova horizontalna komunikacija u kojoj krećemo od razgovora, od susjeda k susjedu i od uvijek k onom kojeg percipira kao neprijatelja ili možda i prema onome tko će sutra opet biti neprijatelj, a neki će možda postati prijatelj. Tu, na ovoj razini, mislim da to izgleda jednostavno, a zapravo je ona najzahtjevnija. I tu nam sigurno zna i objavljivanje knjiga i strukturiranje svega što smo napravili u formu koja se može prenijeti nekom drugom. Ja bih ovdje postavila pitanje: "Tko je sad taj drugi? Tko to sjedi u europskim institucijama kome mi moramo nešto reći o tome, o tome što bi zapravo na toj trećoj razini te građanske integracije i dijaloga se trebalo uiniti, tko bi bio taj sugovornik?"

patient and steadfast efforts do not result in instant solutions. This was the first thing we had to learn; how to temporarily subdue our emotions in order not to hurt ourselves and others. Manipulations abounded in those times. I did a lot of work with IDPs and refugees, and their children. My work lasted from 1992 up until 2008, when we organized a two-week summer vacation in Switzerland for children from Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia.

... Had it not been for our steps and initiatives, the work of ordinary common people ... who knows what could have happened. ... I think this is where everything should begin, especially peace-building initiatives. Let me conclude by stressing the importance of communication. We were at war with the opposing side because that was where our enemies were. Had we thought about whether they may be the same as we are... this is what is important: to see in others what you see in yourselves. These are the first steps which need to be taken. I am not an educated woman, but I have learned a lot, chiefly about patience and mediation, and I have had the feeling that people accepted and trusted me. I think that is the basis for these initiatives. Not everyone has the talent, will, strength of belief, or the heart to step forward and accept help from men in uniforms.

... If you have a strong desire, will, heart and belief that the Other is not your enemy, if you have that strength, you can achieve a lot of things.

#### VESNA TERŠELIĆ:

I would like to organize these experiences to create a chance to brand in such a way that it could be transferred and shared with other countries in need. This is no small task! We have a rich experience of direct peace-building activities and dialogue. How could we transfer this experience to others, who live on other continents, or maybe even on this one, and are currently undergoing a post-war period? What should we do in this situation? I think we should start from the point we found ourselves at in 1990 and 1991, when we realized that the voices of the higher political levels were not characterized by a willingness to negotiate or compromise, so we started an initiative entitled "Anti-war Campaign" and turned to our friends in other countries. On the one hand it was crucial to have like-minded people in our streets and towns, specifically in Zagreb, Rijeka and Poreč, later in Osijek as well, but on the other hand it was important to have interlocutors in other countries, who have had experience in peace-building or anti-war activism; however, these were few and far between. These two groups, however, did form a core of like-minded individuals. We started our first initiatives and soon opened a dialogue with groups who didn't share our ideologies, in our neighborhoods, our towns and other towns as well. Mate Šimić, who was already mentioned, was an obvious choice for collaboration. He chaired the Exiles' Association at that time. Another obvious candidate for collaboration was Štefica Krstić who was the head of the Association for the Families of Missing Persons, which is still one of our close collaborators. I will mention a third group as well. I am talking about our colleagues who protested against the war, such

Bila sam u prosincu [2009.] na jednom skupu u Berlinu i tamo vidjela novog direktora za zapadni Balkan koji se zove Zoltan Martinusz i koji je na početku svog obraćanja skupu uspio uvrijediti sve prisutne iz naše regije! To je bilo fenomenalno! Rekavši da, evo, on kao direktor nam sada govori kao ljudima koji veći izlaze iz tinejdžerskih godina demokracije, obratio se tako s visoka cijelome skupu, govoreći svima nama da mi, kao tinejdžeri demokracije o demokraciji nemamo pojma, da nije bilo uvijek koji u tom slučaju nije bio protiv njega. Svi su imali potrebu njemu nešto reći. To su ljudi kojima ćemo mi u europskim institucijama trebati nešto reći i o tome što je izgradnja mira i što bi se, recimo, u nekim drugim zemljama moglo i trebalo replicirati. Ja bih rekla da s jedne strane imamo njih, a s druge strane, ja od '91. radim u komunikaciji s Natašom Kandić. Danas skupa radimo na jednoj inicijativi za ustanovljenje regionalne komisije o inženjericama o ratnim zločinima i drugim teškim povredama ljudskih prava. Dovoljno je bilo teško '91., i meni je '91. bilo teško putovati u Beograd kad se o tome uopće nije smjelo ni govoriti, kad sam tamo s kolegama iz Centra za antiratnu akciju i s drugima, između ostaloga i s Natašom Kandić koja je '92. osnovala Fond za humanitarno pravo, razgovarala o tome kako zajedno podržati nekakav dijalog, nekakvu izgradnju mira. A danas skupa radimo na inicijativi gdje nam je opet teško biti u dijalogu! I uopće nije lako graditi jednu takvu regionalnu inicijativu! A ipak je to bilo olakšano inženjericom da su se ratovi u Hrvatskoj, Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu vodili u Europi i da je bilo više interesa među narodnih institucija i među narodnih donatora.

...

I sad bismo trebali, osim što ovako pobrajamo naša iskustva, smisliti i snage da se to sve lijepo znanstveno upakira, da se pretvori u nekakve toke koje se onda mogu pretvoriti u javno-politički prijedlog koji bi, eventualno, jednoga dana mogao razumjeti i gospodin Zoltan Martinusz. Kad će biti taj dan, teško je reći, ali vjerujem da, kad jednom sjednemo za stol u Briselu, da on neće biti jedini za tim stolom koji neće razumjeti što mi pričamo i čemu to služi, nego će biti još onih drugih i da je jako bitna ta dodatna priprema i dodatni istraživački rad koji će nam omogućiti da naša iskustva pretočimo u jasan set preporuka. Mislim da je to doista potrebno i u drugim zemljama i na drugim kontinentima.

### VESNA KESIĆ:

Ljiljana je naime rekla nešto zanimljivo, da će Vukovar biti polariziran dok tamo ljudi žele, bez obzira na to što ste mislili pod tim. U tom momentu mi se otvorio itav niz pitanja o kojima, naravno, stalno razmišljam. Kao prvo, što je to što ljudi žele? Da li im je u interesu da ostanu polarizirani? Da li reintegracija nije uspjela? Zašto nije uspjela? Ponovno otvaramo cijelu priču... Ovo pitanje, kao i puno toga što smo ovdje pričali, vodi do nekog čemu mislim da manje razgovaramo. Što je to što bi stvarno dovelo do katarze? Na razini regije i u međusuprotstavljenim skupinama u pojedinim mjestima, gradovima? Jer ja moram priznati, unatoč svim dijalozima, unatoč svim razmjenama iskustava i danas se štrečnem kad čujem jedno drugačije iskustvo višenjake uloge ženskih udruga u mirovnim procesima. Ni sama se nisam u stanju baš sasvim na emotivnoj, na osobnoj razini sabrati i reći: sad ja samo

as the Women in Black from Belgrade, or protesters against the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Right from the outset we needed to communicate both locally and internationally in order to accomplish anything. And then we were forced to humbly admit: "We have no idea what to do with a conflict; we don't know what non-violent communication is," and embark on a journey of learning. I think this is first and foremost in the peace-building process; this initial humility to admit to yourself that this is something you don't know how to do. There may be others who do, though, and you can start by asking those people, even though they often may not consider themselves to be true experts. So we embarked on this journey of learning, aware of the fact that politicians had failed to perform their duty and that we had to do it instead of them. In order to propose changes in the first place, we had to learn as much as we could about the field we would work in. This is an ongoing process. I am the co-founder of over 10 organizations. Some of them still exist, some don't, but all of them have in one way or another been involved in peace-building and have contributed to the formation of an infrastructure of peace. If I were to give peace-building advice today, it would basically be to consider all three segments which are vital to a peace-building campaign. The involvement of the military is unavoidable; even in the most favorable conditions where a truce has already been declared, we still need the presence of the army, even in the form of soldiers sitting idly in their tanks, to guard against the reemergence of armed conflict. The second segment is the political one; we have witnessed their negotiation capabilities during the time of peaceful reintegration. The third segment, the civil one, is where this horizontal communication takes place: the communication between neighbor and neighbor and between one person and those they perceive as enemies; people who may become their enemies in the future - but may also become their friends. This level seems to be the simplest, but is in fact the most demanding. Part of this segment includes the publishing of books and the structuring of all we have achieved into a form which is transmissible to others.

I would like to pose the question: "Who is this Other? Who is the person in the European institutions we should address about issues which need to be tackled in this third segment of civil reintegration? Who is our interlocutor there?"

In December [2009] I participated at a conference in Berlin and met the new director for the West Balkans region, Zoltan Martinusz, who managed to insult all participants from our region at the very beginning of his address! It was unbelievable. He, as the director, addressed us as members of teenage democracies, talking from his high horse as if we had no clue about democracy, and caused indignation in every single person at the conference. Everybody felt the urge to explain his errors to him. These are the people we will need to talk to about peace-building and about some of the initiatives which we feel should be replicated in other countries. On the one hand, we have those people, on the other hand, we have people like Nataša Kandić, with whom I have been communicating since 1991. We are currently collaborating on an initiative to form a regional committee for investigating facts about war crimes and other severe human rights violations. It was very

slušam drugo viđenje. Prema tome, šta je u biti ono što vodi katarzi? Svi smo došli do toga da je to dijalog, dijalog, dijalog ... Možda je. Najvjerojatnije na individualnoj razini. Mi ćemo se kao pojedinci u tom smislu pomiriti, razmijeniti iskustva ili možemo postati najbolji prijatelji ... Ali kako to dići na razinu zajednice, regije, i tako dalje? I tu mislim da nam nedostaju dvije stvari. Jedna je ono o čemu je Milan govorio i o čemu ja isto stalno govorim i što nikako da proizvedemo, a to je dokumentirana memorija. Dokumentirana memorija svih vrsta i to ne samo dokumenata, činjenica, nego i tih emotivnih bilježenja. To je ono što zovemo usmena historija, ili čak neka vrsta, ne znam, pjesma koje uopće ne moraju imati visoku poetsku vrijednost. Mi nemamo ništa! Nama romane pišu ljudi koji su profesionalni književnici, što može biti savršeno, ali ne vjerujem da ima tu katarzičnu ulogu. To je nešto što mi se čini da je potrebno prema tom pokušaju da se katarza, emocionalno pražnjenje, konačno dogodi ili punjenje. A drugi problem koji je ogroman ... je transfer iskustva i znanja što je isto nešto u čemu smo iz raznih razloga potpuno zakazali. Dio je odgovornosti i na nama, mi to, upotrijebit u namjerno termin, mi to nismo uspjeli kapitalizirati! Nemam pojma zašto, odnosno, možemo o tome razgovarati na još jednoj konferenciji, možda zato što smo se paralelno morali baviti i s praktičnim radom, radom na terenu i poslije toga smo to brzo pokušavali konceptualizirati, par nas je pokušalo raditi neke magisterije, ali sve je to bilo kasno. Nismo uspjeli na vrijeme spojiti iskustvo i znanje. To sad uspijevaju tek neke nove generacije koje će sad poći na svima nama "magistrirati", "doktorirati" i tako dalje. Što je super! Ali mi nismo uspjeli kapitalizirati u smislu u kojem mislim da je Vesna govorila. Ja čak vidim i daljnje mogući da se zaista u svijetu nametnemo kao jedna sredina. Neka se jedna udruga registrira pri UN-u ili negdje kao jedan *think tank* koji je u stanju nuditi rješenja. U ovome nismo sasvim sami odgovorni, tu je dijelom odgovorna i naša vlada i njena uloga pri UN-u. Još uvijek [vlada] ne shvaća koliko bi njima bilo korisno da nas šalju u UN umjesto što šalju nove, po američkim školama, dobro školovane, birokrate i diplomate, ali kojima nedostaje iskustvo. Dok druge vlade, druge zemlje, ja znam niz primjera iz Latinske Amerike, barem što se ovog ženskog iskustva tiče, oni itekako šalju svoje ljude koji su bili i aktivisti, tj. aktivistice. Ne znam da li sam sad zakomplicirala ili nisam, ali uglavnom, par je razina; kako doći do katarze, gdje mislim da sav racionalni napor nije dovoljan, katarza zahtijeva još nešto.

I u Vukovaru, i na razini regije, i među nama, partikularno. Jer kao što možemo vidjeti ovdje nema predstavnika nekih udruga i nekih ljudi koji su bili itekako uključeni u ove prve faze i mirovne reintegracije i pokušaja *peace-buildinga* i koji su radili na terenu. Dakle, i među nama postoje ta razilaženja ... I tako sve skupa uz zabilježenu memoriju koja je raznovrsna, dijalog, svašta i mirjenje, kako to sve dovesti do nekakve vrste katarze koja je neophodna? I koju ne možemo stvoriti našim malim terapeutskim razgovorima koji su za nas odlični. Oni su terapijski za nas. Ono što je za nekoga Thompson, to su za nas ovakve priče. I oboje je legitimno, što se mene tiče! ... Da je Thompson legitimna terapija za jedan sloj stanovništva, i sve dok u njega projiciramo svoje ideološke animozitete, ne razumijemo šta je potreba ogromnog dijela ljudi.

hard indeed in 1991 when I had to travel to Belgrade, at a time where such trips were unimaginable, in order to work on developing some sort of peace-building dialogue with my colleagues from the Center for Antiwar Action, including Nataša Kandić who founded the Fund for Humanitarian Law in 1992. And now, once again we are working on such initiative, and dialogue is still hard to achieve. It is not easy at all to build such regional initiatives! And all of this was in spite of the fact that the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo took place in Europe, which guaranteed a greater than normal involvement of international institutions and donors.

...

Having enumerated our experience, we should now find the strength to shape them, in a scientific manner, into points which can be the basis of a public political proposition which could one day be comprehended even by mr Zoltan Martinusz, It is hard to say when that day will come, but I believe that, when we sit down at the table in Brussels, he will not be the only one at the table who is unable to understand what we are talking about and what the point of our point is. There will be others like him, and additional preparations and research will be very important in enabling our experiences to be formulated into a clear set of recommendations. I think this could be out to good use in other countries and other continents as well.

### VESNA KESIĆ:

Ljiljana mentioned something very interesting, and that is the fact that Vukovar will remain divided as long as people there want it to be that way. Irrespective of what you meant by that, at that moment I was reminded of a whole series of questions which have been on my mind for a long time. First of all, what do people want? Is it in their best interest to stay polarized? Was the reintegration successful? If not, why? We need to re-open the whole story. These questions, just like many other issues we have discussed here, leads to a topic which has not been discussed as thoroughly: what would really lead to a catharsis, both on a regional level and between conflicting groups in specific cities and towns? I have to admit that, in spite of the level of dialogue that's been achieved, in spite of all the experiences shared, I still shiver when I hear some of the different perspectives of the role of women's associations in peace-building processes. I am not capable of distancing myself personally and emotionally and saying: "I am merely listening to another point of view." So what is the key to achieving this catharsis? We have been claiming that the key is dialogue, dialogue, dialogue. ... Perhaps it is. Probably on an individual level. As individuals, we are able to make peace, share our experiences and even become friends ... but how can we transpose this to the level of a community, a region, and so forth? I think we are missing two things in this respect. One of the things Milan discussed, which is something I have been talking about, is the need to produce some sort of documented memory. A documented memory of all sorts of phenomena: not just documents and facts, but of emotional aspects of the process as well. This can be done through what we call oral history, or through various other forms, even songs which do not have to have great artistic value. We have none of those!

Our war novels are written by professional authors, which can be perfect, but it does not carry that sort of cathartic charge. I think that we need an attempt to reach this emotional catharsis, to discharge our emotions so that we can recharge them again. The other problem, and a huge one at that, is the transfer of experience and knowledge which has, for various reasons, so far been completely unsuccessful. We are partially to blame here, as we have failed to capitalize on our experience. I don't know why, and that could be the subject of a different conference; maybe because we were involved in practical fieldwork at the same time, so the implementation phase preceded the concept phase; a couple of us started work on our masters' theses on that topic, but that was too late. We were not able to combine knowledge and experience quickly enough. The new generation is using these experiences as a basis for their masters' and doctoral theses and other research. Which is great! But we have failed to capitalize on it in the sense that Vesna was talking about. I see real options for us to become a widely acknowledged community. One of our associations should register with the UN or a similar organization as an independent *think tank* which offers peace-building solutions. The responsibility is not only in our hands, because the government needs to play its role in the UN. The government still doesn't realize how useful we could be as envoys to the UN, instead preferring to send new diplomats and bureaucrats, educated abroad and book-smart, but inexperienced. The governments of other countries, on the other hand, such as the countries of Latin America, tend to send people who used to be activists, at least in the field of women's activism. I may have complicated all of this a bit, but in any case, there are several levels involved in achieving catharsis; in short, I feel that rational efforts are not enough: achieving catharsis needs something more.

In Vukovar, on the regional level, and on an interpersonal level. You can see that representatives of some associations and groups which were involved in the first phases of peaceful reintegration and peace-building fieldwork are not present here today. So, there are disagreements even within our peace-building community. With all the diverse memories, experiences of dialogue, disputes and reconciliations, how can we use them to achieve this much-needed catharsis? This catharsis will not be reached through our little therapeutic sessions, no matter how excellent they are for us. Because they have a therapeutic effect on us. What Thompson does for other people, these conversations do for us. And both are equally legitimate, as far as I am concerned! Thompson is a legitimate form of therapy for a certain part of our population, and while we focus on projecting our own ideological disagreements on it, we will fail to understand the underlying needs of a great number of people.

## DRUGI OKRUGLI STOL: "GRASS ROOT ISKUSTVA IZGRADNJE MIRA"

ZAGREB,  
22. OŽUJKA 2010.

DRUGI PO REDU OKRUGLI STOL ODRŽAO SE NA TEMU GRASS ROOT ISKUSTVA IZGRADNJE MIRA. POZVANI SU MIROVNI AKTIVISTI I AKTIVISTKINJE S PROSTORA BIVŠE JUGOSLAVIJE DA PREZENTIRAJU SVOJA ISKUSTVA DIREKTNE IZGRADNJE MIRA KOJA MOGU BITI PRETOČNA U PREPORUKE ZA PREVENCIJU SUKOBA ILI UPRAVLJANJE KRIZAMA. PRVENSTVENO SU NAS ZANIMALE PREPORUKE IZ PERSPEKTIVE ORGANIZACIJA CIVILNOG DRUŠTVA. KAKO SMO GRADILI MIR? ŠTO JE UČINJENO DOBRO, A ŠTO LOŠE? ŠTO DRUGI MOGU NAUČITI IZ NAŠEG ISKUSTVA? KOJI SU PRIMJERI DOBRE PRAKSE? MOGU LI SE ONI PRENIJETI I NA DRUGE SUKOBNE SITUACIJE?

UVODNI GOVORI I UVODNI PRAKSE NA RASPRAVI BILJE SU: **GORAN BOŽIČEVIĆ** IZ MIRAMIDA CENTRA IZ GROŽNJANA, **ANA RAFFAI** IZ REGIONALNE ADRESE ZA NENASILNO DJELOVANJE – RAND IZ SESVETA I **MARIJA GAJICKI** IZ ORGANIZACIJE VIVISECT IZ NOVOG SADA, REPUBLIKA SRBIJA. OVDJE DONOSIMO DIJELOVE RASPRAVE.

### LANA VEGO:

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Iskustvo rata u Hrvatskoj i na ovim prostorima uzrokovalo je nastanak velikog broja mirovnih inicijativa, većinom su to bile lokalne inicijative koje su pokušavale vratiti povjerenje u zajednicu te ju ponovno izgraditi. Danas mi se čini da postoji kritika, određeni nedostatak i problemi koji su nastali s nesustavnim prikupljanjem, sistematiziranjem i artikuliranjem iskustava izgradnje mira. **Čini se da je takvo dokumentiranje bitno iz dva razloga, kao prvo, zbog samog dokumentiranja, a kao drugo zbog prijenosa iskustava i naučenih lekcija kako bi se onda mogle integrirati u nacionalne pa i međunarodne politike koje se tiču i obnove i sigurnosti i razvoja.** Mirovne inicijative nisu imale mogućnost promišljanja i procjenjivanja svog djelovanja, a pogotovo ne na način koji bi omogućio prijenos tih iskustava te mogućnost da ta iskustva postanu temelj javnog zagovaranja.

### LANA VEGO:

...  
Pozvali smo još nekolicinu organizacija iz regije koje nisu mogle doći. To su:

## THE SECOND ROUND TABLE: "GRASS ROOT EXPERIENCE IN PEACE BUILDING PROCESS"

ZAGREB,  
MARCH 22<sup>ND</sup> 2010

THE 2<sup>ND</sup> ROUND TABLE WAS HELD ON THE SUBJECT OF GRASS ROOT EXPERIENCE IN PEACE BUILDING. PEACE ACTIVISTS FROM AROUND THE TERRITORY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WERE INVITED TO PRESENT THEIR DIRECT EXPERIENCES IN PEACE BUILDING, EXPERIENCES THAT COULD EITHER BE TRANSLATED INTO CONFLICT PREVENTION OR CRISIS MANAGEMENT. OUR MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST WERE REFERENCES TAKEN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS: HOW WAS PEACE BUILT? WHAT WAS DONE RIGHT AND WHAT WAS DONE WRONG? WHAT CAN OTHERS LEARN FROM OUR EXPERIENCE? WHICH ARE THE EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICES AND COULD THEY BE TRANSLATED ONTO OTHER CONFLICTS?

THE DISCUSSION WAS INTRODUCED BY **GORAN BOŽIČEVIĆ** FROM THE MIRAMIDA CENTRE IN GROŽNJAN, **ANA RAFFAI** FROM RAND - REGIONAL ADDRESS FOR NONVIOLENT ACTION IN SESVETE AND **MARIJA GAJICKI** FROM THE VIVISECT ORGANIZATION FROM NOVI SAD, REPUBLIC OF SERBIA. THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION.

### LANA VEGO:

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The experience of war in Croatia and the surrounding territory led to the emergence of a large number of peace building initiatives. These were mostly local initiatives that had as their main goal rebuilding the war-torn community and restoring its assurance. Today it seems a certain critique is present, a specific disadvantage accompanied by problems that arose with the recent gathering, classification and articulation of peace development experiences. It seems that this kind of documentation is fundamental for two reasons. First, for the process of documentation itself and second, for the translation of experiences and lessons learned so that they could be integrated into national and even international policies that deal with reconstruction, security and development. Peace initiatives had no possibility of rethinking and assessing their activity, especially not in a way that would enable the translation of given experiences with the possibility of them becoming the basis for advocacy.



Omladinski centar iz Gornjeg Vakufa/Uskoplje. Gospođa Jasminka Drino Krilić, koju vjerovatno i većina vas poznaje. Naime, smatrali smo da je Omladinski centar koji je osnovan 1996. godine dobar primjer grass root inicijative izgradnje mira. Sam Centar je u glavnoj ulici u gradu koja se nekada zvala Ulica bratstva i jedinstva, a danas ima i muslimanski i hrvatski naziv. Centar je djelovao u sredni podijeljenog grada i ponašao se kao sigurno mjesto za mlade ljude, ali i njihove roditelje. U Centru su se održavali tečajevi engleskog jezika i razna ulazna tečajeva. U početku su se tečajevi održavali odvojeno, no u međuvremenu su djeca i mladi sami poželjeli spojiti razrede. Kroz druženje u ovakvom prostoru koje omogućuje interakciju dvije inačice sukobljene strane, djeca su bila u mogućnosti osjetiti drugačiji način življenja u zajednici, a da to nije segregacija, polarizacija ili politizacija i na taj način ih se direktno osnaživalo da bi bili jaki akteri u izgradnji mira i u procesu pomirenja u razorenoj zajednici. Mislili smo da bi bilo zanimljivo čuti iskustva gospođe Jasminke, što je kod njih dobro funkcioniralo, a što nije i što bi ona imala za preporučiti ili predložiti. Još jedna organizacija koju bi spomenula iz Bosne je CNA, Centar za nenasilnu akciju, koji je započeo svoj rad s uredom u Sarajevu, a nedugo zatim su otvorili i ured u Beogradu. Neke od aktivnosti kojima se CNA bavi su treninzi izgradnje mira, tako postoji osnovni trening, napredni i trening za trenere. To su desetodnevni intenzivni treninzi kojima su sudionici/e su iz cijele regije. To je prostor unutar kojega se daje velika pažnja povezivanju i komunikaciji među ljudima iz različitih krajeva, radi se na izgradnji povjerenja i te se obrađuje tema suočavanja s prošlošću. Svrha treninga je osnažiti građane. Nadalje, CNA radi dokumentarne filmove u kojima obični ljudi pričaju svoje priče, pričaju o ratu, o gubitcima, patnji, razaranja i pomirenju. Meni se jako sviđaju njihovi dokumentarci jer kroz njih se vidi kako mirovni rad može ostaviti jako snažan utisak kroz neke alternativne mehanizme, ustvari tu mislim na umjetnost i korištenje umjetničkih formi kao kanal za mirovne inicijative. Ono o čemu sam htjela razgovarati s CNA je njihov rad sa sudionicima rata, što rade u zadnjih šest, sedam godina. Između ostalog, organiziraju javne tribine koje se zovu "četiri pogleda", na njima se govori o pojedinačnim razlozima i motivacijama iz kojih su se govornici našli u ratu te njihovim pogledima na budućnost. Isto tako, razgovarala sam s organizacijom koja se zove Žene u crnom. Žene u crnom su inicijativa iz Beograda, nastala 1991. godine. Te žene su svaku večer izlazile na tih prosvjeda kako bi izrazile solidarnost s protivnicima rata, sa svim muškarcima koji odbijaju i na front te žele prekid nasilne mobilizacije za sudjelovanje u ratu. One su organizirale više od tisuću prosvjeda, marševa i edukacija najviše u Beogradu, ali i u drugim gradovima u Srbiji. Vrlo brzo unutar same organizacije Žene u crnom je počela djelovati i muška grupa za podršku te su onda kroz zajednički rad organizirali različite oblike pomoći i pružanje moralne, emotivne i političke socijalne i psihološke pomoći i dizerterima rata i prigovaračima savjesti. Razgovarala sam i s organizacijom Grupa 484 koja je nastala 1995. godine isto u Beogradu s ciljem da podrži 484 izbjeglih obitelji koje su bježe i iz Krajine našle utočište u Srbiji., a po njima je organizacija i dobila ime. Grupa 484 je od male grupe entuzijasta koji su pružali humanitarnu, psihosocijalnu, pravnu i informativnu pomoć izbjeglicama i iz Hrvatske i iz Bosne i sa raseljenima s Kosova postala strukturalizirana organizacija s vrlo dobrim sistemskim pristupom problematici prisilnih migracija i migracija uopće. Tako da mislim

## LANA VEGO:

... We have invited a number of other organizations from the region but they were not able to attend. These include Gornji Vakuf / Uskoplje Youth Center (Omladinski centar) and Mrs. Jasminka Drino Krilić, probably well known to most of the participants. We considered Youth Center a good example of grass root peace building initiative. Center itself is situated on the street previously known as the Street of brotherhood and unity (Ulica bratstva i jedinstva) but today bears two different names, a Muslim one and a Croatian one. Center operated in the middle of a divided city and acted as a safe house for youth and their parents. They offered English and computer classes. In the beginning the classes were set apart ethnically but over the time children and youth expressed the desire to bring the classes together. Center was space that enabled the interaction of two sides in conflict and through different social practices children were able to experience different way of living in their community, without being segregated, polarized or politicized. They were directly encouraged to be strong factors in peace building and actors in the process of community reconciliation.

We thought it would be good to hear the experiences of Mrs. Jasminka, her views and opinions on the matter, what functioned and what did not as well as any suggestion that she might give us. Another organization that I would like to mention is CNA from Bosnia. Center for Nonviolent Action began its work in Sarajevo and shortly after branched into Belgrade office. Some of the activities of CNA include peace building trainings that are divided into basic and advanced training and training of trainers. These are intensive ten day trainings that encompass the whole region. It is a vessel within which a great deal of effort is directed towards bringing people together, enabling communication between people from different parts of our region and deals with building of trust and dealing with the past. Trainings' purpose is to enforce the citizens. Furthermore, CNA produces documentaries where common people relate their stories and provide us with their accounts on war, loss, suffering, disappointment and reconciliation. I am very fond of these documentaries as they provide us an insight how peace building efforts can strongly be influenced by alternative mechanisms. Here I consider art and the use of artistic forms as a specific channel of peace building initiatives. What I wanted to talk about with CNA is their work with participants of the war, what they have been doing for the past six or seven years. CNA organizes round tables under the name of "The Four Views". There they talk about different reasons and motives for which participants took part in the war as well as their views on the future. Also, I talked with an organization named "Women in Black". "Women in Black" are an initiative that arose in Belgrade in 1991. These women took the streets every night in silent protests to express their support and solidarity for the opponents of the war, men that refused to go to the front as well as the end to forceful mobilization into the army. They organized more than a thousand of demonstrations, marches and educations, mainly in Belgrade but other cities across Serbia as well. Shortly thereafter a male support group within "Women in Black" started their activities. Working together with women they set out to organize different forms of help, ranging from moral and affective to social,

da su se kroz rad Grupe 484 sigurno mogle artikulirati dobre i kvalitetne preporuke za europske migracijske politike.

#### GORAN BOŽIČEVIĆ:

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Kad sam razmišljao o tome što bi to Europska unija uopće mogla usvojiti, a govorim iz perspektive koja je možda kriva - da je Europska unija vrlo važan jedan od najvažnijih svjetskih ekonomskih i političkih igrača koji može mnogo napraviti u prevenciji i transformaciji nasilnih konflikata diljem planete - onda bi to htio podijeliti na tri perioda:

Prije moguće intervencije, za vrijeme mirovne intervencije odnosno mirovnog rada i nakon mirovnog rada. Koliko god to vama izgledalo logično, smatram daje to važno naglasiti jer vrlo često se usredotočimo samo na mirovni rad, ono što se odvija u sredini. Kada naši dečki odu Afganistan ili u neku drugu UN-ovu misiju, bilo da se ona zvala UNPROFOR ili kako god već. Vrlo je važan i neizmjereno je podcijenjen period pripreme za tako nešto: priprema koja je psihološka priprema, sigurnosna priprema na temeljima ljudske sigurnosti te praktična priprema, kulturološka priprema, a sve su to mehanizmi podrške. Veliki kompliment je institucija koja organizira ovaj okrugli stol - CMS - doživjela negdje 1997. ili 1998. godine kada je konzorcij od 14 mirovnih organizacija iz svijeta odlučio da osnuje svoj tim na terenu u Hrvatskoj, koji se zvao Otvorene oči, a bio je dio šireg projekta, Balkan Peace tima. Iz tog pripremnog treninga organiziran je Centar za mirovne studije.

...

Priprema je užasno važna za ljude, važno je reći i to što ih čekaju jer, u slučaju u zonu konflikta je kao u slučaju u zonu visoke radijacije. Radio sam u Pakracu sa stranim volonterima od kojih je većina dio njih, recimo njih 400 su tri tjedna radili na obnovi grada, sami su plaćali 150 tadašnjih maraka za hranu i smještaj. Oni su imali ogromne probleme vratiti se u svoje sredine, znači u normalne živote u zemljama zapadne Europe, u zemlje ne zahvaćene ratom. Biti u Pakracu tri tjedna, a pogotovo ako ste i više od toga (a mnogi su bili i po par mjeseci), je bilo izuzetno snažno iskustvo.

...

Dakle, biti u razrušenom Pakracu, pomagati bakama da nacijepaju drva, napraviti krov ili napraviti radionicu s djecom, ili radionicu da se možda osnaže žene da pokrenu praonicu - u to doba je vrlo vidljiv ljudski kontakt koji je lišen konzumerizma kojim su preplavljane i Europska unija i sve bogatije zemlje. Vraćajući se u Pakrac, naslušali smo se ljudskih priča i tragedija, a da ne spominjem razrušene kuće i minska polja te nam je rečeno da obični ljudi imaju puno više razumijevanja od psihologa, ljudi u bijelim kutama ili od ljudi iz Svjetske zdravstvene organizacije.

...

Možda bi za kraj samo spomenuo kako smo svi mi učili, odakle smo dobivali podršku, i odakle smo mogli dobivati inspiraciju, znanje i resurse? Bilo je vrlo važno, a to je ono što vrlo rijetko srećem danas, a nadam se da me možete demantirati, da smo podršku dobivali unutar samih organizacija, unutar grupa, unutar projekata u kojima smo radili. Veselje nam je bilo biti jedni s drugima, privatno nismo bili naravno tako bliski prijatelji, ali nas je sustav vrijed-

political and psychological help to war deserters and conscientious objectors. I also talked with the group named "Group 484" that emerged in 1995 in Belgrade with the sole purpose to support 484 families that fled the Krajina region and sought help as refugees in Serbia. The group was named after these 484 refugee families. Group 484 grew from a small collection of enthusiasts providing humanitarian, psychosocial, legal and informative help to refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and people relocated from Kosovo into a well structured organization with a well thought out systematic approach to the problem of forced migration and migration in general. In my opinion the work of Group 484 could just as well articulate solid and quality recommendations for European migration policies.

#### GORAN BOŽIČEVIĆ:

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When I considered what could European Union adopt, and I'm talking from a point of view which may or may not be true, is that the European Union constitutes one of the most important factors in world politics and economy in general and could do a great deal in preventing and transforming violent conflicts across the globe. I would divide the influence into three periods. These are: before the possible intervention, during the peace intervention i.e. peace building efforts and after the efforts. No matter how logical it may seem, I put an emphasis on it. We are very often focused only on peace building efforts, the thing in the very middle of the event, the ongoing process. When our boys leave for Afghanistan or any other UN mission, be it UNPROFOR or any other. One of the most important things which often go overlooked is the period of preparation for a mission of that kind; psychological training, safety measures based on the principle of human security; practical briefing and cultural research and preparation – these all are support mechanisms. The institution that organized this round table, CPS, was given a great compliment somewhere in 1997 or 1998 when a consortium of 14 peace building organizations from around the world decided to delegate its field team in Croatia called *Otvorene Oči* (Eyes Wide Open), a part of a larger Balkan Peace Team project. From this preparation training Centre for Peace Studies was organized.

...

Preparation is one of the key factors for people, to tell them what they can expect. To enter a high risk zone is like entering a highly irradiated area. I worked in Pakrac with foreign volunteers most of whom, say about 400 worked 3 weeks rebuilding the city, paying 150 German marks for food and lodging by themselves. They had immense problems returning into their own environment, meaning going back to their normal lives in countries across Western Europe, countries not engulfed in war. Being in Pakrac for three weeks (and some were there even longer, for months) was an incredibly powerful experience.

...

Staying in the obliterated Pakrac, helping old women chop wood or fix the roof, organizing workshop with kids or enforcing some women to start a laundry room, you can clearly see human contact devoid of the whole con-

nosti, nenasilja, horizontalne podjele, ono što se kaže "moć sa" zbližavala u tom vremenu.

#### MARIJA GAJICKI:

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Godine 2002. smo kao organizacija imali priliku da u Novom Sadu organiziramo izložbu ratnih fotografija Rona Haviva "Krv i med" koja je kroz 64 fotografije predstavljala sve ratne sukobe na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Ta izložba prije nego što je bila u Novom Sadu, bila je i u Bosni i Hercegovini, u Hrvatskoj, onda je došla u Srbiju i izazavala veoma burne reakcije, od Beograda preko Vršca do Čačka, Kragujevca gde su čak i zabranili održavanje izložbe. Novi Sad je bio poslednji grad u kojem se održavala izložba i mi kao organizatori voljeli smo ono što se događalo u drugim gradovima smo htjeli da istražimo i ispitamo šta je to što 2002. godine, po završetku ratnih sukoba na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije što ljude toliko prvocira i zašto ne žele da vide stvarnost i da se suoče s činjenicama. Zanimalo nas je da napravimo objektivnan uvid upravo u taj nacionalizam koji je zagadio prostor bivše Jugoslavije, a također smo htjeli da stvorimo i kreiramo prostor koji do tada nije bio toliko prisutan u široj javnosti - individualan prostor u kojemu možete samostalno da preispitate svoje stavove i da onda iz toga utjemo na ljude da oni promene stavove koje su do tada imali. **Shvatili smo da mediji dokumentarnih fotografija i filma mogu da kreiraju tu vrstu interaktivnih prostora.**

...  
Upravo ta izložba koju smo 2002. godine uradili u Novom Sadu s ratnim fotografijama i s provokacijom koju je proizvela nas je potaknula da razmišljamo kako da ustvari učitav taj proces, pre svega suočavanja sa stvarnošću u kojoj živimo i s događajima iz nedavne prošlosti, uključimo što širi krug ljudi. Ono što je bilo važno za izložbu jeste da... ovo sam veći ispričala, dakle izložba je trajala 10 dana, 64 fotografije, najveći broj stvari koje su tada iritirale posetioce u drugim gradovima odnosilo se na to da su te fotografije laž, da ne predstavljaju činjenicu, da je to, pošto je u pitanju Srbija – anti srpska izložba, da ona pokazuje samo srpsku stvar u ratnim sukobima kao najgoru. Na osnovu tih komentara koji su ranije išli, mi smo odlučili da fotografije izložimo bez potpisa samog autora Rona Haviva i onda da omogućimo ljudima da oni sami daju svoje komentare. Prvi put je ovakva vrsta eksperimenta napravljena s dokumentarnom fotografijom – ija je tematika rat i da bukvalno bez ikakvih ograničenja ljudima dozvolimo da sami upisuju svoje komentare i stavove u odnosu na fotografije. Ono što je bilo potpuno šokantno, za nas je činjenica da nitko nije gledao što se nalazi na fotografijama, nego je svatko dolazio i upisivao ono što jeste njegov prethodni stav, svoje osećanje.

...  
Šta bi mogla da bude preporuka: osim što je izuzetno važna edukacija i uloga programa kao što je na primjer program građanskog vaspitanja, treba da se razmisli o tome da u školski sistem uđu i predmeti koji bi uključivali elemente obrazovanja za mir i da se uključuju još segmenata kao ovaj koji bi omogućio da se znanje prenese ovako kroz medije, umetničke medije i dokumentarne fotografije i filmove ali i mnoge druge angažovane radove. Danas ima sve više i više umetnika koji rade i vrlo su angažovani upravo na najrazličitijim pitanjima i važno je da to također postane deo ovog iskustva.

sumerism that floods the European Union and the rest of the affluent world. We were told by the WHO that when coming back from a destroyed environment, mine fields and human tragedies that they witnessed it is the common folk and not the psychologists who alleviate the experience.

...  
In conclusion I would just like to point out the environment where we all learned, received support and in the end drew inspiration, knowledge and resources. It is very important, and is something I rarely come across today to note that it was within the organizations themselves that we received support, within groups and projects that we worked on. It was a pleasure spending time with each other. We weren't very close privately but this system of values, nonviolence and horizontal diversification, what you could call "power with", was what brought us all together at that moment.

#### MARIJA GAJICKI:

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In 2002 we, as the organization, were given the opportunity to organize an exhibition of war photography in Novi Sad. The exhibition named "Blood and Honey" presented a series of 64 war photographs by Ron Haviv depicting all the war conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Before it was set in Novi Sad the exhibition was held in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. When it came to Serbia it provoked a very negative public reaction, from Belgrade and Vršac to Čačak and Kragujevac where it was eventually prohibited. Novi Sad was the last city in which the exhibition was being held. We, the organizational team of the event, prompted by recent development and feedback that we received wanted to further investigate and find out what it is that, in the year 2002, years after the end of the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia, provoked people to that degree and deterred them from accepting reality and facing the facts. We wanted an objective insight into the nationalist views that soiled the territory of former Yugoslavia. We wanted to create a personal space where you could individually question your views and ideals and in that way influence people to change certain views that they held up to then. What we realized is that the medium of photography and documentary film produces this kind of interactive space.

...  
Exactly this exhibition that we set up in Novi Sad in 2002, with the provocation that we exerted prompted us into thinking how to include as many people as we can into this process of facing the reality that we live in and the events from recent past. The important thing to say about the exhibition, apart from the thing I already said that it lasted for ten days and included 64 photographs, is that visitors in the other cities considered the photographs a lie, as not being objective and representing fact. That it is, given the fact it was held in Serbia just an anti-Serbian exhibition, demonstrating the Serbian side of the conflict as being the worst one. Based on the previous feedback that we received we decided to remove the name of the author from the photographs giving people the possibility to bring their own conclusions and comments. This was the first time we conducted an experiment of this kind, through documentary photography dealing with the subject of war. We literally allowed people to express their views and give their comments on

Još nešto, kada govorimo o našem iskustvu trudili smo se da sve ovo što radimo i što stičemo kao iskustvo da objedinimo i da sakupimo kao delove mozaika koji se nama čine indikativni i interesantni. Za pet godina uspeli smo da napravimo takve vrste arhiva da ukoliko vi poželite da u vašoj sredini za 10 godina govorite o problemima rata na prostorima bivše Jugoslavije, mi možemo doći i sa izložbom fotografija sa dokumentanim filmovima, koji će biti upravo taj poticaj za taj razgovor i za debate. Naš cilj je, a mogla bi da bude i preporuka: kako kreirati mesta kao što vi imate u ljudskih prava, ali u istovoj regiji gde bi se nalazila sva ta značajna arhiva koja je nasala i sakupljena iskustva i zašto se ne bi mogao napraviti jedan veliki priručnik ili rečnik ili vodič koji bi bio upravo kroz mirovni aktivizam i iskustva. Zašto bi nove generacije sve morale da učestvuju? Ovo je poslednji trenutak da se lobira za takvu inicijativu da postoji jedno takvo mesto gde se nalaze svi relevantni dokumenti koji bi mladim generacijama koristili i ne ponavljali naše greške koje su napravljene u prošlosti.

#### GORDAN BODOG:

...

Od 2003. do 2005. godine trajao je proces koji se intenzivno dogodio i u Hrvatskoj nazvan *People Building Peace*, ljudi grade mir, a aktivisti su ga popularno zvali "nova agenda za mir" u sklopu kojega su napravljene i preporuke UN-u; kontekstualne, vrijednosne i strukturalne.

Preporuke su rezultirale time da je četrdesetak predstavnika različitih organizacija (pa i mirovnih organizacija) u Hrvatskoj bilo zadovoljno sa sadržajem i nastavilo je i dalje rad na njima i iz toga je nastala prva radna verzija "Platforme za izgradnju mira u Hrvatskoj". Platforma je promovirana, najavljenja i publicirana javnosti na prvoj nacionalnoj konferenciji izgradnje mira u Hrvatskoj u Vukovaru, prosinca 2005. godine. Većina tih preporuka je integrirana u preporuke za regionalnu izgradnju mira, u tom kontekstu ima i preporuka o grass root iskustvima, a dobar dio toga integriran je i u globalnu agendu. Bilo je rečeno zašto to radimo - zato što se nam se te stvari vraćati kao buomerang: kao kriteriji i međunarodnih agenata i organizacija, i kod finalizacije regionalnih, kontinentalnih, nacionalnih strategija. Međutim, promišljanje što se dalje radi ne samo s Platformom, promišljanje što smo i na koji način primjenjujemo te preporuke u smislu, ne samo izgradnje mira, nego i drugih stvari koje se bave osnaživanjem građanskog društva, učenjem iz pouka prošlosti i tako dalje. Tako da prije nego što bi finalizirali nekakve preporuke UN-u, mislim da bi u procesu trebalo obratiti pažnju što se događa sa rezultatima i preporukama otprije, kakav je njihov život u praksama, u budućnosti, zašto se segmentirano ili uopće ne primjenjuju?

#### GORDAN BOSANAC:

...

Jednom je rečeno super stvar: ne bi nas tu uopće bilo, niti mene, a niti mirovnih studija, da nije bilo ovog rata, dakle, vjerojatno ne bi bilo niti HVIDRA-e, niti bi mi danas o ovome diskutirali, ali činjenica je da se desio rat i činjenica je da je rat inicirao različite grass root inicijative, inicijative građana, civilnog društva...

photographs without any inhibitions. What was most shocking is that no one actually looked at the photographs but rather came and expressed their previously formed opinions and sentiments.

...

The recommendation could be the following: apart from the extremely important role of education and implementation of programs such as the civil education program, careful thought should be given to implementing courses into the national curriculum that would already include the elements of education on peace (building). The inclusion of more segments such as this one where knowledge would be presented through different types of media such as artistic forms and documentary photography and films or any other socially engaged work. There are more and more artists who are very socially engaged in dealing with diverse subjects making it a part of the experience on the whole. There is another thing worth mentioning when we talk about our experience. We worked hard on bringing all this work and seemingly interesting and indicative experience together, like pieces of a mosaic. In five years time we managed to construct this type of archive so that if, for example in ten years time you want to talk about the experience of war in your surroundings we could participate with our material, the photography and documentary corpus which will in turn act as an incentive for a discussion or debate about the experience. Our aim and it could be the recommendation, could be the following: how to create spaces such as your Human Rights House but concerning the whole region where we could archive this large quantity of material that we gathered, just as well as share the accumulated knowledge. Why not produce one big lexicon or guide through peace building activism and experience? Why would every generation need to start all over again? It's high time we lobby for such an initiative, to create a single space where all the relevant data could be stored, data that could be of use for generations to come and urge them not to make the same mistakes people did in the past.

#### GORDAN BODOG:

...

I remember this process named *People Building Peace*. We called it "New agenda for peace" and it consisted of recommendations to the UN: contextual, valued, structural; a process that lasted since 2003 to 2005 and intensively took place in Croatia as well. It showed results in several different ways. The recommendations that were not only meant for the UN resulted in contentment of more than 40 representatives and peace building organizations in Croatia pushing people to work even harder on them. The work resulted in the first draft of "Peace building platform in Croatia", which was then promoted, announced and finally published during the first national peace development conference in Vukovar, 2005. A great number of these recommendations were integrated into recommendations for peace development in the region. Among other things you could find sections on grass root experiences and a good part of it was concerned with a specific global agenda.

We were told why we were doing that. It was to come back to us in a boomerang effect in form of criteria from international agents and organizations



...  
 Kada razmišljam s ove zahtjevne pozicije da li mi možemo nešto reći u Europskoj uniji, što to znači mehanizmi ranog upozorenja, dakle, cijela poanta je u tome da li netko može na vrijeme reći: dogoditi će se sukob, dogoditi će se rat. Iz te pozicije mi se čini da je **jedan od mogućih propusta** upravo **nedovoljno kvalitetno** tretiranje civilnog društva i **građanskih inicijativa**. Uvijek navodim primjer Kosova u 80-ima odnosno, nenasilni otpor Albanaca na Kosovu koji su se služili isključivo Gandhijevskim metodama i koje ustvari nitko nije čuo kako ih se možda trebalo čuti, jer da ih se čulo na kvalitetan način ne bi se desilo to što se desilo. Druga stvar, nedavno sam ponovno uspio pročitati govor pokojnog profesora Supeka kada se spremao napad na Afganistan, održao je odličan govor na jednom od skupova protiv tog rata, u kojem je rekao sve što će se desiti, on je bio na neki način baba vračara ili vračinja lijepo je predvidio to no što će se dogoditi sa Afganistanom. Niti profesora Supeka tada nitko nije mogao ili nije htio, želio čuti. Mislim da je to iz dodatne pozicije u kojoj velike javne politike vide i doživljavaju građanske inicijative ili civilno društvo kao dodanu vrijednost demokraciji, kao dodanu vrijednost kulturi življenja, a ne kao jedan od ključnih segmenata, bez kojega ne može funkcionirati zdrava životna okolina. To se vidi na bezbroj primjera u kojima se grade moderna društva.

...  
 Tu mi se postavlja slijedeće pitanje, kao nekome tko se bavi mirovnim politikama, pred mene se postavlja veliki izazov: kako mirovnu politiku, ovu *grass root* razine, artikulirati na nacionalni ili europski nivo. Postavlja se pitanje da li je to moguće, da li je metodologija upravljajna državom, metodologija upravljanja Europskom unijom tako napravljena da se vi ustvari ne možete probiti s ovim vrijednostima o kojima je Ana prišla, o malim grupama, o fokusiranom radu, o tome da ćete možda raditi tri godine s troje ljudi, pa će vam netko to prekriti da je output premalen, da je broj korisnika premalen, ali upravo iz iskustva rata na ovim prostorima baš se vidi da to jesu bile vrijedne i važne aktivnosti.

...  
 Želim izraziti moj strah: na koji način da pronađemo nišu, da ono što građanske inicijative zaslužuju, a to je da su konstitutivni stupovi demokracije i da bez njih nema kvalitetnog i dobrog društva - kako da taj glas dobije na svojoj politici koj ozbiljnosti i da li je to moguće? Pogotovo kada se radi o mirovnoj politici, tada postoji veliki paradoks da su svi za mir, svi su protiv rata, svi su za nenasilje, ali to u konačnici nije vidljivo iz samih politika. U konačnici želim vjerovati da svaka osoba ima potencijala za graditi mir, pa da je ustvari moguće raditi nacionalne i veće politike koje su iskrene i koje nisu s figom u džepu. Možda nam treba još vremena, ali mislim da je to naš zadatak: smisliti kako zadržati autentičnost izgradnje mira i u velikim nacionalnim politikama i ne odustati od toga da cijela mirovna politika ne mora biti na margini, već da mora postojati kanal da se pretoči u šire politike.

#### TAMARA PUHOVSKI:

...  
 Ono što sam čula u ovoj raspravi, jest da postoji arhiva, fond znanja i iskustava. Mislim da sam par puta čula da je potrebno organizirati mjesto na kojem

when finalizing local, regional and national strategies. Thinking about what to do with the Platform brought about thinking about what we are and how to implement the knowledge not just in terms of peace building but also other things that enforce the civil society by learning from conclusions on the past. What I think is that, before finalizing any recommendations to UN, during such a process we should pay heed to what happens with certain results or recommendations and how do they function in practice, in the future? Why are they implemented fragmentally or not implemented at all?

#### GORDAN BOSANAC:

...  
 Someone once said a great thing: if it weren't for war we probably wouldn't even be here. There would be no peace studies, no HVIDRA (war veterans' association), nor would we be discussing this here today. But, the fact is the war did happen and the war prompted the emergence of various grass root initiatives, citizens' initiatives and civil society initiatives...

...  
 When I consider things from this difficult position, can we even say something to the European Union, what do early warning mechanisms mean? Therefore, the whole point is whether someone can predict a conflict in time, to say if there will be war. From this position it seems that it is exactly the inadequate treatment of the civil society initiatives one of the possible drawbacks. I always state one example: Kosovo in 1980s and the nonviolent resistance of Kosovo Albanians who exclusively used Gandhian methods. They were probably never heard as they were supposed to be heard because if they had been heeded in this quality way the whole thing would probably never happen. Recently I had the chance to reread the speech of the late professor Supek written at the time of the impending Afghanistan attack. He held the speech at one of the anti war protests in which he clearly anticipated the outcome of the event. In a certain way he was like a soothsayer or a clairvoyant yet, at that time, nobody could or would listen. In a certain way this could be interpreted in the way big public policies see and experience civil initiatives or the civil society as an added value of democracy, as an added value to the culture of living and not as one of the most important segments of the society itself. One without a healthy living environment cannot function. This is visible on numerous cases on which modern societies are built upon.

...  
 As someone that deals with peace policies I am faced with another question: how do you articulate this *grass root* peace building policy on a national or European level? We are faced with an issue whether this is even possible, if the state management methodology or European Union management methodology is even made in a way that you cannot even push through with the values that were discussed: small groups and focused work, working maybe three years with only three people just to be denied due to the fact your output is insignificant or that the number of users is just too small. But, just as you can see on the example of the conflict in the region, these are very important and significant activities.

...



bi se uvali svi artefakti i ostale važne stvari vezane za ljude koji su riskirali svoje živote i dali živote te da se na taj način pokaže i jedna druga strana Balkana koja nije krvava i mračna, gdje mi poluobueni trimo sa toljagama i mlatimo se. I tu mislim da svi ovi napori, svi ovi projekti mogu zaživiti.

Baš sam nedavnoitala, možda je netko i naišao na projekt koji se bavi ovime specifično, daje novac za projekte u području velikih konflikata, velikih zločina, navodi se Auschwitz kao primjer, mislim da tu ima prostora za napraviti centar, kao što postoji Europski parlament u Strasbourgu koji je simbolizirao ka to ka dakle, za napraviti centar na simbolu koji toki susretanja različitih društava i tu smjestiti arhivu i projekte. Recimo u području Europske unije se može puno toga izvući, tu je prostor gdje se može pokaziti druga strana Balkana koja je suraivala još i prije 90-ih, koja se borila za mir i koja je bila vrlo, aktivna i koja je reciklirala neka znanja iz zapadne Europe.

#### MIRJANA BILOPAVLOVIĆ:

...

Ne trebamo razgovarati o istini i činjenicama nego moramo razgovarati o smanjivanju prostora za manipulaciju i interpretacije istine. Bojala sam se kako će sintagma suživota funkcionirati na ratom pogođenom području ako mi dozvolimo da se i dalje manipulira s nama, da prihvaćamo manipulacije, ako samo prihvaćamo interpretacije, a istovremeno ne nudimo nešto drugo.

...

Izuzetno je važno, kada govorimo o izgradnji mira, **izaći iz većih urbanih sredina**, to ne mora biti preporuka Europskoj uniji ali možda se može nešto od toga iskompilirati. Zapravo, važno je dati podršku onim ljudima koji su imali petlje raditi nešto što nije općenito prihvaćeno, koji su imali petlje tu ideju širiti dalje i u tu ideju uvlačiti neke nove ljude koji imaju utjecaj u zajednici i koji bi na taj način zapravo promovirali izgradnju mira kao jednu od najvažnijih vrednota ljudskog života osim one kada se direktno ugrožava pravo na život ako se događa sukob ili ratni sukob. Nakon perioda rezignacije od 1998. do 2005. godine, zapravo smo bili u vakuumu i po meni je to izgubljeno vrijeme; izgubljeno vrijeme jer smo mogli upravo u tom periodu kapitalizirati sve što se događalo u Republici Hrvatskoj pa i mirnoj reintegraciji o kojoj smo razgovarali. Iskoristili smo vrijeme i prostor kada je Hrvatska bila u Vijeku sigurnosti, a da nismo uspjeli plasirati ništa od onoga što smo mi unutar OECD-a napravili, što je izuzetno kvalitetno i hvalevrijedno, i po meni je vrlo važno napomenuti da nismo napravili nikakav akcijski plan izgradnje mira. Mislim da je tu odgovornost na svima nama, da se u budućnosti fokusiramo i na to.

#### ĐURO KNEZIČIĆ:

...

Što se tiče svega spomenutog, razumijem vas, ali nisam sudjelovao u načinu izgradnje mira kao što ste vi sudjelovali civilnim djelovanjem. Sudjelovao sam i smatram, a mislim i da ostali deki tako misle, da smo mi išli u rat zbog mira. Mi nismo išli u rat jer smo željeli taj rat, nego smo željeli spriječiti rat, išli smo se suprotstaviti strašnoj agresiji, koju sam osobno doživio vrlo neugodno. Tako da bih želio reći da ono što je gospođa Slišković napomenuala, a da se ne vraćam na istu temu: domirne integracije u Vukovaru došlo je po

I wish to express my fear, in which way could we find ourselves a niche, providing civil initiatives with the status they deserve, as constitutive pillars of democracy? This is what makes a worthy society but is this even possible? We are faced with a paradox where everyone is against the war and everyone is pro nonviolent action but in the end, none of this is visible from the policies themselves. In the end I want to believe that every person has the potential to build upon peace, that it is possible to form larger, national policies that are true to themselves and not looking to cross you behind your back. Maybe we simply need more time but I think this is our goal: how to preserve the authenticity of peace building in large national policies and somehow stay on the course of keeping the whole peace building politics away from the margin, finding a channel to guide it into larger policies.

#### TAMARA PUHOVSKI:

...

What I understood from this discussion is that an archive, a pool of knowledge and experience already exists. It was mentioned several times that there exists a need to create a space to preserve all the material assets for which many risked their lives. To show there is more to the Balkans apart from the usual gory image of us running around half naked having a go at each other with crude clubs. And this is where I think all these efforts should be exerted, to make all the projects come alive. If we deal with this region there are instances that fund projects such as these, projects in areas of greater conflicts. I recently came across such an instance where they state Auschwitz as an example. There is more than enough space to build such a center here, something like European Parliament in Strasbourg which is only a symbolic point of reference, to build upon a symbolic meeting point of these societies and create an archive as well as run the projects. There is much to gain from the European Union in this area of interest. A space where we could show a different side of the Balkans, a side that worked together before the 1990s and that was, in a way very active in recycling knowledge from the Western Europe.

#### MIRJANA BILOPAVLOVIĆ:

...

We should not talk about truth and fact but we should talk about the reduction of space for manipulation and interpretation of the truth. I was very afraid how this famous paradigm of coexistence would function in a war torn area if we allow ourselves to be continually manipulated and if we accept these interpretations without offering anything different at the same time.

...

It is extremely important when talking about the development of peace, to leave the confines of urban areas. It doesn't have to be a recommendation to the European Union but the knowledge can be compiled. We could provide support for people that had the guts to do something that was not generally accepted, that had the nerves to spread this idea even further trying to involve people that held influence in their surroundings thus promoting peace building as one of the core values of human life, apart from when a conflict directly threatens someone's right to live. After this period of acquiescence

mom mišljenju samo zbog toga što su se prije dogodile, operacije Bljesak i Oluja. Oluja je bila jedna od velikih humanitarnih akcija koja je spasila tisuće i tisuće života, jer da su Srbi i etnici i ostale raznorazne formacije okupirale Veliku Kladušu, Bihać i tako dalje, oni bi po mom mišljenju pobili masu nevinih ljudi, i tako mislim da je to bila velika humanitarna akcija od koje bi mi mogli dosta naučiti, jer se i u Americi u isto tome kako je to velika akcija izvedena bez velikih žrtava.

#### EMINA BUŽINKIĆ:

...

Kad se dogotala operacija Oluja imala sam 10 godina i ispred moje kuće u Sisku prošla je kilometarska kolona ljudi na traktorima, s puno najlonskih vrećica u kojima su nosili stvari i ja nisam znala o čemu je riječ, ali sam znala da su neki ljudi iz moje ulice psovali na njih i gađali ih kamenjem. To me je užasno potreslo, nisam znala o čemu je riječ pa mi je mama objasnila o čemu se radi. To je moja slika Oluje, ne humanitarne i nehumane i mislim da je izrazito dehumanizirala te ljude koji su otišli tamo gdje su morali otići. Tada sam već postala mirovna aktivistkinja, ako se to tako može reći, i prije bila sam s djecom iz svoje ulice da li se mi moramo tako ponašati, da li moramo bacati kamenje na druge ljude i zašto to radimo? Moja motivacija za bavljenje izgradnjom mira dolazi od tuda. Također dolazi i iz 1998. godine i s Kosova, s gledanjem slika na vijestima, kako su izbjeglice napuštale svoje domove. Možda se danas zato bavim i azilom. Htjela sam reći da živim s tim iskustvom koje je traumatiziralo ili ne, proučila sam to više puta, i radim na ovome zato što mislim da neke druge generacije ne moraju tako i da ja svojim primjerom mogu dokazati da se može živjeti drugačije. I zato mislim da je mirovni rad izrazito vrijedan i voljela bih učiniti više o njemu. Ono što je za mene bila prepreka, kako ja dolazim iz Siska, je da nisam poznavala ljude koji se bave mirovnim radom, jer nisam dobivala informacije o mirovnim inicijativama u Sisku i kasnije kada sam počinjala malo više propitivati i razgovorati s roditeljima i starijim ljudima, rekli su mi da su zapravo i te mirovne inicijative u Sisku bile ugušene i zanimalo me zašto.

...

Zato mislim da je ovaj okrugli stol vrlo vrijedan i da napori oko sistematiziranja i artikuliranja sve ove građe moraju biti učinjeni. Određeni materijali koje Documenta ili Građanski odbor za ljudska prava posjeduju trebaju na neki način postati dostupniji i otvoreniji.

...

Sve to treba napraviti kako bi se određene stvari učinile dostupnijima, da se poboljša situacija s udžbenicima povijesti u školama, da se učine napori za poboljšanje građanskog društva, da se arhiviraju informacije koje civilno društva posjeduju da cijelokupna politološka analiza ove situacije bude dostupna.

...

Čini mi se važno vezati preporuke na nešto što Europa vidi kao svoje iskustvo jer Europa ima itekako bogato ratno iskustvo. Ali vrlo vrijedna inicijativa, o kojoj će vjerojatno i kasnije govoriti, je inicijativa za sveobuhvatnim mirovnim obrazovanjem kao dio odgoja i obrazovanja za demokratsko građanstvo. Nedavno sam radila komparativnu analizu više zemalja u tom smislu,

between 1998 and 2005 we were actually living in a space of vacuum. If you ask me it is time lost: time lost because during that period we had the opportunity to capitalize on the events that occurred in the Republic of Croatia, even on the peaceful reintegration that we talked about. We used time and space when Croatia was a member of the United Nations Security Council, without accomplishing a single thing that we later managed to realize as an NGO which is extremely praiseworthy. We couldn't manage to place it as a part of the story in general and what is very important, we didn't manage to construct any action plan on peace building. I think the responsibility lies on all of us, to make it a point of interest and focus in the future.

#### ĐURO KNEZIČIĆ:

...

Concerning the matter, I understand you completely but I did not take part in peace building as you did in your civil engagement. As I consider it, and I believe other boys do, we went to war for peace. We did not go because we wanted this conflict, we wanted to prevent it, and we went there to oppose an aggression which I personally took very hard. So, I would like to point out what Mrs. Slišković already said, without going back to subjects we already covered, that the peaceful reintegration took place only because, luckily for us, we had operations Bljesak (Flash) and Oluja (Storm). Oluja was actually one big humanitarian movement that saved thousands and thousands of lives. Had the Serbs and chetniks stayed there and occupied Velika Kladuša, Bihać and so on in different formations, in my opinion they would have murdered a lot of innocent people. I think it was one big humanitarian action as they teach it even in United States of America - how things could be done without suffering big losses.

#### EMINA BUŽINKIĆ:

...

I just wanted to say that I was ten years old when Operation Oluja (Storm) took place. In front of my house there was a several kilometer long line of people on their tractors, carrying lots of plastic bags containing just few things. I did not know what was happening but the people from my street cursed at them and threw rocks at them. This was very hard for me as I had no idea what was going on so I asked my mother to explain. This is my memory of Operation Oluja, not humanitarian or humane. In fact, it was extremely dehumanizing for the people who had to go where they went. It was then when I became a peace activist if you could call it that way. I talked to the children on my street asking them is it the way we were supposed to act as well? Throwing stones and hurling insults? My motives originate from that day there but also from the images I had in 1998 watching news from Kosovo, refugees leaving from all over the place. Maybe it determined my future and my career in dealing with asylum seeking process. What I wanted to say is that I live with this experience, be it traumatic or not and will continue to do so because I feel other generations that are yet to come do not need to live with it as well. It is the reason why I think peace activism is praiseworthy and would like to know more. The obstacle for me was that I originate from the town of Sisak, I didn't know anyone dealing with peace

kakve kurikulume imaju i podržavaju li nacionalne strategije odgoja za demokratsko građanstvo i kako se to manifestira u školama. To je bila dosta kratka analiza, ali ono što sam naučila je slijedeće: da niti jedna članica Europske unije nema odgoj i obrazovanje za demokratsko građanstvo, da dio zemalja EU ima samo parcijalno obrazovanje vrlo često nedostaje i odgoj, uglavnom se radi o politici koja participaciji, ali ne i o mirovnom učenju i učenju o nenasilju i to je nešto što je defekt obrazovnog sustava Europske unije. Dakle, preporuka da se mirovno obrazovanje kao dio odgoja za demokratsko građanstvo integrira u formalno obrazovanje je definitivno važna i za EU i za ove prostore ovdje.

#### BUDIMR BRATANIĆ:

...  
Ne govorim baš na skupovima, ali Emini volim saslušati jer ona ubaci veliki broj slika koje nas podsjećaju da se uvijek moramo vratiti na motive i na 1991. godinu. O Vukovaru se niti ne usudim govoriti, branitelj sam s prve linije, iz Ogulina sam. Ogulin je bio cijeli na prvoj liniji. Moja slika iz početka 1991. godine je: fašnik je, maškare... i sada u tim maškarama ima svega, glavna atrakcija su taljige i na njima je figura majmuna, onako odrađan sav, figura vruga, figura nekakve nakaze. Mene je to posebno pogodilo jer se ticalo direktno mene. Naime, na tome je na ogromnom kartonu pisalo "djeca mješanih brakova."

...  
Kad se priča o katarzama, a da vam odmah kažem da ja u priču o katarzi ne vjerujem, jer katarza se događa u pozorištu kada svi gledamo u jedan komad i svi u isto vrijeme nešto doživimo, ali katarze se ne događaju u državi svima odjedanput, do toga mora doći svako ponaosob. Znači, ja sam na početku 1991. godine, dok nije bilo oružanih sukoba došao do svoje katarze i spoznao narav država koje su se stvorile na Balkanu. To je moje viđenje, ne mora biti tu i viđenje... E sad da se vratimo, gospođo je rekla da suživot više jednostavno nije dovoljna riječ. Suživot znači da je netko tolerantan, toleriran je i trpi, a to, ako ćemo biti etnički ljudi i reći ćemo da to više nije dovoljna riječ za takvo nešto i morali bi polako poraditi na tome da se takve nespretne interpretacije izbace. A onda da se vratimo na to sve, sad sam malo previše otišao i emotivno govorim, iz srca, i tako mi je lakše, ali hoću vam reći da moramo dubinski sagledati u sebe i u svoje motive i kakav smo korov sadili i sad ne možemo otkivati ruže, sad smo dobili lopate u ruke i sad mi trpamo sve te stvari koje kao takve. Znači, u dubinu, prvo u sebe sagledati, a mene pogodila ta etnička priča, jer sam iz eksplozivne hrvatsko-srpske kombinacije, tako da je ta priča meni pokazala direktnu narav svih događaja koji su se desili. I od nje do sada još nisam osjetio pomaka. Svaka stvar, ne mogu, dubok mi je teret prema Vukovaru, i prema svim tim stvarima i o tome se jednostavno ne dostojim ni govoriti, to su strašne žrtve, ali gospodo moja, isto tako znam da se hrvatska željela riješiti tristotinjak hijada svojih stanovnika, riješila se na način, kao što se riješila. Pozivali su ih da ostanu, a s druge strane su rekli, pokupili su svoje prljave gaće i otišli. Tako da moramo biti iskreni i reći kakve su bile politike u to vrijeme i protiv čega se mi u principu borimo, protiv kojeg demona.

activism because I had no way of acquiring any information in Sisak and when I started discussing the subject with my parents or town elders they all told me most of the peace initiatives in Sisak went out rather fast and I wanted to know why.

...  
That is the reason why I think this round table is of an extreme importance. The efforts in systemizing and articulating all this data must be done. Also, specific data now in the hands of Documenta – center for dealing with the past or the Civil Committee for Human Rights needs to become more accessible.

...  
Not only to make things more available but also to ameliorate the story behind history books, to create a narrative of civil society, to archive all the information of the society itself and to make the complete political analysis of the matter available to the general public.

...  
It seems rather important to relate the recommendations to something that the Europe sees as its own experience; especially given the fact that Europe's warfare experience is vast and long reaching. But another praiseworthy initiative, about which Iva will speak a bit later, is the initiative for incorporating peace education as a part of the national curriculum for democratic society. Only recently I did a comparative analysis of several states in the branch of education and information, what kind of curricula do they have and do they support national strategies of education for democratic society, just as well as the way it is implemented in schools. What I found out is the following: none of the members of the European Union have any type of education for a democratic society and only a number of countries have partial education lacking any upbringing. The case here being related mainly in terms of a political participation but not in form of peace studies or nonviolence teachings what could be considered a defect of the educational system of the European Union. Therefore, the notion to integrate this kind of knowledge into formal education is of great importance for the region and the European Union.

#### BUDIMR BRATANIĆ:

...  
I'm not really into public speeches but I like listening to Emina because she introduces a large number of images that remind us that we always need to go back to the motives and that year of 1991. I dare not speak about Vukovar; I am a veteran, from the front line, born in Ogulin. The whole city of Ogulin was the front line. My image from the beginning of 1991: Carnival masks... even now they have all sorts of things in those masked processions. One image laid heavily on me as it concerned me directly; main attraction – a cart carrying a figure of a monkey, all ragged up, the image of the devil, the image of a freak... and next to it a giant sign saying "children of mixed marriages."

...  
When we talk about catharsis I do not believe in it. Catharsis only happens in theatre, when we all look at the same play at the same time and we all

**OTTO RAFFAI:**

...

S preporukama sjedi bug - informati ki re eno - po mom mišljenju, sjedi u tom smislu kao da je to homogena regija koja daje homogene preporuke, a zapravo, upravo kao i ovaj stol mi smo heterogeni. **I političke interpretacije su nam različite za isti događaj.** I ono što bih volio da opet doživimo, bez obzira koliko je to teško, jer teška je pri a s ljudskim suživotom, zapravo tu je meni temeljno pitanje: na kojim se mi temeljima zapravo zalažemo, kao što se zalažemo za mir razli itim na inom, kako uspjeti to transferirati vlastitoj djeci ili budu im generacijama, a da propitamo metodologiju, kojim na inom to inim danas ili kojim sam na inom to spreman raditi bilo kada. To je zapravo moje pitanje i za budu e. Kojim na inom inim to što inim?

**LANA VEGO:**

...

Željela bi probati sumirati sve što smo uli i spomenuti sve što reklo. inimi mi se da kroz svaki komentar, kroz svako izlaganje se vidi potreba za dokumentiranjem razli itih inicijativa i projekata, i da je potrebno slušanje jedni drugih kako bi se omogu io prijenos informacija dalje. Spominjali smo istraživanje aktivnosti prije sukoba kako bi se ustvari identificiralo što se radilo prije sukoba, kako bi se mogli oja ati mehanizmi ranih upozorenja te kako ja ati utjecaj na me unarodnu zajednicu i političke elite. Isto tako, trebalo bi revidirati dosadašnje mirovne preporuke koje su išle prema van i vidjeti što je ve napravljeno i kakvog je to imalo utjecaja da nam to posluži kao platforma za daljnje djelovanje. Spominjala se važnost, ali i podcjenjenost mirovnih i civilnih inicijativa, te potrebe za iš enjem kanala suradnje izme u nevladinih aktera i političkih elita jer na taj na in bi se tako er omogu io prijenos mirovnih politika i njihova artikulacija u nacionalne i me unarodne politike. Vrlo velika važnost se stavila na okupljanje ljudi s razli itim stavovima i na me usobne susrete. U par navrata se pominjalo da se trebamo truditi da idemo jedan korak dalje od tolerencije prema prihva anju druga ijih i drugih.

experience something at the same moment. Catharsis doesn't affect everyone in the state simultaneously. Everyone has to undergo their catharsis by themselves. I went through mine at the beginning of 1991 when I realized the nature of states that emerged on the Balkans. It is just my point of view; it doesn't necessarily reflect anyone other's... Now to go back to the subject, lady said that today, "coexistence" is not a fitting word anymore. Coexistence means someone is tolerating and being tolerated but at this point that is simply an inadequate word and we should work on getting rid of such interpretations. Now to go back to the gist of it, I went a bit too far and I am a bit emotional at the moment. It's just easier for me like that, but what I wanted to tell you is that we need to look deeper into ourselves and look for personal motives. We planted weed and now we cannot expect to smell the roses. We have now been given shovels and we just shovel the things as such. First look at yourselves. I am deeply struck by this ethnic story because I come from this explosive Serbo-Croatian combination. For me, the story demonstrates the whole direct nature of the events that took place here. And ever since I never felt such a shift, in the crudest of manners, such shifts like this. I simply cannot, Vukovar wound runs deep and I do not have the strength or courage to even talk about it. Those are tremendous sacrifices, but listen to me gents, at the same time I know that Croatia wanted to get rid of some three hundred thousand of its own citizens. And it got rid of them, the way it did. They were invited to stay but they took their dirty laundry and just left. We must be true to ourselves and speak openly about the policies conducted at that time, which is in fact the daemon that we are fighting here.

**OTTO RAFFAI:**

...

With recommendations, technically speaking, a bug appears. In my opinion it comes in a way like it is a homogenous region giving homogenous references when we are, in fact just as heterogeneous as is this table. Even our political interpretations of the event differ. What I would like us to see again, no matter how hard it may be, is a difficult account of human coexistence. This is what, for me, presents the essence of things. Which are the foundations that we work upon, i.e. as we try to enforce peace through different methods, how do we transfer the effort to our children and generations to come? Questioning methodology, how am I doing it today and in what way am I ready to do it at any point in time. This is also my question for the future: in what way am I doing the things I do?

**LANA VEGO:**

...

I would like to try and summarize everything that we heard and mention everything that we talked about. As it seems, within every comment and every presentation we can read out the need for documentation of different initiatives and projects. We are urged to listen to each other to enable the flow of information. We mentioned the research into activities prior to the conflict, to identify the actions that lead us there so that we could enforce early warning mechanism and strengthen our influence on the international community and the political elite. Along the same lines, we should revise our

up-to-date outward recommendations and see what has been done and in what way it influenced our basis for further action. There was also a mention of the importance and disparagement of civil and peace initiatives as well as the need of clarifying these channels of cooperation between nongovernmental actors and political elites. In this way we could enable the translation of peace building policies and their articulation into national and international policies. A great deal of importance was given to bringing people of different viewpoints together, providing them a personal contact and interaction. Also there were talks about making an effort to take tolerance one step further, into acceptance of different and the other.



## TREĆI OKRUGLI STOL: "SIGURNOSNA POLITIKA IZGRADNJE MIRA U DRŽAVAMA BIVŠE JUGOSLAVIJE"

ZAGREB,  
8. TRAVANJ 2010.  
GODINE

TREĆI OKRUGLI STOL BAVIO SE PITANJIMA KREIRANJA SIGURNOSNE POLITIKE EU-A NA TEMELJU ISKUSTVA SUKOBA U BIVŠOJ JUGOSLAVIJI I O MOGUĆIM BUDUĆIM PREVENCIJAMA SUKOBA I POST-RATNOG OPORAVKA DRUŠTVA. KAKO EU POLITIKE MOGU PREVENIRATI SUKOB? KAKO MOGU DOPRINIJETI POST-RATNOM OPORAVKU? ŠTO JE BILO DOBRO, A ŠTO LOŠE U EU-OVU PRISTUPU SUKOBU I POST-RATNOM OPORAVKU NAŠE REGIJE?

UVODNI PREDGOVORI U RASPRAVU BILI SU: **PROF. ŽARKO PUHOVSKI** S FILOZOFSKOG FAKULTETA SVEUČILIŠTA U ZAGREBU, **VEDRAN HORVAT** IZ HENRICH BOLL STIFTUNG-A HRVATSKA, **MONIKA BEGOVIĆ**, DOKTORANDICA NA FAKULTETU POLITIČKIH ZNANOSTI SVEUČILIŠTA U ZAGREBU I **VALENTINA KUFRIN**, STUDENTICA ISTOG FAKULTETA. OVDJE DONOSIMO DIJELOVE RASPRAVE.

### ŽARKO PUHOVSKI:

Hvala lijepa, temu ste odabrali, ona podsjeća na niz okvirnih rasprava koje su zadnjih godina vođene pod engleskim naslovom nazivom *lessons learned*, dakle, lekcije koje su naučene.

Ja sam uvijek na početku koristio poznatu Hegelovu formulaciju: "ono jedino što iz povijesti možemo naučiti jest da iz povijesti ne možemo ništa naučiti", uz dodatak, to naravno Hegel ne bi rekao iz pristojnosti, da ljudi uvijek rade iste gluposti. U tom pogledu ja sam doista ciničan jer u razini novije povijesti, konstrukcija ide ovako: Europska unija, odnosno Europska zajednica, nastala je kao pokušaj da na produktivan način izađe na kraj s jednim ratom iz čega se na primjer u Jugoslaviji nije ništa naučilo, a bilo je susjedstvo, znalo se o tome, govorilo se, ništa se nije naučilo. Pitanje je kako bismo o ekvivalenciji da London ili Pariz ili Brisel naučimo od Zagreba ili Sarajeva, kad Zagreb, Sarajevo i Beograd nisu naučili od Pariza, Londona ili Berlina. I to je razlog za skepticizam, ali s obzirom na to da ima puno mladih ljudi ovdje, valja se nadati da su oni manje skeptični i ja ću pokušati konstruirati one točke iz iskustva koje bi mogle biti uporištem za eventualno drukčije ponašanje.

ZAGREB,  
APRIL 8TH, 2010

## THE THIRD ROUND TABLE: "PEACE BUILDING SECURITY POLICY IN EX- YUGOSLAVIA COUNTRIES"

THIS ROUND TABLE TACKLED THE ISSUES OF CREATING A SECURITY POLICY OF THE EU BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AS WELL AS THE ISSUE OF THE PREVENTION OF POSSIBLE FUTURE CONFLICTS AND THE POST-WAR RECOVERY OF SOCIETY. HOW CAN EU POLICIES PREVENT CONFLICTS? HOW CAN THEY CONTRIBUTE TO THE POST-WAR RECOVERY? WHAT WERE THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SIDES OF THE EU'S APPROACH TO CONFLICT AND THE POST-WAR PERIOD IN OUR REGION?

THE DISCUSSION WAS INTRODUCED BY **PROFESSOR ŽARKO PUHOVSKI** FROM THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN ZAGREB, **VEDRAN HORVAT** FROM HEINRICH BOLL STIFUNG CROATIA, **MONIKA BEGOVIĆ**, A DOCTORAL STUDENT AT THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCES, AND **VALENTINA KUFRIN**. THE FOLLOWING EXCERPTS ARE THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION.

### ŽARKO PUHOVSKI:

Thank you very much, the topic has been introduced, it reminds me of a series of general discussion which have been conducted in recent years under the title *lessons learned*. I always enjoy quoting Hegel, who said: "The only thing we can learn from history is that nothing can be learned from history," with an addendum, which the polite Hegel never would have allowed himself to utter, that people always do the same stupid things. In this respect, I am pretty cynical, because in recent history, the state of affairs is the following one: the European Union, or European Community, was conceived as an attempt to deal with a war in a productive manner, but none of what had been learned was applied in Yugoslavia, which was in the neighborhood: the events taking place were widely known and discussed, but no lessons were learned. The question is, how can we expect London or Paris or Brussels to learn from Zagreb or Sarajevo, when Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade had learned nothing from Paris, London or Berlin? This is a cause of skepticism, but since there are so many young people here who are hopefully less skeptical, I will try to highlight some points of common experience which could be the basis for a different behavioral paradigm.

Prva to ka koju iz jugoslavenskog iskustva izvla im, i koja se meni ini najvažnijom i veoma rijetko raspravljenom, jest do je Jugoslavija pokazala da sigurnost nije dovoljna za opstanak zajednice. Jugoslavija je nedvojbeno bila najsigurniji okvir za opstanak ljudi na ovom podru ju zadnjih 500 godina. U 40 godina, od 1950. do 1990. nitko u Hrvatskoj nije bio ubijen iz politiki razloga, to je najduže razdoblje u Hrvatskoj povijesti. Ubijalo se u inozemstvu, ništa više, ništa manje nego Izraelci, Nijemci ili Francuzi i drugi, ali u Hrvatskoj nitko nije ubijen od 50-te do 90-te. Me utim, zajednica nije bila slobodna, zajednica nije bila demokratska, zajednica nije bila bogata, zajednica nije bila ravnopravna i to se pokazalo pretežu im elementom. Drugim rije ima, nasuprot brojnim, naj eš e veoma, u filozofskom smislu, primitivno formuliranim teorijama me unarodnih odnosa, sigurnost nije dostatna za opstanak zajednice, niti za stabilnost njezine egzistencije.

Drugo, što mi se ini jako važno, jugoslavenski primjer je pokazao da je nužno suo iti se s paradoksom koji glasi: kako to da je Jugoslavija bila superiorno najbolji ili najmanje loš oblik realnog postoje eg socijalizma ili komunizma, a njen kraj je bio daleko najgori od svih? U raspadu Jugoslavije je ubijeno otprilike dvostruko više ljudi nego u raspadu Sovjetskog saveza, a Jugoslavija je imala deset puta manje stanovnika, dakle relativno dvadeset puta više ljudi je ubijeno, govore i o istim brojkama. Sve dobre strane Jugoslavije su bile u tomu da je ona bila država organiziranog šverca izme u istoka i zapada. Švercala se ideologija, švercala se tehnologija, švercala se geostrategija i od toga je Jugoslavija 40 godina živjela. Drugi trik koji je Tito uspio nametnuti svijetu, bilo je decentralizacija koja je zvana demokratizacija i svi su vjerovali da je ovdje više demokracije zato jer je više decentralizacije. Na koncu je to upropastilo zajednicu jer se pokazalo da Jugoslavija ne može izdržati demokraciju jer je demokracija koja je tu postojala bila pod navodnicima, i ustvari decentralizacija, koja je u zadnjim godinama opstanka Jugoslavije dovela do toga da se Jugoslavija svela na Jugoslavensku narodnu armiju. To je jedino što je bilo jugoslavensko zadnjih godina – sve drugo je bilo republiko. A protiv Jugoslavenske narodne armije ne možete djelovati politiki, protiv armije ne možete djelovati politiki. Dakle, kada se Jugoslavija svela na Jugoslavensku narodnu armiju, bilo je zadano da raspad mora biti rat, da ne može biti okrugli stol kao u Pragu gdje se sedam, osam eha sretne i dogovore da se stvari baršunasto riješe. I strašna stvar je bila da je etrnaest studenata dobilo batina, što je strašno, ali prema 125 000 mrtvih u Jugoslaviji nije usporedivo. ak su u Bugarskoj stvari išle lakše jer je postojao centar politike mo i. U Jugoslaviji je postojao samo centar vojne mo i, ponavljam opet, diskusija s vojskom je kontradikcija, raspravljati s tenkom nije naro ito produktivna komunikacijska struktura. U narednom koraku je došlo do povezivanja armijskog hardvera s Miloševićevim politiki kim softverom i onda smo imali strukturu koja je simboli ki nakon pada Vukovara pokazala, to se veoma rijetko spominje, da je naredbom Vrhovnog štaba JNA-a, etiri dana nakon pada Vukovara, promijenjene su jugoslavenske uniforme i postale su gotovo identične srpskim uniformama iz Prvog svjetskog rata, skinute su petokrake zvijezde, usput re eno. To su danas, više-manje, svi zaboravili. Ali to je ve bio korak kada više nema Jugoslavije, to je sada i formalno Srbija, do Vukovara se radi o Jugoslaviji. I ono što je paradoks, do trenutka po etka

The first point from the Yugoslavian experience, which I hold very important and underrepresented in these discussion, is the fact that Yugoslavia has shown that security is not a guarantee for a society's survival. Yugoslavia was undoubtedly the safest framework for the survival of the peoples of this region in the last 500 years. In 40 years, from 1950 till 1990, no one in Croatia was killed for political reasons, which is the longest period in Croatian history. There were killings abroad, no more and no less than the Israelis, Germans or the French did, but in Croatia no one was killed from 1950 until 1990. However, the society was not free, it was not democratic, it was not wealthy, it was not egalitarian, which proved to be an overwhelming problem. In other words, contrary to the numerous, often philosophically speaking primitively formulated international relations theories, security is not enough for neither the survival or the stability of a community.

The second and equally important lesson from Yugoslavia is that it is important to face the paradox that, even though Yugoslavia was by far the best (or least bad) realized form of socialism or communism, its breakdown was by far the worst. During the breakdown of Yugoslavia, approximately twice the number of people lost their lives than in the breakdown of the Soviet Union, even though Yugoslavia had ten times fewer inhabitants: thus, relatively speaking, twenty times as many people lost their lives, if we consider only the ratios. The key advantage of Yugoslavia was that it was a state for smuggling between the East and the West. You could smuggle ideologies, technologies, geo-strategies; this was the bread and butter of Yugoslavia for 40 years. The other trick Tito pulled is to convince the world that decentralization meant democratization: everyone believed that Yugoslavia was more democratic than it was because it was highly decentralized. In the end, this ruined the entire society because it was made apparent that Yugoslavia cannot endure this sort of democracy, this ostensible democracy which was in fact nothing more than decentralization, which in the final stages of the history of Yugoslavia lead to the fact that the only thing holding Yugoslavia together was the Yugoslavian National Army. This was the only true Yugoslavian element in those final years – everything else was republic-based. One couldn't act politically against the Yugoslavian National Army; you can never act politically against armies. Thus, when Yugoslavia was reduced to the Yugoslavian National army, war was the unavoidable outcome of the dissolution: there simply was no chance of things being resolved like they were at the round table in Prague, where seven or eight Czechs met and decided to end it all with a gentle touch. The fact that fourteen students took a severe beating is terrible, but incomparable to the 125.000 dead in Yugoslavia. Even in Bulgaria, things ran more smoothly, because a center of political power existed. In Yugoslavia, only a center of military power existed at that time; and it bears repeating that the idea of a peaceful discussion with the military is a contradiction in and of itself: engaging in a discussion with tanks is hardly a fruitful communicational paradigm. Next came the joining of the army hardware with the political software Milošević was controlling, creating a structure which, after the fall of Vukovar, symbolically demonstrated – and this is seldom mentioned – its allegiance: a direct order from the army headquarters insisted on changing the uniforms to make them almost iden-

rata u Hrvatskoj, 56% svih vojnika u JNA-u su ne-Srbi. Danas to nitko ne voli govoriti, prva žrtva u Splitu je jedan Makedonac, onaj u tenku, danas se to ne voli govoriti, ogroman broj Albanaca, bilo je Hrvata i tako dalje.

Ali ono što je za naše iskustvo važno jest: a) sigurnost nije bila dovoljna; b) decentralizacija umjesto demokracije nije bila dovoljna, nego je, dapače, kontraproduktivna; c) što nitko na zapadu ne voli čuti, demokratizacija i liberalizacija su omogućile rat i to je ono što treba jasno reći.

Jugoslavija je mogla opstati samo kao nedemokratska država. Pitanje je glasilo: nedemokratska Jugoslavija ili rat? I to je ono što se treba suočiti bez fraziranja u kojem sam ja godinama sudjelovao, pokušaja da se demokratizira Jugoslavija jer se pokazalo da to nije bilo moguće. A da je demokratizacija *de facto* vodila do liberalizacije javnog prostora, a liberalizacija javnog prostora je dovela do govora mržnje jer su ljudi odlučili da mogu konačno govoriti o onome o čemu se četrdeset godina nije smjelo govoriti, tko je zapravo koga ubio u Drugom svjetskom ratu i ne znaju i najčešće da time pripremaju novi rat. To su sve, po mom sudu, iskustva koja idu nasuprot uobičajenim frazama koje čete čuti. Najčešće fraze koje se vani čuju su da je to nastavak višestoljetnih sukoba Srba i Hrvata. Povijesna činjenica je veoma jednostavna i hrvatski i srpski nacionalisti je ne vole čuti: nikada u povijesti nije bilo oružanog sukoba Hrvata i Srba do 1991. godine. U Drugom svjetskom ratu su se zajedno borili protiv partizana, na Bleiburgu su zajedno stradali; *nota bene* jedan od najvećih skandala katolike crkve je to što ne dopuštaju pravoslavnom svećeniku da dođe na Bleiburško polje, a tamo je ubijeno više pravoslavaca nego muslimana, ali to ostavljam po strani. Ono što je me utim važno, prvi put u povijesti, sukob koji su jedni drugima dugo obećavali je došao do ishoda, kao sukob koji je imao jasnu nacionalnu konotaciju. Srbija je htjela ovo, Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica, Hrvatska je htjela, a da to najprije nije mogla reći, teritoriji ili a) Banovine, i b) što je bilo još teže reći je onaj koji je Tito, odnosno Tilas, u onoj sjednici Politbiroa dodijelio Hrvatskoj. Pokazalo se, dakle, da je nacionalna strategija koja je motivirala ljude za rat bila zapravo, kao i često inače, kao i svaka druga ideologija – oslonjena na nešto što su bile lažne "činjenice", lažne tvrdnje koje su se pojavljivale kao činjenice. U tom kontekstu s mirovnog stajališta mi se čini jako važnim jedna stvar, nasuprot uobičajenim shvaćanjima da je za mir bitno suočiti se s uzrocima rata pa ih onda preraditi, meni se čini puno važnije da se mimo realnih uzroka rata pozabavimo onime što je dovelo do toga da ljudi prihvate rat.

U Prvom svjetskom ratu, ljudi nisu išli u rat zbog diobe kolonija u Africi, iako je to realni uzrok u pozadini, nego zato što su "grozni Srbi" ubili našeg nadvojvodu u Sarajevu. To je ono što je realno motiviralo ljude za rat. Ovdje je važno pokazati što je realno motiviralo ljude, a uzroci rata su bili mnogo manje ekonomski, a puno više simbolički. Nitko ne bi bio sretniji od mene, osobno i profesionalno, da mogu reći da se Jugoslavija raspala zato što se nisu poštovala ljudska prava, ali to nažalost nije istina. Oni koji su bili bitni faktori raspada Jugoslavije nisu bili značajno zainteresirani za ljudska prava, bili su zainteresirani za prava određenih skupina, jedne nasuprot druge, i onda na takti koj razine, u kojoj su me narodni promatrači stalno i iznova

tical to the Serbian uniforms from World War One; even the five-pointed stars were removed. Almost everyone has forgotten that. But that was the point at which Yugoslavia was no more: after the fall of Vukovar, there was no more Yugoslavia, only Serbia, even formally speaking. The paradox was that, until the beginning of the war in Croatia, 56% of all soldiers were non-Serbian. It is rarely talked about nowadays, but the first war victim in Split was a Macedonian, one driving a tank; we also fail to mention the large number of Albanian casualties, even though there were some Croatians as well, of course.

What is important for our experience are the following facts: a.) Security was not enough; b.) Decentralization was not a fitting substitute for democracy; in fact, it was counter-productive; c.) Although the West dislikes hearing this, democratization and liberation actively enabled the war, and this should be stated explicitly.

Yugoslavia could have survived and persisted only as a non-democratic country. There was a choice between a non-democratic Yugoslavia on one hand and war on the other. This needs to be faced without attempting to phrase it differently, as many of us, including myself, have been trying to do: simply put, Yugoslavia could not have been democratized, and that has been proven. This democratization *de facto* led to the liberalization of public space which in turn led to hate speech, because people decided to start talking about a topic which had been forbidden for forty years, "who had killed whom during World War Two", without realizing that in doing so they were laying the groundwork for a new war. All of these are experiences which disprove the accepted "truths" you are likely to hear. The explanation which is most commonly heard abroad is that the war was a continuation of a centuries-long feud between Serbs and Croats. But there is a very simple historical fact which neither Serbian nor Croatian nationalists like to hear: never in history before 1991 did Croats and Serbs engage each other in armed conflict. During World War Two they fought together against the Partisans, they died together in Bleiburg; *nota bene*, one of the greatest errors of judgment of the Catholic Church is banning Orthodox priests from Bleiburg, when in fact more Orthodox faithful than Muslims lost their lives there, but that is another story. What is important, though, is that for the first time in history the long-awaited conflict finally erupted, in the form of a confrontation with strong national overtones. Serbia wanted the Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica stretch, while Croatia wanted, without being able to overtly express this, either the territorial scope of the Banovina of Croatia, or the territory that Tito and Tilas assigned to Croatia at the historic meeting of the Politbiro. It was shown that the nationalist strategy which motivated the people into waging war was in fact, as it often is, like any other ideology, based on erroneous "facts" and false claims representing themselves as facts. In this context, and from a peace-building viewpoint, there is one problem I need to point out: contrary to the popular opinion that in order to build peace we must face the underlying causes of war and work on them, I believe it is much more important to focus on the reason(s) why people chose to accept this war.

promašivali, radilo se sljedeće: kad su vidjeli da se kao opravdanje sukoba pojavljuje nacionalni ili nacionalistički motiv onda su svi svjetski mudraci prihvatili jednu shemu koju znaju, to je pravo na samoodređenje. Međutim, pravo na samoodređenje ne znači i moje pravo da kažem ja sam Hrvat, nego znači i da kad kažem "ja sam Hrvat", time kažem - ovo je Hrvatska, ono je uvijek teritorijalno pravo, a ne pravo stanovništva. Onda se radilo tako da su svi raspravljali '91. godine o pravima Srba u Kninu i Hrvata u Zagrebu, umjesto da se raspravlja o pravima Hrvata u Kninu i Srba u Zagrebu koji su na koncu nastradali. Kao što danas raspravljaju o pravima Srba u sjevernoj Mitrovici i Albanaca u sjevernom djelu Mitrovice, i Albanaca u ostalom djelu Kosova, umjesto da raspravljaju obrnuto i taj teritorijalni pristup je doveo do litavog niza pogrešnih prosudbi, kao što je nesposobnost da se anticipiraju stvari dovela do niza katastrofalnih inozemnih intervencija.

Ja ću samo dvije kratko spomenuti. Prvo, jedna od najglupljih stvari koja se dogodila bila je embargo na oružje u jesen '91. godine koje su propisale Ujedinjene nacije. On je stvorio hrvatsku mafiju, on je natjerao političare da pokvare kriminalce, da pošalju članove porodice ljudi iz vlade da s kriminalcima organiziraju firme u Lichtensteinu ili negdje drugdje da bi ilegalno kupovali oružje jer su Ujedinjene nacije zabranile da se kupuje oružje državi koja je bila napadnuta. I to je postupno dovelo do kriminalizacije i politike u društvu s katastrofalnim konsekvencama. U isto vrijeme, *nota bene*, nije donesen embargo o zabrani uvoza nafte i tada je jugoslavenska, odnosno srpska strana, imala ogromnu količinu oružja i malo nafte, a hrvatska je strana imala malo oružja i dovoljno nafte. Kada su uveli zabranu uvoza nafte, tri godine kasnije, srpski tenkovi su uglavnom bili stacionirani i služili su kao artiljerijska oružja, ne više kao tenkovi, više nafta nije bila toliko potrebna. Dakle, to je primjer pogrešnog reagiranja. Drugi primjer je katastrofalno postupanje spram Makedonije koje je po mom sudu najviše i neuspjeh svih inozemnih dimbenika. Prvo, prva odluka Badinterove komisije od 19. prosinca 1991. glasi da su tri bivše jugoslavenske republike zatražile da budu međunarodno priznate, od njih tri jedna udovoljava svim uvjetima, to je Makedonija, druga, Slovenija, nema novi ustav koji je donesen 4 dana kasnije, treća, Hrvatska, nema Zakon o zaštiti manjina. Od te tri, dvije su priznate – Hrvatska i Slovenija, a Makedonija nije zbog Grčkog nacionalizma. Makedonija je ostala žrtvom. S druge strane, u Makedoniji se dogodio jedini pozitivni pomak međunarodne intervencije tako da su u '90-im godinama doveli, prvi puta u povijesti, jedinice Ujedinjenih nacija prije sukoba: 600 vojnika UN-a i 600 američkih vojnika. Da bi onda jedan korumpirani makedonski političar za nekoliko milijuna dolara priznao, natjerao vladu da prizna Tajvan kao Kinu pa je Kina zauzvrat blokirala produženje mandata trupa u Makedoniji u narednoj odluci Vijeća sigurnosti. Petnaest dana nakon te odluke je počeo rat u Makedoniji. Imamo gotovo empirijske dokaze, a praktički nema analize te situacije koja pokazuje veličinu promašaja inozemnih intervencija. Mi smo '91. bili na jednom skupu na kojemu je bio Butros Butros Ghali. Na pitanje što može učiniti za Hrvatsku ja sam tada odgovorio: "Ja mislim da za Hrvatsku ništa, ali možete slati jedinice u Bosnu i Hercegovinu, tamo će doći do rata". On je rekao: "Nemamo mandat slati vojsku tamo gdje nema rata". Kad su shvatili, bilo je prekasno. Prema tomu, taj tip što se zove *early warning* je nešto što

During World War One, people didn't go to war because of the colonies in Africa, even though they were the concrete underlying cause of the war, but because "those horrible Serbs" killed our archduke in Sarajevo. That was what really motivated people to go to war. These realistic motivations are what should be figured out; the reasons for going to war were much more symbolic than they were economic. No one would be happier than me, both personally and professionally, if we could say that Yugoslavia dissolved because of human rights violations, but unfortunately this is not true. The key agents in this process were not really interested in human rights; they were interested in the rights of particular groups, opposing groups, and pursued their agendas on a tactical level which was repeatedly missed by international observers: when the conflict was explained as the result of national or nationalist tendencies, the wise men of the international community clung to the only paradigm they know, which is the right to self-determination. However, the right to self-determination does not merely enable me to claim to be Croatian; it always entails the following step: when I say "I am Croatian" that also means "This is Croatia" – it is a territorial issue, not an issue of human rights. Back then, in 1991, people would discuss the rights of Serbs in Knin and Croats in Zagreb instead of discussing the rights of Croats in Knin and Serbs in Zagreb, who were the ones who ultimately suffered. The same process is going on today: people are discussing the rights of Serbs in northern Mitrovica and Albanians in the rest of Kosovo, instead of doing it the other way around, and this territorial approach has led to a series of bad calls, in the same manner that the inability to anticipate events led to a series of disastrous international intervention.

I will briefly mention just two of them. First, one of the dumbest moves the international community ever made was the weapons embargo imposed on Croatia in the fall of 1991 by the United Nations. This move created the Croatian mafia, it made the politicians consort with criminals and send the families of cabinet members abroad in order to organize companies in Lichtenstein or similar places which could buy weapons legally, because the United Nations had prohibited a country under attack from buying weapons. This gradually led to the criminalization of the political sector and of the whole society, with disastrous consequences. At the same time, *nota bene*, there was no similar embargo on oil, so the Yugoslavian, or Serbian, side had plenty of weapons and not enough oil while the Croatian side had few weapons but sufficient oil. When the oil embargo was imposed three years later, the Serbian tanks were already mostly stationary, and used as artillery, so oil was no longer needed. This is a textbook example of misguided interventions. Another example is the scandalous attitude towards Macedonia, which was, in my opinion, the greatest failure of the international community. The first decision of the Badinter Arbitration Committee on January 19th 1991 claimed that, of the three former Yugoslav republics which requested international recognition of independence, one fulfilled all necessary prerequisites, which was Macedonia; the second one, Slovenia, didn't have a new constitution (which was created four days later), while the third one, Croatia, didn't have a law governing the protection of minorities. Of these three countries, two were recognized: Croatia and Slovenia, while



se stalno promašivalo zato što su one prve etiri to ke što sam rekao, one svjetonazorske, ideologijske ili, ako ho ete da na fin na in kažem, filozofijske, bile krivo interpretirane, o sigurnosti, o decentralizaciji odnosno demokracizaciji, op enito o opstanku Jugoslavije, pa se nije vidjelo kako stvari zapravo stoje. To je po mom sudu, zadano u naobrazbi, svjetonazoru i interesu onih koji vode me unarodnu politiku tako da se bojim da niti ova iskustva ne e biti od velike pomo i ali rekao sam za svaki slu aj da olakšam svoju dušu. Hvala lijepo.

#### SLOBODAN FRANOVIĆ:

...

I sada koje je mjesto Crne Gore, ovdje je propušteno i ina e se propušta prva agresija koja je napravljena. Nemojte bukvalno shvatiti agresiju, mada su u estvovala vojne sigurnosne službe. To je bila agresija na Crnu Goru, to je bio prevrat '89. godine. Zato što je Crna Gora, kakva je bila tada, slaba, ona je bila slabija po autonomiji, po kapacitetima, kakvim god ho ete, institucionalnim.

...

Me unarodna zajednica tada se još nije miješala, ali unutrašnji odgovor, drugih država ... sje am se tada i u vašoj štampi je pisalo: "hrvatska šutnja". Tako je bilo kvalifikovano to, a to je bio klju an doga aj. Možda nisam u pravu, to je moje mišljenje, ali da Miloševi onda može jednom kad je uspostavio kontrolu nad Crnom Gorom, da kaže nije Srbija u ratu, nego Jugoslavija je u ratu.

...

Pogledajte što se doga a s Bosnom, vrlo tužno s Bosnom i Hercegovinom, a imate ak, evo pro itao sam ju er, najnoviju inicijativu premijera srpskog entiteta, Dodika, koji kaže da je pokrenuo postupak da se donese zakon zabrane nošenja feredže. To je isto izrugivanje ljudskih prava, ja pripadam onima koji zagovaraju sekularizam, ali ovo je nešto drugo pa taj entitet ima državnu slavu iako je multi-etni an ... ja mislim da je važno za obnovu povjerenja i pomirenja i uspostavljanje ne ega što više ne e proizvoditi ove ratove, pitanje je snažnije podrške od strane Europske unije prema politici kažnjivosti ratnih zlo ina, a koju sada ne vidim. Mislim da je sada u funkciji onih koji zagovaraju politiku nekažnjivosti. Za mene je neprihvatljivo da svi znamo gdje se krije optuženi general Mladi , gdje se krije optuženi general Hadži ... Važno je da Europska unija nas tjera, ove države i njihove pravosudne sisteme na saradnju za ono što e do i poslije Haaga. Mi stalno vršimo pritisak u Crnoj Gori i nedavno je, prije mjesec dana, isporu ena jedna osoba koja je ovdje optužena za ratne zlo ine, prije nekoliko dana je uhapšena druga i mi podržavamo takve trendove, ali mi imamo u Crnoj Gori recimo tri su enja, sada u toku...

#### IVICA FILIPOVIĆ:

...

Ono što sam prvi put ovdje danas uo od gospodina profesora Puhovskoga, da je sukob imao etiri dimenzije. Ja bih tu dodao 5. dimenziju u kojoj sam ja, recimo, vodio rat, osobni rat. Meni je ve ina ljudi iz moje grupe mrtva. Pod udnim okolnostima, što zapravo je rat, što je gospodin rekao iz Crne Gore, da je to bila prva agresija vojno-obavještajnih službi. Eto, ja sam u jednom momentu rekao gospodinu Baji u (državni tužitelj op.a.) da sam imao pro-

Macedonia failed to receive recognition due to Greek nationalism. Macedonia was wronged here. On the other hand, Macedonia is the only example of positive change in international intervention policies: in the 1990s, for the first time in history, UN troops – 600 UN soldiers and 600 US soldiers - were deployed prior to the conflict. Afterwards, a corrupt Macedonian politician accepted several million dollars in bribes to make his government recognize Taiwan as part of China; in return, China blocked the Security Council from extending the mandate of UN troops in Macedonia. 49 days after that decision, the war in Macedonia began. We have empirical evidence of this, and yet there has been no analysis of this situation which would show the true scope of the failure of international interventions in this case. In 1991, we met Boutros Boutros Ghali at a conference. When he asked me what he could do for Croatia, I answered: "Nothing for Croatia, but you can send troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina, there will be war there." He said: "We do not have the mandate to send troops where there is no war." When they realized what was going down, it was too late. These early warnings were constantly neglected because they kept misinterpreting the basic four ideological, or philosophical, premises of security, decentralization and democratization, and the survival of Yugoslavia in general, so the real state of affairs was not understood. I am afraid that this is something which is embedded in the education, worldview and interests of international policy makers, so I'm afraid that our experiences will not change much, but I said it out loud just to take it off my chest. Thank you.

#### SLOBODAN FRANOVIĆ:

...

Where, then, is the place for Montenegro – which is being overlooked as the first site of Yugoslavian aggression. I am not talking about literal aggression, although the army security services were involved. It was an act of aggression on Montenegro, a coup in 1989! This was possible because Montenegro was weak, and had limited autonomy and institutional capacities.

...

The international community did not interfere back then, and there was an internal consensus between other federal states: I remember even the Croatian press commenting on the "Croatian silence". That was how it was qualified, this crucial event. I may not be correct, this is only my opinion, but establishing control over Montenegro enabled Miloševi to say that it was Yugoslavia and not Serbia who went to war.

...

Look at the sad events taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is even a new initiative by the prime minister of the Serbian entity, Dodik, who is attempting to pass a law to ban burqas from being worn in public. This is a mockery of human rights; I am in favor of secularism, but this is something else entirely. This entity even has a national holiday even though the country is multi-ethnic. I believe that, in order to build trust and reconciliation and a society which will not cause any further conflict, we need stronger support from the EU towards the enforcement of processing crimes of war, which is something that is currently lacking. I think the current policy favors those who advocate politics of impunity. It is unacceptable that we all know where



blema sa sustavom, moji ujaci su završili, kao pripadnici onih snaga NDH-a na Bleiburgu, ali mi se ne bojimo suda, mi se bojim grabe. Do i na sud je velika stvar, bolje Gotovina u Haagu, nego u grabi. Tako da bih ja ovdje, osobno, s obzirom da profesor vrlo dobro zna dijagnozu, njemu dao jedan dokument koji se zove "Provođenje programa lustracije". To znači rješavanje ostataka bivše službe. Koliko znam Europska unija ima neku deklaraciju.

...  
Ali zapravo, mi pri ulasku u Europsku uniju moramo završiti nekoliko stvari, jedna od njih je upravo ta da riješimo problem lustracije, kako smo, recimo sad, otvorili problem branitelja, gdje je puno toga nama natovareno na vrat, gdje je sistematski pravljena zavada među ljudima. Nama su se nudile mirovine i sve ostalo, a za mene su oni ljudi koji su dobili mirovinu i ovako i onako žrtve. Ovjek u si uzeo radno mjesto, onda si ga još napravio kriminalcem i natjerao ga da kupi mirovinu. To je jednostavno bilo sustavno, nisu ljudi krivi osobno.

### SEMINA LONČAR:

Evo mali prilog današnjoj konferenciji. Kako da Europa nauči iz naših iskustava da prepozna moguće konflikte sutra koji se mogu dogoditi u Europi, kako ih prevenirati i kako ih suzbiti i kako ih ukloniti. Da bismo došli do preliminarnih zaključaka koji daju neke sugestije, neka rješenja, opet se moramo vratiti na onu temu, a to je suočavanje s prošlošću. Znači, moramo na neki način sagledati te činjenice i istinu sagledati s više aspekata, i politički i pravno i s filozofskog aspekta, sa svih tih vrijednosnih sudova sagledati što se to događalo.

Pitanje je da li promatrati tu istinu kao cjelokupno događanje u kontekstu europskog i svjetskog poretka ili pojedinačno što se događalo u mom kraju, u mom gradu. Ja mogu upravo započeti s iskustvima što se događalo u mom Splitu '90. godine. Bila sam jedan od direktora Brodogradilišta Split i kao pripadnik vešinskog hrvatskog naroda sam osjetila potrebu da se suprotstavim nacionalizmima, koji su u početku bili tihi, koji su bili perfidni prema radnicima Brodogradilišta Split. Tada je brodogradilište brojalo 12 000 radnika i kooperanata. Tada je počeo moj aktivizam i borba za ljudska prava jer sam osjetila potrebu da se angažiram i suprotstavim gaženju onih koji su manjina, koji su civili, koji nisu bili u nikakvim vojnim institucijama ni političkim tijelima, prema kojima nije bilo pošteno da se krene s politikom, recimo, iseljavanje iz stanova, isključivanje s posla. Ja sam kao jedan od rukovodioca morala na listu tehnološkog viška pobrojati na svom odjelu sve Srbe i staviti ih na listu tehnološkog viška. Ja sam pitala direktora, po čemu uvažavate tko je Srbin, a tko Hrvat broj jedan, a broj dva, zar to može biti kriterij tko je loš ili dobar radnik? Na to mi je direktor, sada pokojni, odgovorio da se još o čemu nisam dobro osvijestila kao Hrvatica. Ja sam pitala da mi pojasni taj termin, ja sam tu strunu jako, educirala sam se u Švedskoj da mogu primijeniti neke nove tehnologije u brodogradnji i smatrala sam da je to moj značajni doprinos. To je samo jedna sličina '90. godine.

...  
Istina je stvar trenutka i kako se stvar sagledava, po meni, ona treba biti sagledana s više vrijednosnih aspekata i možda je jedna generacija mlađih

the indicted generals Mladić and Hadžić are hiding. ... The European Union should pressure these countries and their judicial systems to cooperate in order to prepare them for what will come after the Hague trials. We are constantly pressuring the government of Montenegro, and a month ago a person indicted for war crimes was extradited, several ago another suspect was apprehended, and this is a trend we support wholeheartedly; we have three trials in progress in Montenegro at the moment.

### IVICA FILIPOVIĆ:

...  
Today, professor Puhovski said that the conflict had four dimensions. Here I would add a 5<sup>th</sup> one, the field on which the war took place for me: an inner, personal war. Most of the people from my unit are dead. They died in strange circumstances; our participant from Montenegro already mentioned that the war started by the aggression of the military security services. At one point, I told Mr. Bajić (the state prosecutor) that I had some issues with the system; my uncles, as members of the forces of the NDH, ended up in Bleiburg; we are not afraid of the court, we are afraid of the ditch. Appearing before the court is an important thing; being tried in the Hague is better for Gotovina than ending up in a ditch. Personally, since the professor is well aware of the situation, I would like to present a document entitled "Implementing the process of lustration". This would enable us to dispose of the remains of the former secret services infrastructure. As far as I know, the EU has some sort of declaration to that effect.

...  
During the process of accession to the EU, we must take care of several issues, one of which is this problem of lustration; the issue of war veterans is being tackled, but a great amount of blame has been shifted to our shoulders, as if there was a systematic attempt to cause conflict within the people. We were offered pensions and so forth; in my opinion, those people who accepted such pensions are already victims. Their jobs have been taken from them, and they have been forced to become criminals and buy their pensions. This was a flaw of the system, there was no personal blame in it.

### SEMINA LONČAR:

Let me offer my humble contribution to today's conference. Can Europe learn from our experience how to recognize possible conflicts in Europe in the future, how to prevent, control and end them? In order to reach preliminary conclusions on which we can base our suggestions and solution, we must once again go back to the topic of facing the past. We must somehow consider these facts and look at the facts from several viewpoints, politically, judicially, and philosophically: all these value systems can provide an interpretation of what was going on here. The question is, should we consider these facts in the context of the European and global system or in the local context of what was going on in our particular towns and neighborhood. I can talk about the events that took place in my hometown of Split in 1990. I was one of the managers of the Brodosplit shipyard and, as a member of the Croatian majority, I was intent on combating the growing nationalisms,

osoba i naše djece i unuka, koji ne e biti optere eni tim razli itim istinama, o tome dati puno bolji sud i procjenu kako bi, ne kako bi promijenili povijest, nego kako bi u budu nosti gradili upravo taj mir i sigurnost. Tako er, što se ti e nekakvog doprinosa da se te sigurnosne politike grade, mislim da smo zanemarili u ovih 20 godina upravo pristup prema u enicima u školama, i mladima i prema školskim udžbenicima. Kad pogledam udžbenik 4. razreda osnovne škole, zna i da je u eniku 10 - 11 godina, tekstovi vrve rije ima krv, robovi, zlo ini, patnje i sl. Zna i, ve kod te djece se usa uju neki izrazi koji kod njih mogu izazvati neke nedoumice, dileme, frustracije, na kraju krajeva nepoznavanja onoga što je pisac htio re i i kakva je poruka toga.

Moja je poruka da moramo edukaciju kroz naše školske udžbenike provoditi upravo o ljudskim pravima, kroz mirotvorne politike, politike nenasilnih rješavanja konflikata me u mladima od malih nogu.

### ZLATKO VUJOVIĆ:

...  
Ono što sam htio re i, a spomenuto je sporadi no od nekoliko kolega koji su izlagali danas, jeste pitanje obrazovanja, tj. ovdje je kolegica spominjala mirovno obrazovanje. Me utim, ono što ja vjerujem da je jedan velik problem kada govorimo o unapre enju nekoga suživota i tolerancije na ovim prostora i preveniranje nekih eventualno mogu ih sukoba, jeste upravo što postoje i obrazovni sistemi proizvode odre ene tenzije i obrazuju mlade ljude da imaju negativan odnos prema pripadnicima drugih naroda u okruženju. Zašto to kažem? Zato što, koliko ja mogu saznati iz razgovora s prijateljima i kolegama u regionu, ini se da agresivnost kod mladih ljudi, koji ne pamte konflikte li no, na osnovu svojih li nih iskustava, mnogo je snažnija i ja a nego što je to slu aj kada govore ljudi koji su preživjeli te sukobe, preživjeli taj konflikt na osnovu neke li ne traume.

...  
Moderator je postavio pitanje da li je Crna Gora mogla ranije da stekne nezavisnost ili je dobro da je tada. Mi smo '97. godine ušli u period kada su se po eli sticati uslovi da se izborimo za nezavisnost, a 2006. smo i formalno stekli. No, ja mislim da je najve a vrijednost kada govorimo o državnom vrhu i ukanovi u, koji je obilježio dvadeset godina vlasti u Crnoj Gori, jeste što smo možda imali više strpljenja nego možda neke druge zemlje u tom sticanju. Mogli smo je ste i ranije, ali pitanje je cijene – koja bi bila cijena sticanja takve neovisnosti, da li je možda nekoliko godina ranije, možda i 7-8 godina ranije ste i neovisnost bilo prihvatljivo posebno kada to poredimo s iskustvima drugih država na podru ju bivše Jugoslavije. Vjerojatno je da kada govorimo o sagledavanju efekata politike državnog vrha, to najuspješniji dio politike, a to je izbjegavanje direktnog konflikta i ratnih dešavanja u Crnoj Gori. Ja vjerujem da se možda i pored svega onoga što se dešavalo od strane državnog vrha Srbije od '86. pa naprijed, da je možda bilo više strpljenja i u politikama koje su vodile Hrvatska i Slovenija možda bi bile izbjegnute u jednom dijelu. ... ini se da su se oružani sukobi koji su se desili izme u strana koje nisu bile ravnopravne, a vjerujem ako strane nisu ravnopravne treba sa ekati, kao što je slu aj u Crnogorskog državnog vrha, oni su se jednostavno sve vrijeme naoružavali, ja ali su svoje bezbijeđnosne snage do onoga

which, although initially subdued, were harmful to the workers of the shipyard. The shipyard had 12,000 employees at that time. That is when my human rights activism began, because I felt the need to oppose the oppression of minorities and civilians who had no connections to any military or political institution, and who shouldn't be politically assaulted through evictions and layoffs. As one of the managers, I was told to find all Serbs in my department and place them on the redundancy list. I asked him how I was supposed to know who was Serbian and who Croatian, and how that could be a sensible criterion to determine the quality of an employee? The now late general manager told me that I obviously wasn't in touch with my Croatian self. I asked him to explain that comment; I was an expert, educated in Sweden so I could bring some new shipbuilding technologies; I thought that was what I was there for. This is just a still from 1990.

...  
Truth is a matter of moment and perception; in my opinion, it has to be considered from several value systems, so a younger generation, one of our children or grandchildren, who are unburdened by these different truth systems, might be able to judge this whole situation better; not in order to rewrite history but to enable themselves to build peace and security for the future. Likewise, I believe that our security-building policies of the past 20 years have neglected to participate in the educational process, including communication with children and youths and in the design of textbooks. When I look at the 4<sup>th</sup> grade history textbook, I can see that a child of 10 or 11 years is presented with a series of words such as *blood, slaves, crimes, suffering*, which can cause dilemmas and frustration in children, who may be unable to grasp what the author was trying to say and what his message was. My point is that textbooks should be utilized to promote human rights, peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution from an early age.

### ZLATKO VUJOVIĆ:

...  
What I wanted to say, which was already sporadically mentioned by several contributors here today, was the issue of education; specifically, peace education. However, I believe that a large problem in building and improving tolerance and coexistence in this region and preventing possible future conflicts is precisely the fact that existing educational systems produce certain tensions and teach young people to have a negative attitude towards members of other ethnicities of the region. Why am I saying this? Because, based on my conversations with friends and coworkers in this region, the aggression among young people, who have had no personal experience of conflict, is much more pronounced than in the attitudes of people who actually personally took part in this traumatic conflict.

...  
The Moderator raised the question of whether Montenegro could have achieved independence earlier or if the timing was good. In 1997 we started achieving the prerequisites for that independence, and in 2006 we were formally recognized. Personally, I believe that the greatest advantage, when speaking of our higher political echelons and ukanovi , who has been in power for 20 years in Montenegro, is that they exhibited more patience in

trenutka kada je bilo nemoguće za vojne snage Savezne Republike Jugoslavije da održe kontrolu nad teritorijem Crne Gore. Samim tim potpuno je bila bespredmetna vojna opcija za Miloševića, da on nije imao nikakve šanse da i ostvari u Crnoj Gori.

#### KSENIJA JOVIČIĆ:

...

Ja bih dala jedan prijedlog Europskoj uniji što bi oni mogli naučiti od nas. Znači, prvo prijedlog, a onda mogu obrazložiti ukratko zašto. Uvesti predmet Odgoj za demokraciju i ljudska prava, dakle, odgajati za ljudska prava i demokraciju od vrtića, a od osnovne škole i srednje škole uvesti taj predmet u škole. Ja vam mogu reći što smo mi do sada napravili. Nastavnim planom i programom za upravne referente je predviđeno u drugom i trećem razredu dva sata predmeta ljudska prava. Kod nas u Vukovaru već 4. godinu predajem taj predmet samo u trećem razredu, dakle, samo dva sata. Koliko mi je poznato, to je kao fakultativni predmet, kao što se odabire latinski jezik ili filozofija, uvršten u nastavu, dakle, dobivaju se ocjene. Nije mi poznato da još nigdje u Hrvatskoj postoji u nastavi ... Država je ponudila učenice o ljudskim pravima, uvršteno je u nastavni plan od 2005. godine, ali nigdje nije prepoznato, osim u Vukovaru i to igrom slučaja. ... Govorim o ljudskim pravima kroz institucije, dakle, ne kroz nevladine organizacije koje, npr. organiziraju škole ljudskih prava, gdje od naših 400 učenika svake godine eventualno dva učenika odu na tu školu i onda kad se vrate kažu: "ostalo mi je srce tamo". Na taj način to doživljavaju, kao nešto sasvim novo. To govorim zato jer ne možemo današnje političare preodgojiti, ali možda možemo buduće političare naučiti...

#### VELJKO VIČEVIĆ:

...

Ja ću pokušati samo s jednog aspekta sagledati djelovanje Europske unije i šire međunarodne zajednice na sukobe koji su se, odnosno rat koji se dešavao i u našoj zemlji. Volim to često istaknuti, da su oni nazočni od početka. Dakle, to je jedna činjenica koja se rijetko vidi kroz povijest u svijetu, uvijek dolaze nakon ili pred kraj sukoba, ovdje su prisutni doslovce prije većih sukoba, oni su već nazočni ili na našim područjima. Ja vidim jedan problem pa je moje skromno mišljenje da im uputimo jednu poruku. Mislim da niti Europa niti svijet nije bio baš previše spreman u organizaciji *monitoringa* budućeg sukoba. Prvenstveno mislim da nisu imali izgrađene standarde kakve ljude treba uputiti i koje edukacije trebaju biti ti ljudi – uglavnom su dolazili diplomati, a neki i sa ne previše dobrim, kako bih rekao, diplomatskim radom, dakle, ne previše iskusni, ali i oni koji su bili iskusni, nije se previše ušlo u genezu situacije su se ti ljudi bavili, kojom vrstom diplomacije i onda kad su došli, imam dojam da su novonastale države maltene bili taoci tih ljudi na određenom načinu. Što želim istaknuti, i to je moja poruka kao malog čovjeka, dionika svih tih događanja, da je Europa u izgradnji sigurnosne politike, koju doživljavam kao jako heterogenu i dosta tromu, sebi dozvolila da kroz djelovanje na ovim prostorima, upravo kroz te ljude, posrednike, odnosno urede, na neki način možda i u datom trenutku, lošim odabirom kadra, postaje taoc svojih odluka tih ljudi.

the process of achieving independence. We could have achieved independence sooner, but the price would have been steeper if we had pressed the issue 7 or 8 years earlier, especially taking into consideration the experiences of other former Yugoslav nations. This is probably the greatest achievement of our statesmen: avoiding direct conflict and war in Montenegro. I believe that, in spite of all that the Serbian rulers had been doing from 1986 onwards, had there been more patience in Croatian and Slovenian policies, some of the conflicts could have been partially avoided. The armed conflict erupted between sides who were not equal, and I believe that, in the case of uneven odds, the disadvantaged side should wait, as was the case in Montenegro. We kept arming and strengthening our security forces, up to the point where it was impossible for the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to maintain control over the Montenegrin territory. This took the option of military conflict out of Milošević's hands: he had no chance of winning a war in Montenegro.

#### KSENIJA JOVIČIĆ:

I would like to make a suggestion to the European Union as to what they might learn from us. First, I will present the suggestion, and then I will explain and elaborate on it. We should introduce a subject entitled "Democracy and Human Rights Education" into our educational systems, starting as early as kindergarten and following through in elementary schools and high-schools. I can tell you what we have achieved so far. The syllabus of our School for Administration and Management includes two classes in *Human Rights* a week in the second and third grade. For four years I have been teaching this subject to third-graders in Vukovar, two hours a week. As far as I know, this is an optional class like Latin or Philosophy and they are graded on it. I am not aware of whether this exists anywhere else in Croatia. ... The government offers human rights education, it is part of the National Syllabus since 2005, but it is not being implemented anywhere except in Vukovar. ... I am talking about institutional human rights education, that is, not through non-government organizations and their projects such as human rights workshops. These workshops are attended by maybe two of our 400 students a year, and when they return they say that they have "left their heart there". They realize that this is something completely new. I am emphasizing the importance of this process because we may not be able to reach the politicians of today, but we can educate the politicians of tomorrow.

#### VELJKO VIČEVIĆ:

...

I will attempt to consider the actions of the European Union and the wider international community in response to the conflict or more accurately war which took place in our country, among others. I often like to emphasize that they were present from the very beginning. This is a fact that is rarely perceived in history: usually, the international community steps forward at the end of the conflict or even after the resolution, while in this case they were here even before the conflict began. I see a problem here, so I think we should send them a message. I believe that neither Europe nor the rest

**GORDAN BODOG:**

...

Htio sam reći nešto vezano za obrazovanje za sudjelovanje u mirovnim misijama koje su već u tijeku. Da podsjetim, mislim da je 2002. ili čak 2003. u Hrvatskoj, u organizaciji Ministarstva obrane i Hrvatske vojske, bilo održano nekoliko vježbi, što simulacijskih, što terenskih. To su vježbe usklađivanja mirovnih operacija, gdje bude zatrebalo. Bio sam prisutan na dvije simulacijske vježbe koje su se zbog troškova odvijale internetski jer i vojska već duže vrijeme obrazuje *cyberom*. Dakle, negdje 200-tinjak ljudi iz inozemstva na vezi, nije se sve radilo na terenu, nego na kompjuterima i zapravo ta vrsta i obrazovanje za mirovne misije u onom smislu kako postoje sporazumi i što se misli o tome je odrađeno, u realitetu. Trebalo bi analizirati kako zapravo te međunarodne, pa i europske vojne snage, koje onda participiraju pa i sa NATO-om i ostalima u mirovnim misijama, kakvo je to obrazovanje rađeno, kakve su te vježbe zaključke pokazali, plus-minus analiza, kakva je praksa, procijeniti što je bilo dobro, a mogu vam reći i jer sam bio prisutan, da tu o mirovnom obrazovanju nije bilo govora.

**RADA BORIĆ:**

Ne znam kako i na koji način će Europa prihvatiti naše prijedloge ali evo, u dobroj volji. Sigurnosno iskustvo bilo bi i mirovno iskustvo iz cijele regije budući da su i žene i muškarci prelazili granice bez obzira na ratne sukobe i ratove. Mi [u regiji] imamo ipak 15-godišnje iskustvo kako se radi, kako se još uvijek može raditi. Ja govorim iz ženskog iskustva, imamo nešto od priručnika i *manuala* koje su radile žene koje su radile sa žrtvama rata, i ovog trenutka se koristi u Afganistanu, a koristilo se za vrijeme NATO-ova bombardiranja i na Kosovu. Dakle, postoji ovo materijalno iskustvo u smislu mirovnog obrazovanja tako da mislim da imamo neku ekspertizu oko prevencija sukoba.

Budući da je EU Hrvatsku s pravom natjerala na uvođenje nekih standarda, voljela bih sagledati situaciju iz rodne perspektive. Naime, postoji dokument koji ove godine slavi svoju 10. godišnjicu i obvezujućiji je za Hrvatsku, to je UN-ova rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti 13/25 koja govori o ženama i politikama mira. No, Hrvatska još uvijek nije napravila akcijski plan za provedbu te politike, a ona upravo govori o tome kako bi se žene mogle uključiti i u mirovne misije, mirovne edukacije i drugačije se tretirati, ne samo kao žrtve rate već i kao one koje mogu doprinijeti miru. Mislim da bi bila zgodna ideja, budući da je Hrvatska napravila već niz akcijskih planova od ribarstva do uvođenja podmorja, da se napravi i nacionalni akcijski plan za tu rezoluciju. E sad, ne znam možemo li mi utjecati na Europu da nas natjera da napravimo akcijski plan? Mi jesmo Vladi poslale zahtjev, čak je i ženska civilna scena voljna napraviti taj plan jer smatramo da je bitna implementacija i da se vodi briga oko rodne ravnopravnosti, a ne samo oko mirovnih misija, nego upravo oko mirovne edukacije – nepristojno je da muškarci odlaze na Kosovo i hodaju po selima i pitaju koja je žena silovana, kada ima žena koje bi to znale napraviti kako treba.

of the world was adequately prepared for organizing the monitoring of the impending conflict. Firstly, I believe that they hadn't yet developed the standards delineating which people should be sent and what types of education are required: most of the envoys were diplomats, some of them less than diplomatic in their approach, I dare say; some of them inexperienced; but even those who were experienced were not selected on the basis of their diplomatic expertise, so the new countries became hostages to the ideas of those people. I wish to stress, as a regular person and participant of these events, that the European security policy, which is very heterogeneous and quite slow to react, caused Europe itself to become the hostage of its own decisions, through the actions of its agents - mediators and offices - in this region and, at times, through a poor choice of staff.

**GORDAN BODOG:**

I wanted to add something about the education for participating in already ongoing peace-building missions. Let me remind you that in 2002 and 2003 the Croatian Ministry of Defense and the Croatian Army organized several exercises, some of which were simulations and some field-exercises. These were peace operations simulations intended for any possible situation. I participated in two simulations which were held via the Internet, as the army has been utilizing cyber-resources. 200-odd people from abroad were online, communicating by means of computers, and peace-building education was taking place in the true spirit of existing peace-building treaties and schools of thought. We should analyze how the international and European armed forces which participate in peacekeeping mission alongside NATO troops are educated, what we can conclude from their exercises, conduct a cost-benefit analysis, and determine their flaws and advantages; however, having been present during their work in the field, I must conclude that peace-education was virtually non-existent in that context.

**RADA BORIĆ:**

I don't know how or if Europe will take our suggestions into consideration, but here they are anyway. The security experience is in some way the same as the peace-building experience [in the region] because men and women crossed the borders despite the wars and conflicts. We have a 15-year experience of how this sort of work should be undertaken. I am talking from a women's perspective, we have some manuals which were created by women in collaboration with victims of war which are currently being used in Afghanistan, and was used in Kosovo during the NATO bombings. We have material evidence of our peace-building education and experience, which points to a certain expertise in conflict prevention.

Seeing how the EU has rightfully made Croatia introduce certain standards, I would like to consider this issue from a gender perspective. The UN's Security Council resolution 13/25 concerns the issue of women and peace policies, and this year the document, which is binding for Croatia as well, celebrates its 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary. However, Croatia still hasn't formulated a plan to imple-



**EUGEN JAKOVČIĆ:**

Ja u samo kratko govoriti o inicijativi [Inicijativa za osnivanje Regionalne komisije za ustanovljavanje i javno iznošenje činjenica o ratnim zločinima i drugim teškim povredama ljudskih prava u bivšoj Jugoslaviji] koju je Gordan spomenuo, a Documenta se time bavi... Meni je drago da sam već jedan duži period u ovoj priči, radim u Documenti i malo sam duže na ovoj temi, vezano za regionalnu inicijativu velikog broja nevladinih organizacija [REKOM]. Ali, inicijativa kao takva može biti zapravo poruka institucijama u Europi, ona je negdje na toj razini i prepoznata. Ona je financirana i podržana u jednom djelu, dobivamo potporu iz Brisela i to je upravo važno da je prepoznata kao inicijativa. U inicijativi je negdje sudjelovao i profesor Puhovski i prepoznatljivi ljudi koji su se temama suočavanja s prošlosti i važnosti za naše društvo bavili jako rano i oni su definirali jedan cijeli van-sudski mehanizam koji može pokriti puno toga što je danas rečeno i koji može biti poruka kako se s tim temama na ovim prostorima radi. To jest naša inicijativa, ona nije negdje sa strane, to je inicijativa koja je potekla iz potreba koje su se pojavile, pojavila se od organizacija koje vrlo pomno prate sudbenu za ratne zločine i koje su vrlo hrabro, kao naše kolege u Bosni i Hercegovini, "Istraživačko-dokumentacioni centar" – velika organizacija koja je napravila popis svih stradalih i poginulih u BiH, "Fond za humanitarno pravo" je upravo napravio popis stradalih i poginulih na Kosovu i Documenta radi u Hrvatskoj "Ljudske gubitke '91.-'95.". To je vrlo teška stvar i ona ovdje ide vrlo mnogo, za razliku od Bosne i Kosova, vrlo je teško u Hrvatskoj. Ono što želim reći je da ova inicijativa, bez obzira na cilj, postiže nešto na mikro razini.

U veljači smo bili u Dubrovniku, imali smo regionalne konzultacije s logorašima, s ljudima koji su samim time pripadali različitim formacijama. Imali smo situaciju gdje su logoraši iz Republike Srpske, to nije iz susjednog Trebinja, usprkos zabrani njihove krovne udruge iz Banje Luke zapravo prekršili to pravilo, i po prvi puta nakon rata i svega onoga što su prošli u Splitu i Loru zapravo smogli snage i došli u Dubrovnik i razgovarali. Tako da na toj mikro-razini se zapravo postižu nekakvi napreci, stvara se jedan dobar ambijent iz kojega onda može proizaći puno toga. U Kninu smo organizirali konzultacije 4. kolovoza, dan prije proslave Oluje. Na našim konzultacijama, a čestito se to radi, svjedočile su žrtve u ovom slučaju i Hrvatske i Srpske u Kninu. To je bilo moguće, to je išlo i nije bilo nikakvih incidenata. Meni se zapravo to tada učinilo kao jedan vrlo važan iskorak jer, kao što i sami znate, medijski i u svakom drugom pogledu, tih dana se raspravljalo samo gdje će pjevati Marko Perković Thompson...

**ŽARKO PUHOVSKI:**

Tri stvari bih htio reći koje su na neki način bile implicitno u raspravi, a koje su za perspektivu za Europsku uniju važne. Prvo pitanje koje se iz Jugoslavije i njenog iskustva može naučiti jest da je podmetanje pod tepih ono što uništava zajednicu. To je ono što je Jugoslaviju dovelo da se od '41. – '45. nije govorila istina – mi smo svi u I., II., III., ofenzivu, a kod kuće slušali drugo. Lagali su i u školi, lagali su i kod kuće, ali smo više vjerovali onima kod kuće

ment this policy, which details the way in which women can get involved in peace missions, peace education, and be treated differently, not merely as victims of war but as participants in the peace-building process. I think it would be a good idea to formulate a national plan inspired by this resolution, in the same way plans which detail fishing or underwater environmental protection have been formulated. Can we influence Europe to make us formulated such a plan? We have already sent a request to the government, and the women's civil scene is willing to work on the plan, because we believe that the implementation and care about gender equality is vital, not just in peacekeeping missions but peace education as well: it is rude to have men going around the villages of Kosovo and asking how many women were raped, when there are female activists who would be able to do it properly.

**EUGEN JAKOVČIĆ:**

I will briefly present the initiative Gordan has already mentioned [The Initiative to form a Regional Commission for truth-seeking and truth-telling about war crimes and other severe human rights violations in Former Yugoslavia], which is something Documenta has been working on. ... I am pleased to be involved in all of this, I work for Documenta and have been working on this for a while now, in a joint regional initiative of a large number of non-government organizations [RECOM]. The initiative itself can be a lesson for other European institutions, it is recognized at that level. It is partially financed and supported by the official Brussels, and this recognition is important. Professor Puhovski contributed to the initiative, alongside noted individuals who have a vast experience in dealing with the past and its importance for our society, and who have defined an entire non-judicial mechanism which can handle most of the issues discussed today and which can be a lesson on how work should be done in this region. This is our initiative, it has not been imported from abroad, and it arose from emerging needs: it involves organizations which have been vigilantly monitoring war crimes trials, like the Bosnian Center for Research in Documentation, a large organization which has collected a list of all victims of war in BH, or the Fund for Humanitarian Law which has collected a list of war victims on Kosovo; Documenta is trying to do the same for war victims in Croatia in the period from 1991 till 1995. This is an arduous task and the process in Croatia has been very painful and difficult, unlike those in Bosnia and Kosovo. What I am trying to say is that this initiative can, irrespective of its goal, achieve something on the micro-level.

In February we visited Dubrovnik, had conversation with former prisoners of detention camps in the region, and which thus belonged to certain groups. At one point the ex-prisoners from Republika Srpska, from the neighboring Trebinj to be exact, defied the order of their association from Banja Luka and came over to talk, summoning up the strength to approach us after what they endured in Split and Lora. On this micro-level progress is constantly being achieved and a positive atmosphere is being created which could be the starting point for many things. In Knin we organized consultations on the 4<sup>th</sup> of August, one day before the celebration of the Oluja action. Many witnesses participated, from both the Croatian and Serbian side. It was possible,



jer su bili naši. I '91. godine pobijedila je istina od koje nasuprot istini iz škole jer se u školi evidentno lagalo, dakle, to je ovo suočavanje s prošlošću u koje je važno i za koje treba vremena. Uprizorit ću nešto. Moja je generacija, '68. generacija, u Njemačkoj uvela suočavanje s prošlošću, ne '49., nego dvadeset i nešto godina kasnije, plus ekonomski razvoj – nemojmo zaboraviti i ritav niz drugih stvari. Dakle, treba neko vrijeme da se do toga dođe i to je ta prva stvar koja mi se čini važnom.

Druga stvar, jednostavna paralela koja mi je pala na pamet neki dan kada sam dobio ogroman materijal, pregled rasprava u Belgiji. To je potpuno identična situacija u Jugoslaviji '88. i '89. godine, taj tip animoziteta između Valonaca i Flamanaca – ja se osjećam, nažalost, kao kod kuće. Međutim, sigurno je da tamo rata neće biti jer njihova država nije subjekt, jer su oni u Europskoj uniji. Jedan veliki anarhist, Kropotkin, iz drugih je razloga rekao da je jedini način da ljudi žive u miru jest da države budu tretirane kao maloljetnici, dakle, da budu u situaciji da im se reducira suvremenost. Nema uopće dvojbe da je tamo društvena napetost usporediva sa situacijom prije rata u Jugoslaviji. Europska unija to neće dati, dakle ovaj tip integracije zaista stišava sukob bez obzira na sve cijene, bez obzira koliko se to nama ne sviđa, pitanje glasi, i to je sada treće: što smo spremni dati za miran život? Nešto se treba žrtvovati, mi moramo ocijeniti što je važnije jer ono što se događalo nakon rata i što se čini najopasnijim je strah od sukoba kao takvih zato što smo vidjeli, kako god sukobe nazivali, do kuda oni vode – do ubijanja. Umjesto da se shvati da je normalan život društva život u sukobima i da se ustvari radi o smanjivanju razine nasilja u postupanju sa sukobima: ne da ja moram prihvatiti što je on rekao, nego da mu ne bacim glavu. A sad se kaže, nemoj mu baciti glavu u glavu tako što ćeš mu reći da ima pravo iako misliš nema pravo. I onda stvaramo podmetanje pod tepih i novi krug sukoba, odnosno spiralu. Ne samo govoriti, nego i moći uti, bez nespornosti i ići u pravcu redukcije nasilja, redukcije ovlasti države, nametanja pravila svima, pa i državama, i onda reći: ok, govorite što hoćete, svačajete se kako hoćete, ne emo vam nametati pravila postupanja.

Mi veoma često koristimo tu frazu istina i pomirba. Istina ide uz uznemiravanje, a ne pomirenje jer da citiram Oscara Wildea: "svako pristojno društvo počinje na laži jer je pristojno društvo". Nije pristojno nekome reći da je glup ili da ružno izgleda jer istina nije pristojna. Prema tome istina uvijek izaziva sukobe i uznemirenje i zato treba stvarati pripreme za istinu. Recimo da troje od nas ovdje, bilo kojih, zna kompletnu istinu, nedvojbeno da je sada kaže, ostali bi iz ovih ili onih razloga rekli: "Ma kakvi!", i imali bismo sukob. Treba ići korak po korak, istinu treba tretirati kao nešto što se dozira. Ja to kao profesor filozofije ne bih smjeo reći, ali istina je da kada nešto nekome lupite u glavu izaziva kontra reakciju. Dakle, moramo psihologiju uzimati u obzir, ono što je kolega govorio o povijesti, njemački učenici u povijest tako da imaju na lijevoj strani engleski dokument iz Drugog svjetskog rata, a na drugoj strani njemački dokument. Ono što ja hoću da znate, što je pisao general Adžić i što je pisao general Mladić Jastrebovi ili Veliki Jastrebovi, vi si izvolite imati svoje stavove, to mene ne zanima, hoću da vidim to kao učenice i učenici znate, to od vas tražim, a interpretacije neću davati ja kao profesor jer ću opet doći

it was working and it caused no incidents. I think that that was a great step forward, because at that time, as you know, the majority of the media was discussing the location of the next concert of Marko Perković Thompson.

### ŽARKO PUHOVSKI:

I would like to point out three things which have been an implicit part of our discussion and which might be important from the European Union's perspective. The first lesson we can learn from the Yugoslavian experience is that sweeping problems under the rug is precisely the thing which can destroy a community. That was what happened in Yugoslavia: from the 1941-1945 period onward, nobody would tell the truth: in our schools we were being taught about the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> offensives, but at home we were told different things. We were being lied to both in school and at home, but we ended up believing those at home more, because they were "our people". In 1991, as well, the truth from home triumphed over the truth from school, because the schools had obviously been lying to us. This is a process of facing the past which will take time. Let me make a point. My generation, the generation of '68, brought about this process of facing the past in Germany, not in '49 but some twenty-odd years later, accompanied by economical growth and a slew of other factors. This process requires time and that is an important thing to note.

Another thing to be mentioned is a simple parallelism which crossed my mind when I got an abundance of materials detailing the ongoing discussions in Belgium. This situation is identical to the situation in Yugoslavia in 1988 and 1989; this type of animosity between the Flemish and the Valois unfortunately makes me feel right at home. However, it is certain that no war will take place, because their country is not a subject, it is a part of the European Union. A great anarchist, Kropotkin, once said –albeit in a different context– that the only way for people to live in peace is for them to treat countries as minors. There is no doubt that the social tensions in Belgium are comparable to the pre-war situation in Yugoslavia. The European Union will not allow that, so this type of integration really does control conflicts no matter what the cost, whether we like it or not: the question is, then, what are we willing to risk to achieve a life of peace? Something must be sacrificed, we have to decide on our priorities, because one of the most dangerous effects of war is the ensuing fear of confrontation, since we have witness where confrontations, in whatever guise, lead us: to death. We should realize that a normal life in society will always be filled with conflict and that the way to resolve this is to reduce the level of violence involved in conflict resolution. You don't have to agree with everything that is being said, but don't react with violence if you disagree. Nowadays, we are forced to say we agree even if we don't in order not to provoke violence. This leads to a policy of sweeping problems under the rug, which leads to a vicious circle or spiral of violence. The goal is not only the freedom to speak, but also the freedom to hear, without misunderstandings, and step in the direction of the reduction of violence, reduction of state authority and of forcing rules upon both people and countries; then we can say: "Say what you want, argue all you like, we're not going to tell you how to behave."

u situaciju Jugoslavije: vi ete uti od roditelja Srba jednu pri u o Vukovaru, od roditelja Hrvata drugu pri u, a ja ho u da znate i jedno i drugo. I onda imamo ovu pri u, znamo neke injenice, znamo imena žrtava, nemamo ove pri e za koju je Jasenovac najbolji primjer. U takozvanoj stru noj literaturi cifre su pale od 20 000 do 1 200 000, dakle 1:60. To je toliko skandalozno da je nepojmljivo. Može biti 20%, 50% razlika, ali 1:60, i to ponavljam ponovno u znanstvenim asopisima su spominjane cifre 20 000 kao najmanja i 1 200 000. I zato sam skepti an prema tomu da e nove generacije biti mirnije. Mi danas kada do emo do Jasenovca ili Bleiburga, a mi smo unuci ili praunuci ve , još uvijek nismo u stanju o tome mirno razgovarati. Dakle, treba i i polagano, s time da ove dvije stvari, redukcija nasilja uklju uju i redukciju ovlasti države, pokazalo se kao jako dobar na in postupanja sa sukobima. Prepoznavanje sukoba po mom mišljenju ne po inje s nacionalizmom, nego s naoružanim nacionalizmom. Srpski nacionalizam nije bio ništa gori od Hrvatskog ili Bošnja kog, ali je imao neusporedivo više oružja i zato je bio gori. Dakle, ja mogu htjeti njega ubiti nožem, on mene strojnicom, mi imamo jednaku namjeru, njegova šansa je 20 puta ve a da on bude ubojica, a ne ja. Iako smo izvorno imali jednaku namjeru, tu je stvar kada treba postaviti pitanje tko je ja i – ja sam automatski na strani slabijeg, dok je slabiji. Dakle, '91. godine hrvatska parola glasi *Stop the war in Croatia*, '95. to je srpska parola jer su se promijenile okolnosti. Isti ljudi koji su bili kolja ki agitatori '91. u Kninu, '95. vi u, molimo vas nemojte nas tu i. Nisu se ljudi promijenili, nego su se okolnosti promijenile, neovisno o ideologiji, neovisno o simpatijama, jaka sila štiti slabijega od ja ega, pitanje koliko je njihova procjena, ali to su njihovi objektivni parametri. Ja mogu re i Hrvati imaju pravo iz '41., Srbi imaju pravo iz one godine, to su irelevantne pri e, tko je gdje slabiji treba biti zašti en po istoj logici. Ako se to ne razumije onda ne možemo sa sukobom iza i na kraj i to se može prenijeti, ja mislim. Hvala.

We often use the phrase “truth and reconciliation”. Truth creates unrest, and not reconciliation; let me quote Oscar Wilde: “Every polite society is based on lies, because it is a polite society.” It is impolite to call someone stupid or ugly, because truth is not polite. Truth always causes conflicts and unrest, so we should prepare for the truth. Let’s say three of us here really knew the whole truth and went on to tell it, the others would, for this or that reason, say “No way,” and we would have a conflict. We should go step by step, truth should be dosed. As a professor of philosophy I shouldn’t be saying this, but a direct approach is always likely to cause a counter-effect. The psychology of communication should be taken into account, something which was already mentioned when talking about history: German students learn history in such a way that they are presented by both an English and a German document from World War Two. I would like students to know both what was written by general Adžić and generals Mladi Jastrebović and Veliki Jastrebović; they can have their personal opinions about it, but that is none of the teacher’s business. The interpretations should not be provided by the teacher because that would once again lead to the Yugoslavian situation: Serbian parents will present one side of the Vukovar story, Croats another side, but the education system should provide both sides. In this case we have a story, some facts, the names of the victims: we wouldn’t have to deal with contentious stories. Take Jasenovac, for example. In the so-called professional writings one can find a wide range of estimates of the number of victims: from 20,000 to 1,200,000, so a ratio of 1:60. This is unbelievably scandalous. The difference can be 20 or 50 percent, but 1:60, especially in scientific periodicals, is unacceptable. That is why I am skeptical regarding the potential for peace of the future generations. We cannot speak calmly about Jasenovac or Bleiburg, and we’re the grandchildren or grand-grandchildren of victims. This process should be engaged slowly. The reduction of violence should include the reduction of state authority, which has been shown to be a good way of resolving conflict. Recognizing potential conflict does not begin with recognizing nationalism, but with recognizing armed nationalism. The Serbian nationalism was not worse than the Croatian or Bosnian one, but it was incomparably better armed, and thus much more dangerous. Whether the assault was made with a knife or with a machinegun, the intention is the same, but the gun is twenty times more likely to be lethal. Even though the original intention was the same, we need to determine who has the more power, and I am always more likely to side with the weaker side, for as long as it is weaker. In 1991, the Croatian slogan was *Stop the war in Croatia*, while in 1995 it became the Serbian slogan, because the circumstances had changed. The same people who were promoting slaughter in Knin in 1991, started begging for protection in 1995. The people hadn’t changed, the circumstances did; regardless of ideology or personal sympathies, the international community will protect the weaker from the stronger; to what extent is their personal decision based on their objective parameters. We can claim that Croats were wronged in this year, Serbs in that year, but that is irrelevant: whoever is weaker at any given time should be given protection. If this is not understood, we will not be able to deal with conflict, and this is a lesson that I believe can be imparted. Thank you.

**SUDIONICI I SUDIONICE SVA TRI OKRUGLA STOLA SU:**

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## 4 KOMPILIRANE I SISTEMATIZIRANE PREPORUKE / COMPILED AND SYSTEMATIZED RECOMMENDATIONS

# KOMPILIRANE I SISTEMATIZIRANE PREPORUKE

UREDILI:  
**LANA VEGO,  
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CVIJETA SENTA**

Na kraju publikacije donosimo neke od preporuka koje su proizašle iz objavljenih tekstova i dijelova rasprava (prema odabiru uredništva). Preporuke smo grupirali po sljedećim područjima:

- 1/ PREVENCIJA NASILJA – UPRAVLJANJE SUKOBOM – MIROVNO OBRAZOVANJE
- 2/ LJUDSKA SIGURNOST
- 3/ DEMOKRATIZACIJA I LJUDSKA PRAVA
- 4/ VOJNE INTERVENCIJE
- 5/ SUOČAVANJE S PROŠLOŠĆU
- 6/ GRADJANSKE INICIJATIVE – GRADJANJE MIRA "OD DOLJE"
- 7/ RAZVOJNA POLITIKA

Naravno, ovo je samo jedna od mogućih podjela preporuka. Neke od preporuka mogle bi se našti i u drugim područjima, ali je radi preglednosti sistematizacija ukinjena na ovaj način.

Ponovno podsjećamo da nije moguće okupiti sve sigurnosne preporuke proizašle iz iskustva rata u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i da navedene preporuke zasigurno ne pokrivaju sva područja i sva iskustva. Ovo je tek prvi pokušaj sistematizacije iskustva izgradnje mira i pretakanje tog iskustva u preporuke za kreiranje javnih politika koje, vjerujemo, mogu biti inspiracija za kreiranje ne samo sigurnosne, već i drugih politika vezanih uz izgradnju mira.

## PREVENCIJA NASILJA – UPRAVLJANJE SUKOBIMA – MIROVNO OBRAZOVANJE

**Potrebno je sustavno pratiti i izvještavati o oblicima i pojavama nasilja u društvu te kroz godišnje izvještaje prikupljati činjenice o nasilju.** Izvještavanje i nadgledanje treba pokrivati razne dimenzije pojavnosti nasilja: fizičko, institucionalno i psihičko. U tom smislu potrebno je kreirati indikatore po kojima se nasilje može pratiti ovisno o njegovoj pojavi.

**Na temelju primijećenih oblika nasilja treba organizirati što više javnih rasprava na tu temu i na taj način otvarati sukob u društvu.** Otvaranje

# COMPILED AND SYSTEMATIZED RECOMMENDATIONS

EDITED BY:  
**LANA VEGO,  
GORDAN BOSANAC  
AND CVIJETA SENTA**

At the end of this compendium we have gathered some of the recommendations which stem from the papers collected within and selected excerpts from round table discussions (editors' choice). Our recommendations are grouped into the following areas of expertise:

- 1/ THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE – CONFLICT MANAGEMENT – PEACE EDUCATION
- 2/ HUMAN SECURITY
- 3/ DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
- 4/ MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
- 5/ DEALING WITH THE PAST
- 6/ CIVIL INITIATIVES – GRASSROOTS PEACE-BUILDING
- 7/ DEVELOPMENTAL POLICIES

Of course, this is just one of many possible categorizations of recommendations. Some of them could fit well within several other areas, but for clarity's sake, we have arranged them in this way. We would like to stress that it is not possible to gather the security recommendations from all parts of former Yugoslavia and that the ones presented here do not necessarily cover all areas of interests and all the different experiences. This is merely an attempt at a systematic presentation of the peace-building experience and a formulation of these experiences into recommendations for public policy creation, which can be an inspiration for the creation of both security policies and other policies related to peace-building.

## THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE – CONFLICT MANAGEMENT – PEACE EDUCATION

**It is necessary to systematically monitor and report on the occurrences of violence within society.** This monitoring has to be implemented through annual reports on the occurrence of violence. Such monitoring and reporting has to cover all the various manifestations of violence: physical, institutional and psychological. It is necessary to create indicators through which violence can be monitored.



problema, sukoba u javnom prostoru na vrijeme, ključan je preventivni mehanizam eskalacije nasilja. Velika je odgovornost na svima koji će upravljati ovim procesom da to čine savjesno i u skladu sa zakonom. Potrebno je kapitalno voditi proces otvaranja sukoba kroz konzultacije s javnošću, ne samo u centrima moći, već i u manjim sredinama.

**Kvalitetno upravljati otvorenim sukobima i na vrijeme osigurati da sudionici rasprave o sukobima imaju dobru edukaciju o tome kako upravljati sukobima – uvoditi mirovno obrazovanje u obrazovne sustave.** Da bi se uopće moglo odgovorno upravljati i otvarati sukobe, potrebno je imati znanje o nenasilnim vještinama koje se moraju učiti kroz sustavno obrazovanje.

**Za zaustavljanje, preusmjeravanje sukoba i obnavljanje društvene zajednice nakon sukoba do razine održivosti mirnodopskog života, potrebno je razdoblje podjednako dužini trajanja sukoba.** Ova teza proizlazi iz direktnog iskustva rada s ljudima u post-ratnim zajednicama na području istočne Slavonije. Važno je od početka znati koliko će proces obnavljanja zajednice uzeti vremena.

**Tijekom i neposredno nakon mirovnih misija, nužno je planski, kreativno, dovoljno dugo i sveobuhvatno raditi na pozitivnom preusmjeravanju sukoba na svim razinama društva, pri čemu je u poslijeratnim situacijama civilno društvo gotovo u pravilu potpuno razoreno ili nerazvijeno.** Često se događa da je poslijeratni razvoj usmjeren na prioritete koji ne uključuju obnovu civilnog društva. Time se preskače važan rad s građanima koji su direktno pogođeni ratnim razaranja i koji upravo kroz organizacije civilnog društva mogu kvalitetno doprinijeti oporavku društva.

**Ponekad je važnije imati strpljenja, nego donositi *ad-hoc* odluke.** Ova preporuka proizašla je iz primjera osamostaljenja Crne Gore koja se osamostalila relativno kasno u odnosu na druge države nastale raspadom Jugoslavije. Ako strane nisu ravnopravne, nije preporučljivo ulaziti u otvorene sukobe, već je bolje jačati vlastite kapacitete kako bi se postigla formalna ravnopravnost i tada se sukob može lakše transformirati.

**U post-konfliktnom društvu netrpeljivost se lakše i brže širi kod onog dijela populacije koji nije imao direktna iskustava s konfliktom te na njih mora biti usmjerena posebna pažnja i strategija rada.** Agresivnost kod mladih ljudi koji ne pamte konflikte na osnovi osobnih iskustava je mnogo snažnija i jača, nego što je to slučaj kada govore ljudi koji su preživjeli konflikt na osnovi neke osobne traume.

**Uvesti (formalno i neformalno) mirovno obrazovanje na svim razinama školovanja.**

Mirovno obrazovanje je pokreta globalne transformacije koja podrazumijeva najprije najdublju promjenu osobnih stavova i ponašanja šire i se na različite prakse društvenog upravljanja i razvoja. Također, u školski sustav treba uvesti i obrazovanje o medijima i o umjetničkim formama zbog poticanja i učenja o angažiranoj umjetnosti. Kroz provođenje mirovnog obra-

**Based on collected factual information on violence as many public discussions on particular types of aggression as possible should be organized, thus making all social conflicts “open” to the public.** The “opening” of the problem of conflict in the public sphere in time is a key element in the prevention of the escalation of violence. Anyone who will manage these processes will have a great responsibility to do so conscientiously and in accordance with the law. The process of opening conflicts through consultations with the public should be undertaken in a pervasive manner, not only in centres of power but in smaller communities as well.

**It is imperative to manage open conflicts confidently and provide an appropriate education to the participants of the process of conflict resolution;** this can be achieved by introducing peace education into educational systems. In order to manage and “open up” conflicts, knowledge of non-violent conflict resolution skills is required; this knowledge can be acquired through systematic education.

**The process of stopping and redirecting conflict and re-establishing a sustainable peaceful social community after prolonged periods of conflict requires an amount of time approximately equal to the duration of the conflict.** This claim is rooted in direct experience working with people in the post-war communities in the region of eastern Slavonia. It is important to know from the outset how long the process of restoration will take.

**During peace missions and in the periods immediately following them, it is vital to work on the positive redirection of conflict on all levels of society in a planned, diligent, creative and all-encompassing manner. However, civil society is usually completely destroyed or underdeveloped in post-war contexts.** The post-war development is often focused on priorities which do not include the restoration of civil society. This approach ignores some important work with citizens who may be directly affected by the ravages of war and who could contribute greatly to the recovery of society through the actions of civil society organizations.

**Sometimes having patience is more important than making quick decisions.** This recommendation stems from the example of Montenegro, which gained its independence relatively late compared to other former Yugoslavian republics. If the two sides in a conflict are not equal, open confrontations are inadvisable; it is better to work on improving one's own capacities in order to achieve formal equality, which facilitates conflict transformation.

**In a post-conflict society, intolerance spreads more quickly and widely in that part of the population which has had no immediate experience of conflict;** these should be approached carefully and strategically. The aggression in youths who have had not personal experience of conflict is much more intense and strong than the one found in people who have personally endured conflict.

zovanja posebnu pažnju treba posvetiti djeci i mladima. Velika je važnost rada s djecom u podijeljenim zajednicama gdje postoje obrasci ponašanja koji se temelje na uzajamnom nepovjerenju, neprijateljstvu, netolerantnosti i nasilju. Nositelji neformalnih programa mirovnog obrazovanja trebaju biti i organizacije mladih jer se na taj način osnažuju mlade osobe za aktivnu izgradnju mira.

Radionice su jedini djelotvoran način provedenja mirovnog obrazovanja. **Ova metoda učenja ne stvara samo doživljaj (koji integrira sve psihofizičke funkcije: tjelesno izražavanje, osjetilnost, emocije, sjećanja, maštu, volju, spoznaju, intelekt i intuiciju), nego formira vrijednosnu orijentaciju i ono što zovemo nenasilno djelovanje. Metodologija u velikoj mjeri pridonosi usvajanju vrijednosti mirovnog obrazovanja.**

**Redovito provoditi treninge za nenasilno djelovanje.** Ovakvi treninzi moraju biti za male i pregledne grupe od najviše 12 ljudi koje se učini kako djelovati nenasilno. Ako se u svakoj grupi jedan dio aktivno uključuje u proces društvene promjene, ako se osposobe da u svojoj okolini pokrenu mirovne aktivnosti i "zavrte" dijalog u sredini u kojoj je šutnja bila normalno stanje stvari, sav novac i trud se isplatio.

## LJUDSKA SIGURNOST

**Potreban je snažan paradigmatki zaokret poimanja sigurnosti.** Državocentrično poimanje sigurnosti dovodi do ponavljanja sukoba na bazi etničkih ili ideoloških podjela poznatih u regiji, ali i u EU-u. Potreban je zaokret prema širem i sveobuhvatnijem konceptu ljudske sigurnosti.

**Pojavnost nasilja treba primarno razumjeti kroz koncept ljudske sigurnosti – razumjeti što sigurnost čini svakom čovjeku, a ne nužno samo kolektivnim identitetima.**

Prilikom eskalacije sukoba najčešće se vidimo strane u sukobima kao pripadnike/ce određenih kolektivnih identiteta (etnička pripadnost, društvena skupina – npr. navijači i sl.). Iako kolektivni identitet ima velik utjecaj na ponašanje osobe, ne smijemo izostaviti prilikom analize nasilja činjenicu da svaki sudionik u nasilju ima vlastite karakteristike te da nasilje ne nanosi štetu primarno "kolektivnom identitetu", već pojedincu. U tom smislu i prevencija mora biti djelomično fokusirana i na pojedinca, a ne samo na kolektiv.

**Odsustvo fizičkog nasilja nije dovoljno za opstanak zajednice.** Jugoslavija je nedvojbeno bila najsigurniji okvir za opstanak ljudi na njenom području u zadnjih 500 godina. U 40 godina, od 1950. do 1990., nitko u Hrvatskoj nije bio ubijen iz političkih razloga i to je najduže razdoblje u Hrvatskoj povijesti. Međutim, društvo nije bilo slobodno, demokratsko niti ravnopravno i to se pokazalo pretežim elementom.

**Važnost participacije.** Važnost uključivanja interesa svih grupa sa specifičnim sigurnosnim potrebama i onih dionika koji, pored totalne populacije, mogu biti pod dodatnim sigurnosnim prijetnjama. Participacija je neophodna

## Introduce (formal and informal) peace education in all levels of education

Peace education is the vessel of a global transformation which entails a deep and thorough change in personal attitudes and behaviors by focusing on different practices of social management and development. Likewise, the school system should offer education on the media and on different art forms in order to teach about and foster interest in socially committed art. Throughout the implementation of peace education, special attention should be devoted to children and youths. Work with children in divided communities is very important, because it helps eliminate behavioral patterns based on mutual mistrust, hostility, intolerance and violence. The protagonists of peace education should include youth organizations, because in this way young people are taught active peace-building skills.

Workshops are the only effective way of implementing peace education. **This method of learning does not only consist of an experience (which integrates all psychophysical functions: non-verbal communication, sensitivity, emotions, memories, the imagination, will, cognition, intellect and intuition), it also works toward creating a value system and a propensity towards non-violent behavior. The methodology is especially suited to the acquisition of the values of peace education.**

**Organize non-violent action trainings regularly.** This type of training is best suited for small and manageable groups of 12 people at the most, which are taught the skills of non-violent behavior. If every such group introduces one active participant into the process of social change, if they are trained to organize peace-building activities in their own communities and get a dialogue going in otherwise silent communities, the money and effort will not have been in vain.

## HUMAN SECURITY

**A strong paradigmatic shift in the conceptualization of security is required.** The state-centric concept of security leads to a repetition of conflict on the basis of ethnic or ideological divisions known in the region and the EU. We need a shift towards a wider and broader concept of human security.

**The phenomenon of violence should be primarily interpreted from the perspective of human security: we need to understand what security means for individuals, and not just collective identities.** In the process of conflict escalation, the opposing sides are usually perceived as members of certain collective identities (ethnic or social groups – such as football fans etc.). Even though collective identity has a significant effect on personal behavior, we must not overlook the fact that every person involved in a violent conflict has some personal characteristics, and that violence does not damage collective identities, but individuals themselves. In this light, prevention should also partially focus on the individual, not on the collective.

dimenzija oblikovanja nove sigurnosne politike s obzirom da je ona dosad vrlo esto bila reducirana na proizvod i rezultat rada ekspertne zajednice dobro povezane s trenutnom političkom elitom. Ovdje zato vrijedi ponoviti da je *grass root* pristup, koji traži redefiniranje politike odozdo, neophodna dimenzija za oblikovanje koncepcije sigurnosti u budućnosti.

## DEMOKRATIZACIJA I LJUDSKA PRAVA

**Decentralizacija se ne smije razumjeti kao demokratizacija.** Ovaj fenomen dogodio se u bivšoj Jugoslaviji gdje je decentralizacija federacije na pojedine republike služila kao privid demokratizacije. U realnosti to nije bilo tako. Zato je važno postojanje jasnih standarda demokratizacije i izbjegavanje relativiziranja i stvaranja privida demokracije.

**Nepripremljena nagla demokratizacija može dovesti do liberalizacije javnog prostora, a liberalizacija javnog prostora do govora mržnje.** Ovaj primjer istaknut je upravo u kontekstu dezintegracije Jugoslavije kad je pod geslom demokracije govor mržnje postao dominantan dio političkog, ali i javnog govora. Otvorio se prostor i konačno se moglo govoriti ono o čemu se četrdeset godina šutjelo (npr. tko je koga zapravo ubio u Drugom svjetskom ratu) i ne znaju i da time pripremaju novi rat.

**Prilikom ostvarivanja prava na samoodređenje, potrebno je veću pažnju posvetiti novonastaloj manjini, umjesto konstantne podrške većini koja se već definirala i identificirala u skladu s novim teritorijalnim ustrojem.** U vrijeme raspada Jugoslavije, u Hrvatskoj se raspravljalo o pravima Srba u Kninu i Hrvata u Zagrebu, umjesto da se raspravljalo o pravima Hrvata u Kninu i Srba u Zagrebu koji su nastradali. Kao što se danas raspravlja o pravima Srba u sjevernoj Mitrovici i Albanaca u sjevernom dijelu Mitrovice i Albanaca u ostalom dijelu Kosova, umjesto da se raspravlja obrnuto.

**Raditi na demokratizaciji političke kulture – prekinuti s praksom i običajem da visoka politika** vidi i doživljava građanske inicijative ili civilne društvo kao dodanu vrijednost demokraciji, kao dodanu vrijednost kulturi življenja. Civilno društvo jeste jedan od ključnih segmenata bez kojeg ne može funkcionirati zdrava životna okolina. U 90-ima na Balkanu nije bilo tako.

**Umjesto da se naglašava sekularizam kao način zaštite društva od nasilnih sukobljavanja potpomognutih religijskim pripadnostima, za podržavanje miroljubivog suživota potrebno je poticati pluralizam unutar vjerskih zajednica.** Rad s vjerskim zajednicama je važan. Nije dovoljno prepustiti ih same sebi.

**Osigurati jaču ulogu medija.** Mediji mogu imati velik doprinos sprječavanju konflikata i izgradnji mira. U upravljanju sukobom tijekom krize, esencijalne su medijske i komunikacijske strategije. Kako bi bila uspješna u svojim odgovorima na moguće konflikte, u svojem širenju demokracije i ljudskih prava te u svojim ambicijama da podržava socijalni razvoj, regionalnu suradnju, izgradnju mira i sprječavanje sukoba, Europska Unija mora koristiti medije

**The absence of physical violence is not enough for the survival of a community.** Yugoslavia was doubtlessly the safest social structure for the survival of the people of this region in the last 500 years. In 40 years, from 1950 until 1990, no person was killed in Croatia for political reasons, which is the longest such period in Croatian history. However, the society was not free, democratic or egalitarian, which proved to be the decisive factor.

**The importance of participation.** The importance of taking into consideration all groups with specific security needs, and those members of society who may be endangered by security threats which do not affect the overall population. Participation is thus a necessary aspect of shaping new security policies, due to the fact that it has so far often been reduced to the product or result of the agency of experts which are well-connected to the current elite. This is why it bears repeating that a grass-roots approach is vital to formulating concepts of security for the future.

## DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

**Decentralization is not the same as democratization.** This phenomenon occurred in former Yugoslavia where the decentralization of the federation was used to create an illusion of democracy. In reality this was not the case. Establishing clear standards of democratization is vital in order to avoid relativism or false democracy.

**Sudden and ill-prepared democratization can lead to the liberalization of public spaces, which can lead to hate speech.** The example of the disintegration of Yugoslavia proves this claim: under the flag of democracy, hate speech became the dominant paradigm of political and public speaking. The public space was open, and topics which had been left untouched for 40 years (such as who killed whom during World War Two) were once again publicly debated, without realizing that this was setting the stage for another war.

**While achieving self-determination, it is important to pay attention to the newly-constituted minorities, instead of offering unwavering support to the majority that has already been defined and identified according to the new territorial layout.** During the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the rights of Croats in Zagreb and Serbs in Knin were being discussed instead of paying attention to the rights of Croats in Knin and Serbs in Zagreb, which was the part of population that was in danger. The same is going on today: we are focusing on the rights of Serbs in northern Mitrovica and Albanians in the rest of Kosovo, instead of the other way around.

**Work on the democratization of political culture:** end the practice of perceiving civil initiatives or civil society as merely an addition to democracy or a bonus element of culture. Civil society is one of the key segments of society, without which it cannot function as a healthy living environment. That was what was missing in the Balkans in the 1990s.

kao katalizatore promjena.

**Kao mjera prevencije sukoba stoji pitanje distribucije državnog proračuna kao sigurnosno pitanje.** Treba mijenjati odnose unutar samih proračuna i osnaživati sektore koji mogu povećati sigurnost, prvenstveno kroz porast kompetencija, ekspertize i kapaciteta za suočavanje s novim oblicima prijetnji sigurnosti. Treba povećati ulaganja u obrazovanje, u poljoprivredu, u zaštitu okoliša, kao i u energetska sigurnost ili u bolju pripremljenost za izvanredne situacije.

**Problem periferizacije.** Potrebno je pragmatično ili bar privremeno obratiti procesa između centra i periferije i dopuštanje da se iskustva na periferiji ili u budućim članicama Europske unije koriste i u centru političkog odlučivanja. Neophodna je otvorena razmjena između EU-a i država na Balkanu o sigurnosnim prijetnjama, ona je važna za daljnji proces integracije u Uniju, ali i za samu Europsku uniju i njeno daljnje pozicioniranje u susjedstvu ili pojedinih članicama koje se pokazuju manje stabilnima.

**Opasnost od stalne pauperizacije i privatizacije u razvoju zajedničke sigurnosne politike.** Pauperizacija koja se događa uzduž Europe i povremeno eruptira, kao u grčkom slučaju, neizostavno je povezana s pitanjem privatizacije sigurnosti prema kojoj sve veća naklonost imaju privredne i političke elite u EU-u, ali i regiji. Sama mogućnost da se sigurnost osigura putem javnih sredstava ugrađena je u samu srž europskog jedinstva, u primat privatnog vlasništva, što opet pokazuje primarno ekonomsku motivaciju cijelog projekta ujedinjenja.

## VOJNE INTERVENCIJE

**U slučaju eskalacije sukoba u nasilje potrebno je osnažiti mehanizme za nadziranje povreda ljudskih prava. Nije dovoljno čekati završetak nasilja i tek onda prikupljati podatke o kršenju ljudskih prava, već je potrebno takve podatke prikupljati i tijekom samog trajanja eskaliranog sukoba. Ovakvo nadziranje povreda ljudskih prava mora biti organizirano (u granicama mogućnosti) odmah s početkom nasilja.** Podaci o nasilju koji bi bili prikupljeni za vrijeme trajanja ili netom nakon završetka sukoba ključni su za smanjenje traume nakon završetka sukoba kroz različite mehanizme (sudske, van-sudske, i sl). **Zbog toga je prilikom ulaska u bilo koju oružanu intervenciju potrebno osmisliti i kvalitetnu dokumentaciju nasilja koja mora biti prikupljena od nezavisnog tijela.**

**Prilikom međunarodnih intervencija potrebno je vrlo pažljivo odabrati diplomaciju i ostalo osoblje koje će se baviti tim konfliktom. Potrebno je kvalitetno obrazovati kadar koji odlazi na mjesta sukoba.** Iskustvo iz bivše Jugoslavije govori o prisutnosti velikog broja diplomatskog i vojnog osoblja koje nije imalo osnovna znanja o samom karakteru sukoba te je stoga imalo krive procjene. Sticao se dojam kako su novonastale države bile ponekad taoci takvih ljudi.

**Instead of insisting on secularism as a means of protecting society from violent conflicts caused by religious identities, a peaceful coexistence should be based on fostering pluralism within religious communities.** Work with religious communities is important. They cannot be left to themselves.

**Insuring a more prominent role of the media.** The media can greatly facilitate the prevention of conflict and the creation of peace. During the conflict management stage of a crisis, communication and media strategies are vital. In order to be successful in its response to possible conflicts, in the spreading of democracy and human rights and in its ambition to maintain social development, regional cooperation, peace and conflict prevention, the European Union must use the media as a catalyst for change.

**Budget distribution is a security issue from the viewpoint of conflict prevention.** The ratios within the budgets should be change in order to strengthen sectors which can enhance security, primarily through an increase in the competence, expertise and capacity of dealing with emerging security threats. We should increase funds for education, agriculture, environmental protection, as well as energy security and emergency contingencies.

**The issue of peripheralization.** We need to effect a pragmatic, or at the very least temporary, reversal of the process of peripheralization in order to allow the experiences of the peripheral regions of the European Union to be utilized in the political decision-making centers. The open exchange of experience between the EU and the countries of the Balkans on the issues of security threats is crucial to the process of integration into the Union, but also to the positioning of the EU itself in the neighborhood, and to some of the less stable member-states as well.

**The danger of constant pauperization and privatization in the development of common security policies.** The pauperization that is taking place all over Europe, and occasionally erupts, like it did in Greece, is closely linked to the issue of the privatization of security, which is connected to the economic and political elites of the EU and the wider region. The possibility of ensuring security through public resources is embedded in the very core of European unity, in the primacy of private property, which is a clear indication of the economic motivation of the unification project.

## MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

**In the case of an escalation of violence, we need to strengthen the mechanisms for monitoring human rights violations. It's not enough to wait until the violence has ended to begin collecting human rights violations data. The monitoring of human rights violations must be organized as much as it is possible from the very outset of violent conflict.** This data on violence which can be collected during the conflict or immediately following it can be crucial for reducing trauma in the post-conflict period, through various mechanisms, both judicial and civil. **That is why every military in-**



**Embargo na uvoz oružja može imati izrazito negativne posljedice za društvo.** Iako je cilj bio sprečavanje naoružanja i eskalacije nasilja, na primjeru Hrvatske je vidljivo kako je embargo na oružje proizveo itav niz negativnih posljedica. Postojeće kriminalnom miljeu otvorila se nova "poslovna prilika" te su na taj način ostvarili suradnju s političkim elitama. **Kvalitetnija procjena situacije i sukoba mora biti provedena prije uvođenja embarga na uvoz oružja.**

## SUOČAVANJE S PROŠLOŠĆU

**Podmetanje pod tepih je ono što uništava zajednicu – procesi suočavanja s prošlošću su iznimno značajni u postkonfliktnim društvima.** Za Jugoslaviju je bilo pogubno što se o događanjima iz perioda 1941.-1945. nisu govorile inženjere. Jedna se verzija događaja zagovarala u službenim institucijama, a druga privatno. Nije se odvijao sistematiziran proces suočavanja s prošlošću i to je bio indirektan uzrok sukoba u '90-ima.

**Osim već usvojenih sudskih procesa sankcioniranja nasilja, potrebno je razvijati komplementarne modele tranzicijske pravde iz pozicije žrtava koji doprinose upravljanju sukobom.** Ovo se posebno odnosi na uspostavu "komisija za istinu i pomirenje" koje u svoj fokus rada stavljaju žrtvu i zajedno sa žrtvama i stručnjacima rekonstruiraju događaje iz nasilne prošlosti.

**Nasuprot uobičajenom shvaćanju da je za mir bitno suočiti se s uzrocima rata, važnije je mimo realnih uzroka rata pozabaviti se onime što je dovelo do toga da ljudi prihvate rat.** Na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije postojale su nacionalne strategije koje su motivirale ljude za rat i koje su bile oslonjene na iskrivljene inženjere, politički manipulirane tvrdnje koje su se predstavljale kao istina.

## GRAĐANSKI INICIJATIVE – GRASS ROOT IZGRADNJA MIRA

**Na vrijeme osigurati politički legitimitet nenasilnim građanskim inicijativama koje upozoravaju na društvene nepravde.** Demokratski sustavi dozvoljavaju i potiču građane na slobodu govora i slobodu okupljanja – mehanizme kroz koje građani imaju priliku upozoravati na društvene nepravde. Ipak, zbog inflacije različitih inicijativa dolazi do njihove relativizacije pa države primarno pokušavaju osigurati jednake uvjete za sve, bez konkretne analize poruka koje proizlaze iz tih inicijativa. Zato je važno sustavno slušati poruke i pokušati što bolje razumjeti uzroke nepravde na koje građani upozoravaju.

**Osigurati mogućnost za direktan rad neposredno nakon ratnih sukoba.** Podrška ovakvom radu može osigurati međunarodna zajednica ili sama država u kojoj se sukob dogodio (primjer Volonterskog projekta Pakrac gdje je omogućen rad pod patronatom UN-a i u suradnji s civilnim inicijativama).

**Priprema za rad u podijeljenoj zajednici je vrlo važna.** Ako se razvije civilna inicijativa za rad u podijeljenoj zajednici, potrebno je osigurati dobru i

tervention should be accompanied by a well-prepared independent monitoring committee.

**During international interventions, the diplomats and other involved staff should be carefully selected. The staff in the field should be thoroughly educated.** The experience from former Yugoslavia has proven that many of the diplomatic and military personnel didn't have even a basic knowledge about the nature of the conflict and thus kept coming to erroneous conclusions. Consequently, the emerging nations sometimes appeared to be hostages of these people.

**A weapons embargo can have extremely negative social consequences.** Although the goal was to prevent the violence from escalating, the Croatian example vividly shows how a weapons embargo can have a series of negative consequences. The existing criminal underground was given another "business opportunity" and enabled to establish contact with political elites. **A more thorough assessment of the situation must be undertaken before imposing a weapons embargo.**

## DEALING WITH THE PAST

**Sweeping problems under the rug is something which can destroy a community, and the processes of dealing with the past are highly important in post-conflict societies.** The fact that the events between 1941 and 1945 were never discussed proved to be fatal for Yugoslavia. The formal institutions presented one version of the story, while another one was being taught at home. There was no attempt at a systematic process of dealing with the past, which indirectly caused the conflict in the '90s.

**In addition to the already accepted processes of sanctioning violence, we need to develop complementary models of transitional justice, based on the perspective of the victims, which would contribute to the process of conflict management.** Specifically, this entails the formation of "committees for trust and reconciliation", which focus their attention on the victims and collaborate with them on reconstructing violent events from the past.

**In contrast to the widely-accepted concept that, in order to achieve peace, we need to face the causes of the war, it is also important to understand what made people accept the war.** In the territory of former Yugoslavia, there were national strategies motivating people to go to war based on misrepresented facts and politically manipulated claims posing as truths.

## CIVIL INITIATIVES – GRASSROOTS PEACE-BUILDING

**Ensuring political legitimacy to non-violent civil initiatives warning of social injustices.** Democratic systems allow and encourage their citizens to peruse their freedom of speech and freedom of public gathering to point out social injustices. However, the inflation of these initiatives leads to a rela-



kvalitetnu pripremu prije početka aktivnosti. Također, potrebno je provoditi pripreme treninge za volontere i sve sudionike ovakvih inicijativa kako se djelovanjem ne bi naštetilo i na taj način otežao proces pomirenja.

**Po prestanku direktnog rada u podijeljenoj zajednici potreban je nastaviti pratiti sudionike tih procesa.** Primjer Volonterskog projekta Pakrac pokazao je da su se volonteri vratili svojim kućama promijenjeni. Tada im je potrebna podrška i potrebno im je omogućiti povratak u društvo iz kojeg su potekli.

**Rat gotovo posve uništava zajednicu kao mjesto zajedništva i povjerenja. Zato je nužno graditi "od dolje" i biti s ljudima koji se fizički vraćaju/ostaju u tako razorenim zajednicama.** Ovaj pristup izgradnje mira fokusira se na svakog pojedinca, na pojedinca/kulturni je problem ne riješiti samo nacionalnim ili lokalnim politikama, već je potreban direktan rad s ljudima na terenu. Svaki povratak pojedinac zaslužuje zasebnu pažnju. Direktan pristup, iako je logistički zahtjevan, ponekad je puno efikasniji od saniranja posljedica rata nacionalnim politikama i strategijama (koje su jednako važne, ali ne bi smjele biti važnije od ovog pristupa).

**Za efikasnu izgradnju mira potrebno je omogućiti susret** ljudima koji pripadaju različitim religijskim grupama. Važno je da se pripadnici raznih grupnih identiteta i vjerskih zajednica mogu susresti. Susreti malih grupa u kojima je moguće stvoriti siguran prostor za razgovor i koje podržavaju izricanje svoje posebnosti, a istodobno ima vremena i snage raditi na onome što je zajedničko i ključno za poticanje suživota.

**Izgradnja mira ne smije biti elitistička.** Izgradnja mira mora biti područje kojim se mogu baviti svi koji to žele. Isto tako, kroz mirovni rad se mora poticati uloga veterana i šire od DRR-a (demobilizacije, razoružanja i reintegracije) te ih poticati na izgradnju mira, suočavanje s prošlošću i nenasilno djelovanje.

**Svako mirovno djelovanje nemoguće je bez osnovne financijske podrške.** S osiguranom financijskom podrškom, mirovne organizacije nisu pod prijetnjom pretvaranja u profitna poduzeća. Kako bi efikasno provodile mirovni rad, važno je da ne budu preopterećene birokratskim poslovima te da ne prevagne vođenja knjigovodstva nad onim aktivnostima zbog kojih je organizacija osnovana.

**Važno je poticati mirovne aktiviste i aktivistkinje na artikuliranje i analiziranje svog iskustva.** Treba omogućiti i osnažiti mirovne aktiviste i aktivistkinje da prenose svoje iskustvo. Obzirom da je prijenos znanja na druge generacije i druga geografska područja koristan, potrebno je ulagati u edukaciju, omogućiti istraživanja i poticati na povezivanje mirovnog aktivizma i edukacije u području odgoja i obrazovanja za ljudska prava i demokratsko građanstvo. Važno je stvoriti prostor koji bi omogućio novim generacijama prijenos znanja i osigurao dostupnost sve relevantne dokumentacije vezane uz izgradnju mira.

tive decrease of the appreciation of their significance, so states attempt to ensure equal opportunities for all of them, without taking into consideration the specific messages these initiatives present. Because of this, it is important to systematically listen to their messages and try to understand the underlying causes of the injustices the citizens are warning about.

**Providing the prerequisites for work immediately after the conflict.** This sort of work needs support from the international community or from the government of the country in which the conflict took place (such as in the Pakrac Volunteer Center where work was conducted under the patronage of the UN and local civil initiatives).

**Working in divided communities requires extensive preparations.** In case a civil initiative develops in a divided community, thorough preparations must be made before the start of the activities. Volunteers and all participants must undergo initial training so the program doesn't exacerbate the damage and hinder the process of reconciliation.

**After the completion of a program in a divided community, there should be a follow up with the participants that worked in these divided communities.** The Pakrac Volunteer Center was a good example of volunteers returning to their homes as change people. These people need further support and help in reintegrating into their societies.

**War destroys any community's role as a place of unity and trust. Therefore it is important to build trust from a "grass root" perspective, including working with people who are returning or staying in these war-torn communities.** This approach to peace-building focuses on individuals, on people whose problems will not be solved through national or local policies, but through direct fieldwork. Every victimized individual deserves personal attention. The direct approach, although logistically demanding, can sometimes be much more effective than trying to rectify the consequences of war through national policies and strategies, which are equally important but shouldn't overshadow this approach.

**In order to effectively build peace, we should make it possible for people who belong to different religious groups to meet.** It is important to enable members of different group identities and religious communities to meet. Small group meetings enable the creation of a safe space for discussion and expressing your individuality, while at the same time providing the time and will to discuss those shared characteristics which are key to establishing coexistence.

**Peace-building should not be an elitist process.** Peace-building must be a field open to everyone who is interested. Likewise, the role of veterans in peace-building should be expanded from the present DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration) paradigm, and they should be encouraged to participate in peace-building, facing the past and non-violent action.

Kako bi **razmjena iskustva između EU-a i zemalja u regiji** bila omogućena **neophodno je krenuti "odozdo", iz civilnog društva, od zainteresirane javnosti i uključenih građana** koji svoje direktno iskustvo mogu podijeliti s ekspertnom zajednicom.

**Osvijestiti političke manipulacije i dehumanizaciju drugog**, "neprijatelja" i to raditi kroz ostvarivanje kontakata i susreta s drugom stranom. Na taj način se smanjuju predrasude i stereotipizacija i umanjuju se mogući nastupi eskaliranja sukoba.

## RAZVOJNA POLITIKA

**Ključni izazov strategijama izgradnje mira nakon faze povratka, normalizacije i obnavljanja minimuma povjerenja u ratom razorenim zajednicama, jest povezivanje izgradnje mira s aktivnostima za stjecanje dohotka i razvojnim strategijama.** Na taj izazov nije moguće odgovoriti samo s razine lokalne zajednice, već je potrebno definirati politiku razvoja na razini cjelokupne države kao mirovni projekt.

**Shvatiti mir i socijalnu koheziju kao bitan društveni resurs.** Prestanak oružanog sukoba ne znači normalizaciju života. Potrebno je konstantno raditi na vrijednostima tolerancije i nediskriminacije u društvu kako bi se ostvario i održao mir.

**Peace-building work is impossible without financial support.** When financial support is provided, peace-building organizations are not in the danger of turning into profit-based companies. In order for them to be able to effectively work on peace-building it is also important not to burden them with bureaucracy and paperwork instead of letting them focus on the primary goals of the organization.

**It is important to encourage peace activists to articulate and analyze their experience.** Peace activists should be encouraged to transfer their experience. The transfer of knowledge to other generations and other geographical regions is useful, so we should invest in education, encourage research and the implementation of peace activism and education into the field of human rights and civil democracy education. We need to create a space which would enable the transfer of knowledge new generations and ensure the availability of all relevant peace-building documentation.

To enable an **exchange of experiences between the EU and the countries of the region**, this process has to **start bottom-up**, based on civil society and involved citizens who can share their direct experience with the expert community.

**We should debunk political manipulations and the attempts to de-humanize the Other**, the "enemy", by establishing contacts with the other side. In this way we can reduce prejudice and stereotyping and prevent potential conflicts from escalating.

## DEVELOPMENTAL POLICY

**The key challenge to peace-building strategies, after the phase of the return of refugees and the normalization and restoration of a minimum of trust in war-torn communities, is the process of connecting peace-building activities with the income-making and developmental strategies.** This challenge cannot be overcome solely from the local level; a developmental policy has to be formulated on a countrywide level, as a peace-building project.

**Conceptualizing peace and social cohesion as an important social resource.** The end of armed conflict does not automatically mean the normalization of life. It is important to constantly work on the values of tolerance and non-discrimination in order to achieve peace.



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